GOVINDARAJAN P. R. v. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF FISHERIES, METTUR DAM
2002-09-25
F.M.IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, V.S.SIRPURKAR
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.—The challenge in this writ petition is to the order of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, dated September 14, 2001, in O.A. No. 4287 of 1991 in and by which the Tribunal declined to set aside the charge-memo, dated September 13, 1991, issued to the petitioner. 2. The brief facts which led to the filing of the above said O.A. were as under: The petitioner was deputed to work as Secretary of the Mettur Dam Fishermen Co-operative Society some time in the year 1980-82. He was relieved of the said post and was transferred back to the parent department on October 13, 1982. It is stated that an enquiry u/s 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act was held in which it was reported that the petitioner along with the other employees of the society were held responsible for causing loss to the society to the tune of Rs. 1,31,372. Based on the said report, the petitioner was issued with a show-cause notice, dated February 9, 1984. It was followed by an order, dated April 23, 1987, wherein it was held that the petitioner caused loss to the society. The said proceedings, dated April 23, 1987, came to be challenged before the Tribunal for Co-operative Cases and by order, dated August 30, 1990, the proceedings of the Deputy Director of Fisheries Department, dated April 23, 1987, was set aside and the matter was remanded back for holding a fresh enquiry. Thereafter, fresh proceedings were initiated under the new Act u/s 87 and an order came to be passed on September 7, 1991, again holding that the petitioner was liable to make good the loss. Pursuant to the said order, the present charge-memo, dated September 13, 1991, came to be issued to the petitioner under Rule 17(b) of the CCA Rules. It was as against the said charge-memo, the petitioner preferred O.A. No. 4287 of 1991, before the State Administrative Tribunal. In the mean time, as the petitioner reached the age of superannuation, he was permitted to retire on August 31, 1993 without prejudice to the pending disciplinary proceedings. However, all his service benefits were withheld. 3.
It was as against the said charge-memo, the petitioner preferred O.A. No. 4287 of 1991, before the State Administrative Tribunal. In the mean time, as the petitioner reached the age of superannuation, he was permitted to retire on August 31, 1993 without prejudice to the pending disciplinary proceedings. However, all his service benefits were withheld. 3. Be that as it may, the second order, dated September 7, 1991, pursuant to the surcharge proceeding was also challenged before the Co-operative Tribunal, and by an order dated November 28, 1997, the order, dated September 7, 1991, was set aside, once again with a direction to the concerned authority to hold a fresh enquiry. It is on record that on this occasion, the surcharge proceedings, came to be dropped against the petitioner by proceedings, dated October 21, 1999. It is relevant to point out that when the O.A. was taken up for disposal by the State Administrative Tribunal, it was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal about the dropping of the surcharge proceedings in the proceedings, dated October 21, 1999. The petitioner would contend that after his retirement, as he was staying at Vaniyambadi, he was not aware of the proceedings, dated October 21, 1999. The petitioner's O.A. came to be dismissed on September 14, 2001 without reference to the dropping of the surcharge proceedings in the proceedings, dated October 21, 1999. When the petitioner came to know about the said proceedings on November 22, 2001, he approached the Tribunal again by filing a review application in R.A. No. 27 of 2001, which also came to be rejected by the State Administrative Tribunal in its order, dated January 29, 2002. It was in these circumstances, the petitioner came forward with this writ petition, challenging the order of the Tribunal, dated September 14, 2001, in O.A. No. 4287 of 1991. 4. When the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader was directed to take notice and four weeks time was granted to the first respondent to file its counter. The said order was passed on March 5, 2002. Thereafter, the writ petition came up once again for orders on August 13, 2002.
4. When the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader was directed to take notice and four weeks time was granted to the first respondent to file its counter. The said order was passed on March 5, 2002. Thereafter, the writ petition came up once again for orders on August 13, 2002. In view of the development that had taken place after the issuance of the chargesheet, dated September 13, 1991, which culminated in the dropping of the whole surcharge proceedings on October 21, 1999, the learned Government Pleader was directed to make a statement as to whether the respondent really intends to proceed with the enquiry, in view of the exoneration of the petitioner from the surcharge proceedings. The writ petition was directed to be posted after two weeks. Thereafter, when the writ petition came up again on September 2, 2002 further time was given to the Government Pleader to get necessary instructions from the first respondent. The writ petition came up again on September 16, 2002, on that day, the Government Pleader fairly stated that in spite of his best efforts, the first respondent did not come forward to place any material nor furnish any information as to the stand that it proposes to take. The Government Pleader, therefore, expressed his inability to state the case of the first respondent. In the above circumstances, we proceed to pass orders in this writ petition based on the materials placed before us. 5. On a perusal of the chargesheet, dated September 13, 1991, we find that based on the report of the earlier surcharge proceedings, the petitioner was charged with the misconduct of having acted in concert with his co-employees, and indulged in defalcation of accounts, and thereby, committed misappropriation of society's funds. The alleged malfeasance were stated to have been committed during the period 1980-81 and 1981-82. On a perusal of the proceedings of the Deputy Director of Fisheries Department, Coimbatore, dated October 21, 1999, we also find that in the said proceedings the Deputy Director, on detailed analysis of all the material evidence placed before him, found that there was no scope for imposing any surcharge on the concerned employees. Accordingly, he held that the earlier surcharge proceedings, dated September 7, 1991, cannot be sustained.
Accordingly, he held that the earlier surcharge proceedings, dated September 7, 1991, cannot be sustained. When such a definite conclusion was ultimately reached by the Deputy Director in his proceedings, dated October 21, 1999, the charges levelled against the petitioner in the chargesheet, dated September 13, 1991, cannot also stand, since each and every one of the charges framed in the said chargesheet was based on the surcharge proceedings, initiated on November 12, 1983 which was restated in the fresh surcharge proceedings, dated September 7, 1991. Since the very basis of the issuance of the chargesheet, dated September 13, 1991, did not exist after the proceedings of the Deputy Director, dated October 21, 1999, the first respondent cannot be permitted to proceed with the chargesheet dated September 13, 1991, issued to the petitioner. 6. In the said circumstances, when the said subsequent development was not brought to the notice of the second respondent-Tribunal, the petitioner's O.A. came to be dismissed on September 14, 2001, on the ground that there was no scope for quashing the charge-memo. In any event, when the same was brought to the notice of the Tribunal in the review application, we are of the view that Tribunal ought to have held that considering the age of the petitioner, who is now 66 years old, the retention of the chargesheet, dated September 13, 1991, against him would serve no purpose. Moreover, the petitioner, who was permitted to retire on August 31, 1993, was deprived of all his service benefits by virtue of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we feel that the petitioner's O.A. deserves to be allowed and he should be permitted to avail all the terminal benefits without any further delay. 7. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. The charge-memo dated September 13, 1991, issued to the petitioner stands quashed and the first respondent is directed to settle all the terminal benefits of the petitioner, pursuant to his superannuation on August 31, 1993, within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Consequently, connected W.P.M.Ps are closed.