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2002 DIGILAW 1164 (PNJ)

Ravinder Sood v. Union Territory, Chandigarh

2002-10-31

S.S.NIJJAR

body2002
Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. This petition seeks quashing of the criminal complaint dated 06.06.1998, Annexure P-1, FIR No. 212 dated 27.07.1988, under Sections 406, 498-A IPC, registered at Police Station, Central, Sector-17, Chandigarh, Annexure P-2, and proceedings consequential thereto. 2. Marriage between petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 was solemnized at Chandigarh on 12.12.1996 according to Hindu rites and from the said wedlock a female child was born on 26.03.1998. The child is at present living with her mother, i.e. respondent No. 2. Due to incompatibility in the temperament, the parties have been living separately since February, 1998. Out of the acrimony, multiple litigation ensued between the parties. Respondent No. 2, the complainant-wife filed a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Respondent No. 2 also filed a complaint mentioned above. On the basis of the complaint, FIR in question has been registered against the petitioners. 3. As usual, the whole of the family of the petitioner-husband has been arrayed as accused. The pressure tactics of the parties seem to have borne fruit. A decree of divorce has been granted to the parties by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, on 26.03.2002. The entire dispute between the parties have been settled. Financial arrangements have been made part and parcel of the decree of divorce. Learned counsel for all the parties have agreed that there is no dispute pending between the parties. It is also stated by all the learned counsel for the parties that it would be in the interest of justice if the criminal complaint, FIR and the consequential proceedings are quashed. As noticed above, I am of the considered opinion that criminal litigation was resorted to by the complainant for the purpose of an ultimate settlement in the divorce proceedings. That purpose seems to have been achieved. To permit the criminal proceedings to continue now would be unnecessarily harass all the parties concerned. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and ors., 1988(1) Recent Criminal Reports (SC) 565, the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "7. That purpose seems to have been achieved. To permit the criminal proceedings to continue now would be unnecessarily harass all the parties concerned. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and ors., 1988(1) Recent Criminal Reports (SC) 565, the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue. The Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage". 4. Furthermore, the continuance of these proceedings are bound to end in failure as none of the prosecution witnesses would support the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the criminal proceedings even if taken to their logical end, would be an exercise in futility. Apart from the above, it would be an unnecessary burden on the criminal justice system which is already heavily burdened. This view of mine also finds support from the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Singla and others v. State of Haryana and Another. In this case, it has been held as follows :- "9. The Honble Supreme Court in Ram Lal and Another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 2000(1) RCR(Crl.) 92 (SC) : J.T. 1999(1) SC 147 has held that Section 320 Cr.P.C. which deals with compounding of offences provides two tables therein and only such offences as are included in said two tables can be compounded and none else, in view of the provisions contained in Sub Section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. that no offence shall be compounded except as provided for by this section. But, in my view this decision will not be applicable to the facts of the present case before this court. This decision of the Honble Supreme Court referred to above was rendered in a criminal appeal. One of the appellants before the Honble Supreme Court had been convicted in an offence under Section 326 IPC which is a non-compoundable offence. Therefore, in those circumstances, the Honble Supreme Court held that the Court cannot grant leave to that appellant to compound the offence in as much as the offence under Section 326 IPC is a non-compounable offence. But in the present case, the matter is still pending before the trial Court. The petitioners herein have not been convicted, and this is not an appeal against the conviction. The petitioners want the FIR itself quashed on the ground that the matter has been compromised. The second respondent- complainant has filed the affidavit that she does not want to pursue the criminal proceedings and that she has no objection to quash the FIR in question. In these circumstances, this Court is not requested to grant leave to compound the offence. The prayer is to quash the FIR and the consequent criminal proceedings on the ground that there is no use of keeping the proceedings pending since the complainant herself is not interested in pursuing the proceedings. Her father has also filed an affidavit to that effect. In these circumstances, I am of the view that though the court cannot grant permission to the parties to compound an offence which is not compoundable in terms of Section 320 Cr.P.C. this Court can quash the FIR and the consequential proceedings before the conviction. Inasmuch as it will be a wastage of time and an exercise is futility to allow the proceedings to go on. If the complainant and others are not going to the support the case of the prosecution, then the trial court would have only to undertake the exercise of conducting a trial in which there is no chance of convicting the accused. Therefore, instead of allowing this exercise in futility, I am of the view that the FIR in question and the consequential proceedings can be quashed in the interest of justice. Therefore, instead of allowing this exercise in futility, I am of the view that the FIR in question and the consequential proceedings can be quashed in the interest of justice. Of course, the State has filed reply stating that the charge-sheet has been filed before the trial court, but, in view of the fact that the complainant herself is not willing to support the allegations in the FIR, I am of the view that the filing of the charge-sheet cannot be taken to be a bar to the quashing of the proceedings". 5. In similar circumstances in the case of Bhai Rajinder Pal Singh v. Manveen Kaur (Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 4391 of 1998, decided on 14.05.1999, the Supreme Court observed as under :- "I.A. No. 5 of 1999 is allowed and petition for dissolution of marriage which is transferred to this Court is allowed to be amended accordingly. There will be a decree for dissolution of marriage between Manveen Kaur and Bhai Rajinder Pal Singh by mutual consent, as prayed. The parties have also recorded terms of compromise between them relating to payment of alimony, withdrawal of proceedings instituted by either party before any Court etc. The terms of compromise signed by both the parties and their advocates are taken on record. There will be an order in terms of the compromise so recorded. We also direct that criminal case arising out of F.I.R. No. 59 of 1994, dated 26.4.1995, under Section 406/498-A IPC filed in the Police Station, Sector 26, Chandigarh, which has been transferred to this Court, is quashed. I am of the considered opinion that aforesaid ratio of law is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In such circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case where (sic). The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly". 6. I am of the considered opinion that aforesaid ratio of law is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In such circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case where this Court ought to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to put an end to the criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice. 7. In such circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case where this Court ought to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to put an end to the criminal proceedings to secure the ends of justice. 7. Consequently, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, criminal complaint dated 06.06.1998, Annexure P-1, FIR No. 212 dated 27.07.1988, under Sections 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station, Central, Sector-17, Chandigarh, Annexure P-2, and proceedings consequential thereto, are hereby quashed. No costs. Petition allowed.