Judgment :- M.R. Hariharan Nair, J. The important question of law arising for decision in this case is whether an officer who is reinstated in service after suspension for involvement in criminal case is entitled to claim the suspension period as period on duty with all monetary benefits if the acquittal is not based on a finding that the prosecution case is wholly baseless; but only on grant of benefit of doubt. 2. While working as typist in the Government Leprosy Hospital, Koratty, the petitioner was placed under suspension as per Ext. P1 order dt. 18.7.1987 w.e.f. 5.7.1987 for the reason that criminal case involving offence under Sections 420 and 477 A of the I.P.C. was registered against him by the Chalakudy police as Crime No. 196 of 1987. After due trial the petitioner was acquitted in the case vide Ext. P2 judgment granting benefit of doubt. 3. After considering the said acquittal the petitioner was re-instated in service vide Ext. P3 order of the first respondent and it was mentioned that orders regularizing the period of suspension would be issued separately. Ultimately the second respondent directed that the suspension period would be treated as duty for all service benefits except for pay and allowances and that the petitioner need only be paid subsistence allowance for the said period. It was also mentioned in Ext. P5 that the order should be issued only after issuance of notice to the petitioner. Accordingly Ext. P6 show cause notice was issued and after considering the explanation, Ext. P8 order was passed confirming that the said period would be treated as on duty, but only with subsistence allowance and not with full pay and allowances. The petitioner is now aggrieved that though Ext. P9 appeal was filed before the second respondent challenging that finding, it is dismissed vide Ext. P10 order without stating any reasons. 4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the only reason for the suspension was the involvement of the petitioner in a criminal case and once he is acquitted of the offence charged, it necessarily follows that he should be re-instated with all monetary benefits. It is also pointed out that the Government should have given reasons in Ext. P10 instead of simply stating that as per earlier order the Government had decided the issue. 5. I have heard the learned Government pleader also. It is also pointed out that the Government should have given reasons in Ext. P10 instead of simply stating that as per earlier order the Government had decided the issue. 5. I have heard the learned Government pleader also. According to him, the Government has already considered all the relevant aspects while issuing Ext. P5 order and it was considering the fact that the accused was merely given the benefit of doubt for justifying acquittal, that the Government directed that he need not be re-instated with full monetary benefits. According to him, the disciplinary authority has the discretion to do so. 6. A Bench of this Court had occasion to go into the statutory provisions and principles to be applied in a case of re-instatement in WA No. 862 of 1988 (M.V. Subramonian v. Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C.). It was found that where the re instatement is not under Rule 56 Part I K.S.R., but based on acquittal by criminal court it is Rules 56B that applies. 7. Rule 56 B provides, inter alia, that when an officer who has been suspented is re-instated the authority competent to order re-instatement shall consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the officer for the period of suspension ending with re-instatement and whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. Under Rule 56B (3) where the authority competent to order re-instatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8) be paid the full pay and the allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended. Sub Clause (4) of Rule 56 B provides that in a case falling under sub-rule (3), the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. Sub Clause (4) of Rule 56 B provides that in a case falling under sub-rule (3), the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. Under sub clause (5), in a case other than those coming under sub-rules (2) & (3) the officer shall, subject to the provisions of sub rule (8) & (9) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the officer of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period as may be specified in the notice. Sub clause (7) further provides that in case falling under sub-rule (5), the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose. The proviso to the sub clause also allows the officer to opt that the period of suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the officer. 8. A perusal of Ext.P1 order shows that the provisions under which suspension was ordered was not specified. The reason given is retention in police custody from 5-7-1987. If that is so the powers invoked is under Rule 57, Part I K.S.R. A perusal of Ext. P2 judgment, however, shows that the petitioner was not arrested by the police and that actually he appeared before court on 7.7.1987 and was released on bail on the same day. If that is so it is Rule 58, Part I K.S.R. that would enable the disciplinary authority to suspend him. In view of this position I shall consider the legal position in both situation. 9. If that is so it is Rule 58, Part I K.S.R. that would enable the disciplinary authority to suspend him. In view of this position I shall consider the legal position in both situation. 9. Rule 58 of Part I K.S.R. states, inter alia, that an officer against whom a criminal charge is pending in a court of law should be placed under suspension by the issue of specified orders to that effect during periods while he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned (e.g. while released on bail) if the charge made or proceeding taken against him is connected with his position as an officer or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude unless there are exceptional reasons for not adopting that course and that in regard to persons so suspended their pay and allowances should be governed by the provisions already mentioned. 10. Rule 57, Part I K.S.R. provides as follows : "An officer who is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, or is undergoing imprisonment, shall be deemed to be under suspension with effect from the date of commencement of the detention or imprisonment, as the case may be, and shall not be allowed to draw any pay and allowances during such period of suspension other than any subsistence allowance and other allowances that may be granted in accordance with Rule 55 until he is reinstated in service. An adjustment of his pay and allowances for such periods should thereafter be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of blame or (if the proceedings taken against him where for his arrest for debt) of its being provided that the officer's liability arose from circumstances beyond his control." 11. As can be seen from the above, reinstatement in cases of suspension under Rule 57 is subject to a condition that an adjustment of his pay and allowances for such period of suspension should be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of the blame. As can be seen from the above, reinstatement in cases of suspension under Rule 57 is subject to a condition that an adjustment of his pay and allowances for such period of suspension should be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of the blame. It is clear from a perusal of Rule 58 that the same condition applies even to cases of suspensions of the ground of existences of criminal charge which would cause embarrassment in the discharge of his duties or where the charge involves moral turpitude. 12. This Court has held in Mohammed Easa Sahib v. D.I.G. of Police (1990 (2) K.L.T. 462) that the expression "acquitted of blame" means something more than a mere acquittal and that where the officer is acquitted giving the benefit of doubt, he would not be entitled to full amount of pay an allowance during the period of suspension. The authority in such cases is to record a finding as to whether in its opinion the suspension is wholly unjustified. That has to be done with reference to the relevant facts and circumstances which were obtaining at the relevant point of time. 13. Having considered the petitioner's case in the light of the above position of law, I am of the view that the matter requires fresh consideration by the Government. First of all Ext. P 10, which is the appellate order, is not speaking in nature. None of the reasons given in Ext. P9 appeal memo or in Ext. P7 explanation have been considered therein. That apart, the only reason stated in Ext. P10 is that the Government considered the matter at an earlier stage while issuing Ext. P5. Ext. P5 is an order passed based on a clarification sought by the first respondent. There the direction is that the monetary benefits should be limited to the subsistence allowance payable. After giving such a direction it is further mentioned that a notice should be issued to the petitioner with regard to that proposal. That direction indicates that the earlier finding was only provisional and that the disciplinary authority was still left with a discretion to decide as to how the period should be treated after considering the objections raised by the petitioner. That direction indicates that the earlier finding was only provisional and that the disciplinary authority was still left with a discretion to decide as to how the period should be treated after considering the objections raised by the petitioner. There has not been such fresh consideration by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority. 14. In the circumstances I am of the view that the matter deserves a fresh consideration by the appellate authority viz. the second respondent to decide as to which sub clause of Rule 56 B applies to the petitioner. Ext. P10 order is hence quashed and the second respondent is directed to dispose of Ext. P9 appeal on the merits and through a speaking order after affording an opportunity to the petitioner to be heard. The Original Petition is disposed of as above.