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2002 DIGILAW 1148 (AP)

P. Sesha Rao v. Government of A. P.

2002-09-23

DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, S.R.NAYAK

body2002
ORDER (Per. S.R. Nayak, J.) The unsuccessful petitioner has filed this writ appeal calling in question the correctness of the order of the learned single Judge dated 2-3-2001 made in Writ Petition No.21354 of 2000. 2. In the above writ petition, the petitioner/ appellant assailed the validity of G.O. Rt No.1518, Law (A) Department, dated 2-11-2000 by which the petitioners appointment as Panel Advocate for A.P. Scheduled Castes Co-operative Finance Corporation Limited was terminated by paying him one months remuneration in lieu of one months notice. When the said action was called in question in the writ petition, the same was justified by the 3d respondent by contending that the writ petitioner was not conducting the case entrusted to him with due diligence and on account of serious lapses committed by him, the Corporation suffered heavy losses and prejudice. The learned single Judge, having noticed the provisions of Rule 9 of the A.P. Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1999 notified by G.O.Ms. No.118, Law (L) Department, dated 28-6-1999, dismissed the writ petition after holding that the termination of the appointment of the petitioner was in accordance with Rule 9 of the Rules. Hence this writ appeal by the petitioner-Advocate. 3. We have heard Sri Sesha Rao, party-in person and the learned Advocate-General for the respondents. 4. While assailing the action of the 3d respondent in terminating his appointment as a panel Advocate, Sri Sesha Rao, contended that the said action was mala fide, arbitrary and violative of Rule 23(a) of the Rules. The learned Advocate-General, on the other hand, submitted that the grievance of the petitioner brought before this Court does not involve any public law element and, therefore, the writ petition itself was misconceived. Alternatively, the learned Advocate-General contended that there was every justification for the 3rd respondent to terminate the appointment of the petitioner, because he did not conduct the cases entrusted to him with due diligence and seriousness expected of a panel advocate and on account of serious lapses committed by him, the 3rd respondent-Institution suffered heavy losses and prejudice. 5. The termination of the appointment of the petitioner as panel advocate was done by the 3rd respondent by invoking the power reserved to it under Rule 9 of the Rules. Rule 9 of the Rules reads as follows: "9. 5. The termination of the appointment of the petitioner as panel advocate was done by the 3rd respondent by invoking the power reserved to it under Rule 9 of the Rules. Rule 9 of the Rules reads as follows: "9. Termination of Service:- Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 8, either the Government or the Law Officer may terminate the engagement with one months notice. Provided that the Government may terminate the engagement by paying one month remuneration in lieu of one month notice." 6. In the instant case, of course, no advance notice was given to the writ petitioner as provided in the main part of Rule 9. But, the 3rd respondent had sent a cheque to the petitioner towards one months remuneration in lieu of one months notice. The pleas of mala fides and arbitrariness urged by the writ petitioner cannot be gone into by this Court in a summary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the context of the stand taken by the 3rd respondent in its counter. Out of the pleadings of the parties, many factual controversies arise for resolution and such a resolution could be possible only after permitting the parties to lead evidence and tender themselves for cross-examination by each other. Therefore, we leave open all those factual controversies to be agitated before the competent civil Court, if the petitioner is so desirous of pursuing his legal remedies. 7. The petitioner further contended that the Rules were brought into force, vide G.O.Ms.No.118, Law (L) Department, dated 28-6-1999, that is to say, with effect from 28-6-1999, whereas he was appointed as a panel Advocate for the 3rd respondent for a period of three years with effect from 15-12-1998 and, therefore, in terms of Rule 23(a) of the Rules, he should have been allowed to continue until the expiry of his term of appointment. Should it be noted that the Rules are not statutory rules. They are administrative instructions issued by the Government in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be said that the State and its authorities or the instrumentalities of the State, like the 3rd respondent, under no circumstances, can terminate the appointment of its Counsel. They are administrative instructions issued by the Government in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be said that the State and its authorities or the instrumentalities of the State, like the 3rd respondent, under no circumstances, can terminate the appointment of its Counsel. In the instant case, it is specifically alleged that the writ petitioner was guilty of committing serious lapses in the matter of conducting cases on behalf of the 3rd respondent and on account of those lapses, it has suffered heavy losses and prejudice. Therefore, the only question to be considered is, whether the allegations levelled against the petitioner-advocate are substantiated and justified? That could be done only in a properly instituted suit in a competent civil Court. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substantive ground to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed, however, reserving liberty to the writ petitioner/appellant to work out private law remedies, if he is so advised before jurisdictional civil Court. No order as to costs.