M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) WE have heard the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor, the learned Counsel who represents the respondents-accused who are the original accused 2 to 4 before the Trial Court. The case against accused 1 was separated because he was apparently absconding. The allegation was that at around midnight on 13-9-1994, the present three accused along with accused 1-Vishnu had gone to the residence of deceased Nagappa, the reason being that some altercation had taken place between the parties earlier that day in the course of the Ganapati procession. The accused are alleged to have knocked at the door and P. W. 1-Sumithra who is the wife of the deceased Nagappa opened the door. The accused called Nagappa out and in fact, virtually dragged him out, tore his shirt and an altercation took place between the four accused and Nagappa. At the end of this altercation, accused 1 inflicted a stab injury on the abdomen of Nagappa after which they all ran away from that place. Dimensionwise, the injury was a very small one measuring half-an-inch but the weapon had caused a small tear to the intestine and the kidney. P. W. 1-Sumithra took her husband into the house and obviously attended to him and it was only the next day that he was taken to hospital. Obviously, because of the haemorrhage Nagappa died. The police arrested the accused and at the end of the investigation they were charge-sheeted for having committed offences punishable under Section 302 read with Sections 114 and 34 of the IPC. The majority of the crucial witnesses did not support the prosecution and we are ultimately left with the evidence of wife Sumithra who is P. W. 1 and the mother, P. W. 6. Sumithra very categorically states that the four accused had come to their residence on that night, that they had assaulted her husband and that he came to be stabbed in the course of that incident. The mother, p. W. 6 has deposed to the effect that deceased Nagappa had told her that accused 2 was on inimical terms with him and that he had threatened to kill him and that accused 2 was the person who gave the knife to accused 1 who in turn stabbed Nagappa. The mother, p. W. 6 has deposed to the effect that deceased Nagappa had told her that accused 2 was on inimical terms with him and that he had threatened to kill him and that accused 2 was the person who gave the knife to accused 1 who in turn stabbed Nagappa. We need to take note of the fact that P. W. 6 was admittedly not present when the incident took place and everything that she has stated is on the basis of what her son is supposed to have told her. It is for this reason that this evidence will have to be perhaps slightly discounted or accepted with a level of caution. ( 2 ) THE learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has submitted that the presence of P. W. 1-Sumithra is perfectly natural, that she knows the accused, that she has identified them and that her evidence has withstood the test of cross-examination and consequently this evidence as corroborated by the evidence of P. W. 6, the mother and the medical evidence of Dr. Lachappa, P. W. 1 is more than sufficient to establish the charges. His submission is that even if accused 1 is absconding, that the remaining accused can be convicted in him absence if it is established that they abetted him and shared the common intention in which case the liability of the act of stabbing Nagappa would devolve on all the accused. The learned Counsel therefore submitted that the order of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Judge is bad in law and that the same must be set aside and the three accused must be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel representing the accused has seriously assailed the evidence insofar as he submits that there is a clear desire on the part of P. Ws. 1 and 6 to foist the stabbing incident on the present accused even though it is an individual act attributable to accused 1. He lays emphasis on the fact that there is no dispute about the evidence insofar as the allegation is that accused 1 was the person who used the knife even if the accused shared the common intention of assaulting nagappa. He lays emphasis on the fact that there is no dispute about the evidence insofar as the allegation is that accused 1 was the person who used the knife even if the accused shared the common intention of assaulting nagappa. The submission canvassed is that unless there is additional material before the Court to establish that the common intention of the group was directed towards killing Nagappa, that it would not be permissible in law to convict the present accused for that offence even if the court were to hold them guilty of the lesser charge of having physically assaulted Nagappa. The learned Counsel has submitted that even if the evidence indicated that the remaining accused assisted accused 1 in the knife assault or on the other hand if they established that they had instigated accused 1 to stab the deceased that only then the prosecution can argue that they could be held liable for this act but in the absence of either of these two factors, that the acquittal order under Section 302 would have to be sustained. He has attacked the evidence of P. W. 1 with regard to the alleged assault on deceased Nagappa by accused 2 to 4 by pointing out that there were virtually no injuries on the deceased either external or internal other than the stab injury and one small bruise on the knee which is hardly attributable to an assault. His submission therefore is that the order of acquittal is perfectly just and should be upheld. ( 4 ) ON the material before us, the interesting question that arises is as to whether in the first instance the charge of abetment of common intention along with the accused who is not before the Court is sustainable. Though it was contended on behalf of the accused that in law it would not be permissible to sustain such a charge, we need to point out that the Supreme Court and the various High Courts have in the course of the last twenty years held that in cases of violence such as an unlawful assembly and rioting where the assault is pursuant to the collective act of several persons that if one or more of them is not before the Court or is for that matter unknown, that the charge is still sustainable and if established could lead to a conviction of the remaining accused. ( 5 ) ON the main point however, where we accept the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 6 to the extent that it establishes that accused 1 to 4 came to the residence of Nagappa on that night, knocked on the door, dragged him out, tore his shirt, assaulted him and ultimately ended up by stabbing him, where the material is good enough to indicate that all these acts were pursuant to the common intention of the group. In criminal law, before abetment or common intention can be made actionable, the prosecution must establish either from direct evidence or even circumstantial evidence that there was a meeting of minds or unity of action directed towards the ultimate end result. For example, if a group of persons armed with deadly weapons chase a person, assault and kill him, the inference would be that all those who form part of the assault party shared the common intention or abetted each other insofar as being armed with deadly weapons and participating in the act of assault could indicate that they shared the objective of killing the victim and acted in furtherance of their common intention or in a given instance that they abetted each other in the offence. Applying the well-defined principles of law to the present case, we find that there is no direct conclusive evidence to indicate that the present accused 2, 3 and 4 came there with the objective of killing Nagappa because they have not made any statement to this effect nor were they carrying any weapons. It is true that there is an allegation to the effect that accused 2 was carrying the knife and that he gave it to accused 1 but this is hardly believable because if we were to accept the prosecution charge that accused 2 was hostile to the deceased and intended to kill him and that he had brought the knife for this purpose, it does not stand to reason why he would not us it himself and instead give it to accused 1. It is clear to us that since accused 1 is not before the Court, that the witnesses have overreached themselves by putting in this additional embellishment in order to sustain the murder charge against the present accused. It is clear to us that since accused 1 is not before the Court, that the witnesses have overreached themselves by putting in this additional embellishment in order to sustain the murder charge against the present accused. Again, it is nobody's case that accused 2, 3 and 4 either instigated accused 1 to stab nagappa nor is there any evidence to indicate that they assisted Nagappa in the process, as sometimes happens, by preventing the deceased from running away or holding his down or the like. Consequently, the only fair, correct arid irresistible conclusion would be that the common intention of the group was to settle scores with Nagappa and since they had come without any weapons it was clear that at the highest, they aimed at physical assault. ( 6 ) IT is true that in the course of this incident Nagappa was stabbed and the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has very strongly submitted that the Court cannot delink the stabbing from the rest of the assault as it was part and parcel of the assault which the accused had directed against the deceased and that as long as even one of them had a weapon and used it, that it could never be argued that the object of the visit was only to settle scores through a minor physical assault such as fist blows etc. We have taken note of this angie and what we need to highlight is that criminal law admits to a situation wherein a group of persons is motivated by a particular objective such as to assault a particular person and that in the course of the incident one or more of them exceeds the general objective by using too much force or inflicting a fatal injury which was obviously never the intention. We have carefully dissected the present incident which was one of some duration and it is clear to us that if the objective was to kill Nagappa, that the accused would have straightaway caught hold of him, stabbed him and run away from there which is not what happened. We have carefully dissected the present incident which was one of some duration and it is clear to us that if the objective was to kill Nagappa, that the accused would have straightaway caught hold of him, stabbed him and run away from there which is not what happened. He was dragged out, his shirt was torn and he was virtually beaten up and it was only thereafter that accused 1 suddenly used the knife and in the absence of any interconnec- tion between this act and the earlier ones and in the absence of any interconnection between his action and any instigation, provocation or assistance from the remaining accused, we are constrained to hold that in keeping with the well-settled position in law, the liability for the last part of the assault i. e. , stabbing would devolve only on original accused 1. Consequently, it would not be permissible to uphold the charge under section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC against the present accused. The order of acquittal as far as this charge is concerned is therefore confirmed. ( 7 ) WE cannot however lose sight of the fact that the evidence does establish that accused 2 to 4 have assaulted the deceased Nagappa in the course of the incident but in the absence of any injuries, external or internal, all that they would be liable for is a conviction under Section 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The accused have spent a considerable period in custody and consequently, we direct that they shall undergo imprisonment for the period undergone by them in custody. ( 8 ) IN the result, the appeal partially succeeds though on a technical ground having regard to the fact that the accused have undergone sufficient period in custody. It is unnecessary for them to be rearrested nor is any further punishment awarded. The appeal succeeds to this extent and stands disposed of. Bail bonds of the accused to stand cancelled. --- *** --- .