ORDER 1. The respondents have chosen not to enter appearance in spite of service being effected. Hence, the matter is proceeded against them ex parte. 2. This appeal pertains to an order of acquittal passed by the High Court against the order of conviction and sentence under Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860 as passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 3. The factual element records that deceased Premlata was married to Brindawan sometime in the year 1979 and the deceased stayed with her husband and in-laws for some time, but there being maltreatment, she had to a leave her in-laws' place and by reason therefor came and stayed in the house of her parents. Thereafter, at the behest of the panch as of the area, though she went back to her husband's place but the same was rather short-lived and by reason of harassment and torture she had to leave her husband's house and came back to the father's house. 4. Fresh attempts by the panchas were made and the deceased Premlata was persuaded to go back to her husband's house upon an assurance to stop harassment. 5. Subsequently, however on 8-4-1983, in the early hours of the morning, Premlata died as a result of bum injuries. By reason of the intervention of the neighbours, the dead body could not be disposed of and the same was sent for post-mortem and Dr Badkar (PW 13) noted extensive bums on the body of the deceased and the medical opinion available on record is that the deceased died by reason of severe bum injuries. 6. The record further depicts that the investigation thereafter commenced and after examining the witnesses, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused persons (respondents herein) for an offence under Section 306 of the Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge upon a perusal of the evidence convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs 200 each. 7. The question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether the harassment by the respondents herein would attract the liability under Section 306 of the Penal Code by operation of Section 113-A of the Evidence e Act? 8. 7. The question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether the harassment by the respondents herein would attract the liability under Section 306 of the Penal Code by operation of Section 113-A of the Evidence e Act? 8. The High Court, however, answered the issue in the negative and allowed the appeal upon setting aside the order of conviction and sentence under Section 306 of the Penal Code as passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 9. The State, however, is in appeal against the order of the High Court, as noticed above. 10. Learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal placed reliance on an earlier decision of this Court in Gurbachan Singh v. Sat pal Singh with which we record our concurrence that the matter stands squarely and evenly covered by the said judgment and it has been held by this Court in paras 41 and 43 as under: (SCC p. 461) "41. On a conspectus of these decisions, this argument on behalf of the appellant fails and as such the presumption arising under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act has been rightly taken into consideration by the trial court. 43. In the instant case on a proper consideration and weighing of the evidences the only reasonable view that can be taken is that the cruel behaviour and constant taunts and harassment caused by the accused persons while Ravinder Kaur, deceased was in her in-laws' house instigated her to commit suicide and in our considered opinion no other reasonable view follows from a proper consideration and appraisement of the evidences on record. As such the decision cited above is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case." 11. Incidentally, this Court in Gurbachan Singh easel upon consideration of the language of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act and its date of incorporation in paras 36 and 37 further stated as under: (SCC pp. 459-60) "36. It has been contended on behalf of the accused-respondents that Section 113-A of the Evidence Act was inserted in the statute book by Act 46 of 1983 whereas the offence under Section 306 IPC was committed on 23-6-1983 i.e. prior to the insertion of the said provision in the Evidence Act. 459-60) "36. It has been contended on behalf of the accused-respondents that Section 113-A of the Evidence Act was inserted in the statute book by Act 46 of 1983 whereas the offence under Section 306 IPC was committed on 23-6-1983 i.e. prior to the insertion of the said provision in the Evidence Act. It has, therefore, been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the provisions of this section cannot be taken recourse to while coming to a finding regarding the presumption as to abetment of suicide committed by a married woman, against the accused persons. 37. The provisions of the said section do not create any new offence and as such it does not create any substantial right but it is merely a matter of procedure of evidence and as such it is retrospective and will be applicable to this case. It is profitable to refer in this connection to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, p. 570 wherein it has been stated that: 'The general rule is that all statutes, other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence, are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature....'" 12. Having regard to the state of law as discussed hereinbefore in Gurbachan Singhl a brief reference to the facts in Gurbachan Singhl ought also to be noticed: Ravinder Kaur, daughter of Gurbachan Singh, resident of Amritsar, was married to Satpal Singh in November 1982 and while living in the house of her in-laws Ravinder Kaur used to visit the house of her parents at Amritsar occasionally and during those visits she used to tell them about the unhappiness of her in-laws and that there was demand for dowry and also taunting of her by the members of the family of her in-laws which had resulted in tremendous amount of mental torture. 13. Situation turned to a point where Gurbachan Singh had to bring Ravinder Kaur to his house for ill-treatment but by reason of the intervention of a social worker and on the assurance of good behaviour, Ravinder Kaur was sent to her in-laws' place once again. 14. 13. Situation turned to a point where Gurbachan Singh had to bring Ravinder Kaur to his house for ill-treatment but by reason of the intervention of a social worker and on the assurance of good behaviour, Ravinder Kaur was sent to her in-laws' place once again. 14. It has been recorded in the judgment that by reason of nonavailability of information, Gurbachan Singh sent his two other daughters Surjit Kaur and Sajinder Kaur to Raja Sansi to the house of the in-laws of Ravinder Kaur to enquire about her welfare. The deceased complained to them about the torture as well as the cruel behaviour of her in-laws and the factum 'f constant maltreatment meted out to her and on 25-6-1983 at about 6.30 p.m. Gurbachan was informed that his daughter had committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body and then setting herself on fire. 15. It is on this set of facts this Court laid down the law as above and in view of the factual backdrop, as noticed hereinbefore in this judgment, the matter in fact fits in with all force, to which we have already lent our concurrence is noticed above. The High Court has ignored the evidence available on record and misread it. 16. The totality of the evidence suggests that such a serious provocation would be enough for an ordinary woman in the Indian set-up to do what the deceased is state have done. 17. It is only-today this Court has been pleased to deliver a judgment in Gurpreet Singh State of Haryana2 more or less on an identical situation and recorded therein that in spite of the legislative acceptance of the social situation this lust for money of one section of people has led the crave (sic) of bride-burning on an ascending scale rather than a descending one. This I matter also is no exception. 18. In the wake of the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to record that the opinion as expressed by the High Court is wholly erroneous both on the state of law as also on the state of the facts. As such, the order under challenge cannot be sustained and stands set aside and that of the trial court stands restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly. As such, the order under challenge cannot be sustained and stands set aside and that of the trial court stands restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The bail bonds of Accused 2 and I 3 shall stand cancelled and they shall serve out the remaining portion of their sentence. Since Respondent 1 has already expired, no order need be passed against him.