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2002 DIGILAW 1131 (AP)

M. Netrananda v. B. Sambasiva Rao

2002-09-18

DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, S.R.NAYAK

body2002
S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these writ petitions are directed against the common order of the special Court under the A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, the special Court) dated 5-3-2001 made in LGA Nos. 17 and 39 of 1999 dismissing the Appeals and confirming the order of the special Tribunal under the A. P. Land grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, the Special Tribunal) dated 20-11-1998 made in OP No. 756 of 1993. ( 2 ) WP No. 1405 8 of 2001 is filed by the applicant in the OP whereas WP no. 11559 of 2001 is by the respondent, who is held to be the land grabber by the special Tribunal as well as the special court in the light of the evidence placed on record. Both the Courts below, however, in lieu of delivery of possession of the application schedule land, awarded compensation in a sum of Rs. 1,80,000/- in exercise of the power conferred purported to be under sub-section (5) of Section (7-A) of the A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) act, 1982 (for short, the Act ). According to the petitioner in WP No. 14058 of 2001, that part of the order which directed payment of compensation in lieu of delivery of possession is one without jurisdiction and such order could not have been passed by the Courts below under the provisions of the Act. It is also his case that even assuming that the Courts below have power to award compensation in lieu of delivery of possession of the application schedule land, even then, the compensation now awarded is very meagre and it does not constitute correct market value of the application schedule land. ( 3 ) IN WP No. 11559 of 2001 filed by the respondent-alleged land grabber, it is contended that the finding recorded by the Courts below that the petitioner is the land grabber within the meaning of that term as defined under Section 2 (d) of the act is perverse and not based any substantive legal evidence. It is also contended that compensation of Rs. 1,80,000/- awarded by the Courts below, in the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the evidence on record, is highly excessive and arbitrary. ( 4 ) IN the context of the rival contentions raised by the parties, the following points arise for our consideration and decision:1. It is also contended that compensation of Rs. 1,80,000/- awarded by the Courts below, in the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the evidence on record, is highly excessive and arbitrary. ( 4 ) IN the context of the rival contentions raised by the parties, the following points arise for our consideration and decision:1. Whether the Courts below have jurisdiction under sub-section (5) of section (7-A) of the Act to award compensation in lieu of delivery of possession of the application schedule land to the land owner?2. Whether the findings recorded by the courts below that the petitioner in wp No. 11559 of 2001 is the land grabber is perverse and liable to be set aside?3. Whether the compensation of rs. 1,80,000/- awarded by the Courts below is arbitrary and unreasonable? ( 5 ) THE first question is no longer res integra. A Division Bench of this Court in mandal Revenue Officer, Saroornagar v. Special Court under A. P. Land grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2001 (4) ALT 687 (DB), was called upon to decide precisely the same question, being whether the Special court under sub-section (7) of Section (8) could award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession. Dealing with the above question, the Court opined that it cannot be done under the Act. We are in respectful agreement with the above view of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court. However, Sri M. V. Suresh, learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP No. 11559 of 2001, relying on the judgment of another Division bench of this Court in Dantuluri vijayalakshmi v. The Special Court under a. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1996 (2) An. WR 64 (DB), contended that the Special Tribunal or the special Court, as the case may be, could award compensation for wrongful possession of land under subsection (5) of Section 7-A or under subsection (7) of Section 8 of the Act. The submission of the learned Counsel is not well-founded. We have perused the judgment in the above case. In that case, the Division bench was not called upon to decide the precise question whether the special Court, under sub-section (7) of Section 8 of the act, could award compensation in lieu of delivery of possession. The submission of the learned Counsel is not well-founded. We have perused the judgment in the above case. In that case, the Division bench was not called upon to decide the precise question whether the special Court, under sub-section (7) of Section 8 of the act, could award compensation in lieu of delivery of possession. What fell for consideration and decision in that case was whether the compensation payable under sub-section (7) of Section 8 of the Act should be determined with reference to the date of the impugned judgment and decree or it should be fixed after adding six months to the date of filing of the application. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH the learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP No. 11559 of 2001 meekly contended that the finding recorded by the Special Tribunal as well as the special Court that the petitioner is the land grabber within the meaning of that term under Section 2 (d) of the Act is perverse, he was not in a position to substantiate that contention. However, the learned Counsel contended that the said finding is vitiated on account of the fact that the special court did not consider the statement of objections filed by the petitioner to the report of the Commissioner appointed by the special Court. But, we find from the record that this submission of the learned Counsel is factually incorrect. The Special Court not only adverted to the fact of filing of objections to the report of the Commissioner by the petitioner in WP No. 11559 of 2001, but also considered in great detail the objections raised in the statement of objections and it has given cogent and convincing reasons to reject the same. The finding recorded by the special Court as well as the Special Tribunal that the petitioner is the land grabber, in the sense that he grabbed plot No. 62 and has put up construction thereon, is unimpeachable in the light of the legal evidence adduced in the case. Should it be noticed at the threshold that in the written statement filed by the petitioner/land grabber, it is specifically contended that he has nothing to do with plot No. 62 and he is the allottee and owner of plot No. 63 and he has made construction only in plot No. 63. The petitioner should stand or sink with his pleading. The petitioner should stand or sink with his pleading. The petitioner cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. The two Commissioners appointed by the Special Tribunal as well as the special court, after due survey and verification of the records found, as a matter of fact, that the petitioner in WP No. 11559 of 2001 has constructed a building in plot No. 62 and not in plot No. 63, as claimed by him. ( 7 ) FROM the records, we do not find any procedural irregularity committed by the courts below or the Commissioners appointed by the Special Tnbunal as well as the Special Court. There is also no controversy between the parties that the applicant is the allottee and owner of plot no. 62. The claim of the applicant that he is the owner of plot No. 62 is well established by sale deed and other legal evidence placed before the special Court. ( 8 ) THIS takes us to the third question. From the record it is seen that in the application filed by the applicant under section 8 of the Act, the value of the application schedule property is shown to be rs. 1,80,000/ -. It is pointed out by the special court that in the written statement filed by the land grabber this assertion made in the application is not denied. On the basis that the petitioner-land grabber has not denied the value of the application schedule property stated by the applicant in his application, the courts below have chosen to award compensation in a sum of Rs. 1,80,000/ -. According to Sri D. V. Sitharama Murthy, learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP no. 14058 of 2001, there is nothing wrong on the part of the Courts below in awarding compensation in terms of the value stated by the applicant in the application filed under section 8 of the Act in the absence of denial of that value by the respondent - land grabber in the written statement filed by him. The learned Counsel, on the other hand, contended that the Courts below ought to have seen that the actual market value of the application schedule land is more than rs. 1,80,000/ -. In support of that plea the learned Counsel would draw our attention to a certificate produced at page 39 of the material papers filed in WP No. 1405 8 of 2001. 1,80,000/ -. In support of that plea the learned Counsel would draw our attention to a certificate produced at page 39 of the material papers filed in WP No. 1405 8 of 2001. Sri M. V. Suresh, learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP No. 1 1559 of 2001, on the other hand, would maintain that there is absolutely no legal evidence on record, except the self-serving statement of the applicant to conclude that the actual market value of the application schedule property is rs. 1,80,000/ -. The learned Counsel would maintain that the Courts below, being the statutory authorities, should have determined the market value independently on the basis of substantive legal evidence and not merely on the self-serving statement of the applicant. We find some force in this contention of Sri M. V. Suresh. ( 9 ) SUB-SECTION (5) of Section 7-A of the Act reads as follows:-"7-A. Special Tribunals and its powers, etc:- 1. xx 2. xx 3. xx 4. xx 5. It shall be lawful for the Special Tribunal to pass an order in any case decided by it, awarding compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession, which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order and profits accrued from the land payable of the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct the re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful owner. The amount of compensation and profits so awarded and cost of re-delivery, if any, shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue if the government are the owner or as a decree of a civil Court, in any other case: provided that the Special Tribunal shall, before passing an order under this subsection, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in this regard and consider every such representation and evidence. "it cannot be gainsaid that the power to award compensation is a discretionary power vested in the special Tribunal under subsection (5) of Section 7-A of the Act. Similar power has been vested in the special court under sub-section (7) of Section 8 of the Act. "it cannot be gainsaid that the power to award compensation is a discretionary power vested in the special Tribunal under subsection (5) of Section 7-A of the Act. Similar power has been vested in the special court under sub-section (7) of Section 8 of the Act. In a given case where the special Tribunal or the special Court thinks it appropriate to award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession, then sub-section (5) of Section 7-A or subsection (7) of Section 8 of the Act requires the Special Tribunal or the special Court, as the case may be, to award compensation which shall not be less than the amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order and also profits accrued from the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of the land grabbed. Therefore, whenever the special Tribunal or the special Court, as the case may be, thinks it appropriate to award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession of the land grabbed, it becomes necessary for the special tribunal or the special Court, as the case may be, to first determine the market value of the land grabbed. It is axiomatic that the market value of the land grabbed cannot be determined solely on the basis of the claim put forth by the applicant. An independent exercise has to be undertaken by the Special Tribunal or the special Court, as the case may be, and it should determine the actual market value of the land grabbed on the basis of substantive legal evidence adduced in the case. ( 10 ) SECONDLY, although a point relating to the payment of compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession was raised before the special Court, the special Court did not take any steps to determine the market value of the land grabbed. Such an issue was not even framed by the Special tribunal. Therefore, the parties had no opportunity to lead evidence on the claim. Therefore, we think it just and proper to direct the special Court to frame an issue relating to the compensation payable to the owner in terms of money for wrongful possession of the application schedule land and decide the same after affording reasonable and fair opportunity of being heard to the applicant and the land grabber. Therefore, we think it just and proper to direct the special Court to frame an issue relating to the compensation payable to the owner in terms of money for wrongful possession of the application schedule land and decide the same after affording reasonable and fair opportunity of being heard to the applicant and the land grabber. ( 11 ) IN the result and for the foregoing reasons, we declare that the Courts below have acted without jurisdiction in awarding only compensation in terms of money in lieu of delivery of vacant possession of the application schedule land in favour of the owner and that the applicant is entitled to seek delivery of the application schedule land. The special Court is directed to put the applicant-owner into possession of the application schedule land after evicting the land-grabber after going through the necessary procedure. The claim of the applicant-owner for compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession is remanded to the special Court with a direction to frame an issue in that regard, permit the parties to lead evidence and decide the same as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. ( 12 ) BOTH the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly in terms of the above directions. No costs.