Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 1090 (MAD)

The Special Tahsildar v. Tmt. Jayalakshmi

2002-09-20

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM

body2002
Judgment :- The property measuring about 2.42 acres of land in Vellakoil village belonging to Tmt.Jayalakshmi, the respondent herein, was acquired for the purpose of providing house sites for B.C. and M.B.Cs. On 3.1.1994, the Section 4(1) Notification was published. Ultimately on 23.12.1994, in pursuance of the enquiry, the Department took possession of the property. After enquiry, the Special Tahsildar, A.D.W., Kangayam, the petitioner herein has fixed the compensation value at Rs.25,000/- per acre and granted 30% solatium. 2. The respondent, aggrieved by the quantum of the Award, filed an appeal before the Sub Court, Dharapuram. Ultimately, by the order dated 17.3.1997, the compensation amount from Rs.25,000/- per acre was enhanced to Rs.2,75,000/- with 30% solatium and interest at 12% p.a. to be paid till the date of actual payment of the entire compensation as per Section 23(1)(A) of the Land Acquisition Act. 3. The respondent filed I.A.No.14 of 2001 for amendment of the decree under Sections 151, 152 and 153 C.P.C. praying for the deletion of the terms under Section 23(1)(A) of the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that Section 23(1)(A) found in the decree does not represent the letter and spirit of the judgment. The Special Tahsildar, the petitioner herein also filed I.A.No.43 of 2001 to review the order of the Court below under Sections 114, 151 and 152 C.P.C. stating that as per Section 23(1)(A), the respondent would be entitled to payment of 12% interest only up to the date of taking the possession or the date of the Award, whichever is earlier. As such, the respondent would not be entitled to 12% interest till the date of actual payment of the entire compensation. 4. The trial Court on considering the materials available on record passed a common order allowing I.A.No.14 of 2001 filed by the respondent and dismissing I.A.No.43 of 2001 filed by the petitioner and consequently, Section 23(1)(A) as found in the decree was directed to be deleted. 5. This order is under the challenge in the present Civil Revision Petition filed by the Special Tahsildar, A.D.W., Kangayam. 6. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the petitioner would submit that Section 23(1)(A) and 23(2)of the Land Acquisition Act provides interest and solatium respectively. 5. This order is under the challenge in the present Civil Revision Petition filed by the Special Tahsildar, A.D.W., Kangayam. 6. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the petitioner would submit that Section 23(1)(A) and 23(2)of the Land Acquisition Act provides interest and solatium respectively. When Section 23(1)(A) provides for 12% p.a. on the market value for the period commencing from the date of publication of Section 4(1) Notification till the date of the Award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier, the respondent would not be entitled to the interest amount up to the payment of the entire compensation, as there is no other provision enabling the Court to award interest in addition to the statutory interest prescribed under the Act. 7. On the other hand, Mr.V.K.Muthusamy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that the impugned order is justified, since the Clause 23(1)(A) was added in the decree inadvertently and it does not represent the spirit of the judgment, the deletion of the said clause is perfectly valid. It is also submitted that no review can be made after the Award was passed. 8. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the parties. 9. Section 23(1)(A) would provide thus: "In addition to market-value of the land, as above provided the court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub sec.(1) in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier." 10. The reading of the above provision would make it clear that the land owner would be entitled to the interest at the rate of 12% p.a. for the period commencing from the date of publication of Section 4(1) Notification till the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier. But in this case, in both the judgment and decree, it is mentioned that the respondent would be entitled to the interest at the rate of 12% till the date of actual payment of the entire compensation. 11. But in this case, in both the judgment and decree, it is mentioned that the respondent would be entitled to the interest at the rate of 12% till the date of actual payment of the entire compensation. 11. It is true that the Clause 23(1)(A) has not been mentioned specifically in the judgment. But, it is incorporated in the decree. The trial Court in its impugned order would delete Clause 23(1)(A) of the Act holding that Section 23(1)(A) has not been dealt with by the Court, while the rate of interest was fixed and as such, Clause 23(1)(A) found in the decree has to be deleted. But, it is noticed that the petitioner also filed I.A.No.43 of 2001 seeking for clarification through the review petition stating that the respondent would not be entitled to the interest till the date of actual payment of entire compensation. 12. Though the trial Court would find that the Clause 23(1)(A) was not taken into consideration while fixing the rate of interest up to the particular period, it did not think it fit to consider whether the earlier order passed by it would be in consonance with the relevant provisions of the Act. 13. The Supreme Court in the judgment reported in A.I.R.1996 S.C.127 (STATE OF H.P. v. DHARMA DAS) would observe that there cannot be any order regarding the payment of interest in a manner other than the one in which statute prescribes payment. The relevant portion of the observation is given below: "It is settled legal position that when the statue deals with payment of interest to the claimants either under Section 31 or Section 28 of the Act, the Court had no power to award interest in a manner other than the one in which the statute prescribes payment. It is seen that in a case where decision has been taken exercising the urgency power under Section 17(4) of the Act and the award was made subsequent to the taking over possession, obviously the claimant would be entitled to payment of interest under Section 31 from the date of taking possession till the amount is deposited pursuant to the award of the Collector under Section 11. On reference, if the compensation is enhanced, under Section 28 of the Act and the proviso thereto the claimants would be entitled to the rates of interest specified therein. On reference, if the compensation is enhanced, under Section 28 of the Act and the proviso thereto the claimants would be entitled to the rates of interest specified therein. Apart from these provisions, there is no other provision under the Act empowering the Court to award interest on equitable grounds, in addition to statutory rates of interest prescribed under the Act. Equitable consideration has no role to play in determination of the compensation and the manner of awarding interest as enjoined under the Act. The Act is to be administered in the manner laid in the Act and in no other way. As a concomitance, the equity jurisdiction of the Court is taken out and the Act enjoins the Court to grant interest as per the statutory rates specified in the Act." 14. From the reading of the above provisions and the observation made by the Supreme Court, it is noticed that apart from the provisions under Sections 23(1)(A), 28 and 31 of the Act, there is no other provision under the Act empowering the Court to award interest in addition to the statutory rates of interest prescribing the period under the Act. 15. The question as to whether the Court has got powers to award interest in a manner other than the one in which statute prescribes payment has not been considered by the trial Court. 16. Though the counsel for the respondent would cite a number of judgments to show that no review can be made, I am of the view that to consider this aspect as to whether the Court has got powers to order payment of the interest extending the period other than the period prescribed under the Act, it would be appropriate to remand the matter to the trial Court. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded. The trial Court will hear both the parties on this aspect and decide in accordance with law. No costs. Consequently, no order is necessary in C.M.P.No.2943 of 2002. 17. After pronouncement of the order, the learned counsel for the respondent would request that suitable direction may be issued to the trial Court to decide the issue expeditiously. Therefore, the trial Court would decide the issue within three months from the date of receipt of this order.