JUDGMENT B. PANIGRAHI, J. — This revisional application filed by the defendant is directed against an order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bhubaneswar in Title Suit No. 793 of 1999 dated 8.5.2001 dismissing the petitioner’s prayer to take up first the preliminary issue of maintainability of the suit. 2. The factual matrix leading to this revisional applica¬tion is as follows : The plaintiff-opp. party No. 1 filed Title Suit No. 793 of 1999 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bhubaneswar with a prayer for a declaration that the order of the Government of Orissa regarding the approval of defendants Nos. 4 to 14 as the teaching and non-teaching staff of Santilata Mahavidyalaya in the district of Balasore is illegal, invalid and not binding on him. The plaintiff, inter alia, claimed to have been appointed as a Lecturer in Education in Santilata Mahavidyalaya ever since 1st December, 1981 vide Governing Body Resolution dated 25.11.1981. In course of his employment he was also asked to take over the post of Principal in charge of the said College vide Resolution No. 75 dated 10.5.1993 and it was accordingly approved by defend¬ant No. 1. When the said approval was withdrawn without any rhyme and reason by the State Government, opp. party No.3, the peti¬tioner, therefore, had to approach this Court by filing a writ application being O.J.C. No. 6623/99 which was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court in the following manner : “4. 16.12.99 - Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. In our view, disputed questions of fact are involved and, therefore, it is not possible to decide the same in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. For this reason, we do not find that any relief can be granted to the petitioner in this writ application. The petitioner, if so advised, may either file a properly constituted suit before the competent Civil Court or make an application for being impleaded as a party in the pending suits. The writ application is disposed of.” Thereafter the plaintiff filed the instant suit for the following reliefs : “(a) Let a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff declaring the Government order No. 13042 dt. 27.2.99 and No. 15219 dt. 12.3.99 of the Dy. Secretary to Govt. of Orissa of the office of the defendant No. 2 and office order No. 13732 dt. 27.2.99 and No. 15219 dt. 12.3.99 of the Dy. Secretary to Govt. of Orissa of the office of the defendant No. 2 and office order No. 13732 dt. 9.3.99 and office order No. 16508 dt. 17.3.99 of the Dy. Director (NGC-I) Higher Education, Orissa, office of defendant No. 1 are illegal and void and enquiry dt. 24.6.89 conducted by defendant No. 1 in respect of the properties of the staff pattern of Shantilata Mahavidyalaya, Uitikiri, Balasore is improper and void in view of showing the minors and students, students of the said College as staff and without verification of Governing body records as per letter No. 1448 dt. 9.1.89 and showing some educationally defi¬cient person as staff and without having appointment order of the defendant No. 3. (b) Let a decree of permanent injunction be passed in favour of the plaintiff injuncting the defendant No. 4 to work as Principal and defendant Nos. 5 to 14 to work in the Shantilata Mahavidya¬laya as staff of the College. (c) Let the cost of the suit be decreed in favour of the plain¬tiffs.” 3. Pursuant to the summons the petitioners appeared in the Court below and have filed their written statements, inter alia, stating that there have been a spate of litigations in different Courts as regards the status of the plaintiff as a lecturer in Santilata Mahavidyalaya. It is further claimed that the petition¬ers are only the approved staff of the College and as such enti¬tled to receive grant-in-aid from the Government. They have also taken the stand that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide inter se rights of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the petitioners inasmuch as the Education Tribunal after it being constituted is empowered under Section 24-B of the Orissa Education (Amendment) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Amending Act’). There¬fore, by necessary implication the plaint should be non-suited as the Civil Court has not been vested with the jurisdiction to decide the aforesaid controversy. 4. Learned trial Judge has, however, rejected the petitioners’ prayer by, inter alia, holding that since this Court permitted the plaintiff to approach the Civil Court for resolving the con¬troversial facts, therefore, it cannot be said that the Civil Court is devoid of its jurisdiction to decide the said dispute as a reason whereof the learned Judge was inclined to dismiss the petitioner’s prayer. 5. 5. At the outset the revisional application appeared before the learned Single Judge of this Court who thought it apposite to place the matter before a Division Bench of this Court inasmuch as there was an earlier direction of this Court permitting the plaintiff-opp. party No.1 to file a civil suit. It is, therefore, in the above context the Division Bench shall have to decide as to whether the aforesaid direction would impliedly mean to file a claim either before the appropriate authority or in a Civil Court. That is how the revisional application had appeared before this Division Bench. 6. Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Advocate appearing for the revi¬sionists has argued with strong intensity of conviction that the trial Court’s order is per se illegal when jurisdiction of the Court is impliedly barred by virtue of a special statute under Section 24-B of the Amending Act. It has been further noted that although normally all the issues involved in a suit should be tried together and not in piece meal, but, when there is a ques¬tion of jurisdiction which can be otherwise decided only upon admitted pleadings, then without driving the parties to a long drawn process of evidence the suit can be appropriately disposed of. In support of his contention he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 255 (Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. and another). In the aforesaid judgment the apex Court has, however, taken the view that when there is an apparent implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant relief prayed for by the plaintiff, in such cases he should be directed to follow the appropriate procedure whereunder he can get his remedy. If the Scheme of the Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or by implication in respect of the remedies which are available under the Education Act and for which a complete proce¬dural machinery has been provided in the Act, in such situation the plaintiff should be asked to pursue his remedy not in Civil Court but under the Act where sufficient remedies have been provided. He has also relied upon another judgment reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1250 (Munshi Ram and others v. Municipal Commit¬tee). He has also relied upon another judgment reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1250 (Munshi Ram and others v. Municipal Commit¬tee). On reading both the judgments we feel that the apex Court has applied the principle of implied bar created under Industrial Disputes Act and the other under Panjab Municipal Act (3 of 1971) under Section 61 (1) (b). 7. Mr. Routray, learned Advocate appearing for the opp. party No. 4 has repelled the aforesaid contention by stating that there should not be any inference that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction unless the special Statute precludes or debars exercise of such jurisdiction. He has also by way of analogy placed before us the provisions of Section 39 of the Orissa Estates Abolition At and also other analogous provisions of different Statutes which specifically prohibits exercise of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Since Section 24-B of the Amend¬ing Act does not inhibit the Civil Court to exercise its power, therefore, it cannot readily be inferred that it has no jurisdic¬tion. Ordinarily the Civil Court should try and decide all the issues together, but not in piece meal unless such preliminary issue can be disposed of without any evidence and only on the pleadings. The plaintiff since has claimed certain controversial facts with regard to his appointment as a Lecturer and subse¬quently as Principal vis-a-vis the petitioners, such question cannot be decided by the Education Tribunal. That is why this Court permitted the opp. party No.1 to file a civil suit. 8. Upon hearing submissions and counter submissions ad¬vanced by both the parties and on perusal of the pleadings of the parties we found that the plaintiff has claimed to have been appointed by the Governing Body ever since 1981 and subsequently he was kept as Principal in-charge of the College and it appears, the Governing Body has allegedly appointed the petitioners as the teaching and non-teaching staff of the college to defeat the plaintiff’s right. Therefore, in this factual backdrop it has to be ascertained whether such controversial question of fact can be raised and decided in the civil Court or the Education Tribunal. 9. From the opp. party No. 4’s submission it appears that the inter se claim of the petitioners as well as opp. party No. 1 cannot be resolved by the Education Tribunal. Such dispute can only be decided by the Civil Court. Mr. 9. From the opp. party No. 4’s submission it appears that the inter se claim of the petitioners as well as opp. party No. 1 cannot be resolved by the Education Tribunal. Such dispute can only be decided by the Civil Court. Mr. Rourtray has placed the provisions of Section 24-B of the Amending Act and wanted us to draw an inference that the Education Tribunal has no power to decide such inter se rights. By his ingenuous argument he submit¬ted that if a dispute between teaching staff and the Managing Committee or the Governing Body, as the case may be, and the Gov¬ernment, such dispute only can be decided by the Education Tribu¬nal. In the plaint we found that the Deputy Director, Higher Education order dated 5.3.99 has been challenged in the Civil Court whereunder the grant-in-aid for payment of salary to the staff of Shantilata Mahavidyalaya has been accorded. In the above backdrop it has to be borne in mind whether the petitioners or the opp. party is/are the approved teaching staff of the College or not. The Tribunal shall have to decide if the petitioners vis-a-vis opposite party No. 1 are approved staff of the College. Under Section 24-B of the Amending Act such question can only be decided by the Tribunal. The Education Tribunal has adjudicatory power to resolve the dispute and controversies related to eligi¬bility of the payment or non-payment of the grant-in-aid given by the Government of Orissa. Since the plaintiff has complained of non-payment of grant-in-aid, it is, therefore, in this situation the Education Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate such lis. 10. After the grant-in-aid having been sanctioned in favour of the petitioners, there was no occasion for the State to enter into the arena of contest. Therefore, in this background it is either the plaintiff alone shall be entitled to grant-in-aid or defendants 4 to 14, which question appropriately comes within the power of the Tribunal. In the prayer also opp. party No. 1 has claimed for a declaration that the order passed by the Government by sanctioning grant-in-aid is not valid and binding on him. That question also cannot be decided by the Civil Court and can only be decided by the Education Tribunal. 11. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as follows: “9. party No. 1 has claimed for a declaration that the order passed by the Government by sanctioning grant-in-aid is not valid and binding on him. That question also cannot be decided by the Civil Court and can only be decided by the Education Tribunal. 11. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as follows: “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein con¬tained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” The manner in which the plaintiff has sought relief in this case seeking a declaration and injunction is only cognizable by the Tribunal. In a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reported in 1997 (5) SCC 536 (Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others) the apex Court held that exclusivity of these provisions relating to refund - and conversely the bar to other proceedings created by them - is specific to the subject of refund and is apart from and in addition to the general bar implicit in the Act. The Education Act has self-contained provi¬sions which provide sufficient mechanism to resolve the contro¬versy between the parties. Therefore, the parties should have to take resort to such adjudicatory process to achieve their right and bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court shall be inferred by the necessary implication. In a recent judgment the apex Court held in 2001 AIR SCW 2993 (Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and others) which runs as follows : “The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Sec. 20 and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitu¬tion or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the juris¬diction of the Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judi¬cial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the juris¬diction of the Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judi¬cial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the peti¬tion under Art. 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.” In another judgment of this Court reported in 1984 (I) OLR 978 (Orissa Road Transport Company Limited and another v. Sachidanan¬da Kanungo) the question of interpretation of Section 9, C.P.C. appeared before the learned Single Judge of this Court. In the aforesaid judgment the learned Single Judge held that where a special Tribunal is created by or under the authority of an Act of the Legislature for the purpose of determining the question as to the rights which are the creation of the Act, then, the juris¬diction of the Tribunal is, unless provided otherwise, exclusive and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is said to be impliedly barred. 12. While appreciating the petitioner’s contention we feel it necessary to quote the provision of Section 24-B of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 which reads as follows : “24-B. Adjudication by Tribunal - (1) the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate all disputes and differences, between the Managing Committee or, as the case may be, the Governing body of any private educational institution and any teacher or employees of such institution of the State Government or any officer or authority of the said Government, relating to or connected with the eligibility, entitlement, payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid. (2) Any person, aggrieved by an order pertaining to any matter within jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make an applica¬tion to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. (2) Any person, aggrieved by an order pertaining to any matter within jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make an applica¬tion to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. (3) On receipt of an application under Sub-section (2), the Tribunal, shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary that the application is a fit case for adjudication by it, admit such application, but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after record¬ing its reason : Provided that no application before the Tribunal seeking a claim of grant-in-aid against the State Government or any officer or authority of the said Government shall be admitted, unless the applicant has served a notice on the State Government or con¬cerned officer or authority furnishing the details of the claim and a period of two months has expired from the date of receipt of the said notice by the State Government or, as the case may be, the concerned officer or authority. (4) The Tribunal shall not admit an application under Sub-section (2), unless it is made within one year from the date of expiry of the period of two months referred to in Sub-section (3). (5) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to any rules made by the Government, shall have power to regulate its own proce¬dure. (6) All the proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.” There has been plenary power conferred upon the Tribunal to adju¬dicate disputes and differences between the Governing body of any private Educational Institution and any teacher or employees of such institution or the State Government or any officer or au¬thority of the said Government, relating to or connected with the eligibility, entitlement, payment or non-payment of grant-in-aid. Opp. party No. 1 in the suit has claimed his eligibility to be appointed as a Lecturer in the Shantilata Mahavidyalaya. He also disputed the claim of these petitioners as the teaching staff of the said College. Therefore, in such a dispute it is the Tribunal which has been conferred with the powers to decide and resolve their controversy. Opp. Opp. party No. 1 in the suit has claimed his eligibility to be appointed as a Lecturer in the Shantilata Mahavidyalaya. He also disputed the claim of these petitioners as the teaching staff of the said College. Therefore, in such a dispute it is the Tribunal which has been conferred with the powers to decide and resolve their controversy. Opp. party No. 1 has also questioned about the order of payment of grant-in-aid in favour of the petitioners which squarely comes within the powers of the Tribunal over which no Civil Court should have exercised its powers. In Sub-section (5) of Section 24-B it is also laid down that there has been self-contained procedure for adjudication of such disputes. It is stated in no uncertain terms that the Code of Civil Procedure has hardly any application while deciding such dispute covered under Sub-section (1) of Section 24-B of the Orissa Education Act. 13. Mr. Routray has submitted the Xerox copies of the judg¬ments reported in (1998) 8 SCC 623 (Lufthansa German Airlines v. VU Sales Corporation), (1998) 8 SCC 624 (K. John Koshy and others v. Dr. Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw), 1994 (I) OLR 391 (Jogi Sahu and others v. Umesh Chandra Mishra and others) and Vol. 32 (1990) OJD 120 (Shyama Sundar Mohapatra v. Janaki Ballav Patnaik and others) and some other decisions. On a careful consideration of those decisions we found that those are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence we did not feel it necessary to discuss those decisions at length. 14. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has raised his second limb of submission that since the cause of action for filing of the suit arose within the jurisdiction of the Balasore Court, therefore, the Civil Court at Bhubaneswar does not have territorial jurisdiction. We do not feel it in¬clined to advert to the said contention inasmuch as the question of jurisdiction under Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been answered in favour of the petitioners. 15. Considering the case of the parties from any angle we found that such relief could not be granted in civil Court and in appropriate circumstances plaintiff shall have to lay his claim before the Educational Tribunal if he is so advised. 16. Accordingly this revision succeeds with cost. 15. Considering the case of the parties from any angle we found that such relief could not be granted in civil Court and in appropriate circumstances plaintiff shall have to lay his claim before the Educational Tribunal if he is so advised. 16. Accordingly this revision succeeds with cost. The order of the trial Court dated 8.5.2001 is set aside and accordingly it is directed that the plaintiff can take return of the plaint for proper presentation before the competent authority within a month from date. M. PAPANNA, J. I agree. Revision allowed.