JUDGMENT - BATTA R.K., J.:---The State has come in appeal against the order dated 6th September, 1996, passed by J.M.F.C., Saoner, whereby the respondent was acquitted of the charge under sections 26 and 33 of Indian Forest Act and section 3 of Forest Conservation Act, 1980, which he was facing. The order in question was passed following the directions of the Apex Court in (Common Cause A Registered Society v. Union of Indian and other)1, Writ Petition (C) No. 1128/1986 reported in 1996(4) Bom.C.R. 519 . The appeal has been filed under section 378 read with 482 of Cri.P.C. The appeal was called for hearing yesterday as also today. Though on both days, learned Advocate for the appellant was present, no one appeared on behalf of the respondent. It may be mentioned here that the attendance of the Advocates in the Court in Final Hearing Criminal Matters is not at all satisfactory and at times the Court work cannot be transacted for want of Advocates. In spite of bringing this fact to the notice of the President of Bar, there has been no improvement. Accordingly, the appeal in question was heard in the absence of Advocate for the respondent. 2. Learned Advocate for the appellant firstly submitted before me that the respondent was charged with the offence under sections 26 and 33 of the Indian Forest Act and section 3 of Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and tried for the offences relating to the Acts dealing with the environment have been exempted in terms of para 4 of the judgment in Common Cause A Registered Society v. Union of Indian and others (cited supra) from the principles laid down in 1(a) to 2(f) in the said judgment. Learned Advocate for the appellant also relied upon the Seven Judge Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in (P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka)2, reported in 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (S.C.)859(C.B.) and has drawn my attention specifically to paras 29 and 34 of the said judgment. It is also urged by him that for the delay in start of the trial, the prosecution was not in any way responsible and the trial remained pending mainly because of the respondent remained absent on the dates of hearing. In this respect, he has drawn my attention to the farad orders of the said case which are at pages 8 to 15 of the paper book. 3. In this respect, he has drawn my attention to the farad orders of the said case which are at pages 8 to 15 of the paper book. 3. He has also relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge in (The State of Maharashtra v. Nandkishor Brijalal Shonchatra)3, Criminal Writ Petition No. 135 of 2000, wherein it was held that Forest and Wild Life are integral part of environment and the Indian Forest Act deals with an environment and any offence committed under Indian Forest Act would be covered by the exception carved out by the Apex Court in para 4 of the judgment in Common Cause A Registered Society v. Union of Indian and others (cited supra). 4. All the contentions advanced by the learned Advocate for the appellant are not only well founded, but have the backing of law on the subject. The Apex Court in Common Cause A Registered Society v. Union of Indian and others (cited supra) had laid down certain principles on the basis of which the delay in trials was not countenanced and directions were given for closure of cases and discharge of the accused subject to the condition enumerated in the said principles 1(a) to 2(f). However, it is pertinent to note that it was specifically stated in para 4 of the said judgment that the said directions shall not apply to the cases of offence involving certain categories of cases and in this category Acts dealing with Environment falls. The appellant was being tried for the offence under sections 26 and 33 of the Indian Forest Act and section 3 of Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and without hesitation it can be said that the same relate to Environment. Therefore, the trial Court without taking note of the said exception contained in para 4 of the judgment, ordered the closure of the case as also acquittal of the appellant, which, on the face of it, is illegal and contrary to the judgment of the Apex Court in Common Cause A Registered Society v. Union of Indian and others (cited supra). The Seven Judge Constitution Bench judgment in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (cited supra) has in para 29 clearly laid down that the time limits or the bars of limitation prescribed in several decisions made in Common Cause (I), reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1619 , (Raj Deo Sharma (I))4, 1999(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)1 and (Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar)5, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)184 could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. It will be appropriate at this stage to reproduce the observations of the Seven Judge Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court contained in para 29, which read as under :-- 29. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (I) as modified in Common Cause (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II) the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold : (1) The dictum in A.R. Antulay case is correct and still holds the field. (2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R. Antulay case adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions. (3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (1), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Rajdeo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. (5) The criminal courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be a better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 Cri.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. (6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary quantitatively and qualitatively by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall act. We answer the questions posed in the orders of reference dated 19-9-2000 and 26-4-2001 in the abovesaid terms. 5. The Constitution Bench also pointed out in para 34 that this decision shall not be the ground for reopening a case or proceeding by setting aside any such acquittal or discharge as is based on the authority of 'Common Cause' and 'Raj Deo Sharma' cases and which has already achieved finality and reopen the trial against the accused therein. The case under consideration has not achieved finality since the appeal was admitted and pending before this Court. The case under consideration has not achieved finality since the appeal was admitted and pending before this Court. Besides this, it is pertinent to note that the prosecution was not in any manner responsible for delay in the trial inasmuch as such factors are required to be taken into consideration in terms of the observations in (Abdul Rehman Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak)6, 1993(1) Bom.C.R. 185 A perusal of the farad of the trial Court shows that the complaint was filed on 23-1-1992 and the respondent was discharged on 24-1-1992. The said order of discharge was challenged and the matter was remanded to the trial Court. The matter was fixed in August 1993. From August 1993 to 15-9-1995, the respondent remained absent. On 15-9-1995, the respondent was exempted from appearance. The respondent again remained absent from the next hearing that is to say 12-1-1996 onwards till the date of passing of the impugned order. The farad order, therefore, clearly established that if at all anyone was responsible for delay in the trial, it was the respondent himself and obviously the respondent cannot be given benefit or premium of his own default. The order of the trial Court acquitting the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained on any ground whatsoever. 6. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 6th September, 1996 is hereby set aside and the trial Court shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms. Appeal allowed. -----