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2002 DIGILAW 1141 (AP)

M. PREMA BAI v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, HYDERABAD

2002-09-20

B.S.A.SWAMY, G.YETHIRAJULU

body2002
G. YETHIRAJULU, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner invoked the special original jurisdiction of this Court through this writ of habeas corpus praying to direct the respondents to produce her son Manoj Kumar singh now detained in Central Prison, chenchalguda, before this Court and to order his release forthwith after declaring that his detention as illegal and void. ( 2 ) IN the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the petitioner averred that on 28-6-2002 the respondent passed an order under Section 3 (2) of the Andhra pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers. Dacoits. Drug offenders, goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act 1 of 1986) (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity) detaining her son manoj Kumar Singh @ Manoj Kumar on the ground that he is a bootlegger as defined in Section 2 (b) of the Act with a view to prevent him from acting in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The said order was served on 29-6-2002. The detenu made a representation to the respondents 1 and 2 and to the Advisory board constituted under the Act. The 2nd respondent and the Advisory Board rejected the same on 12-7-2002 and 19-7-2002 respectively. The Government of Andhra pradesh has confirmed the detention order on 10-8-2002. The petitioner further alleged that her son was detained by taking into consideration four incidents wherein the police found him in possession of 200 packets of Illicit Distilled liquor (ID liquor) intending for sale. The petitioner further mentioned in the affidavit that the order of detention of her son was passed in a mechanical manner on vague, irrelevant, stale and non-existing grounds. She further mentioned that the detenu was granted bail in all the crimes and he was acquitted by the metropolitan Magistrate on 29-1-2002 in cc No. 1682 of 2001 in respect of the alleged offence covered by the second incident under Section 8 (b) of the A. P. Prohibition Act alleged to have been committed by him on 10-10-2000 and the said information which is the most relevant material was not placed before the detaining authority before passing the order of detention. She further mentioned that mere possession of ID liquor sachets does not amount to an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. She further mentioned that mere possession of ID liquor sachets does not amount to an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, the detenu is entitled to be released and the order of detention is liable to be set aside. ( 3 ) BEFORE adverting to the facts of the case, we wish to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 (b) of the act defines "bootlegger" and it reads as follows: "bootlegger" means a person, who distils manufactures, stores- transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any of the provisions of the andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 and the rules, notifications and orders made thereunder, or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the abovementioned things by himself or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing; ( 4 ) SINCE the allegation is that the detenu was in possession of ID arrack, which is an intoxicant, intended for sale in contravention of the provisions of the andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, the rules, notifications and orders made thereunder, and the allegations, if believed, the detenu can be brought within the definition of bootlegger . ( 5 ) SECTION 3 of the Act empowers the Government to make orders detaining certain persons and it reads as follows: 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons : (1) The Government may. if satisfied -with respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do. make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the Jurisdiction of a district Magistrate or a Commissioner of police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do. make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the Jurisdiction of a district Magistrate or a Commissioner of police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do. they may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. Provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed three months, but the Government may. if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do. amend such order to extend such period, from time to time by. any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the government. ( 6 ) SRI C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the order is liable to be quashed on three grounds, namely : (1) The possession of liquor may attract some other penal provision, but there is no material to show that the consumption of ID liquor poses grave or widespread danger to life or public health, which is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (2) The acquittal of the detenu for the alleged possession of ID liquor packets on 10-10-2001 was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority, the said ground is nonexistent, and that had it been brought to the notice of the detaining authority it would have influenced him in coming to a different conclusion and as the information placed before the detaining authority is irrelevant, the order cannot stand. (3) The factum of the detenu enlarged on bail in all the cases was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority. (3) The factum of the detenu enlarged on bail in all the cases was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority. Hence the order is liable to be quashed. Point No. 1: ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the grounds of detention there is no indication that the detenu was indulging in distillation, manufacturing, storing, import, export, sell or distribute ID liquor. Therefore, the mere possession of ID liquor sachets does not show that the acts of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and disturbs the public order and therefore requests that the detention may be declared as illegal and void. ( 8 ) THE Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City, who is the detaining authority, passed an order under Section 3 (2) of the Act on 28-6-2002 and it was served on the detenu on 29-6-2002. In the said order the detaining authority mentioned that the detenu is a bootlegger and is indulging in acts of transportation/sale of id liquor, the consumption of which is harmful to the public health and he is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in Hyderabad city. The order further indicates that the detaining authority was satisfied that the provisions of the Act should be invoked to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and accordingly invoked his powers to detain him. Accordingly the detenu was detained on the date of service of the order by lodging him in the Central prison, Chenchalguda, Hyderabad. The order of the detaining authority is enclosed with the grounds of detention. In the said grounds it was mentioned that the detenu is indulging in transportation/sale of ID liquor for human consumption, that the consumption of the said ID liquor is harmful to public health and is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in Hyderabad city. The order of the detaining authority is enclosed with the grounds of detention. In the said grounds it was mentioned that the detenu is indulging in transportation/sale of ID liquor for human consumption, that the consumption of the said ID liquor is harmful to public health and is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in Hyderabad city. The detaining authority referred to four instances of the detenu indulging in such activity i. e. , (1) On 9-4-2000 at 1505 hours the detenu was found transporting 200 packets of ID liquor on a scooter for sale at his house, (2) on 10-10-2000 at 1535 hours the detenu was found transporting 200 ID liquor sachets for sale, (3) on 22-12-2001 at 1020 hours the detenu was found transporting 200 packets of ID liquor for sale which is unfit for potable purpose, and (4) on 19-2-2002 at 1740 hours the detenu was found in possession of 200 packets of ID liquor for sale, which was unfit for potable purpose. ( 9 ) SINCE there is a specific allegation that he was found transporting and selling id liquor, we do not find any force in the plea of the petitioner that there was no indication that the detenu was indulging in transport and sale of ID liquor. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the mere possession of ID liquor sachets by the detenu is not prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, the proceedings have to be quashed by declaring the detention as illegal and void. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to the Division Bench judgments of this Court rendered under similar circumstances. We wish to refer to those judgments to find out whether they are applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 12 ) IN Boya Chinna Subbarayudu v. The Collector and District Magistrate, Kurnool and others, 1994 (3) ALT 467 (DB), a Division Bench of this High Court while considering Section 2 (a), explanation and (b) and Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Act held that the order of detention was passed without mentioning in the grounds that the percentage of fusil oil in seized liquor and fermented wash constitutes grave danger to life and public health. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the order of detention is vitiated and the detenu is entitled for release forthwith. The division Bench further held that if a bootlegger sells illicitly distilled arrack, which contains harmful substances, certainly he can be detained on the ground that his activities constitute grave danger to life or public health. It was further held that by reason of indulging in acts in contravention of the provisions of the A. P. Excise Act, the rules and the notifications and the orders made thereunder a person cannot be detained under Section 3 (1) unless the acts in which he is indulging affect or likely to affect adversely to the maintenance of the public order. It was further held that everyone who answers the description of bootlegger couldn t be detained preventively under the Act. The detaining authority must be satisfied that the detention is necessary with a view to prevent the person concerned from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Only if the activities of bootlegger cause grave or widespread danger to life or public health, he can be detained. Since the chemical examiner s report does not disclose as to what is the permissible level of the fusil oil and impermissible limits so as to cause grave or widespread danger to life or public health, the detaining authority will not be justified in ordering the detention. ( 13 ) IN Smt. Konala Syamala v. The Collector and District Magistrate, East godavari District, Kakinada, 1996 (4) alt 205 (DB), a Division Bench of this court held that the order of detention of the detenu was not in accordance with law. Therefore, it cannot sustain and is liable to be quashed on the ground that there was no material to show that the contraband, if consumed, will result in grave or widespread danger to life or public health. ( 14 ) IN N. Kami Reddy v. Govt. of A. P. Rep. By its Secretary, GA (Law and Order), department, Hyderabad, 1997 (4) ALT 522 , a Division Bench of this Court held that unless illicitly distilled liquor being sold contains substances, which constitute grave danger to life or public health, order of detention is not legal. ( 14 ) IN N. Kami Reddy v. Govt. of A. P. Rep. By its Secretary, GA (Law and Order), department, Hyderabad, 1997 (4) ALT 522 , a Division Bench of this Court held that unless illicitly distilled liquor being sold contains substances, which constitute grave danger to life or public health, order of detention is not legal. It was further held that the detention of the person in the absence of a specific allegation that the liquor seized from the petitioner contained fusil oil or other impurities constituting grave or widespread danger to life or public health. It amounts to violation of fundamental rights of the detenu under article 22 (5) of the Constitution and the impugned order of detention is liable to be quashed. It was also held therein that unless the grounds of detention specifically advert to the fact that the percentage of the fusil oil or other impurities found in the seized liquor constitutes a grave or widespread danger to life or public health, it is not open to the detaining authority to order detention under section 3 of the Act. ( 15 ) THE above legal position makes it clear that unless there is specific advertence in the grounds of detention that the percentage of fusil oil or other impurities constitutes a grave or widespread danger to life or public health, it is not open to the detaining authority to order detention under section 3 of the Act. ( 16 ) IN the light of the principles laid down in the above Division Bench judgments of this Court, we wish tp verify whether the detaining authority adverted to the above aspects in the grounds of detention. ( 17 ) UNDER all the grounds it was mentioned that the samples, which were taken from the seized liquor packets, were sent to the chemical examiner for analysis and after analysis of those samples the chemical examiner gave separate reports. In the report relating to incident No. 1 the chemical examiner reported that in item nos. 1 and 2 of the samples there was 21. 20% and 21. 00% of Ethyl Alcohol respectively and those samples were found to be illicitly distilled liquor. In respect of samples relating to incident No. 2 the chemical examiner found 22. 11% and 21. 51% of Ethyl Alcohol in item Nos. 1 and 2 of the samples there was 21. 20% and 21. 00% of Ethyl Alcohol respectively and those samples were found to be illicitly distilled liquor. In respect of samples relating to incident No. 2 the chemical examiner found 22. 11% and 21. 51% of Ethyl Alcohol in item Nos. 1 and 2 respectively and the samples were found to be illicitly distilled liquor. In respect of the samples relating to incident No. 3 the chemical examiner reported that the tests conducted by him disclosed positive regarding the presence of alcohol, acidity and fusil oil and elite impurities and the sample is illicitly distilled liquor which is unfit for potable purpose. In respect of the sample relating to incident no. 4 the chemical examiner gave similar report as that of the sample relating to incident No. 3. ( 18 ) IN the grounds of detention it was mentioned by the detaining authority that the ID liquor manufactured with molasses or jaggery in most unhygienic, unscientific and crude method of direct distillation process, there is no possibility to remove impurities or harmful bye-products of alcohol such as fusil oil, acids, aldehydes, furfural and the odour giving substances which are very poisonous which were formed during fermentation and distillation. It was further mentioned that since the ID liquor contained impurities in sufficiently large quantities they affect all the systems in the body, paralyse nervous system, damage digestive system and greatly reduce the life span of the person consuming ID liquor regularly. The detaining authority also mentioned that the regular consumption of id liquor containing so many deleterious substances is undoubtedly harmful to the public health and consumption of ID liquor results in premature deaths and the manufacture and sale of ID liquor is a social evil, which the poor labourers and the daily wage earners are the silent sufferers. It was further mentioned in the rounds of detention that the detenu was clandestinely indulging in acts of transportation/sale of illicit distilled liquor, the consumption of which is seriously injurious to the public health and are highly hazardous and harmful to the public health, particularly to the health of the liquor addicted lower strata public as it is cheaper than the licensed liquor. The judgments cited by the learned Advocate- general relates to ill-effects of consumption of intoxicants and those judgments relate to the regulatory measures to be taken in manufacturing and vending of liquor. But, to bring a man in possession of ID liquor under the definition of bootlegger the detaining authority has to satisfy itself that apart from possession of illicit ID liquor, there is a material to show that consumption of ID liquor is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as held in the above cases. ( 19 ) THE above information furnished by the detaining authority indicate that the id liquor found in possession of the detenu in grounds 3 and 4 are not potable, as per the report of the chemical examiner, and they can definitely form grounds of detention. The same opinion cannot be formed on the ID liquor found in possession of the detenu as the report of the chemical examiner does not say that the same is not potable. We leave the matter there in the light of the view we are going to take on the other points. Point Nos. 2 and 3 : ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that since the detenu was acquitted in CC No. 1682 of 2001 for the alleged transport and sale of id liquor by the concerned Magistrate on 29-1-2002 i. e. , much prior to the passing of the detention order. This ground is a non- existing one and this information was not placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing of the detention order. The satisfaction being subjective under the Act, it cannot be definitely said which incident weighed with the detaining authority and therefore the order of detention has to be set aside. ( 21 ) BUT, the learned Advocate-General contended that the cases ending in acquittal could also form basis in passing the order of detention. In support of his plea he cited the following judgments: ( 22 ) IN Mohd. Subrati @ Mohd. ( 21 ) BUT, the learned Advocate-General contended that the cases ending in acquittal could also form basis in passing the order of detention. In support of his plea he cited the following judgments: ( 22 ) IN Mohd. Subrati @ Mohd. Karim v. State of W. B. , AIR 1973 SC 207 , the hon ble Supreme Court while considering section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal security Act, 1971 on the point whether non-prosecution of a person for his past activities which amount to an offence operates as bar to his detention under section 3 observed as follows: if for any reason it is not possible to successfully try and secure the conviction and imprisonment of the persons concerned for their past activities, which amount to an offence, but which are also relevant for the satisfaction of the detaining authority for considering it necessary that a detention order under Section 3 be made for preventing such persons from acting in a prejudicial manner as contemplated by that section, then, the act would indisputably be attracted and a detention order can appropriately be made the detention order in such a case cannot be challenged on the ground that the person ordered to be detained was liable to be tried for the commission of the offence or offences founded on his conduct, on the basis of which, the detention order has been made or that proceedings under Chapter VIII Cr. PC could be initiated against him. Jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention under section 3 is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it mala fide. The matter is also not res integra. ( 23 ) IN the case covered by the above decision the petitioner was detained through the impugned order made by the District magistrate in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 (1) and (2) of the maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community on account of the conduct of the petitioner in committing theft of electric copper wires resulting in disruption of electric supplies for several hours. The supreme Court while making the above observations in reply to the contention of the petitioner that the detention order is not sustainable held that even though the petitioner is not put to regular trial for the alleged offences for want of evidence, there is no bar to his detention if the detaining authority under the Act is satisfied that it is necessary to make the order of preventive detention on the grounds contemplated by the Act. ( 24 ) IN P. N. Koushal v. Union of India and others, 1978 (3) SCC 558 , a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court while dealing with Punjab Excise Act, 1914 observed that of all the problems in human society, there is probably none which is as closely related to criminal behaviour as is drunkenness, although its dangers are not commonly understood or accepted by the public. Ethyl alcohol can have perhaps the most serious consequences of any mind and body-altering drug. It causes addiction in chronic alcoholics, who suffer consequences just as serious, if not more serious than opiate addicts. It is by far the most dangerous and the most widely used of any drug. ( 25 ) IN K. Arjuna Kumari v. Govt. of A. P. , (1988) 1 SCC 296 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of prevention of Black Marketing and maintenance of Supplies of Essential commodities Act, 1980, held as follows: 8. The sufficiency of the materials available to the detaining authority is not to be examined by the Court. While considering the writ petition of or on behalf of the detenu the Supreme Court or the High Court does not sit in appeal over the detention order, and it is not for the Court to go into and assess the probative value of the evidence available to the detaining authority. Of course, a detention order not supported by any evidence may have to be quashed, but that is not the position here. There was clearly sufficient material before the District Magistrate to justify the forming of his opinion. It was not therefore possible to accept the contention that the ground mentioned for the detention was non-existent. 11. Of course, a detention order not supported by any evidence may have to be quashed, but that is not the position here. There was clearly sufficient material before the District Magistrate to justify the forming of his opinion. It was not therefore possible to accept the contention that the ground mentioned for the detention was non-existent. 11. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards the factual existence of the condition on which the order of detention can be made, namely, the grounds of detention constitute the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based. . . . ( 26 ) BUT the Supreme Court in a catena of cases held that though the case of acquittal can be a ground of detention, the detaining authority should satisfy the Court that the detention order was passed after applying its mind to this aspect of the matter. From the detention order it cannot be said that the order was passed after applying its mind. ( 27 ) FOR the first time in the counter it is stated that the order was passed after taking into consideration the acquittal in the second case. The law on this aspect is well settled. The order has to stand or fall on its own and the reasons cannot be supplemented or amplified by way of counter judgment. ( 28 ) IN Pilli Yeteswari v. Govt. of A. P. , 1996 (4) ALT 485 (DB), two persons were detained on the basis of conclusions drawn from the number of cases they were respectively involved. The first detenu was acquitted in the first eight cases. The factum of acquittal in those cases was not available to be taken against him. Case covered by Serial No. 9 was still pending. It was explained in the counter-affidavit that the acquittals of the detenu were only because of his goonda character and that he forced the witnesses not to depose against him, which they obliged for being in fear of him. But such an allegation was not made in the grounds of detention supplied to him and he did not have the opportunity to represent against such opinion formed against him. But such an allegation was not made in the grounds of detention supplied to him and he did not have the opportunity to represent against such opinion formed against him. Had it been brought to his notice and had he been given the opportunity to represent against it, it was another matter if the representation would have been considered and rejected. A Division Bench of this high Court held that the order of detention is not shown to have considered the fact of acquittals and yet to have come to the conclusion of the necessity for detention because of the nature of the acquittals being as alleged in the counter affidavit. The Court further held that it is too well known in law that public orders, are to ex facie show the grounds on which they are made and it is not permissible to construe the meaning of such order in the light of explanations subsequently given. The impugned order was accordingly set aside. ( 29 ) IN Ahmad Nassar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 SCC (Crl.) 1469, the supreme Court held that non-placement of relevant material before detaining authority and non-consideration of such material by the detaining authority, vitiates the detention order. ( 30 ) IN the case covered by the above decision certain contraband goods were seized from the detenu at the airport and he was ordered to be detained under conservation of Foreign Exchange and prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) and the Court held that a man is to be detained in the prison based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, every conceivable material which is relevant and vital, which may have the bearing on the issue should be placed before the detaining authority. The sponsoring authority should not keep it back based on his interpretation that it would not be of any help to a prospective detenu. The decision is not to be made by the sponsoring authority. A detention order vitiates if any relevant material is not placed before the detaining authority, which reasonably could affect his decision. The sponsoring authority should not keep it back based on his interpretation that it would not be of any help to a prospective detenu. The decision is not to be made by the sponsoring authority. A detention order vitiates if any relevant material is not placed before the detaining authority, which reasonably could affect his decision. ( 31 ) IN K. Aruna Kumari (supra) the Supreme Court while dealing with one ground of detention held that if material and vital facts which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order, are not placed, it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal. ( 32 ) IN the case covered by the above decision, the detenu was a contractor indulging in clandestine business of diversion of levy cement. He was detained under Section 3 of the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. The supreme Court while laying down the above principle felt that there was ample evidence before the District magistrate to base his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing the impugned order. ( 33 ) IN Shivprasad Bhatnagar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 870 , the Supreme Court while dealing with section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, held as follows: it is now well settled that grounds of detention must be pertinent and not irrelevant, proximate and not stale, precise and not vague. Irrelevance, staleness and vagueness are vices, any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate the ground of detention. And a single vicious ground is sufficient to vitiate an order of detention. ( 34 ) THE Supreme Court further held that the second ground of detention suffers both from the vice of staleness because of the passage of time since the happening of some of the incidents, and the vice of irrelevance because they relate to law and order and not to the maintenance of public order . The detenu is therefore entitled to be released. The detenu is therefore entitled to be released. ( 35 ) IN Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. The Police Commissioner and others, AIR 1986 SC 1282, the Supreme Court while considering Section 3 of the Gujarat prevention of Antisocial Activities Act and article 22 (4) of the Constitution held that non-placing of the material fact that the detainee was acquitted in two cases resulting in non-application of mind of the detaining authority to the said fact vitiated the requisite subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order invalid. ( 36 ) IN the case covered by the above decision, out of five instances of commission of various offences under IPC the acquittal of the detenu in the offences mentioned at S. Nos. 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority. The Supreme court therefore held that had the said fact been brought to the notice of the detaining authority, it would have influenced his mind one way or the other. Therefore, it vitiates the subjective satisfaction and invalidates the detention order. ( 37 ) IN Ramesh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1881 , a detention order was passed on the basis of four instances of possessing foreign liquor under Gujarat prohibition Act. The case covered by ground no. 2 ended in acquittal on 31-8-1988 i. e. , earlier to the passing of the impugned order. The said material was withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority. The Supreme Court while considering section 3 (2) of Gujarat Prevention of antisocial Activities Act held that had this material fact been placed before the detaining authority it might have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order and quashed the order passed by the detaining authority. ( 38 ) NEXTLY, in A. Rajareddi v. The Collector and District Magistrate, Adilabad, 1996 (4) ALT 305 (D. B), a Division Bench of this Court held that detaining authority has to prove that the detenu is continuously engaged in activities in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order before ordering detention and an isolated incident cannot be made a basis to show the detenu as habitual offender and the order of detention passed by the authority in a mechanical manner without applying its mind to the facts of the case is unsustainable. ( 39 ) IN the case covered by the above decision out of six instances cited in the grounds of detention, the detenu was not even an accused in three cases and out of the remaining three cases he was already acquitted in one case, while the other two cases alone are still pending trial before the Courts. One of the cases does not even relate to any offence as contemplated in Section 2 (c) of the Act. Under those circumstances, the court held that the detaining authority is not justified in forming the opinion that he is a goonda . ( 40 ) LASTLY, we are of the opinion that the incident mentioned in ground No. 1 is a stale one since the alleged incident has taken place two years prior to the date of passing the order of detention. ( 41 ) IN the light of the above authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, we find sufficient force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and we are of the view that non-placing of the relevant material before the detaining authority vitiates the order of detention. The failure of the concerned authorities in placing the information regarding the enlargement of the detenu on bail in all the four cases is also a ground to quash the order of the detaining authority. The non- placing of the information regarding the above aspects is leading to a doubt as to what was the actual consideration for the detaining authority to pass the impugned order. The ratio laid down in the above cases will squarely apply to the facts of the present case. ( 42 ) IN the light of the above discussion we hold that there is illegality in the impugned order and it is liable to be quashed. The ratio laid down in the above cases will squarely apply to the facts of the present case. ( 42 ) IN the light of the above discussion we hold that there is illegality in the impugned order and it is liable to be quashed. ( 43 ) IN the result, the writ petition is allowed. The detention order passed by the 1st respondent is quashed as it is violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India and it is further ordered that the detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless he is required in any other case. In the circumstances, no costs.