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2002 DIGILAW 1113 (SC)

MOHANAN PILLAI v. STATE OF KERALA

2002-09-11

D.M.DHARMADHIKARI, UMESH C.BANERJEE

body2002
ORDER 1. Sometimes truth is stranger than fiction though in the normal course of events there is no justifiable reason there for but the present matter provides C such an instance: strange are the ways the blood relations react in particular situations, but the present case presents one of the rarest of the rare specimens of how the blood relation would react in a given situation. 2. This introduction is being made a part of this order by reason of the fact that the father, a 74 year old man, was brutally murdered by his elder son d with 26 injuries as per the medical evidence. The son, on the date of occurrence, was aged about 32/33 years, obviously a young man with high spirits and energy but had a devastating temper which in fact has deprived him of the parental love. Be that as it may, coming back to the contextual facts, it appears that the deceased father chastised the sister of the accused about two weeks back from the date of the occurrence. The accused was not e available in town on that date but after his arrival and on being told by the sister, the son became an aggressor and blows and fists started pouring in. It is on this background the Sessions Court thought it fit to record at this juncture that the father flashed out a knife and is said to have inflicted some injuries on the son. The knife, the evidence records, however, was taken away from the father by the son, obviously a 74 year old man cannot resist a 32 year old young man, who sat on the chest of the father and started inflicting wounds on to the father's body. That did not, however, pacify the anger of the son against the father for having chastised the sister, the son thereafter went out and brought a wooden leg piece of a wooden bench and hit the father which resulted in the deceased breathing his last immediately. 3. It is on this factual background that the Court of Session thought it fit to consider that the case does not fall under the rarest of rare cases but thought it fit to sentence the accused to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code. 4. 3. It is on this factual background that the Court of Session thought it fit to consider that the case does not fall under the rarest of rare cases but thought it fit to sentence the accused to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code. 4. The High Court laid its concurrence upon confirmation of conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal. 5. This Court, however, thought it fit that the matter needs to be delved h into initially on the ground of nature of offence upon condonation of delay of about 1000 days but subsequently the leave was granted to this matter. We are not expressing any opinion as regards the earlier order as passed by this Court but the fact remains that the entire matter is now open, for our appreciation and we invited the learned advocate for the appellant-accused to make his submissions though the learned advocate in his prudence thought it fit to restrict it to the nature of offence, namely, whether the offence, as noticed above, would fall within the ambit of Section 302 or Section 304 Part I of the Penal Code. The Sessions Court, of course, negatived it and so did the High Court. 6. It is difficult for us to concede to the prayer of the learned advocate, more so, in the fact situation of the matter under consideration without even taking recourse to the relationship between the accused and the deceased. The submission of the learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal has been that on greatest provocation this murder has taken place though, however, he was unable to refute the charge of being the aggressor at the first instance, since the facts only depict the same. 7. Incidentally, in Murau v. State of T.N.) one of us (Banerjee, 1. dealt with the issue as regards the right of private defence and in para 8 thereof it has been noticed as below: (SCC p. 234) "8. Right of private defence is undoubtedly, a defence available to an accused but the court' while dealing with the defence, ought to act with proper circumspection and caution, since the same is an exception rather than a rule." 8. The exception spoken of, however, is statutory in nature and Section 300 Exception 2 of the Penal Code makes it clear and categorical on that score. The exception spoken of, however, is statutory in nature and Section 300 Exception 2 of the Penal Code makes it clear and categorical on that score. The specific reference of the statute that the availability of such a defence is without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. Admittedly, the knife was taken away from the father's possession by the son and the son sat on the chest of the father and inflicted as many as 26 wounds. It is only thereafter and not being satisfied with the same he took out a leg piece of a wooden bench and hit him causing immediate collapse and death of the father. It is on this background that the submission, as rendered by the learned advocate in support of the appeal, will have to be considered and upon consideration of the same, we do feel it expedient to record that without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence, that does not stand satisfied in the contextual facts. In our view, the High Court is otherwise right in accepting and confirming the judgment of the Court of Session and as such this appeal fails and is dismissed.