Judgment Amar Dutt, J. 1. Civil Revision Nos. 2659 of 1986, 1200, 1262, 1397, 3388, 3488 of 1987, 1357, 1474 and 2594 of 1988 are being taken up together for hearing because in all these cases the learned counsel appearing for the tenants rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Wadhawan and Ors. v. M/s Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and Ors., (2002-2)131 P.L.R. 370 (S.C.), for submitting that in view of this judgment, this Court is obliged to remand these cases back to the Rent Controller with the direction that he should determine the arrears of rent along with interest payable thereon and the costs required to be paid by the tenant and thereafter afford an opportunity to him for making a tender. In case the tenant does not make the tender within the time specified then the Court would be obliged to make a final determination regarding arrears of rent, interest and costs and while passing the ejectment order make implementation of the same contingent upon the tenant tendering the rent within a time to be specified by the Court. For these submission, the learned counsel rely upon paras 29 and 30 of the judgment, which read as under:- "29. The result of the discussion may be summarized. Under proviso to Section 13(2)(i), the Controller having discharged his obligation of passing an order under the proviso, either suo moto or on his attention in this regard being invited by either of the parties, it will be for the tenant to pay or tender the amount provisionally assessed by the Controller on the first date of hearing of the application for ejectment. On compliance, the Controller would proceed to adjudicate upon the controversy arising for decision by reference to pleadings of the parties and by holding a summary enquiry for the purpose. Such adjudication shall be provisional and subject to the later final adjudication. The finding that may ultimately be arrived at by the Controller may be one of the following three. The Controller may hold that the quantum of arrears as determined finally is (i) the same as was found to be due and payable under the provisional order, (ii) is less than what was determined by the provisional order, or (iii) is more than the one what was held to be due and payable by the provisional order. The Controller may hold that the quantum of arrears as determined finally is (i) the same as was found to be due and payable under the provisional order, (ii) is less than what was determined by the provisional order, or (iii) is more than the one what was held to be due and payable by the provisional order. In the first case the Rent Controller has simply to pass an order terminating the proceedings. In the second case the Controller may direct the amount deposited in excess by the tenant to be refunded to him. In the third case it would not serve the purpose of the Act if the tenant was held liable to be evicted forthwith as is the view taken by the Punjab High Court in the case of Dial Chand (supra). The Controller directing the eviction of the tenant may pass a conditional order affording the tenant one opportunity of and a reasonable tune for depositing the amount of deficit failing which he shall be liable to be evicted. This power in the Rent Controller can be spelled out from the use of the word "may" in the expression "The Controller may make and order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession", as also from the principle of equity and fair play that the tenant having complied with provisional order passed by the Controller should not be made to suffer if the finding arrived at by the Controller at the termination of the proceedings be different from the one recorded in the provisional order. While exercising the discretion to make a conditional order of eviction affording the tenant an opportunity of purging himself of the default the Controller may also take into consideration the conduct of the tenant whether he has even after the passing of the provisional order continued to pay or tender the rent to the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings as a relevant factor governing the exercise of his discretion. Such a course would be beneficial to the landlord too as he would be saved from the trouble of filing a civil suit for recovery of rent which fell due during the pendency of proceedings for eviction before the controller. 30. Such a course would be beneficial to the landlord too as he would be saved from the trouble of filing a civil suit for recovery of rent which fell due during the pendency of proceedings for eviction before the controller. 30. To sum up, our conclusions are: "(1) In Section 13(2)(i) proviso, the words assessed by the controller qualify not merely the words the cost of application but the entire preceding part of the sentence i.e. the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application. (2) The proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 casts an obligation on the Controller to make an assessment of (i) arrears of rent, (ii) the interest on such arrears, and (iii) the cost of application and then quantify by way of an interim or provisional order the amount which the tenant must pay or tender on the first date or hearing" after the passing of such order of assessment by the Controller so as to satisfy the requirement of the proviso. (3) Of necessity, the date of first hearing of the application would mean the date falling after the date of such order by controller. (4) On the failure of the tenant to comply nothing remains to be done and an order for eviction shall follow. If the tenant makes compliance, the inquiry shall continue formally adjudicating upon the dispute as to the arrears of rent in the light of the contending pleas raised by the landlord and the tenant before the controller. (5) If the final adjudication by the Controller be at variance with his interim or provisional order passed under the proviso, one of the following two orders may be made depending on the facts situation of a given case. If the amount deposited by the tenant is found to be in excess, the Controller may direct a refund. If, on the other hand, the amount deposited by the tenant is found to be short or deficient, the Controller may pass a conditional order directing tenant to place the landlord in possession of the premises by giving a reasonable time to the tenant for paying or tendering the deficit amount, failing which alone he shall be liable to be evicted. Compliance shall save him from eviction. Compliance shall save him from eviction. (6) While exercising discretion for affording the tenant an opportunity of making good the deficit, one of the relevant factors to be taken into consideration by the Controller would be, whether the tenant has paid or tendered with substantial regularity the rent falling due month by month during the pendency of the proceedings." 2. The learned counsel for the landlords do not, for a moment, contest the inferences sought to be drawn from the aforesaid judgment but they submit that in Rakesh Wad-hawans case (supra) the Honble Judges of the Apex Court have not considered the purport of two earlier judgments handed down by co-equal Benches in M/s Rubber House v. M/s Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1989-1)95 P.L.R. 584 (S.C.) and Rajinder Kumar Joshi v. Veena Rani J.T. 1990(4) S.C. 50, according to which no obligation is cast upon the Rent Controller to make such preliminary assessments regarding the arrears of rent and in case the tenant chooses not to tender the rent as claimed, he runs risk of being ejected on the ground of short tender. In M/s Rubber Houses case (supra) their lordships were interpreting the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control or Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 and had observed as under ;- "(i) After a careful scrutiny of the Section 13(2)(i) and the first proviso annexed thereto, we see no force in the submissions of the learned counsel that there is any statutory duty cast on the Rent Controller even in the first instance to determine and calculate the arrears of rent and the interest but on the contrary the proviso requires the tenant to pay or tender the actual arrears of rent within 15 days of the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service along with the interest to be calculated by the Controller at 8 per cent per annum on such arrears together with such costs of the application, if any, as may be allowed by the Controller. What the proviso requires is that the Controller has to calculate the interest at 8 per cent per annum on such arrears of rent and determine the costs of the application, if any. What the proviso requires is that the Controller has to calculate the interest at 8 per cent per annum on such arrears of rent and determine the costs of the application, if any. If the, argument of the learned counsel is to be accepted then in every case the Rent Controller has to hold an enquiry at the first instance and determine the arrears of rent even on the first date of hearing which is in the nature of things not possible without any evidence, nor is it contemplated under the scheme of the Act. When there is a statutory obligation on the tenant either to pay or tender the arrears of rent within a period of 15 days of the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due notice it is for him to calculate the exact arrears of rent due and to pay or / tender the same and if the tenant fails to do sp he is deemed to have not paid or made the valid tender of the rent. Hence, we hold that this argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is misconceived and fallacious." 3. In Rajinder Kumar Joshis case (supra) while interpreting the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 their lordships of the Supreme Court had made the following observations:- ".....we cannot help noticing the lacuna in the Act and the hardship to which a tenant may be put when, as in the present case, the landlord makes a demand on the tenant for rent which is not due from him and yet the provisions of Section 13(2)(i) of the Act require him to tender the rent as demanded or to face the consequences of eviction from the rented premises. On the other hand, to hold that the requirement of the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) to tender the rent means the tender of the rent as the tenant thinks he is in arrears of, would also render nugatory the requirements of the said proviso. For it would in almost all cases involve first a decision of the dispute with regard to both the rate of rent as well as the period of arrears leading to the hardship of the landlord some of whom are as poor as, if not more than the landlord. For it would in almost all cases involve first a decision of the dispute with regard to both the rate of rent as well as the period of arrears leading to the hardship of the landlord some of whom are as poor as, if not more than the landlord. A balance has to be struck between the two situations so as not to render the protection given by the Act to the tenant illusory and at the same time not to deprive the landlord of his least legitimate expectation to be paid regularly the rent for the use and occupation of his premises.....When the premises are let out, they are generally let out at an agreed rent. It is only in rare cases that the rent is either not fixed or becomes a subject matter of dispute. The tenant is not without a remedy in such cases. The Act gives remedy both to the landlord as well as the tenant to apply to the Controller under Section 4 to fix the fair rent. Since the provisions of Section 13(2)(i) loom large and the tenant otherwise faces the prospect of being evicted it is for him in such cases to take precaution and apply to the Controller to fix the fair rent failing which he may pay or tender the rent either as demanded by the landlord or which according to him is due. In the latter case he takes the risk, for if it is proved ultimately that the rent paid or tendered by him was less than what was due, he faces eviction. It is also not correct to say that in the absence of rent-receipts issued by the landlord the tenant is unable to prove either the rate of rent or the period for which the rent is in arrears. He can always make a written grievance to the landlord or apply to the Rent Controller for a direction to the landlord to issue rent-receipts or deposit the rent before the Rent Controller. Since the Act gives the tenant protection from eviction except on grounds stated therein, this is the minimum precaution that should be expected to be taken by the tenant to save himself from eviction. Since the Act gives the tenant protection from eviction except on grounds stated therein, this is the minimum precaution that should be expected to be taken by the tenant to save himself from eviction. The Act has been on the statute book for a number of years now and no serious difficulty has been experienced on account of the fact that the Rent Controller has not been given the power to give time to the tenant to deposit the rent as determined by him when the application for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent is preferred by the landlord. This is because the Act as pointed out above makes provision for the dispute. On the other hand, to read in Section 13(2)(i) the provisions as suggested by Shri Nesargi would involve recasting of the statute which is not permissible for the Court to do." 4. On the basis of these pronouncements, the learned counsel for the landlords state that as the aforesaid judgments have not been considered by the Apex Court while disposing of Rakesh Wadhawan s case (supra) and the strength of all the three Benches is the same, this Court is obliged to follow the guidelines laid down in M/s Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera v. Umrao and Ors., (1981)83 P.L.R. 335, which are to the following effect :- "Now the contention that the latest judgment of a co-ordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have pre-eminence irrespective of any other consideration does not commend itself to me. When judgments of the Supreme Court are of co-equal Benches and therefore of matching authority then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rationale and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstances of the time and date on which they were rendered. It is manifest that when two directly conflicting judgments of the superior Court and of equal authority and extent then both of them cannot be binding on the Courts below. Inevitable a choice though a difficult one, has to be made in such a situation. On principle it appears to me that the High Court must follow the judgment which appears to it to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. Inevitable a choice though a difficult one, has to be made in such a situation. On principle it appears to me that the High Court must follow the judgment which appears to it to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. The mere incidence of time whether the judgments of coequal Benches of the Superior Court are earlier or later is a consideration which appears to me as hardly relevant." 5. They further point out that as these observations according to the Full Bench of this Court in M/s Kulbhushan Kumar and Co. v. The State of Punjab and Anr, (1983)85 P.L.R. 768, have not been overruled by the Supreme Court, therefore, this Court while taking into consideration the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Wadhawans case (supra) will also have to consider the law laid down in M/s Rubber Houses case and Rajinder Kumar Joshis case (supra) and thereafter determine as to which judgment more elaborately and accurately lays down the law and has, therefore, to be followed by this Court and the Courts below. Since the conflict between these judgments and Rakesh Wadhawnas case (supra) is likely to be raised in a large number of cases, which are pending in this Court as well as in the eviction applications, which are pending before the Rent Controller as also the appeals filed by either sides before the Appellate Authority, it would be but proper that the determination of the question as to which judgment of the Apex Court lays down the law more elaborately and accurately should be made by a larger Bench so as to settle this question conclusively. 6. For the reasons recorded above, it is directed that the papers be laid down before Honble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to resolve the conflict, which apparently exists between the law as laid down in M/s Rubber Houses case and Rajin der Kumar Joshi s case (supra) on the one hand and Rakesh Wadhawan s case (supra) on the other, so as to declare in terms of M/s Indo Swiss Time Limiteds case (supra) as to which of these judgments lays down the law more elaborately and accurately and has, therefore, to be followed by the Courts in the States of Punjab and Haryana and Union Territory, Chandigarh.