L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE respondent herein filed o. S. No. 188 of 1993 on the file of the principal Junior Civil Judge, Nizamabad against the petitioners for recovery of an amount of about Rs. 20,000/- together with interest at the rate of 16. 5% per annum. The suit was decreed on 24. 11. 1995. Inasmuch as the petitioners/plaintiffs mortgaged the property as security for payment, a preliminary decree was passed granting six months time for redemption of the mortgage. The petitioners/plaintiffs did not redeem the mortgage in that period. Thereafter the respondent appears to have filed the application for passing final decree. Since there was delay of 787 days in filing the same, it filed LA. 1694 of 2001 under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. The petitioners resisted the same pleading that the delay was not properly explained. The trial Court in its order dated 11. 3. 2002 condoned the delay. Hence the revision. ( 2 ) SRI V. Ravi Kiran Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent had time till 24. 11. 1995 to file the application for final decree proceedings. No steps were taken either during the three years permissible in law or for about two years thereafter. He submits that there is hardly any explanation worth its name in support of the plea for condonation of the delay, in the affidavit filed in support of LA. and the trial Court erred in condoning the delay. He also submits that valuable rights were accrued to the petitioners on account of the failure of the respondent to file the application within time and the same cannot be permitted to be defeated without there being proper explanation. ( 3 ) SRI K. Kishore Kumar Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the delay in filing the final decree proceedings was on account of the failure of the Manager, who held the office during the relevant point of time, and as soon as it was noticed by the successor the proceedings ought to have been initiated and that steps were taken duly explaining the delay. He relied upon various judgments of this Court as well as supreme Court in support of the contention that the respondent being the nationalised bank dealing with public funds, liberal views need to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. He relied upon various judgments of this Court as well as supreme Court in support of the contention that the respondent being the nationalised bank dealing with public funds, liberal views need to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. ( 4 ) IT is true that where public funds are involved, the Courts should be liberal in condonation of delay. However, it is too difficult to generalise such a proposition and relieve the institutions from the responsibility and obligation to assign reasons. The question of there being liberal or other approach would arise if only there are certain reasons. If no reasons exist, it is too difficult to condone years of delay based on the ground that the affected party is an institution dealing with public funds. Equally important are the rights conferred upon citizens by law. ( 5 ) IN the affidavit filed in support of the I. . A. , the only reason stated is as under:"i state that recently I have taken the charge of the Manager, from my predecessor and also pursued the all suit filed accounts and files wherein it has came to my notice that in the above case final decree petition is not filed by predecessors by oversight within stipulated time as such delay is caused for filing final decree petition in the said case. " ( 6 ) A reading of the said paragraph hardly discloses that the respondent was vigilant in prosecuting the matters and despite the same, it was handicapped. If at all there was anything, the affidavit only explains the delay from the date on which the deponent had assumed the office. No attempt whatever is made to explain the delay that occurred before he assumed the charge. The respondent being an institution, the spells of time cannot be split with the assumption of office by various incumbents. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners places reliance upon the judgment of this Court reported in State Bank of india v. Sri Veera Hanuman Rice and flow Mill, 2000 (5) ALT 295 . After considering the various judgments on the subject, and after noticing that, there was no explanation as to what transpired between 20. 11. 1992 to 27. 10. 1994, ultimately it was held that if a portion of the period remains unexplained, the Court cannot condone the delay. After considering the various judgments on the subject, and after noticing that, there was no explanation as to what transpired between 20. 11. 1992 to 27. 10. 1994, ultimately it was held that if a portion of the period remains unexplained, the Court cannot condone the delay. At least in that case there were several contentions as to the illness of the advocate, efforts made by the bank, etc. No such thing is evident from the affidavit filed in the present case. This Court found that, in the circumstances referred to therein the delay of 714 days was not properly explained. When the delay of 714 days was found not explained properly even where several factors relevant to the issue such as illness of the advocate, efforts made by the bank, etc. , have been raised, it is too difficult to condone the delay of 787 days where such explanation does not exist at all. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of this court reported in State Bank of India v. Y. Venkat Reddy, 2002 (1) ALD 261 . In that case there was a dispute as to the starting point for the computation of delay. The same is evident from the following paragraph:"24. However, from the impugned order, the delay, after deducting the period of three years as contemplated under Article 137, and also the six months granted for redemption, is not clear, 1 feel it appropriate to remand the matter to the Court below for calculating the exact number of days of delay in filing the application for passing the final decree and then pass appropriate orders. " ( 9 ) SUCH a situation does not exist in the present case. He has also relied upon judgment of this Court reported in g. R. Satyanarayana v. Secretary to government, General Administration department, 2002 (4) ALT 120 , and submits that once the trial Court condones the delay on being satisfied, the same cannot be interfered with by the superior Court. The observation made in the above said case is not that absolute and always depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the respondent did not plead any reason worth its name, the question of the same being explained or being treated as reasonable does not arise. The observation made in the above said case is not that absolute and always depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the respondent did not plead any reason worth its name, the question of the same being explained or being treated as reasonable does not arise. In that view of the matter, it is held that the respondent failed in explaining the delay of 787 days in filing the final decree proceedings. The IA. , is, therefore, dismissed and the C. R. P. is allowed. No order as to costs.