C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) A-2 in Sessions Case No. 244 of 1998 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge for trial of offences under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-cum-VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, is the appellant. ( 2 ) APPELLANT and four others were charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 376, 384, 506, 509, 109 and 120-A read with Section 34, I. P. C. Since A-3 in the crime was absconding, the case against him was split up and appellant and three others were committed to take therein trial in a Court of Session. The learned VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, to whom the case was made over, framed charges under Sections 120-B, 109, 376, 384, I. P. C. read with Section 34, I. P. C. , Section 506 I. P. C. read with Section 34 I. P. C. and Section 509 I. P. C. read with Section 34, I. P. C. against the appellant and the other accused. The appellant and the three other accused not pleaded guilty of the offences charged against them. In support of its case the prosecution examined eight witnesses and marked Exs. P1 to P5 and M. Os. 1 to 13. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution, the appellant and the other accused were examined under Section 313, Cr. P. C. None of the accused adduced oral or documentary evidence. The learned VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge holding that charges against A1 and the appellant are proved, convicted them for the offences charged and holding that the charges against A5 and A6 are not proved against them, acquitted them of all the charges framed against them and sentenced the appellant to Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 376 read with Section 120-B, I. P. C. , rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default simple imprisonment for two months for the offence under Section 292 (A), I. P. C. , Rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 384 read with Section 511, I. P. C. , simple imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default simple imprisonment for two months for the offence under Section 292 (A), I. P. C. , Rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 384 read with Section 511, I. P. C. , simple imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 506 read with Section 34 I. P. C. , simple imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs. 500/- in default simple imprisonment for 15 days for the offence under Section 509 read with Section 34, I. P. C. , and directed the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently. Hence this appeal by A2, questioning his conviction and sentences imposed. ( 3 ) IT is sated that A-1 also preferred an appeal against the conviction and sentences imposed against him. At the time of admission of this appeal, the learned Judge while admitting the appeal refused to grant bail to the petitioner and dismissed Criminal M. P. No. 4621 of 2002 filed by the appellant seeking bail during the pendency of the appeal. Subsequently the petitioner filed another bail application. When that petition came up before my learned brother T. Ch. Surya Rao, J. , he while observing that it is not proper to consider bail application, because the earlier bail application was dismissed, directed the appeal to be posted for final hearing. When the appeal came up for hearing before him, he directed the appeal being posted before another Bench. So, as per the directions of My Lord the Chief Justice, the appeal came up before me for hearing. ( 4 ) WHEN the appeal was listed for hearing, the learned Counsel for the appellant, while addressing arguments on the bail application, stated that in the appeal filed by A1, who allegedly committed the offence of rape, was granted bail and so the appellant who is convicted by invoking Section 120-B and Section 34, I. P. C. , for rape allegedly committed by A1, is also entitled to bail. When I stated that appellant cannot be granted bail in view of the order dismissing his bail application filed along with the appeal and the observation made by my learned brother Surya Rao, J. , he addressed arguments in the appeal, though normally this appeal and the appeal preferred by A1 should have been heard together. Since the conviction of A1 in respect of the charges framed against him is not suspended by this Court in the appeal preferred by him, it has to be taken that conviction of A1 for the charges framed against him is still in force, and on the premise that A1 committed the offences alleged against him, the case of the appellant, for the charges framed against him by the trial Court, has to be considered. ( 5 ) THE case of the prosecution is that appellant and A3 are friends of A1, A4 and A5 who are brothers and were the neighbours of P. Ws. 1, 2 and 3, who are son, daughter and widowed mother, at Nampally. Since the parents of A1, A4 and 5 have no daughters, they used to treat P. W. 2 like their daughter. Subsequently they i. e. A1, A4 and 5 and their parents shifted their residence to Banjara Hills from Nampally, but the mutual visits between their family and P. Ws. 1 to 3 continued. One day when the parents of A1, A4 and 5 were away, the appellant and the other accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy to extract money from P. W. 3 by taking nude pictures of P. W. 2, made a telephone call to the house on the pretext that his mother wants to see her. After P. W. 2 went to the house of A1, he gave her water with some pills and made her unconscious and took her to his bed room, and after committing rape, took her nude photographs and sent them to P. W. 3 with a demand for Rs. 5,00,000/-, under a threat that if that amount were not to be paid, enlarged nude photographs of P. W. 2 would be pasted on the walls, and so P. W. 1 gave Ex. P1 report to P. W. 7. 5,00,000/-, under a threat that if that amount were not to be paid, enlarged nude photographs of P. W. 2 would be pasted on the walls, and so P. W. 1 gave Ex. P1 report to P. W. 7. ( 6 ) THE evidence of P. W. 1 is that the mother of A1, A4 and A5, their neighbour when they were residing at Nampally for a number of years, used to treat his sister (P. W. 2) as her daughter, and so there was close association and mutual visits by the family members in both families and therefore even after A1, A4 and A5 and their parents shifted their residence to Banjara Hills from Nampally, A1 used to visit his house at Nampally frequently, and he and P. W. 2 also used to go to the house of A1 at Banjara Hills frequently, and one day A1 made threatening phone calls and thereafter they received a envelope containing the nude photographs of his sister (P. W. 2) in a compromising position with a man whose head portion in the photograph was removed, to hide his identity, and a few days later i. e. , on 28-10-1996. A1, A4 and Arjuna Rao (A3) came to his house at 11 AM and threw a packet containing photographs of his sister (P. W. 2) with a man, and in the meanwhile a number of telephone calls demanding five lakh rupees from them, holding out a threat that in the event of their failure to pay the amount demanded, the nude photographs of P. W. 2 would be pasted as wall posters and would also be circulated to his relatives and in those telephone calls A1 also stated that he has partners and those partners also are interested in receiving money, and so he went to the house of A1 at about 8. 30 P. M. on 2-11-1996 to settle the matter with him and having found all the accused in the house of A1, made a request to them not to spoil the life of his sister (P. W. 2), but they insisted on his paying the amount demand by them in exchange of the negatives and videographed film of the nude scenes of his sister (P. W. 2) and so he gave Ex. P1 report to police. P1 report to police. During cross-examination he admitted that he did not state in his statement recorded by police under Section 161, Cr. P. C. that A1 informed him that other persons also are involved as partners and so huge money is being demanded and that on 2-11-1996 when he went to the house of A1, all the accused also were present there, and that he begged them not to spoil the life of his sister. ( 7 ) ). The evidence of P. W. 2 is that, as the parents of A1 have no daughters, they used to treat her as their daughter and so even after they (A1 and his family members) shifted their residence to Banjara Hills from her neighbourhood at Nampally, A1 used to visit her house and she and P. W. 1 also used to visit the house of A1 frequently and that on 15-7-1996, at about 1 P. M. , after receiving a phone call from A1 that his mother wants to see her, she went to the house of A1 and found the appellant there in the house of A1 and on seeing her the appellant went away and thereafter when she drank the water given by A1 she felt drowsy and started losing conscience, and at that stage A1 took her into his bed room and thereafter while she was still in a semi-conscious stage, she found A1 lying naked by her side and somebody taking video through the window, and thereafter became unconscious for a long time, and after regaining consciousness she found the appellant and A1 handling a video camera in a closed room, and while leaving the house of A1 she found the appellant on the verandah of the house of A1 and after a few days her mother informed her that her nude photographs with a man, whose face in the photograph was cut off, were delivered with a demand of five lakh rupees for returning the negatives of those photographs. The learned Public Prosecutor wanted to get the photographs received by the mother of the witness, marked as exhibits through this witness. But the learned trial Judge refused to mark those photographs on the ground the negatives of the photographs were not produced by the prosecution. The learned Public Prosecutor wanted to get the photographs received by the mother of the witness, marked as exhibits through this witness. But the learned trial Judge refused to mark those photographs on the ground the negatives of the photographs were not produced by the prosecution. The learned trial Judge, in my considered opinion, was in error in not permitting the prosecution to bring on record the photographs received by the mother of the witness as exhibits on behalf of the prosecution that too when the case of the prosecution is that A1, by sending the nude photographs of P. W. 2 to P. W. 3, demanded money from P. W. 3 in exchange of the negatives of those photographs. Whether anything embarrassing either to the person (s) found in the photograph (s) or to his kin if they are exposed to others can be known by the Court only when the photographs are brought on record. If nothing which is odd or embarrassing is found in the photographs, the demand for ransom or extortion may not be believed by the Court. So it is essential for the prosecution to bring on record the photographs allegedly sent with a demand for ransom and so the photographs ought to be marked as exhibits by the trial Court. The question whether those photographs were sent or not by the accused will have to be decided on the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The trial Court obviously failed to keep in view the fact a person who tries to extract money by taking photographs of persons in nude, would not send the negatives of the photographs also with his demand for ransom. Therefore prosecution cannot be expected to produce the negatives of the photographs allegedly sent by an accused demanding ransom for delivering the negatives of the photographs sent, if the police, during investigation, are able to recover the negatives from the accused, those negatives also would be marked by the prosecution. The trial Court, thus, committed an error in not allowing the photographs being marked as exhibits through P. W. 2. Be that as it may, P. W. 2, during cross-examination stated that she knows the appellant because he used to come along with P. W. 1, and denied the suggestion that she does not know who the appellant is. The trial Court, thus, committed an error in not allowing the photographs being marked as exhibits through P. W. 2. Be that as it may, P. W. 2, during cross-examination stated that she knows the appellant because he used to come along with P. W. 1, and denied the suggestion that she does not know who the appellant is. ( 8 ) I am constrained to observe that the evidence of P. W. 3, nay some of the other P. Ws. , also, is not properly recorded. Since the word accused is singular and plural also, the trial Courts while recording the evidence of witnesses should be careful in recording the evidence of witnesses when they are speaking with reference to the accused . So the trial Courts should specifically note the number of accused when a witness is referring to one or some only of the number of accused involved in a case. In this case, A1, A4 and A5 are brothers. Since A3 is absconding, only, A1, appellant, A4 and A5 took trial. A1, A4 and A5 being brothers live in the same house. From the memo of charges framed by the trial Court it is seen that the appellant is a resident of Sultan Bazar, which is far away from Banjara Hills, where A1, A4 and A5 reside. The evidence of P. W. 3, as recorded by the trial Court, reads :-EARLIER we were staying at Nampally. I know all the accused. They were our neighbours in a rented house. They used to move very close to us. They also used to visit our house. Thereafter they shifted to Banjara Hills. And on one day, A1 and Arjun, Madhu dropped the photos in my house. I also received phones and they had photos and video cassettes. " (Underlyning mine) arjun and Madhu spoken to by P. W. 3 probably relate to A3 and A4. The sentence they (i. e. , the accused) used to move very close to us in the above extracted portion of the evidence of P. W. 3 obviously has reference to A1, A4 and A5 only, but not A2 i. e. , the appellant, because admittedly he was never the neighbour of P. W. 3, P. Ws. 1 and 2 also did not state that at one point of time appellant was their neighbour. 1 and 2 also did not state that at one point of time appellant was their neighbour. So, obviously P. W. 3 was speaking only about A1, A4, and A5, and may be about A3 also, when she stated that they dropped the photographs in her house. But due to improper recording of the evidence of P. W. 3, it appears as if appellant also was a neighbour of P. W. 3, and thus is known to her. The evidence of P. W. 3 is that she sent P. W. 1 to talk to the accused about the phone calls and that they demanded Rupees Five Lakhs for returning the photographs and negatives. Even assuming that the accused referred to in the evidence of P. W. 3 included the appellant also, since her knowledge of the demand of five lakh rupees by the accused is through P. W. 1 only, it is in the nature of hearsay evidence, and so the evidence of P. W. 3 is not of help to the prosecution to establish the guilt of the appellant for any of the charges framed against him. ( 9 ) THE evidence of P. W. 4 is that he imparts training to youth in Photography and Videography. Since he did not identify the appellant or the other accused, his evidence is not very relevant for deciding this appeal. ( 10 ) THE evidence of P. W. 5, a Videopgrapher and Photographer, is that he hires his Video Camera at Rs. 200/- per eight hours, and that appellant and A1 took his Video camera on hire. During cross-examination he stated number of people take Video cameras on hire from him, and that he maintains a Register containing the details of the persons that took the video cameras on hire from him, and that Register does not disclose the appellant and A1 taking the video camera on hire from him and that police showed the appellant and A1 outside the Court hall and asked him to identify those persons in Court and so he identified them. ( 11 ) P. W. 6 is a Pancha at the time of seizure of M. Os. 1 to 5 under Ex. P2 panchanama, at the instance of A1. His evidence is not relevant for deciding this appeal. ( 12 ) ). P. W. 7 is the Police Officer who registered Ex. ( 11 ) P. W. 6 is a Pancha at the time of seizure of M. Os. 1 to 5 under Ex. P2 panchanama, at the instance of A1. His evidence is not relevant for deciding this appeal. ( 12 ) ). P. W. 7 is the Police Officer who registered Ex. P1 report given by P. W. 1 and issued Ex. P3 (F. I. R ). His evidence also is not relevant for deciding this appeal. P. W. 8, the Investigating Officer. During cross-examination he admitted that P. W. 2 did not state before him that she saw somebody taking a Video through the window or that after regaining conscience, she found A1 and the appellant handling the Video camera in closed doors. ( 13 ) FROM the above evidence on record it is seen that only P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 spoke about the appellant. As stated earlier, since the evidence of P. W. 3 is in the nature of hearsay, no reliance can be placed on her evidence. So the evidence of only P. Ws. 1, 2 and 5 remains. ( 14 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that since the evidence of P. W. 2 does not disclose that she was a victim of rape and since there is not even an iota of evidence against the appellant to show that there was a conspiracy between the appellant and A1 to rape P. W. 2, or to extract money from P. Ws. 1 and 3, merely on the basis of the evidence of P. W. 2 that she found the appellant on the verandah of the house of A1 when she went to the house of A1 and saw somebody taking Video through a window and later found the appellant and A1 handling a video camera in closed doors, the trial Court was in error in convicting the appellant for the offences charged against him, that too when P. W. 8 admitted that P. W. 2 did not state before him that she saw appellant on the verandah or handling the video camera along with A1 in closed doors in her Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement. P. C. statement. His next contention is that the trial Court was in error in taking into consideration the video film without putting the contents therein to the appellant during his examination under Section 313, Cr. P. C. by relying on Bommisetty Anjaneyulu v. State of A. P. , 2002 (1) Andh LD (Cri) 387 and Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 415 : (1956 Cri LJ 805 ). The contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that since the offence alleged is rape, in her agony and shock, P. W. 2 not mentioning the minute details in her Section 161, Cr. P. C. is not and cannot be a ground for disbelieving her evidence. Relying on State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, 1996 Cri LJ 2448 : ( AIR 1996 SC 1744 ) and State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan, 2000 SCC (Cri) 1474 : (2000 Cri LJ 4584) he contended that since a charge under Section 120-B, I. P. C. can only be proved by circumstantial evidence and since evidence of P. W. 2 clearly establishes that she saw the appellant in the house of A1 on the day of the incident, the trial Court rightly convicted the appellant also for the offences alleged and so there are no grounds to interfere with the conviction and sentences imposed by the trial Court on the appellant. ( 15 ) AS stated earlier since the conviction under Section 376, I. P. C. against A1 is not suspended, this appeal has to be decided on the basis that A1 is guilty of rape. Since the judgment under appeal does not show that the appellant was found guilty on the basis of the contents of the Video Cassette, appellant cannot be heard to complain that he is prejudiced by the learned trial Judge convicting A1 for an offence under Section 376, I. P. C. by viewing the video tape seized from his possession. He cannot also be heard to say that he is prejudiced by the omission of the trial Court putting some questions in his Section 313, Cr. P. C. examination. The purpose of Section 313, Cr. P. C. examination is to give an opportunity to the accused persons to offer their explanation in respect of the incriminating evidence adduced by the prosecution against him or them. P. C. examination. The purpose of Section 313, Cr. P. C. examination is to give an opportunity to the accused persons to offer their explanation in respect of the incriminating evidence adduced by the prosecution against him or them. In this case the learned trial Judge put all the incriminating evidence against the appellant to him in his Section 313, Cr. P. C. examination. So both the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant have no relevance for deciding this appeal. ( 16 ) SOMNATH Thapa case (1996 Cri LJ 2448) (supra) relied on by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor relates to Bombay blastings that took place on 12-3-1993, which shocked the nation. After investigation charge-sheet was filed against some persons. The question before the Supreme Court was whether there was sufficient material on record to frame a charge for an offence under Section 120-B, I. P. C. against those accused. On behalf of the prosecution it was contended that in order to establish a charge under Section 120b, I. P. C. it is not necessary to establish that the accused (from whom RDX etc. was recovered) knew that that RDX and/or bomb was/were meant to be used for bomb blast at Bombay so long as they knew that the material would be used for bomb blast in any part of the country. In that connection it was held that to establish a charge of conspiracy, knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary and in some cases intent of unlawful use being made of goods or service in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself, and it was further held that prosecution need not establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or services in question could not be put to any lawful use (emphasis supplied ). Since handling or using a Video Camera per se is not an offence and since there is no presumption in law that whoever is found handling a video camera must be using it for an unlawful purpose, the said decision has no application to the facts of this case and no inference can be drawn against the appellant that there was a conspiracy between the appellant and A1 to rape P. W. 2, merely because P. W. 2 stated that she saw the appellant in the house of A1 when she went there and later found appellant and A1 handling a video camera. In Sugathan case (2000 Cri LJ 4584) (supra) relied on by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor it is held that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy is not generally available, and its existence is a matter of inference to be deduced from the acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose which is common between them, and that in order to prove criminal conspiracy there must be evidence direct or cicumstantial to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence, and when the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred from circumstances, the prosecution has to show that the circumstances which give rise to a conclusive and irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence, and since the prosecution has to establish the case beyond all reasonable doubt, a few bits here and a few bits there on which it relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy, and in cases where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the Court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or had come together to pursue the unlawful object. Keeping the tests laid down in the above decision, the evidence on record has to be scrutinized to find out if the prosecution is able to establish the charge under Section 120-B, I. P. C. against the appellant for the rape of P. W. 2 held to have been committed by A1 and for the offences alleged are held to have been proved against A1. ( 17 ) SINCE P. W. 5 clearly admitted that the police had shown the appellant to him outside the Court hall for purpose of identification, his identification of the appellant in Court is of no use to the prosecution. P. W. 5 also clearly admitted during cross-examination that the Register he maintains in connection with the hiring of the video camera does not disclose his renting out the video camera to appellant or A1 on that day. Therefore, the evidence of P. W. 5 is of no help to establish the conspiracy between appellant and A1. ( 18 ) SINCE P. W. 1 admitted during cross-examination that he did not state to the police, in his Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement, that A1, in his phone calls, informed that other persons also are involved as partners and no so huge amount is being demanded and also admitted that neither in Ex. A1 nor his Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement did he state that on 2-11-1996 when he went to the house of A1 he found appellant and other accused there and begged them not to spoil the life of P. W. 2, his evidence in chief examination that appellant also was present when he went to the house of A1 on 2-11-1996 at 9. 30 A. M. , and that he begged him also not to spoil the life of P. W. 2 cannot be accepted or believed. ( 19 ) THE evidence of P. W. 2 that she saw the appellant in the house of A1 when she went to his house on his phone call and that appellant left that place on seeing her, and that after her regaining consciousness she found the appellant and A1 handling the video cameras in closed doors cannot be believed because P. W. 8 admitted that she (P. W. 2) did not make such statement in her Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement recorded by him. So it is clear that this version is an improvement during the course of evidence. The contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that since P. W. 2 was in a state of shock, her failure to mention those details in her Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement recorded by him. So it is clear that this version is an improvement during the course of evidence. The contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that since P. W. 2 was in a state of shock, her failure to mention those details in her Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement is an ignorable omission, cannot be accepted because the question of P. W. 2 being in a state of shock, when P. W. 8 recorded her statement under Section 161, Cr. P. C. does not arise because the incident of rape allegedly took place somewhere in July, 1996 and the statement of P. W. 2 recorded on 3-11-1996 i. e. more than three months after the incident. The evidence of P. W. 8 also shows that after recording the statements of P. Ws. 2 and 3, he requested them to go to medical examination, but P. W. 2 refused to undergo medical examination. So it is clear that P. W. 2 was normal, and was not in a state of shock, when P. W. 8 recorded her statement under Section 161, Cr. P. C. ( 20 ) THE evidence of P. W. 2 that she found somebody taking video from the window is contrary to the case of the prosecution because the specific charge against appellant is that he helped A1 other accused in fixing a video camerain the room. Since charge framed against the appellant is that he helped fixing of a video camera inside the room, the question of his being seen by P. W. While operating a video camera outside the room, is clearly contrary to the version of the prosecution P. W. 8 clearly admitted during cross-examination on behalf of the appellant that P. W. 2 does not state that somebody was taking video through window. Thus the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2 and 5 does not at all show any of the ingredients for bringing out the offence of conspiracy between appellant and A1 or abetment by appellant either for rape or for extortion of any money. ( 21 ) IF I may say so Ex. Thus the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2 and 5 does not at all show any of the ingredients for bringing out the offence of conspiracy between appellant and A1 or abetment by appellant either for rape or for extortion of any money. ( 21 ) IF I may say so Ex. P2 i. e. the confession of A1 said to have been recorded in the presence of P. W. 6 does not support the case of the prosecution relating to the conspiracy between appellant and A1 to rape P. W. 2, I am conscious that consfession of an accused before police is not admissible in evidence. But to drive home the point that there is no conspiracy in between the appellant and A1 to rape P. W. 2, I am taking the aid of Ex. P2 where there is not even a whisper about the conspiracy between appellant and A1 to rape P. W. 2 or abetment by appellant to A1 to commit rape on P. W. 2. ( 22 ) SINCE the prosecution failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt the conspiracy between appellant and A1 to commit rape on P. W. 2 and since the evidence on record also does not establish that appellant abetted A1 to commit rape on P. W. 2, it cannot but be said that the prosecution failed to establish the charges under Sections 120-B, 109 read with 376 IPC against the appellant. ( 23 ) P. W. 2 did not state anything about appellant trying to extract money. The evidence of P. W. 3 is in the nature of hearsay. P. W. 1 did not state in his Sec. 161, Cr. P. C. statement that appellant made any demand for money. In Ex. P1 report he stated that he has a suspicion against appellant. Suspicion, however strong, is not a substitute for proof. The evidence on record does not show that appellant accompanied A1, A4 and A5 when they allegedly made a demand of Rs. 5,00,000/- from P. Ws. 1 and 3. The evidence of P. W. 1 regarding the presence of the appellant in the house of A1 cannot be accepted because he did not state that fact before P. W. 8 in his Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement. 5,00,000/- from P. Ws. 1 and 3. The evidence of P. W. 1 regarding the presence of the appellant in the house of A1 cannot be accepted because he did not state that fact before P. W. 8 in his Section 161, Cr. P. C. statement. Therefore the offences under Section 384 read with Section 34, I. P. C. , Sections 506 read with S. 34 I. P. C. and 509 read with Section 34, I. P. C. framed against the appellant cannot but be said to be not proved. ( 24 ) THEREFORE, I hold that the prosecution failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt the offences charged against the appellant and so I find him not guilty of the offences charged against him and acquit him of those charges. ( 25 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed and the appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Appeal allowed.