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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 116 (HP)

SATYA DEVI SHARMA v. MEGH PAL

2002-04-23

A.K.GOEL, KAMLESH SHARMA

body2002
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 has been filed by the claimants-appellants against the award of Collector Commissioner under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, Sub Division, Shimla (Rural), District Shimla, H.R By means of impugned order dated 24.9.2001 passed in case No. 6 of 1998 while allowing compensation in the sum of Rs. 2,12,307, it was ordered to be deposited within one month of the date of the said decision. Insurance Company was held liable for payment of compensation of this amount with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. for every day of delay thereafter. Besides the aforesaid amount of compensation, both the respondents have been held liable to pay Rs. 5,000 each by way of penalty. 2. When the appeal was filed following two substantial questions of law were framed on behalf of the appellants:— 1. Whether the appellants are entitled to Rs. 3,500 p.m. as salary for the purpose of multiplier in view of amendment made in the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 w.e.f. 8.12.2000? 2. Whether the appellants are entitled to interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date of accident as envisaged under Section 4-A subsection 3(a) of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923? Notice was issued to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 did not choose to appear after due service as is evident from the office record. Dr. Lalit Sharma appeared on behalf of respondentNo. 2. 3. Though Mr. Chauhan learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that his clients are entitled to the benefit of amended provision of Section 4 of the Workmens Compensation Act (here-in-after referred to as the Act) he was unable to persuade the Court as to on what principle of law much less a rule of interpretation this plea has been raised. Only argument addressed was that being a% beneficent legislation it needs to be liberally construed so as to advance the object with which it was enacted and amended from time to time, including such amendments which are carried out while the case is pending either before the Commissioner or at the appellate stage as the case may be. 4. This plea was controverted by Dr. Lalit Sharma on behalf of respondent-Insurance Company. He submitted that relevant date for determining the amount of compensation is the date of accident. 4. This plea was controverted by Dr. Lalit Sharma on behalf of respondent-Insurance Company. He submitted that relevant date for determining the amount of compensation is the date of accident. Per him any subsequent change in law will not entitle claimants like appellants to ask for the benefit of other amended provisions he however, hastened to say that unless such provision is made retrospectively applicable to pending cases also. 5. Admittedly, this is not the situation in the present case as the amending Act No. 46 of 2000 whereby in Section 4(b) Explanation 2 "Rs. 4,000" was substituted for earlier existing Rs. 2,000 came into force with effect from 8.12.2000. Amending Act does not make it applicable to the pending cases, like the present one. While putting up the case of respondent No. 2 Dr. Sharma also submitted that the learned Commissioner below has gravely erred in holding his client responsible for payment of penalty while imposing the same alongwith respondent No. 1. This according to him is not only illegal and unwarranted but is also contrary to the mandate of Supreme Court of India in case Ved Parkash Garg v. Premi Devi and others, AIR 1997 SC 3854. He however, fairly stated that in terms of this decision his client is only liable to pay compensation alongwith interest in accordance with the provisions of law governing the same. 6. So far plea urged on behalf of the appellants that compensation is to be assessed as per amended provision of Section 4 vide Central Act 20 of 1994 supra is concerned, it has been raised simply to be rejected for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. 7. So far rights of a party are concerned those are fructified on the date of accident. Reason being that the grant of compensation involves finances, so unless made applicable retrospectively, such a provision would always be applicable prospectively. This matter is even otherwise no more res Integra, in view of a three judge bench decision of Supreme Court of India in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Valsala K., 2000 ACJ 5, wherein it was held as under: "1. This matter is even otherwise no more res Integra, in view of a three judge bench decision of Supreme Court of India in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Valsala K., 2000 ACJ 5, wherein it was held as under: "1. The next question involved in these special leave petitions is whether the amendment of Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 made by Act No. 30 of 1995 with effect from 15.9.1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and the rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to 15.9.1995? 2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevantdate for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of accident. 3. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata, 1976 ACJ 141 (SC), speaking through Shanghai, J., has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim. 4. A two-Judge Bench of this court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-16906 of 1996, decided on 6.11.1996, however, took the view that Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two-Judge Bench in Neelakandans case (supra), however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deos case, 1976 ACJ 141 (SC), as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deos case, the view expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Neelakandans case is not correct. 5. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deos case, the view expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Neelakandans case is not correct. 5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi, 1998 ACJ 1048 (Kerala), wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent, it is in accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata, 1976 ACJ 141 (SC), lays down the correct law and we approve it." (Emphasis added)" 8. To similar effect are the decisions of this Court rendered in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kala Devi and others, 1997 ACJ 17, FAO (WCA) No. 185 of 1997 United India Insurance Company v. Sumitra Devi and others and FAO (WCA) No. 250 of 1997. Sumitra Devi and others v. Kinnaur Federation and another, decided on 27.11.2001. While taking this view it also cannot be said that amended provision is procedural in nature so as to make it retrospectively applicable. Accordingly question No. 1 does not arise for determination in this case and the plea urged by Mr. Chauhan in that behalf is rejected. 9. So far plea regarding interest is concerned, in view of .the decision in the case of Ved Parkash Garg (supra) respondent No. 2 cannot escape its liability for its payment on the awarded amount of Rs. 1,89,560. Accordingly it is held that from the date of the award i.e. 24.9.2001 it shall be liable to pay interest @ 12% p.a. on it Till the amount is either paid or deposited. 1,89,560. Accordingly it is held that from the date of the award i.e. 24.9.2001 it shall be liable to pay interest @ 12% p.a. on it Till the amount is either paid or deposited. It may be noted that learned Counsel for the parties were not at variance at the time of hearing that the income and factors etc., have been correctly assessed by the Commissioner below while passing the impugned award. 10. Now coming to the plea of Dr. Sharma that his clients have been wrongly held liable for payment of compensation in the sum of Rs. 5,000. In the face of the decision of the Supreme Court in case Ved Parkabh Garg (supra), wherein it was held in paragraph 14 as under: " 14....But so far as the amount of penalty imposed on the insured employer under contingencies contemplated by Section 4-A(3)(b) is concerned as that is on account of personal fault of the insured not backed up by any justifiable cause the insurance company cannot be made liable to reimburse that part of the penalty amount imposed on the employer. The latter because of his own fault and negligence will have to bear the entire burden of the said penalty amount with proportionate interest thereon if imposed by the Workmens Commissioner." This plea deserves to be upheld. 11. Accordingly, it is held that penalty has been wrongly made payable by respondent No. 2. Accident in this case has taken place on 15.4.1998. Claim petition was filed on 6.7.1998 and liability to pay the amount of compensation arose within one month of the accident i.e. by or before 14.5.1998. The amount was not paid within the time allowed under the Act. We, therefore, consider it just and proper for securing the ends of justice that instead of penalty of Rs. 5,000 respondent No.2 shall pay costs of Rs. 5,000 to the appellants. No other point is urged. 12. The amount was not paid within the time allowed under the Act. We, therefore, consider it just and proper for securing the ends of justice that instead of penalty of Rs. 5,000 respondent No.2 shall pay costs of Rs. 5,000 to the appellants. No other point is urged. 12. Before finally parting with this case, we may observe that it was though fit to dispose of this case at the admission stage rather than keeping the file alive on the pendency list of this Court because respondent No. 2 Insurance Company as already noted did not dispute its liability for payment of compensation with interest, we may add here that even if it had disputed still in view of the mandate of Supreme Court (supra) it is bound to pay both these amounts. Further, no appeal has been filed by it. So far respondent No. 1 is concerned, he is not aggrieved by the impugned award as he had not filed any appeal. Thus without admitting the appeal we have finally disposed of the same, as no fruitful purpose would have been served except for increasing the pendency of the Court. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, while upholding the award of the learned Commissioner below but subject to the above modifications regarding payment of costs and interest, this appeal is hereby finally disposed of with no orders as to costs. Appeal disposed of.