D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition was filed challenging the order dated 1-7-2002 of the ii Additional District Judge, R. R. District, hyderabad allowing I. A. No. 1000 of 2002 in a. S. No. 8 of 2002. ( 2 ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) filed the said I. A. No. 1000 of 2002 under Order 6 rule 17 C. P. C. for grant of permission to them to amend the plaint. The said amendment and the reasons are very lengthy and the same need not be extracted since they were already recorded by the appellate court. However, the amendment sought for by respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) is to the effect that they may be permitted to amend the plaint from the one for declaration of title to the one for recovery of possession. The suit was originally filed for declaration of title and for injunction. The trial Court upon considering the evidence both oral and documentary on record decreed the suit in favour of respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs ). Challenging the same, defendant No. 12 preferred a. S. No. 8 of 2001 to the II Additional District judge, R. R. District, Hyderabad. During the pendency of the said appeal (A. S. No. 8 of 2001), respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) filed the said I. A. No. 1000 of 2002 alleging that they were dispossessed from the suit schedule property. In other words, they made complaint to the appellate Court before which the judgment passed by the trial Court in their favour is under scrutiny. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant No. 12 submits that the petition filed under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. cannot be permitted in appeal inasmuch as the said amendment introduces totally a new cause of action. According to him, the original cause of action in the suit filed by respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) was for declaration of title and for injunction. Now by way of this amendment the cause of action was sought to be changed as recovery of possession and hence the same amounts to substantial change of cause of action and introducing totally a new cause of action during the course of appeal. Now by way of this amendment the cause of action was sought to be changed as recovery of possession and hence the same amounts to substantial change of cause of action and introducing totally a new cause of action during the course of appeal. To substantiate his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner (defendant No. 12) relies heavily upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in N. B. Ghosh v. Balai Chand. In fact, the said decision was relied upon by the appellate court at the instance of respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs ). The learned counsel for the petitioner also relies upon the observations at paragraph 21 of the judgment of the said decision, which are in his favour as follows:"even if the plaintiff be found to have been dispossessed just prior to or immediately after the institution of the suit or at any time during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff in order to get an effective decree, must make a prayer for recovery of possession. For the reasons stated the plaintiffs such prayer if not otherwise barred, should be considered as a reasonable and appropriate one. " ( 4 ) THE appellate Court, in its order under challenge, relied upon the same decision wherein it was observed that even at the appellate stage the plaintiff was allowed to amend the plaint for additional relief for vacant possession of the suit schedule property and for injunction. The appellate court placed reliance upon the decision in n. Veerabhadraiah v. N. Bhaskar wherein it was held by this court that an application of plaintiff to amend the plaint in a suit for permanent injunction altering the relief into one for declaration of title and possession can be allowed in view of the dispossession pending the suit. ( 5 ) IN the instant case, the alleged dispossession was during the pendency of appeal. Therefore, the decision in n. Veerabhadraiah v. N. Bhaskar relied upon by the appellate Court is not applicable to the facts of this case in all fours. However, the established principle is that the amendment petition can be resorted to and allowed by the Courts at any stage of the proceedings to meet the ends of justice. Therefore, the decision in n. Veerabhadraiah v. N. Bhaskar relied upon by the appellate Court is not applicable to the facts of this case in all fours. However, the established principle is that the amendment petition can be resorted to and allowed by the Courts at any stage of the proceedings to meet the ends of justice. In the instant case, the specific averment of respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) is that during the pendency of the appeal they were dispossessed from the suit schedule property. In the counter the specific stand of the petitioner-defendant No. 12 is that, right from the beginning he has been in possession and therefore the question of dispossession subsequent to the decree of the suit and during the pendency of appeal does not arise. This is a pure question of fact. By virtue of filing petition by the plaintiffs before the appellate Court the controversy has taken a new dimension. If this alleged dispossession had occurred during the pendency of the trial in the suit, there would not have any plausible objection for the trial court to entertain the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. but the peculiar circumstance in the present case is that the alleged dispossession was during the pendency of the appeal and hence the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that inasmuch as the alleged dispossession had taken place during the pendency of the appeal, the proper course of action available for the plaintiffs is, by way of filling a fresh suit inasmuch as totally a new cause of action was introduced. ( 6 ) IT is to be remembered that the relief sought for in the suit by the plaintiffs is two fold, one is for declaration of title and the other is for injunction. Declaration of title is the primary relief and the relief of injunction is consequential or incidental. Respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) undoubtedly succeeded in the suit and obtained a decree for both the reliefs. Declaration of title is the primary relief and the relief of injunction is consequential or incidental. Respondents 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) undoubtedly succeeded in the suit and obtained a decree for both the reliefs. Now before the appellate Court, when the plaintiffs came forward that they were dispossessed during the pendency of the appeal and asked for amendment of the plaint on that score, in my view the appellate Court is fully justified in allowing the said petition inasmuch as the appeal proceedings are continuous proceedings of the suit and the amendment to the plaint is admissible at any stage of the suit ( 7 ) FURTHER it is to be seen that the plaintiffs obtained decree in their favour in so far as the prime relief i. e. declaration of title, is concerned. In so far as the consequential relief i. e. injunction is concerned there cannot be any objection for the appellate Court in permitting the plaintiffs to amend the plaint to the extent of such consequential or incidental relief further more in such a case the petitione has to succeed on the primary question of declaration of title. If that is decided in his favour, then only, the question of consequential or incidental relief i. e. injunction, will attain some significance. The relief sought for by the plaintiffs in the said i. A. No. 1000 of 2000 or the objection sought for by the petitioner in that regard has become almost academic and redundant inasmuch as the contention of the petitioner-defendant No. 12 all through is that he has been in possession since a long time and during the course of appeal his contention was that he has been in possession. If the contention of the petitioner on the consequential issue which had already been decided by the trial Court in the suit, is accepted, the same would result in the multiplicity of litigation i. e. filing of separate suit. The Courts have to try to not only avoid proliferation of litigation but also shall try to narrow down the scope of litigation. It is not as though the appellate Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. ( 8 ) IN such a case, the next issue that falls for consideration is the procedure that is to be adopted by the appellate Court. It is not as though the appellate Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. ( 8 ) IN such a case, the next issue that falls for consideration is the procedure that is to be adopted by the appellate Court. The procedure laid down under Section 107 order 41 Rule 27 (l) (b), and Rule 28 C. P. C. are relevant provisions. Section 107 C. P. C. reads:"107. (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed,an appellate Court shall have power- (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. "order XLI Rule 27 (1) (b) to the extent relevant reads:" (27 ). (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate Court. But if- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (aa ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) the appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. "order XLI Rule 28 reads:"28. Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the Appellate court may either take such evidence, or direct the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate Court, to take such evidence and to send it to the appellate court. "from the above reading of Section 107 c. P. C. it is clear that the appellate court has jurisdiction to determine a case finally or remand a case to the lower Court or frame issues and refer them for trial and or direct the lower Court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. "from the above reading of Section 107 c. P. C. it is clear that the appellate court has jurisdiction to determine a case finally or remand a case to the lower Court or frame issues and refer them for trial and or direct the lower Court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) envisages the procedure to be adopted in a case where additional evidence has to be recorded by the appellate Court. Order 41 Rule 28 C. P. C. makes it clear that the appellate Court has got the jurisdiction either to record evidence or direct the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred to take such evidence. ( 9 ) IT is only a matter of convenience for the appellate Court either to direct the trial court or any other Court subordinate to it to record evidence on particular issue, or take up the task of recording evidence on its own. Therefore, having allowed the petition filed under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. filed by the plaintiffs it is expedient for the appellate court to invoke the jurisdiction contemplated under Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) read with Rule 28 C. P. C. in order to give a comprehensive finding on the main question of declaration of title as well as the recovery of possession and avoid multiplicity of litigation. ( 10 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I hold that the appellate Court had exercised its jurisdiction in the right perspective and the civil Revision Petition is dismissed subject to the directions indicated above. No costs. The appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible in the view of the fact that the suit is of the year 1992.