JUDGMENT: The appeal is against the decree for partition granted by the trial Court. 2. The suit was filed by the respondents herein for declaration of their title and for permanent injunction or for the relief of partition. The respondents are the children of one Gnanasambanda Mudaliar. Gnanasambandam’s grandfather Palanivel had a brother called Chockalingam. Palanivel predeceased Chockalingam leaving behind two sons Narayanasamy and Manickam. The family possessed large extent of ancestral properties. On 21.7.1912, by a registered deed, Ex.A-1, dated 21.7.1912, the properties were partitioned. ‘A’ schedule property fell to the share of Chockalingam and his sons. ‘B’ schedule property were allotted to Narayanasamy and his brother Manickam who was then a minor. Under this document, the property in Survey No.67 was divided in such a way that the north-western and south-eastern quarters were allotted to Chockalingam and the north-eastern and south-western quarters were allotted to Narayanasamy and Manickam. The plaint refers to Chockalingam’s share as ‘A’ schedule and the other share as ‘B’ schedule. It is averred in the plaint that this extent which was originally 3.10 acres was reduced to 2.72 acres. Subsequently, Narayanasamy and Manickam executed a registered partition deed on 5.4.1933 Ex.A-39 and the whole of ‘A’ schedule property went to Manickam. Manickam sold the property on 11.9.1940 by Ex.A-2 and his property was purchased by Narayanasamy under Ex.A-3 dated 9.2.1950. Narayanasamy died in 1965 and therefore, the respondents became entitled to the whole of the said property. Chockalingam’s share was sold in Court auction and purchased by the appellant’s father. There was no delivery pursuant to the Court auction and in any event, the Court sale can only bind the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor which is 1.36 acres as reduced subsequently. This property though a patta land was always used as a house site. Gnanasambanda and before him, his father constructed thatched huts and let them on rent. The entire extent was one block. There are no visible demarcations. In the resettlement proceedings in 1976, the properties were converted from acres to hectares and are now comprised in three patta numbers in the joint name of the respondents’ father, the appellant and S.K. Velayudha Mudaliar. The respondent’s father is alone paying the k1st and house tax. The appellant has no right in ‘A’ schedule property and is not entitled to any extent more than Chockalingam’s share. The respondent’s father is alone paying the k1st and house tax. The appellant has no right in ‘A’ schedule property and is not entitled to any extent more than Chockalingam’s share. The appellant is aware of the same and he has also treated the property as if it is joint with the respondents and even in the partition amongst the appellant and his sons dated 29.12.1971, only the half share in the entire extent has been dealt with. Now, the respondents and their father have divided the properties by a registered partition deed on 5.11.1978 and the suit property was allotted to the share of the respondents. Since the appellant attempted to trespass into the south-western portion of the suit property and since he prevented the respondents from demarcating the property properly with the aid of a surveyor, the suit was filed. This is brief, is the case of the respondents as per the plaint. 3. The appellant’s written statement denied the right of the respondents. According to the appellant, his father had purchased the entire extent in the survey number in Court auction. The sale was held on 21.12.1933 and confirmed on 29.12.1934. His father Subbaraya Mudaliar took delivery of the items. Until his death in 1940, Subbaraya was in possession as absolute owner and after his death, the appellant is in possession. Therefore, the suit property has been in the possession of the appellant and before him, his father right from 21.12.1933. In 1975, Sri Puthumariamman temple filed a suit against the appellant and Gnanasambanda, the father of the respondents in respect of the same properties as the suit property. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the temple has no right in the suit properties since Subbaraya and after him, the appellant herein alone are entitled to the same. It is relevant to note that in this suit, the father of the respondents was the 2nd defendant. The appeal filed by the temple was also dismissed. So, the respondents are bound by the findings in the said proceedings declaring the title of the appellant and his father. Then again, the appellant filed O.S. No.1290 of 1974 with regard to the properties which are the same as the suit property for declaration and permanent injunction. The defendants in the suit were correspondent and Head Master of S.K.V. High School. Then again, the appellant filed O.S. No.1290 of 1974 with regard to the properties which are the same as the suit property for declaration and permanent injunction. The defendants in the suit were correspondent and Head Master of S.K.V. High School. The management of the said S.K.V. High School filed O.S. No.1289 of 1974 for declaration of their title to the suit properties and for permanent injunction. The suit properties in both these suits are the same as those purchased by Subbaraya in the Court auction. The father of the respondents was the 1st defendant in O.S. No.1289 of 1974 and the appellants was the 2nd defendant. After a joint trial, the suit filed by the appellant was decreed and the suit filed by the school was dismissed. The appeals filed against these were also dismissed. So these judgments also bind the respondents. The validity of the sale deeds dated 11.9.1940 and 9.2.1950 were denied and the alleged partition deed dated 5.11.1978 was attacked as a fraudulent and collusive transaction. In all the three earlier suits, the appellant’s title to the suit property has been upheld. The fact that the appellant has not dealt with the remaining 1 acre, 36 cents would not confer title on the respondents. From 1933, till date, the appellant has been continuously in possession. The suit is barred by res judicata. There is no joint possession. The suit shall be dismissed. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence granted the alternative relief of partition. 5. The questions raised in this first appeal are: (1) whether the respondents are not estopped from denying the title of the appellant; (2) whether the suit is not barred by res judicta; (3) whether the appellant has not at any rate prescribed title by adverse possession and finally, even assuming that all these findings go against the appellant; (4) can a decree for partition be granted when even on their own pleadings, the respondents were allotted specific shares divided by metes and bounds. 6. C.M.P. No.563 of 2002 was filed to receive the certified copy of the sale deed dated 26.2.1942 as additional evidence. 6. C.M.P. No.563 of 2002 was filed to receive the certified copy of the sale deed dated 26.2.1942 as additional evidence. This was necessitated because while the sale deed Ex.A-2 relates to the transaction between Manickam and Appavu and the sale deed Ex.A-3 relates to the transaction between Narayanasamy and Sambandam, there was a missing link in the chain of transactions ending in the alleged purchase by Narayanasamy, the grandfather of the respondents. This additional evidence is the certified copy of a sale by Appavu in favour of Sambandam and therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondents who has filed this petition, the link is complete. The learned counsel for the appellant who is the respondent in this petition however would submit that it is not admissible for the parties to fill up the gap at this late stage especially when there is nothing to show why this document had not been marked in evidence at the earliest stage. 7. The suit properties as described in the plaint are situated in Kurinchipadi village under Survey number and extent as follows: 671 - O.45, 67/2a - 2.17, 67/4b - 0.10 aggregating to 2.72 acres. Ex.A-1 dated 21.7.1912 deals with various properties including this survey number. The first party namely Chockalingam Mudaliar was allotted the ‘A’ schedule property which included 79 1/2 cents in the south-east and 79 1/2 cents in the north-west of this survey number. Similarly, ‘B’ schedule comprising 79 1/2 cents in north-east and 79 1/2 cents in the south-west was allotted to Narayanasamy Mudaliar and his minor brother Manickam. On 5.4.1933, under Ex.A-39, Narayanasamy Mudaliar, his younger brother Manickam Mudaliar and his son Ganansambanda, father of the respondents have executed a partition deed. ‘B’ schedule of Ex.A-39 was allotted to Manicka and it included the Ex.A-1 ‘B’ schedule property in S.No.67. In this, the boundaries of the property S.No.67 allotted to Manickam is clearly given, wherein Chockalingam’s land is shown as the boundaries. This is in consonance with the allotment under Ex.A-1. Subsequent to this, the Court auction purchase takes place which is the starting point of the present case. 8. Mr.M.S. Subramanian, learned counsel for the appellant would point out to the recitals in Ex.B-1, which is the sale certificate dated 29,9.1934. Ex.B-1 schedule of property shows that the subject matter of the sale is the entire survey number 67/1 which was originally 3.18 acres. 8. Mr.M.S. Subramanian, learned counsel for the appellant would point out to the recitals in Ex.B-1, which is the sale certificate dated 29,9.1934. Ex.B-1 schedule of property shows that the subject matter of the sale is the entire survey number 67/1 which was originally 3.18 acres. The learned counsel pointed out to Exs.B-4 to B-10 which are the k1st receipts for various faslis from 1955 in the name of Subbaraya, the appellant’s father. The patta number referred to were also pointed out. Exs.B-10 to B-17 are the land tax receipts. Ex.B-18 shows actual possession by the defendant. Exs.B-233 to B-237 lease deeds executed by the father of the appellant in the year 1935-36 wherein what was leased out was the property that had been taken in the Court auction in O.S. No.20 of 1918 would also show Subbaraya’s possession. The property described in all these documents are identical and they refer to the leased property as the property that has been taken in Court auction. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that right from 1935, the appellant’s father had been in possession of the suit property. Exs.B-10 to B-17 which are of the year 1966 also show that land tax has been paid for houses in Angalamman Koil street and Chembadava street which are the two streets abutting the suit property. Therefore, there is clear evidence to show that the appellant alone had been in possession of the suit property. Ex.B-240 is of the year 1965 in which one Subramanya had executed a registered lease deed in respect of the property which was taken in Court auction by the appellant’s father. More importantly, in Ex.B-241, which is the judgment in O.S. No.66 of 1975, the father of the respondents (the 2nd defendant therein) had given evidence as D.W.1 and he had clearly stated that Subbaraya had purchased the entire suit property in Court auction in his own right and has been in exclusive possession since then. The temple, the plaintiff in that suit, claimed that Subbaraya was a trustee of the temple and therefore, the purchase was made only on behalf of the temple and not in his individual capacity. The decree in the said suit which was marked as Ex.B-242 would show that the suit property comprises of the same survey number as in the present suit i.e., 67/1, 67/2a, 67/2b, 67/4a and 67/4b aggregating 3.18 acres. The decree in the said suit which was marked as Ex.B-242 would show that the suit property comprises of the same survey number as in the present suit i.e., 67/1, 67/2a, 67/2b, 67/4a and 67/4b aggregating 3.18 acres. Ex.B-243 is the judgment in O.S. Nos.1289 and 1290 of 1974. The learned counsel pointed out that in this, the father of the respondents had filed a written statement along with the appellant. He had clearly admitted in his pleadings that the suit property belonged only to Subbaraya, and then to the appellant. In this suit, the appellant was held to be entitled to the suit properties. The appeal against O.S. No.66 of 1975 also went in favour of the appellant and the judgment was marked as Ex.B-245. The learned counsel referred to this as well as the judgment in the joint appeals Ex.B-247. According to the learned counsel, the present suit is therefore barred by res judicata as between co-defendants and if not, atleast the stand taken by the respondents’ father would operate as estoppel by pleadings. The learned counsel would also submit that Ex.A-40 the partition deed executed by the respondents and their father is of no avail since boundaries are not given and what is given is which is contrary to Ex.A-1 and A-2 which refer to identified share as allotted to the parties. He would submit that right from 1935, Subbaraya and after him, his son the appellant had openly been exerting their right, title and interest in the suit property to the knowledge of everybody and therefore, the appellant had prescribed title by adverse possession. He would further submit that assuming without admitting that under the sale certificate, only the right, title and interest of Chockalingam the judgment-debtor could be transferred, then the fact that they took possession of the entire property in 1933 would itself show that the possession which was not legal commenced in hostility to the real owner and continued unbroken. If the respondents had to sustain their claim, then they entered into possession. If they do not do that, the suit cannot be decreed in their favour. If the respondents had to sustain their claim, then they entered into possession. If they do not do that, the suit cannot be decreed in their favour. He further submitted that even it is held that the appellant got under the sale certificate only the property belonging to Chockalingam, and possession of the remaining half was not given to Subbaraya pursuant to Ex.B-1, even then, the decree for partition cannot be granted since as seen already, the properties were allotted in demarcated shares under Ex.A-1 itself. He would also submit that the father of the respondent had pleaded and given evidence that Subbaraya the appellant’s father had taken possession of the entire suit property pursuant to the Court auction sale, so he cannot be now heard to say as P.W.2 in the present case that he did not so in the earlier suits, but it was pursuant to an arrangement between him and Subbaraya that after the litigation was over, the properties would be enjoyed as before separately. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, looked at from any view, he suit ought not to have been decreed. 9. The learned counsel cited the following judgments: (i) Chandu Lal v. Khalilur Rahaman, (1950)1 M.L.J. 241 : A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 17, where it was held that the party sought to be bound by the decision must be proved to have notice that the relevant question was in issue. In that case, the party was held to have filed to discharge the burden. (ii) Kamalayee Ammal v. Parvathi Ammal, (1970)2 M.L.J. 678 , where it was held that private are those who claim under or in right of parties or who standing in successive relationship to the same rights of properties and for applicability of Sec.11, any person who claims under a party to a suit shall be bound by the decision in the previous suit. (iii) Iftikhar Ahmed v. Syed.Meharban Ali, (1974)2 S.C.C. 151 , where the Supreme Court held that the question of res judicata is founded on ancient precedent and is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time and the application of the rule is not bound by technical considerations. (iii) Iftikhar Ahmed v. Syed.Meharban Ali, (1974)2 S.C.C. 151 , where the Supreme Court held that the question of res judicata is founded on ancient precedent and is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time and the application of the rule is not bound by technical considerations. (iv) Nagindas v. Dalpatram, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471, where it was held that admissions if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted and they by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. (v) Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P., (1982)1 S.C.C. 71 , where again, the Supreme Corut held that the basic considerations of the principle of res judicata cannot be excluded on technical grounds.(vi) Chendikamba v. Viswanathamayya, (1939)1 M.L.J. 227 : A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 446, where it was held that admission in plaint or a written statement in prior suit is admission in a subsequent action through it is capable of rebuttal. 10. The learned counsel would also submit that the very fact that the respondents have not mentioned any of the earlier proceedings would go to show that their motive is not bona fide. They are guilty of suppressing material facts and he would further submit that the partition deed of the year 1978 has been deliberately brought about amongst the respondents and their father allotting the suit property to the respondents, so that the father who had given evidence in the earlier suits will not be embarrassed. He would also submit hat the mere fact that in the 1971 partition within the family of the appellant, only a half share in survey No.67 is partitioned cannot outweigh the effect of all the documents produced by the appellant to show their continuous possession from 1933. 11. On the other hand, Mr.K.Kannan, the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand would submit that the respondents have shown that they have title to the property. He would submit that the C.M.P. must be allowed in the interest of justice. When once the title of the respondents is proved, then they cannot be thrown out expect by adverse possession. He would also submit that admissions cannot form the sole basis for holding that the appellant has title. If that is so, then the provisions of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act would be flouted by collusive litigation. When once the title of the respondents is proved, then they cannot be thrown out expect by adverse possession. He would also submit that admissions cannot form the sole basis for holding that the appellant has title. If that is so, then the provisions of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act would be flouted by collusive litigation. He would further submit that the doctrine of res judicata will operate between co-defendants, only if the issue of title between the co-defendants was necessary to decide the earlier suit. If not, the fining given in the earlier suit will not operate as res judicata and Sec.11, C.P.C. will not apply. He would also submit that estoppel cannot be pleaded because the appellant knew the true state of affairs viz., that he did not have title to the property. He could not plead that they were misled by any declaration, act or omission made by the respondents to believe that he had title to the entire extent since he himself knew that the truth was otherwise. He would also submit that the appellant cannot invoke the provisions of Sec.43 of the Transfer of Property Act and claim title under the principle of feeding the estoppel since that does not rise in the instant case. He would also submit that estoppel does not create interest in property except as provided in Sec.43 of the Transfer of Property Act and for this purpose, he relied on Banawarilal v. Sukhdarshan, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 814. He would also submit that if title is found to be the respondents’, they need not prove possession. It is for the defendants to prove that they have perfected title by adverse possession and the onus is entirely on the defendant. He also submitted that admission made by the witness in other litigation is admissible against him alone and not against other defendants and therefore even assuming that the respondents’ father had given evidence as D.W.2 in the earlier litigation, it will not bind the respondents. It was further submitted that when under Ex.A-1, all that Chockalingam got, was a 1/2 share in the suit survey number, the Court auction purchaser cannot claim that he got anything more than what the judgment-debtor had. For this purpose, he relied on Ahmedabad Municipality v. Haji Abdul, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1201. It was further submitted that when under Ex.A-1, all that Chockalingam got, was a 1/2 share in the suit survey number, the Court auction purchaser cannot claim that he got anything more than what the judgment-debtor had. For this purpose, he relied on Ahmedabad Municipality v. Haji Abdul, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1201. He submitted that the party pleading adverse possession is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and therefore, he has no equities in his favour and must clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his adverse possession and for this, he relied on Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 869. 12. Then he would submit that as laid down in Mahbbob Sahab v. Syed Ismail, (1995)3 S.C.C. 693 , four conditions are essential to apply res judicata to the co-defendants. They are: (1) There must be a conflict of interest between the defendant concerned; (2) It must be necessary to decide the conflict in order to give a relief which the plaintiff claims; (3) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided, and (4) the co-defendants were necessary or proper parties in the former suit. Unless these conditions are satisfied, the doctrine of res judicata cannot apply. The learned counsel submitted that in O.S. No.66 of 1975, the temple sought for a declaration of title and for recovery of possession. The appellant claimed that the title was his and the respondents’ father was the defendant’s witness no.1. The decision in the suit did not depend upon the inter se dispute between the two, nor was it necessary to decide it for arriving at the conclusion and therefore the decision in O.S. No.66 of 1975 would not operate as res judicata. 13. As regards the other two suits, in the suit filed by the school, the respondents’ father and the appellant were parties and it was a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. In the suit filed by the appellant the respondents were not parties and therefore, the decision in these suits would not operate as res judicata. He also submitted that there was absolutely no evidence to show that the appellant had been in possession continuously. For all these reasons, he would pray that the appeal should be dismissed. 14. The following documents are relevant insofar as the appellant is concerned. He also submitted that there was absolutely no evidence to show that the appellant had been in possession continuously. For all these reasons, he would pray that the appeal should be dismissed. 14. The following documents are relevant insofar as the appellant is concerned. Ex.B-1 the sale certificate dated 29.9.1934, Exs.B-4 to B17 land tax receipts from 1955 to 1972, Exs.B-19 to B-232 house tax receipts in the name of the appellant which cover the period from 1966 to 1987. Ex.B-233 dated 12.11.1935, Ex.B-24 dated 5.2.1936, Exs.B-235 and B-236, Ex.B-237 dated 24.5.1962, Exs.B-238, B-239 and B-240 are all registered lease deeds. In all these exhibits, the property described is that which was purchased by appellant’s father in the Court auction. Ex.B-1 refers to the entire suit property and not just Chockalingam’s share as we have already seen. Ex.B-241 is the judgment in O.S. No.66 of 1975, the suit filed by the temple and Ex.B-242 is the decree. Ex.B-243 is the judgment in O.S. Nos.1289 and 1290 of 1974, dated 28.9.1976 and Ex.B-244 is the decree. Ex.B-245 is the judgment in A.S. No.129 of 1976 (O.S. No.66 of 1975). Exs.B-246, B247 and B248 are the judgment and decree in the appeals A.S. 182 and 183 of 1976 (O.S. 1289 and 1290 of 1974). On the respondents’ side, they have filed Ex.A-1 which is the 1912 partition deed, Ex.A-39 - 1939 partition deed, Ex.A-2, the sale by Manickam to Appavu, Ex.A-3 sale by Sambandam to Narayanasamy. Ex.A-40 the partition amongst the respondents and their father in 1978. Exs.A-5 to A-9 are parties. Exs.A-10 to A33 are house tax receipts, Exs.A-34 to A-38 are land tax receipts. Ex.A-41 is the demand notice,. Exs.A- 42 and A-43 are the sub-division demands. Exs.A-45 to A-48 are the Commissioner’s report and plan. 15. The four principles for applying the doctrine of res judicata have already been l1sted. Now, what was the dispute in the three suits referred to above is: In O.S. No.66 of 1975, the suit properties in the present case were claimed to be the properties belonging to the temple. The appellant was the 1st defendant and the father of the respondents was the 2nd defendant. Now, what was the dispute in the three suits referred to above is: In O.S. No.66 of 1975, the suit properties in the present case were claimed to be the properties belonging to the temple. The appellant was the 1st defendant and the father of the respondents was the 2nd defendant. It was claimed by the temple that in executing the decree obtained in O.S. No.20 of 1918, the suit properties were purchased in Court auction by the appellant’s father in the capacity of the receiver and trustee of the temple. A specific averment was made in the plaint that the 2nd defendant (the respondents’ father) is in possession of the 5th item of the suit property with the permission of the 1st defendant (appellant). The written statement was filed jointly by the appellant and the respondent’s father wherein it was stated clearly that the suit properties were taken in the court auction by Subbaraya Mudaliar in his individual capacity, “He took possession of the suit properties in his own right and was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by paying k1st and after his death, the 1st defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties in his own right” and it was also claimed that the title by the suit properties had been perfected by adverse possession. In the said suit, the respondents’ father gave evidence as D.W.1 and the case of the appellant herein was accepted totally. The respondents’ father cannot plead ignorance of this judgment. In the order two judgments, O.S. Nos.1289 and 1290 of 1974, the appellant prayed for declaration of his title and permanent injunction and the school S.K.V. High School in its suit prayed for the same relief and in the school’s suit, the respondents’ father was the 2nd defendant and the question of the title of the appellant was clearly in issue when these two suits were jointly tried and though the respondents’ father may not have been a defendant in the appellant’s suit the finding that the appellant was in possession in his own right was rendered in these joint suits. The sale certificate was marked as Ex.A-1 in the said suit and the finding is that from a perusal of Ex.A-1, it is evident that Subbaraya had purchased the properties in his own capacity. The sale certificate was marked as Ex.A-1 in the said suit and the finding is that from a perusal of Ex.A-1, it is evident that Subbaraya had purchased the properties in his own capacity. The appellant had filed registered rent deeds Exs.A-5, A-16, A-17 and A-18 and the finding by the learned Judge is that pursuant to the Court auction, possession was taken and the tenants had recognised the title of Subbaraya and therefore, Subbaraya was not only in possession of the properties covered under Ex.A-15 to A-18, but also in possession of the properties west of them. Finally, a decree was given in O.S. No.1290 of 1975 that the plaintiff (appellant herein) is entitled to the relief of declaration as prayed for. In the plaint filed by the school S.K.V. High School in O.S. No.1289 of 1974, it was averred that the properties in dispute belong to the family of defendants 1 and 2 and also of the plaintiff’s correspondent. Defendants 1 and 2 are the father of the respondent and the appellant respectively and the fining is that “the 1st defendant respectively and the finding is that” the 1st defendant in O.S. No.1289 of 1974 (father of the respondent) to whom the plaintiff in O.S. No.1289 of 1974 (S.K.V. High School) set up title to the suit properties originally had not claimed any interest in the suit property, but would support that the 2nd defendant in O.S. No.1289 of 1974 (the appellant) who is the plaintiff in O.S. No.1290 of 1974 (appellant) alone is having title to the said properties. “ This fining was not challenged in appeal. In fact, in this case, D.W.2 claimed to be the 2nd wife of the respondents’ father said certain huts were in her possession and it was observed by the learned Judge in the judgment in O.S. Nos.1289 and 1290 of 1974 thus: ”But whether D.W.2 has exclusive right over the properties to which she claims exclusive right is not the subject matter of the suits and it cannot also be decided in this suit. Even if she has nay exclusive right to those properties as claimed by her it will not take away the right of P.w.1 to the suit properties in O.S. No.1289 of 1974, since it is well settled proposition of law that in the case of a rightful owner of a property, proof of factual possession of a part of the property will be sufficient to prove his possession of the while, except such portions of it as may be in the actual possession of another." D.W.2 asserted some rights against the appellant. It was rejected. The pleadings in the above mentioned suits read thus: "The 1st defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the above said properties for over 20 years and prescribed title to the abovesaid properties." This written statement was filed both by the appellant and the respondents’ father, the appellant being the 1st defendant. Therefore, it was necessary in the earlier suit to decide the question of title and possession between the defendants who were parties to the suit. 16. The following extract from Kamalayee Ammal v. Parvathi Ammal, (1970)2 M.L.J. 678 can easily be applied to this case: "But she had knowledge of the issues raised. She actively supported the plaintiff in that suit giving evidence in his favour.... the title of the present plaintiff to the suit properties was in issue and actively agitated to her knowledge and with her support." 17. There is no pleading by the plaintiffs that in the earlier suit, their father had colluded with the appellant herein or that the proceedings were fraudulent. In fact, as P.W.2, the respondents father would state: His reason for giving evidence to that effect is that there was an agreement between him and the appellant that the matters can be sorted out later. But for this, there are no pleadings in the present case, no is there any evidence that there was such an understanding barring the interested testimony of P.W.2. In fact, the plaint does not even refer to the earlier suits. The respondents conveniently forgot about them. 18. The learned counsel referred to Mr.Munni v. Tirloki Nath, 61 M.L.J. 196: A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 114 to show that even an admission made in an earlier proceeding will not be binding in a subsequent case. 19. In fact, the plaint does not even refer to the earlier suits. The respondents conveniently forgot about them. 18. The learned counsel referred to Mr.Munni v. Tirloki Nath, 61 M.L.J. 196: A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 114 to show that even an admission made in an earlier proceeding will not be binding in a subsequent case. 19. The case reported in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M.Krishnaiah, J.T. (1998)2 S.C. 23, arose out of O.S.No.51 of 1968 where, Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam (TTD) was the defendant. In an earlier suit filed TTD against Hathiramji Mutt in 1937, the title of TTD to the same property was declared and subsequent to the decree, TTD also obtained delivery under Ex.B-3, delivery receipt. The point that was argued by the plaintiff was that the judgment in O.S. No.51 of 1937 between TTD and another, where the present plaintiff was not a party was not admissible in evidence. The Supreme Court rejecting this contention held that the previous judgment not inter-partes is admissible in evidence as a "transaction" in which the right to property was asserted and recognised. They referred to the judgment in Sital Das v. Sant Ram and others, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 606 and Dinamoni v. Brajmohini, I.L.R. 29 Cal. 190 (P.C.), where it was held that the previous judgment not inter-partes is admissible in evidence to show who the parties were, what the lands in dispute were and who were declared entitled to retain them. 20. Here too, the earlier judgments are evidence to show the nature of the right asserted by the appellant and recognised by the Courts. The admission of the respondents’ father in these proceedings are clear and categoric. In Nagindas v. Dalpatram, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471, it was held that such statements can be made on the basis of rights of parties. To destroy the claim of the appellant, which was admitted by the respondents’ father himself, the respondents have no arsenal. They have no answer to the registered lease deeds Exs.B-233 to B-237. They have no acceptable explanation for the stand taken in the earlier proceedings. They claim right under a partition deed Ex.A-40. The original of this deed is not filed. We do not know whether the document was registered on the date when it was executed. They have no answer to the registered lease deeds Exs.B-233 to B-237. They have no acceptable explanation for the stand taken in the earlier proceedings. They claim right under a partition deed Ex.A-40. The original of this deed is not filed. We do not know whether the document was registered on the date when it was executed. In this, the respondents’ father who had all along admitted the possession and right of the appellant in respect of the entire survey number conveniently agreed to allot this property to the share of the respondents. The respondents’ case is that a party pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. But, equity is as equity does. The respondents cannot claim any equity in their favour in the circumstances of the case. 21. In Govindarasu Udayar v. Pattu, (1999)2 M.L.J. 218 ,where a previous judgment not inter-partes was relied on for deciding the issue, the defendant claimed that he was in possession for the last 80 years, but he did not produce a scrap of evidence to substantiate the claim, but the plaintiff showed that his possession was recognised in the earlier judgments which were marked as exhibits and those were accepted. It is clear from the exhibits marked in the instant case that the appellant has been asserting his right from 1933 continuously and openly and adverse to the right of the respondents herein. The possession has been uninterrupted and unless the respondents prove that they got into possession subsequently they cannot succeed. Even if they had the title, it was defeated by the long continuous hostile possession of the appellant. It is relevant to note that in this case though the respondents sought for the relief of declaration and recovery of possession and in the alternative, for partition, the Court below chose to pass a preliminary decree for partition. The recitals in the document produced in the case would show that under Ex.A-1 demarcated shares were given to ‘C’ and ‘M’ and, therefore unless the respondents prove that though specific shares were allotted, they were in joint possession, the decree for partition cannot be granted. Admittedly, there was a partition in 1912 and clearly identifiable shares in S.No.67 were allotted to the parties. In the absence of evidence to show that notwithstanding Ex.A-1, this property was in joint possession, a decree for partition cannot be granted. Admittedly, there was a partition in 1912 and clearly identifiable shares in S.No.67 were allotted to the parties. In the absence of evidence to show that notwithstanding Ex.A-1, this property was in joint possession, a decree for partition cannot be granted. This is so, because, once servance of status has been brought about by a declaration of intention to be divided as in Ex.A-1, then the process of partition is complete. So, a decree for partition cannot be granted in respect of property which has been divided. 22. In view of the discussions in the paragraphs above, this Court has come to the conclusion that while the appellant has demonstrated by acceptable evidence that he is in possession, the respondents have not shown that the property is enjoyed by all jointly. In addition, it is not open to the respondents to say that though their father had given evidence in the earlier proceedings and had been party to the same, their right under Ex.A-40 is independent. The admission made by the father of respondents as a witness and by his pleadings are clear and do not leave room for doubt. In Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rai, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 605 at 612, it was held: “The admission was made under somewhat suspicious circumstances at the end of the trial of the case when the arguments had begin. In the circumstances, this admission has weak evidentiary ratio. Title cannot pass by mere admission.” This was repeatedly stressed on the side of the respondents. But the above circumstances do not attend the admission relied on in the present case. Further, title does not pass by admission in this case, nor can it in any case. The appellant had asserted that he had been in possession and had prescribed title. The respondent’s father admitted that this was true. The Courts accepted it too. The respondent’s father is one of the parties to Ex.A-40 and therefore, having given evidence that the appellant is exclusively entitled to the possession of the suit properties, he is estopped from acting to the contrary. The judgment in the earlier proceedings will definitely bind the respondents father and as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment referred to above, though the respondents are not parties to the judgments, those judgments are admissible in evidence. The judgment in the earlier proceedings will definitely bind the respondents father and as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment referred to above, though the respondents are not parties to the judgments, those judgments are admissible in evidence. There is no material to show that there was collusion between the defendants in the earlier suit or that the appellant obtained the decree fraudulently. The judgments in the three suits as well as the appeals there against clearly declare the title of the appellant to the suit property. The case of the appellant is that his father took possession immediately after the Court auction sale and registered lease deeds that have been marked which are of the year 1936 show that those documents refer to the properties which were purchased by him in the Court auction. There can be no attack on these mentioned documents. The plaintiff’s case in the earlier suit was that the property belonged to the family of the respondents’ father. This was not accepted. 23. As regards estoppel, in State of H.P. v. Ganesh Wood Products, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 149, while dealing with the doctrine of promissory estoppel it was observed that since it is an equitable doctrine, it should be kept elastic enough in hands of Court to do complete justice between parties. 24. As regards the C.M.P., it is stated therein by the respondent in the appeal that until the arguments had commenced, he did not realise that the sale deed by Appavu to Sambandam had not been filed and the link is not complete. According to him, he did not know about the existence of the document at the time of the trial. It is a certified copy and therefore, the genuineness cannot be impeached. 25. It is doubtful whether the ignorance of the petitioner regarding the sale deed can be accepted. In fact, the pleadings are very vague in this regard. They merely state that the property went out of the hands of the family until it was re-purchased. Two sale deeds Exs.A-2 and A-3 alone are filed. No reason is given why this document was not filed at the earliest stage. None of the conditions set down in O.41, Rule 27, C.P.C. exist. They merely state that the property went out of the hands of the family until it was re-purchased. Two sale deeds Exs.A-2 and A-3 alone are filed. No reason is given why this document was not filed at the earliest stage. None of the conditions set down in O.41, Rule 27, C.P.C. exist. It is not as if, the Court below had refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, nor is it the petitioner’s case that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, this document could not be produced at the earliest point of time, nor can it be said that this document is required to produce judgment. The learned counsel for the appellant who is the respondent in C.M.P. relied on N.Kamalam v. Ayyasamy, (2001)7 S.C.C. 503 , where the Supreme Court had held that the provisions regarding reception of additional evidence are not there in the Code to patch up the weak points in the case or to fill up the omission in the Court of appeal. In the case before the Supreme Court, the suit was instituted in 1981, decree was passed in 1983, first appeal was filed in April, 1983, the application to adduce additional evidence came to be made in August, 1993 and the Supreme Court warned that Courts must be cautious and circumspect while dealing with claims for letting in additional evidence especially after a long lapse of time. In the present case, the suit was filed on 4.3.1985. A decree was passed on 30.4.1987. The appeal was taken on file on 24.7.1987 and the application is filed in 2002. Not only is the application belated, but in view of this Court’s discussion on the main issues, it is not necessary to receive the document and hence the C.M.P. is dismissed. 26. Since the questions raised in this appeal have been answered in the appellant’s favour, the judgment of the Court below must be set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs.