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2002 DIGILAW 1115 (PNJ)

Ganpat Rai v. Parsotam Singh

2002-10-23

N.K.SUD

body2002
Judgment N.K.Sud, J. 1. This civil revision is directed against the order of the Appellate Authority, Gurdaspur dated 8.10.1982, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner against the order of the Rent Controller, Pathankot dated 17.12.1981. 2. The petitioner landlord had filed an application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short the Act) for eviction of the respondent-tenant from a part of his house on the ground floor on the ground of personal necessity. The house is situated within the municipal limits of Pathankot. One portion of this house comprising of three rooms, one bath room and one kitchen had been kept by him for himself for his personal use and the remaining portion consisting of one kitchen, one store, one bath room, one verandah and two rooms with a courtyard on the front had been let out to the respondent-tenant. The petitioners family at the relevant time consisted of himself, two sons and five daughters; three of whom were married and living in their respective homes. The petitioner claimed that his son was about to be married and, therefore, he required the additional accommodation for his own use. The Rent Controller rejected this petition on the ground that from the material on record it was no where evident that the son of the petitioner had been betrothed and that his marriage had been fixed. Thus it could not be spelt out that on account of the imminence of the marriage, his son was to live separately from the other members of the family. He therefore, termed the plea of personal necessity of the landlord as speculative and not objective. He also referred to an earlier litigation in which similar claim made by the petitioner had been rejected by the Rent Controller and the appeal filed before the Appellate Authority, Gurdaspur, was also rejected. These findings have been upheld by the Appellate Authority in the impugned order. 3. Mr. Munish Jolly, learned counsel for the petitioner states that both the authorities below have gravely erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioner. It is pointed out that the reliance placed by them on the earlier round of litigation is totally misplaced as the factual position had undergone a change. It is true that in the earlier round of litigation also, eviction had been sought on the ground of personal necessity. It is pointed out that the reliance placed by them on the earlier round of litigation is totally misplaced as the factual position had undergone a change. It is true that in the earlier round of litigation also, eviction had been sought on the ground of personal necessity. However, thereafter, it was claimed that the petitioners son, who was 23 years of age at the relevant time, was about to be married and, therefore, additional accommodation was needed for him. He further states that both the courts below have wrongly termed his claim for personal necessity as speculative. According to him, it is not for the tenant or for the Rent Controller to sit over the judgment on this aspect. It is for the landlord to decide as to what accommodation is needed by him and his family. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Limited, (1999 (1) 121 P.L.R. 805 (S.C,), in which it has been held that the tenant is nobody to dictate his terms in the matter of bonafide requirement. 4. No one is present on behalf of the respondent. 5. After hearing the counsel for the petitioner, I am satisfied that the petition deserves to succeed, It has been correctly pointed out that the decision in the earlier round of litigation had no bearing on the subsequent claim. The circumstances had indeed undergone a change. A young man of 23 years would normally be married and the Rent Controller had taken too narrow a view in observing that no evidence had been placed on record that he had been betrothed and about to be married. This observation of the Rent Controller has not even been accepted by the Appellate Authority who has proceeded on the assumption that even if the son was to be married, the accommodation in the possession of the landlord was sufficient. The entire issue has been dealt with by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on the basis of conjectures. They had totally lost sight of the fact that the bona fide requirement of the landlord has to be seen from his point of view and as observed by the Supreme Court in Sarla Ahunas case (supra) and no body can dictate terms to the landlord in the matter of bona fide requirement. 6. They had totally lost sight of the fact that the bona fide requirement of the landlord has to be seen from his point of view and as observed by the Supreme Court in Sarla Ahunas case (supra) and no body can dictate terms to the landlord in the matter of bona fide requirement. 6. It is not disputed that the family of the landlord consisted of himself, his two sons and five daughters; three of whom were married. The total accommodation in the entire house consists of five rooms. The landlords claim that he required the entire accommodation for his personal use can not be described as fanciful or a mere desire. Even if the son who was to be married were not be live separately but with the family, he would certainly require extra accommodation. In this view of the matter, I am satisfied that the petitioners application under Section 13 of the Act deserves to be allowed. 7. Accordingly, the order of the Rent Controller dated 17.12.1981 and that of the Appellate Authority dated 8.10.1982 are hereby set aside. The petitioners application under Section 13 of the Act is allowed. The respondent is granted three months time to vacate the demised premises. Since no one has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent, there shall be no order as to costs.