JUDGMENT K.C. Gupta, J. - By this order, I purpose to dispose of six Civil Revisions bearing No. 644 of 2001 (Lekh Raj v. Karnal Improvement Trust and another), 645 of 2001 (Lekh Raj v. Karnal Improvement Trust and another), 648 of 2001 (Lekh Raj v. Karnal Improvement Trust and another), 649 of 2001 (Lekh Raj v. Brij Lal and another) 650 of 2001 (Lekh Raj v. Brij Lal and another) and 652 of 2001 (Lekh Raj v. Brij Lal and another), which arise out of common order dated 28.2.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Karnal. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are that Brij Lal filed Civil Suit No. 187/1988 (433/1997) for declaration against Karnal Improvement Trust and his son, Lekh Raj, that he is entitled to allotment of two shops in Scheme No. 49 framed by the Improvement Trust instead of half shop site allotted to him, on the averments that he took on lease a vacant site from Shri Ram Lila Sabha, Karnal, in the year 1949-1950 and constructed seven shops abutting railway road, Karnal, out of which one shop was kept by him for himself, one was allowed to be kept by his son and remaining shops were let out to various tenants. 3. Site on which the aforesaid shops were constructed was acquired by the Improvement Trust for Scheme No. 49. According to the rules, occupants of the shops were to be allotted newly constructed shops as locally displaced persons. Thus, the Improvement Trust was required to allot two shops to Brij Lal but it allotted only one shop i.e. Site No. 39 to him and his son Lekh Raj jointly. It was also averred that Lekh Raj was tenant under him, so, he was not entitled to any shop. Thus, Brij Lal remained entitled to get allotted one and half shops. He also issued notice to the Improvement Trust for 17.1.1978 but to no avail and, thus, filed suit for declaration. 4. The Improvement Trust and Lekh Raj contested the abovesaid suit and filed written statements. Consequently, various issues were framed. 5. Thus, Brij Lal remained entitled to get allotted one and half shops. He also issued notice to the Improvement Trust for 17.1.1978 but to no avail and, thus, filed suit for declaration. 4. The Improvement Trust and Lekh Raj contested the abovesaid suit and filed written statements. Consequently, various issues were framed. 5. Lekh Raj also filed Civil Suit No. 626/1988 (65/1998) titled Lekh Raj v. Brij Lal and Karnal Improvement Trust for declaration that he was exclusive owner of the site of Shop No. 39 in Scheme No. 49 with further mandatory relief of injunction directing the Improvement Trust, Karnal, to allot him two separate sites of shops in the Scheme No. 49. It was averred by him that he had taken one shop on rent from Ram Lila Sabha, Karnal and another shop from Brij Lal and the sites of those shops alongwith other shops were acquired by Karnal Improvement Trust under Scheme No. 49. However, the Trust allotted Shop No. 39 to him and his father Brij Lal jointly but possession was given to him exclusively. Thus, he was entailed to the site of whole Shop No. 39. 6. Brij Lal filed reply, stating that the suit filed by Lekh Raj was a counter blast to his suit. The Trust filed reply, stating that Lekh Raj was never directly inducted as tenant by Ram Lila Sabha, Karnal, and he was not even entitled to half share of shop, which was taken by Lekh Raj on rent from his father and the same was never acquired and, thus, he was not entitled to the allotment of any site. Various issues were framed. 7. On 4.8.1998, Lekh Raj alongwith his counsel Shri Mohinderjit Singh, Brij Lal and his counsel, Shri S.K. Malhotra and Shri S.K. Bhargav, counsel for the Improvement Trust made the following statements :- "In suit titled as Brij Lal v. Karnal Improvement Trust and Lekh Raj. Joint statement of Shri Lekh Raj son of Shri Brij, On S.A. alongwith Shri Mohinderjit Singh, advocate, without oath. Stated that I and my father are joint owners of disputed plot No. 39, in Scheme No. 49 (retail cloth Market, Karnal). If my father would pay Rs. 5 lacs, half price of my share upto 4.10.1998, through draft, in that eventuality my father Brij Lal would be absolute owner of plot No. 39. Stated that I and my father are joint owners of disputed plot No. 39, in Scheme No. 49 (retail cloth Market, Karnal). If my father would pay Rs. 5 lacs, half price of my share upto 4.10.1998, through draft, in that eventuality my father Brij Lal would be absolute owner of plot No. 39. If Brij Lal does not pay the price of the shop/plot upto 4.10.1998, I (Lekh Raj) would be absolute owner of the plot. Statement of Brij Lal son of Maghar Mal, On S.A. alongwith Shri S.K. Malhotra, Advocate, without oath. Stated that statement of defendant No. 2 heard and understood. Decision of the suit may be done according to the statement of defendant No. 2 leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Statement of Shri S.K. Bhargav, Advocate, counsel for defendant No. 1, without oath. Stated that he has no objection of the suit is decided in view of the statements of defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff. In suit titled as Lekh Raj v. Brij and Karnal Improvement Trust. Joint statement of Sh. Lekh Raj s/o Shri Brij Lal on S.A. alongwith Sh. Mohinderjit Singh, Advocate without oath : Stated that his suit No. 187/88 (65/98) titled Brij Lal v. Karnal Improvement Trust and others has been decided, therefore, I do not want to proceed with the present suit. The suit may be dismissed." On the basis of the aforesaid statements of the parties, learned trial Court dismissed the suit titled as Lekh Raj v. Karnal Improvement Trust and decreed the suit titled Brij Lal v. Karnal Improvement Trust and another subject to the condition that Brij Lal will be absolute owner of the disputed plot if he paid an amount of Rs. 5 lacs to Lekh Raj on or before 4.10.1998. 8. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, Lekh Raj filed two appeals. 9. In each of the appeals Lekh Raj filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Both these appeals were dismissed vide order dated 28.2.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Karnal. It was also held that there was delay of 12 days in filing the appeals which has not been sufficiently explained and as such, there was no reason to condone the delay. Consequently, the applications for condonation of delay were also dismissed. Both these appeals were dismissed vide order dated 28.2.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Karnal. It was also held that there was delay of 12 days in filing the appeals which has not been sufficiently explained and as such, there was no reason to condone the delay. Consequently, the applications for condonation of delay were also dismissed. The petitioner, Lekh Raj, had also filed applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence which were also dismissed as it was held that the trial Court was not required to record whole of the evidence since compromise had taken place. 10. Aggrieved by the said order, Lekh Raj, petitioner filed Civil Revisions Nos. 648 of 2001 and 652 of 2001 against order dated 28.2.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Karnal, whereby his appeals were dismissed and the compromise dated 4.8.1998 recorded by Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Karnal, was held to be valid. Civil Revision Nos. 644 of 2001 and 649 of 2001 were filed against the order dated 28.2.2000 whereby the Additional District Judge, Karnal, dismissed the application of Lekh Raj, petitioner, for additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Civil Revision Nos. 645 and 650 of 2001 were filled by Lekh Raj against the order of the Additional District Judge, Karnal, dated 28.2.2000, whereby his applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay were dismissed. 11. I have heard Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Advocate, counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Mahavir Sandhu, counsel for Improvement Trust, Mr. J.S. Virk, counsel for Brij Lal-respondent and carefully gone through the record. 12. Counsel for the petitioner contended that at the time of effecting compromise, the evidence of petitioner should have come on record but the previous counsel of the petitioner who was to be listed on the panel of Karnal Improvement Trust did not bother to produce evidence and the trial Court effected compromise by recording the statements of the parties and as such, the impugned order passed by the Additional District Judge for not allowing to produce additional evidence was illegal. In my opinion, the contention of learned counsel is not tenable. Since compromise had taken place between the parties, so, it was not required on the part of the previous counsel of the petitioner or the Court to first record evidence and then to record the compromise. In my opinion, the contention of learned counsel is not tenable. Since compromise had taken place between the parties, so, it was not required on the part of the previous counsel of the petitioner or the Court to first record evidence and then to record the compromise. Moreover, there is no prima-facie evidence that the previous counsel of the petitioner, namely, Shri Mohinderjit Singh, was to be listed on the panel of Karnal Improvement Trust and as such, he did not take interest in producing the evidence. In fact, the applications moved by the petitioner for leading additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC are pre-mature. If the compromises are set-aside, then automatically the case would have been fixed for evidence of the petitioner Lekh Raj in case titled Lekh Raj v. Improvement Trust and in another case for the evidence of Brij Lal in case Brij Lal v. Improvement Trust etc. Thus, the applications had been rightly rejected under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and there is no illegality in the same. 13. Counsel for the petitioner next contended that previous counsel of the petitioner, namely, Shri Mohinderjit Singh, was to be listed on the panel of Karnal Improvement Trust and as such, he did not take care to get the attested copies of the judgments and decrees. Moreover, he started demanding huge amount illegally from him and further he applied only for one judgment on 6.8.1998, which copy was prepared on 18.8.1998 but he did not intentionally apply for a copy of the judgment and decree in another case and the same were applied by the petitioner under the advice of his counsel before the lower appellate Court, namely, Shri B.K. Agnihotri, on 7.9.1998 and the copies were prepared on 9.9.1998 and, therefore, the appeals were filed alongwith requisite applications on 15.9.1998 before the lower appellate Court and as such, there was no intentional delay. Copy of judgment filed in the appeal titled Lekh Raj v. Brij Lal and another shows that the petitioner had applied for the copies on 6.8.1998 and the same were prepared on 18.8.1998 and the petitioner took delivery on 1.9.1998. A perusal of the appeal filed in Lekh Raj v. Karnal Improvement Trust shows that the petitioner applied for the copies on 7.9.1998, the copies were prepared in 9.9.1998 and the same were delivered on 10.9.1998. A perusal of the appeal filed in Lekh Raj v. Karnal Improvement Trust shows that the petitioner applied for the copies on 7.9.1998, the copies were prepared in 9.9.1998 and the same were delivered on 10.9.1998. In the first case, it shows that the copies were received in 1.9.1998. However, the appeals were filed on 15.9.1998. If the petitioner did not obtain two copies of the order and decree sheet previously, as per wrong advice of his counsel, atleast he could get the appeals drafted from one set of copies of the judgment and decree which he had already obtained on 1.9.1998 till 2nd set of copies was obtained by him on 10.9.1998 and, thus, he could file the appeals immediately on 11.9.1998, when he had got the second set of copies on 10.9.1998. There is no explanation worth the name as to why the appeals were not got drafted during that period. The appeals were filed by the petitioner on 15.9.1998 i.e. even after 5 days of getting the second set of copies of order and decree sheet. No explanation had been offered as to why the appeals were not filed immediately on 11.9.1998. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 contended that amount of Rs. five lacs was paid to the petitioner on 15.9.1998 and immediately after getting the amount, the appeals were filed. This shows that the petitioner intentionally did not file the appeals before 15.9.1998 till the amount of Rs. five lacs was received by him as per the terms of settlement. Thus, the delay in filing the appeals appears to be mala fide and cannot be considered as bona fide by any stretch of imagination. It has been observed by the Honble Apex Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, (1998-3) 120 PLR 605 (SC) that law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Thus, the first appellate Court has rightly rejected the applications of the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. There is no illegality or impropriety in the same. 14. Thus, the first appellate Court has rightly rejected the applications of the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. There is no illegality or impropriety in the same. 14. Now a perusal of the statements, which Lekh Raj, petitioner, had made alongwith his counsel on 4.8.1998 shows that in case titled Brij Lal v. Karnal Improvement Trust 15. Shri S.K. Bhargav, counsel for Improvement Trust, also made a statement that he had got no objection if the suit was decided in view of the statements of Lekh Raj, defendant No. 2 and Brij Lal, plaintiff. Consequently, the suit was decided. It is an admitted fact that Brij Lal had paid the amount of Rs. five lacs to Lekh Raj on 15.9.1998 and thereafter Lekh Raj had filed the present appeals. Since, Brij Lal, father of Lekh Raj had made payment of Rs. five lacs on 15.9.1998 i.e. prior to 4.10.1998, so, he had become the absolute owner of the whole of the shop site No. 39. If Brij Lal had abandoned his suit with respect to another one and a half shop, then, possibly Lekh Raj cannot raise any objection because the suit was filed by Brij Lal and not by Lekh Raj. In another suit titled Lekh Raj v. Brij Lal and Karnal Improvement Trust, Lekh Raj-petitioner (plaintiff) alongwith his counsel, Shri Mohinderjit Singh, made statement that since case Brij Lal v. Karnal Improvement Trust and others had been decided, so, he did not want to proceed with the present suit and as such, the same may be dismissed. Consequently, the said suit was dismissed. 16. The petitioner, Lekh Raj, is not an illiterate person but he signs in English and thus, is an educated person. He knows the consequences of making statement in the Court. Certainly, he had abandoned his case under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC by making statement in case titled Lekh Raj v. Brij Lal and Karnal Improvement Trust. The allegations made against his counsel that he did not properly guide him as he was to be listed on the panel of counsel for Improvement Trust, is neither here, nor there. As far as the maintainability of the appeals is concerned, the same are maintainable in view of Order 43 Rule 1-A(2) read with Section 96(1) CPC. The allegations made against his counsel that he did not properly guide him as he was to be listed on the panel of counsel for Improvement Trust, is neither here, nor there. As far as the maintainability of the appeals is concerned, the same are maintainable in view of Order 43 Rule 1-A(2) read with Section 96(1) CPC. This has been so observed by the Kerala High Court in Susheela v. Kuttikrishnan, 1998(3) Civil Court Cases 541 (Kerala). 17. Counsel for the petitioner contended that he never entered into a compromise but he was misled by the counsel and as such, the order of compromise should be recalled and the suits should be restored to the original numbers. The contention of the learned counsel is not tenable. The authority Ram Lal v. Brij Kishore, 1995(2) Civil Court Cases 142 (P&H) referred by counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the above mentioned case, suit was dismissed as withdrawn in view of the compromise. Later on, plaintiff prayed for setting-aside the order of dismissal on the allegations that he never entered into an agreement nor did he authorise the counsel. The suit was restored to the original number. Here the statement was signed by petitioner, Lekh Raj, and also by his counsel, Shri Mohinderjit Singh, in token of the correctness of the contents of the compromise. The petitioner is not an illiterate person who is supposed to thumb marked only and did not understand the meaning of the withdrawal of the suit but he had taken a conscious decision to get his suit dismissed as withdrawn and to make his statement in another suit titled Brij Lal v. Improvement Trust that if his father paid Rs. five lacs by 4.10.1998, then he would become owner of the whole of the shop, otherwise he (Lekh Raj) would become owner of the whole of the shop. The compromise was even acted upon as Lekh Raj accepted Rs. five lacs on 15.9.1998. Thus, in view of this compromise, Lekh Raj made statement in another suit consciously and got the same dismissed as withdrawn. There is no material on file which could show that the compromise recorded was not lawful within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC or it was vitiated by any fraud or mis-representation. five lacs on 15.9.1998. Thus, in view of this compromise, Lekh Raj made statement in another suit consciously and got the same dismissed as withdrawn. There is no material on file which could show that the compromise recorded was not lawful within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC or it was vitiated by any fraud or mis-representation. The Honble Supreme Court in Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another, AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1139 held that trial Court can entertain an application of plaintiff for consideration of the allegation that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC and if it was found to be not lawful, then the order can be recalled. Even the plaintiff can question the validity of the compromise in appeal in view of Section 96(1) of the Code read with Order 43 Rule 1-A. However, at the cost of repetition I may state that there is no prima facie circumstance that the compromise itself is fraudulent as such, it shall be deemed to be unlawful and void. Otherwise also, it does not appeal to reason that Lekh Raj was a tenant in one of the shops under his father. There were only three tenants, namely, Harcharan Singh, Mulakh Raj and Pritam Singh under Brij Lal, who were allotted independent shops under Scheme No. 49 by the Improvement Trust. Two shops were also allotted to Ram Lila Sabha. However, no shop was allotted to Brij Lal or muchless to Lekh Raj. Thereafter, the Government had appointed Shah Commission to look into and enquire about the irregularities committed by the Improvement Trust in allotment of the shops. On 24.11.1977, an undertaking was given by the Improvement Trust before the Shah Commission to the effect that arrangement was being made for allotment of a shop to Lekh Raj and his father Brij Lal and ultimately one Shop No. 39 was jointly allotted to them having one half share each. In fact, Shri Brij Lal was entitled to one shop but in order to satisfy his son also, half share was allotted to him. 18. In fact, Shri Brij Lal was entitled to one shop but in order to satisfy his son also, half share was allotted to him. 18. Counsel for the petitioner further contended that by the dismissal of the suit of the petitioner as withdrawn, his claim regarding allotment of one full shop to him qua the Improvement Trust had been left undecided and this had happened due to mis-representation/mistake of facts and due to mis-understanding and also due to lack of advice by his counsel, Shri Mohinderjit Singh. It has already been observed that the petitioner is an educated person. He had made a conscious statement. There is no question that he had been mis- led by lack of advice on behalf of his counsel or his counsel had wrongly advised him or there was mistake of facts. Since, he knew that he was not to be allotted any shop, so, he withdraw the suit. His main purpose was to get some money from his father and having succeeded in getting Rs. five lacs from his father, he withdraw the suit and also effected compromise in another suit. Thus, there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order. Consequently, all the six revision petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.