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2002 DIGILAW 1096 (ALL)

Amin Ansari v. District Judge, Deoria

2002-08-26

S.P.MEHROTRA

body2002
JUDGMENT S. P. Mehrotra, J.—This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed, inter alia, challenging the order dated 15.3.2002 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) passed by respondent No. 2 and the order dated 30.5.2002 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) passed by respondent No. 1. 2. It appears that the respondent No. 3 filed a suit against the petitioner in respect of shop, the details whereof have been given at the foot of the plaint. The relief sought in the said suit was for decree for ejectment and arrears of rent, etc. The said suit was registered as S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000. A copy of the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, has been filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. 3. A perusal of the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, shows that it was, inter alia, alleged by the respondent No. 3 that he was the owner and landlord of the shop in question ; and that the petitioner was a tenant of the shop in question at the rent of Rs. 150 per month ; and that the rent from February, 1986 and onwards was due from the petitioner which the petitioner did not pay despite repeated demands ; and that the rent for more than four months was, thus, due against the petitioner ; and that the petitioner committed default in payment of rent ; and that the notice of demand under Section 20 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, as well as for determination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given by the respondent No. 3 through his counsel to the petitioner on 17.1.2000 which was received by the petitioner on 21.1.2000 ; and that despite the service of the said demand notice on 21.1.2000, the petitioner did not pay any rent ; and that the tenancy stood determined on the expiry of 30 days from 21.1.2000. 4. The petitioner contested the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000 and filed his written statement, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. 4. The petitioner contested the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000 and filed his written statement, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. It was, inter alia, alleged by the petitioner in the said written statement that no cause of action arose to the respondent No. 3 ; and that Suit No. 34 of 1986, Munni Devi v. Shanti Devi and others, was pending for consideration in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Deoria, in respect of the shop in question ; and in the said Suit No. 34 of 1986, an order dated 19.2.1986 was passed restraining the respondent No. 3 from realizing the rent in respect of the shop in question from the petitioner, and further, restraining the petitioner from paying any rent ; and that the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, filed by the respondent No. 3 for recovery of rent besides amounting to contempt of court, was liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. In reply to the said written statement filed by the petitioner, replication was filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 in the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000. A copy of the said replication has been filed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed in the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, which have been referred to in paragraph No. 5 to the writ petition. Issue No. 3 framed in the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, is quoted below : “Whether the suit is barred by Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C.? 7. It appears that the said Issue No. 3 was taken up a preliminary issue by the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 by the order dated 15.3.2002, decided the said Issue No. 3 in negative, and fixed 29.4.2002 for evidence of the plaintiff (respondent No. 3). 8. 7. It appears that the said Issue No. 3 was taken up a preliminary issue by the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 by the order dated 15.3.2002, decided the said Issue No. 3 in negative, and fixed 29.4.2002 for evidence of the plaintiff (respondent No. 3). 8. It was, inter alia, held by the respondent No. 2 in the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2002, that papers filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 showed that the dispute had already been decided between the parties ; and that on the basis of the compromise deed and the map with the compromise deed, it was evident that the respondent No. 3 was the owner of the shop in question, and that the petitioner was the tenant of the respondent No. 3 ; and that non-payment of rent by the tenant to the landlord was against the principles of natural justice ; and that as the petitioner was not paying the rent, nor was he depositing the same in the Court, the respondent No. 3 was entitled to get the petitioner ejected from the shop in question ; and that there was sufficient cause of action for filing the suit ; and that the suit was maintainable. 9. Against the said order dated 15.3.2002, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. 10. By an order dated 30.5.2002, the respondent No. 1 dismissed the said revision filed by the petitioner. 9. Against the said order dated 15.3.2002, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. 10. By an order dated 30.5.2002, the respondent No. 1 dismissed the said revision filed by the petitioner. It was, inter alia, held by the respondent No. 1 in the said order dated 30.5.2002, that the respondent No. 2 had decided the issue as to whether suit was liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the negative ; and that after the parties would lead their respective evidence, there would be no bar to the raising of the said issue again at the time of final hearing before the trial court ; and that the said issue can again be decided at the final hearing of the suit ; and that the conclusion of facts drawn by the respondent No. 2 on the basis of the evidence, were not liable to be interfered with in the revision filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, and that the conclusion of the respondent No. 2 that the tenant had no right that he would not pay rent to the landlord for indefinite period, was not liable to be interfered with. 11. I have heard Sri T. P. Singh, learned senior advocate assisted by Sri Siddharth Singh for the petitioner and Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3. 12. Sri T. P. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the injunction order dated 19.2.1986 passed in Original Suit No. 34 of 1986 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition), neither the respondent No. 3 could realize any rent from the petitioner, nor was the petitioner liable to pay any rent to the respondent No. 3 inasmuch as the said injunction order dated 19.2.1986 was still operative. 13. Sri Singh further submitted that the respondent No. 2 recorded finding on the question of relationship of the landlord and tenant between the respondent No. 3 and the petitioner on the basis of the compromise, even though the petitioner was not a party to that compromise. 13. Sri Singh further submitted that the respondent No. 2 recorded finding on the question of relationship of the landlord and tenant between the respondent No. 3 and the petitioner on the basis of the compromise, even though the petitioner was not a party to that compromise. It was further submitted by Sri Singh that even though the respondent No. 1 in his order dated 30.5.2002, observed that the said question regarding relationship of landlord and tenant could be raised at the time of final hearing after the evidence was led by the parties, but in the later part of the said order, the respondent No. 1 confirmed the findings recorded by the respondent No. 2 in the said order dated 15.3.2002. He submitted that in view of the findings recorded by the respondent No. 2 in the said order dated 15.3.2002 and confirmed by the respondent No. 1 in the said order dated 30.5.2002, the defence of the petitioner would be seriously prejudiced. 14. In reply, Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 submitted that Issue No. 3 in substance was as to whether plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or not. For deciding the said issue, the Court was required to consider only the allegations made in the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000. In case, the said allegations disclosed cause of action for filing a suit on the ground of arrears of rent under Section 20 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, there was no question of rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sri Mandhyan, placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and others v. Heinz India Limited, 2002 (2) AWC 898 . 15. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Sri Mandhyan, placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and others v. Heinz India Limited, 2002 (2) AWC 898 . 15. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows : “Rejection of plaint.—The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases : (a) Where it does not disclose a cause of action ; (b) Where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to so correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so ; (c) Where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so ; (d) Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law ; (e) Where it is not filed in duplicate ; (f) Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9 : Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for the reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” 16. Clause (a) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the plaint will be rejected where it does not disclose cause of action. What is the meaning of “cause of action”? 17. In Mohd. Khalil Khan and others v. Mohbub Ali Mian and others, AIR 1949 PC 84, it was laid down as follows (paragraphs 46 and 61 of the said AIR) : “46. The phrase “cause of action” has not been defined in any enactment, but the meaning of it has been judicially considered in various decisions. 17. In Mohd. Khalil Khan and others v. Mohbub Ali Mian and others, AIR 1949 PC 84, it was laid down as follows (paragraphs 46 and 61 of the said AIR) : “46. The phrase “cause of action” has not been defined in any enactment, but the meaning of it has been judicially considered in various decisions. In Read v. Brown, (1889) 22 QBD 128 : 59 LJQB 120, Lord Esher, M. R., accepted the definition given in Cook v. Gill, (1878) LRSC 107 : 42 LJCP 98, that it meant “every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.” Fry L.J. agreed and said, “Everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the cause of action”. Lopes L.J. said : “I agree with the definition given by the Master of Rolls of a cause of action, and that it includes every fact which it would be necessary to prove, if traversed, in order to enable a plaintiff to maintain his action.” This decision has been followed in India. The term has been considered also by the Board. In Mt. Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, (1887-1888) 15 IA 156 : 16 Cal 98 (PC), Lord Watson delivering the judgment of the Board observed as follows : “Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. If refers entirely to the grounds set out in the plaint as the cause, or in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” 61. “The principles laid down in the cases thus far discussed may be thus summarized : (1) The correct test in cases falling under Order II Rule 2, is “whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit.” Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsunnissa Begum, 1867-11 MIA 551 : 2 Sar 259 (PC) (supra). (2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment, Read v. Brown, 1889-22 QBD 128 : 58 LJQB 120 (supra). (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the causes of action are also different. Brunsden v. Humphrey, 1884-14 QBD 141 : 53 LJQB 476 (supra). (4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be the same if in substance they are identical, Brunsden v. Humphrey, 1884-14 QBD 141 ; 53 LJQB 476 (supra). (5) The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers ......... to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. Muss. Chand Kour v. Pratab Singh, 15 IA 156 : 16 Cal 98 (PC) (supra). This observation was made by Lord Watson in a case under Section 43 of the Act of 1882 (Corresponding to Order II Rule 2), where plaintiff made various claims in the same suit.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. In State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies and another, AIR 1960 SC 1309 , the Apex Court laid down as follows (paragraph 3 of the said AIR) : “We have been referred to the well known observations of Brett, J., in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107 and to the definition of “cause of action” given in Read v. Brown, (1889) 22 QBD 128, which are all referred to in 75 Ind App 121 : AIR 1949 PC 78 (supra). In (1889) 22 QBD 128 (supra), Lord Esher M. R., defined “cause of action” to mean : “Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.” Fry L.J. agreed and said : “Everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the “cause of action”. To the same effect are the observations of Lopes L.J. in Mst. To the same effect are the observations of Lopes L.J. in Mst. Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, 15 Ind App 156. Lord Watson observed : “Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” The meaning of “cause of action” being thus well understood, we now proceed to consider whether the cause of action with which the plaintiff has come to Court has been stated sufficiently in the notice given under Section 80. For this purpose we must first see what is the cause of action set forth in the plaint.” (Emphasis Supplied) 19. In Sivananda Roy v. Janki Ballav Pattanaik and others, AIR 1985 Ori 197 , it was laid as follows (paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said AIR) : “........... To put it in a concise form, the words “cause of action” means the whole bundle of material facts which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. Order VII Rule 11 requires the plaintiff to incorporate in the plaint the facts constituting the cause of action. Thus, the plaintiff has to plead all material facts upon which his right to relies is based and from which Court can arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” “Order VI Rule 2, C.P.C. requires that every pleading shall contain and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. Reading Order VI Rule 2 and Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. together it is clear that the words “material facts” occurring in Order VI Rule 2, C.P.C. with reference to a plaintiff means the facts necessary to form a complete cause of action. The language of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. makes it imperative that the facts constituting the cause of action must find place in the plaint. The language of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. makes it imperative that the facts constituting the cause of action must find place in the plaint. Thus, the conclusion is irresistible that all the facts and not the evidence, which are necessary to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed must find place in the plaint. A plaint which does not conform to the aforesaid requirement can be said to be one which does not disclose a cause of action within the meaning of Order VII Rule 11 (a) C.P.C.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. As noted above, in view of Clause (a) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the plaint does not disclose the cause of action, then the plaint will be rejected. 21. For determining as to whether the plaint discloses the cause of action or not, it will be necessary to look into the allegations made in the plaint. If a reading of the plaint shows that it discloses the cause of action, there will be no occasion for rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The correctness of the allegations made in the plaint or otherwise is not to be considered at the stage of consideration of the question as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that it does not disclose the cause of action. 22. Once a reading of the plaint shows that it discloses the cause of action, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and others v. Heinz India Ltd., 2002 (2) AWC 898 (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, a learned single Judge of this Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 9, 10 and 15 of the said AWC) : “9. In support of the argument and regarding the scope of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. the learned counsel has referred to the decision of the Apex Court in T. Arvindandam v. T. C. Satyapal and another, AIR 1977 SC 2421 . In this case the provisions of Section 35A and Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. came for consideration before the Apex Court. In this case the provisions of Section 35A and Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. came for consideration before the Apex Court. It was observed that if on a meaningful, not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the Court should exercise its power under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled (Emphasis given). And, if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X, C.P.C. 10. After carefully considering the above decisions, I am of the view that it does not apply to the present case. In the present case, the plaintiff disclosed a clear right to sue. Apex Court has also directed that care should be taken to examine whether the grounds mentioned in Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. are fulfilled or not. However, it has not been provided that it can be examined whether the plaintiff has prima facie case or there is chance of the suit being decreed. Clause (d) above only provides for examination as to whether on the basis of the statement made in the plaint, the suit appears to be barred by any law. In the present case, from the statement made in the plaint, it does not appear that the suit is barred by any law. The question whether the Court has jurisdiction under Section 9, C.P.C. can be decided after the proper issue is framed and the scope of Section 9, C.P.C. is different from Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. 15. In view of the above decision, I am of the opinion that the plaint cannot be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by law under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C.” 24. In Izzat Ali v. Muhammad Sharafatullah Khan, AIR 1917 All 355 (DB), Hon’ble Walsh, J., laid down as follows (at page 356 of the said AIR) : “..................... A plaint can no doubt be struck out and a suit dismissed on the ground that the plaint discloses no cause of action. But to entitle a Court to do that, the Court can and must look at the plaint and at nothing else. A plaint can no doubt be struck out and a suit dismissed on the ground that the plaint discloses no cause of action. But to entitle a Court to do that, the Court can and must look at the plaint and at nothing else. And if on reading the plaint it is clear that if the allegations are proved in accordance with the plaint there is any sort of cause of action, however, trivial, frivolous and doubtful it may be, it is the duty of the Court to hear evidence and decide it on the merits...................................” (Emphasis supplied) 25. In view of the aforesaid legal position, let us examine as to whether the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) discloses the cause of action for filing the suit under Section 20 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The said suit has been filed on the ground provided under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The provision, in so far as is relevant, lays down : 20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds.—(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) (* * *) no suit shall be instituted for eviction of a tenant from building, notwith-standing the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in other manner : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in Court or otherwise, reduced to writing and signed by the tenant. (2) A suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds : (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand : Provided that in relation to a tenant, who is a member of the armed forces of the Union and in whose favour the prescribed authority under the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 (Act No. IV of 1925), has issued a certificate that his serving under special conditions within the meaning of Section 3 of that Act or where he has died by enemy action while so serving, then in relation to his heirs, the words “four months” in this clause shall be deemed to have been substituted by the words “one year”. 26. As noted above, the respondent No. 3 in the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, inter alia, alleged that the petitioner was a tenant of the shop in question at the rate of Rs. 150 per month, and that the rent with effect from 1986 and onward was due from the petitioner which the petitioner did not pay despite the repeated demands ; and that the rent for more than 4 months was due from the petitioner, and that the notice of demand under Section 20 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as well as for determination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given by the respondent No. 3 through his counsel to the petitioner on 17.1.2000, which was received by the petitioner on 21.1.2000, and that despite the service of the demand notice on 21.1.2000, the petitioner did not pay any rent, and that the tenancy of the petitioner stood determined on the expiry on 30 days from 21.1.2000. 27. Thus, it is apparent that all the requirements for filing the suit under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, were pleaded by the respondent No. 3 in the plaint of the S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000. 27. Thus, it is apparent that all the requirements for filing the suit under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, were pleaded by the respondent No. 3 in the plaint of the S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000. Therefore, the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000 disclosed the cause of action for filing suit under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. As such, the plaint of the said suit could not be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that it did not disclose the cause of action. 28. Whether the allegations made in the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, are correct or not, will be decided at the time of final hearing on consideration of the evidence led by both the parties. However, correctness of the allegations made in the plaint or otherwise, cannot be examined at the stage of consideration of the question as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of non-disclosure of cause of action. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, filed by the respondent No. 3 was not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, no interference is called for with the impugned orders deciding Issue No. 3 in negative against the petitioner. 30. Let us now come to the submission of Sri T. P. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 2 in the said order dated 15.3.2002, recorded the findings of fact on the merits of the issues, and it was not open to the respondent No. 2 to do so. Sri Singh further submitted that the respondent No. 1 while passing the said order dated 30.5.2002, confirmed the findings recorded by the respondent No. 2 in the said order dated 15.3.2002. In this way, the contention proceeds, the defence of the petitioner on the merits of the case has been seriously prejudiced. 31. Sri Singh further submitted that the respondent No. 1 while passing the said order dated 30.5.2002, confirmed the findings recorded by the respondent No. 2 in the said order dated 15.3.2002. In this way, the contention proceeds, the defence of the petitioner on the merits of the case has been seriously prejudiced. 31. Having considered the submissions made by Sri T. P. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that it was not necessary for the respondent No. 2 to consider the merits of the case while deciding the issue as to whether the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As noted above, the only question relevant for deciding the said issue was as to whether the allegations made in the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, disclosed cause of action or not. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the plaint was not relevant for deciding the said issue. 32. Similarly, there was no occasion for the respondent No. 1 to confirm the findings of fact recorded by the respondent No. 2 on the merits of the case as the merits of the case were to be examined after the evidence was led by the parties in the said suit. As discussed above, the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, filed on the ground mentioned under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, disclosed the cause of action, and the same was not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 33. As discussed above, the plaint of the said S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 2000, filed on the ground mentioned under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, disclosed the cause of action, and the same was not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 33. As it was not necessary for the respondent No. 2 to consider the merits of the case while deciding the said Issue No. 3, it is made clear that the findings recorded by the respondent No. 2 in the said order dated 15.3.2002 on the merits of the case which were confirmed by the respondent No. 1 in the said order 30.5.2000, will not come in the way of the petitioner at the time of consideration of the said suit on merits in the light of the evidence led by both the parties in the said suit, and it will be open to the petitioner to raise all questions on merits of the suit despite the observations/findings recorded in the said order dated 15.3.2002 passed by the respondent No. 2 and confirmed by the said order dated 30.5.2002 passed by the respondent No. 1. 34. Before parting with the case, it is necessary to deal with the observation made by the respondent No. 1 in the said order dated 30.5.2002, that it would be open to raise Issue No. 3 again at the final hearing of the suit after evidence was led by the parties, and the said issue could again be decided at the final hearing of the suit. In my opinion, the said observation of the respondent No. 1 is not correct. While it is true that all questions relating to the merits of the said suit will be considered at the final hearing after the evidence is led by both the parties, but so far as Issue No. 3 is concerned, the order dated 15.3.2002, on the said issue has become final, and it will not be open to the parties to raise the said issue again at the final hearing of the said suit. 35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is dismissed subject to the aforesaid observation.