BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) THE facts leading to filing of these appeals have been narrated in the order of reference by the learned single Judge by his order dated 13-10-2000. They are reproduced herein below:"the State Police Department was of the view that in a case of land acquisition illegal and fraudulent payment of huge amount of compensation had been made in Visakhapatnam district where lands had been acquired by the Government for the purpose of providing house-sites to the weaker sections of the society in Pisinikada village, this had become possible due to criminal conspiracy between the Presiding officer of the Sub-Court, Anakapalle and his staff, the advocate appearing for the claimants. Assistant Government pleader appearing for State and some others. The inspector General of Police, holding additional charge of Addl. Director General of Police, CID, Andhra Pradesh wrote a confidential letter on 4-5-1998 to the registrar (Vigilance ). In this letter he mentioned; "in view of the above facts and circumstances mentioned above all the 8 accused have committed various offences punishable under sections 120-B, 419, 420, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 406 Indian Penal Code read with 120 (B) and 109 Indian Penal Code. Section 195 Cr. PC lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in the section when such an offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of document produced or given as evidence in a proceedings of any Court, except on the complaint in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which the Court is subordinate. Since some of the offences committed by the accused attract the provisions in Section 195 (1) (b) (2) and (3) cr. P. C the procedure contemplated under section 340 Cr. P. C has to be followed. It is therefore requested to initiate necessary action against all the above mentioned persons according to law and in the interest of justice. "thereafter, it appears that the High Court of a. P got the matter examined by a special committee consisting of two Honourable judges of High Court and the special committee submitted its report observing that, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances and the offences alleged, it is desirable and also necessary that the Court itself should take action under Section 340 cr. P. C not only relating to the offences covered by Section 195 (1) (b) Cr. P. C but also relating to offences which are not covered by that section after conducting necessary preliminary enquiry as contemplated under Section 340 Cr. P. C. It also recommended that, District Judge, visakhapatnam to whom appeals ordinarily lie from the judgments of the sub-Court, anakapalli, was competent to conduct enquiry under Section 340 Cr. P. C and to file complaint, if necessary in the competent court. The Full Court accepted the recommendation of the special committee of the Judges and directed the District Judge, visakhapatnam to initiate proceedings under section 340 Cr. P. C vide High Court proceedings Roc. No. 866/96 Vigilance Cell dated 27-10-1998. By these proceedings the high Court accorded permission to the district Judge, Visakhapatnam for initiating proceedings against all the accused persons whose complicity in committing the offences as mentioned in Section 195 Cr. P. C as well as other offences got revealed in investigation report. Thereafter, it appears that the District judge started an enquiry, but before that the district Judge had also sought clarification as to whether the District Judge was competent to initiate proceedings under section 340 Cr. P. C. According to him, in land acquisition matters the appeals from sub-Judge s judgment would lie to the High court, and therefore he had sought clarification whether under Section 195 (4) of Cr. P. C he was competent to hold an enquiry under Section 340 Cr. P. C or it was the Special Judge or the Hon ble High court. This was also considered by two judges of this Court and rejected on the ground that appeals ordinarily would lie to the District Judge and also on the ground that since the District Court at Visakhapatnam was of inferior jurisdiction to that of the high Court therefore the District Judge was competent to hold the enquiry. After the enquiry was held, the District Judge filed complaint under Section 340 Cr. P. C. Against making of the complaint under Section 340 cr. P. C. these appeals have been preferred by two accused one of them is an IAS Officer and another is an Assistant Government pleader. The learned single Judge while narrating the facts briefly mentioned the arguments which were made at the Bar. P. C. Against making of the complaint under Section 340 cr. P. C. these appeals have been preferred by two accused one of them is an IAS Officer and another is an Assistant Government pleader. The learned single Judge while narrating the facts briefly mentioned the arguments which were made at the Bar. He thought it fit to refer the matter to the Division bench since the earlier decision, though administratively, had been taken by two judges of this Court and the matter had also been considered by the Full Court. ( 2 ) THE main ground in these appeals, which has been taken by Mr. Padmanabha reddy, senior Advocate is that, in all cases of land acquisition, appeal lies to the High court from the judgments of the Sub-Judge and in no case appeal would lie to the district Court therefore the District Judge was not competent to order filing of complaint under Section 340 Cr. P. C. He also contended that at no point of time any application had been made before the district Judge or the Sub-Judge in terms of section 340 read with 195 Cr. P. C. It was a complaint made by Inspector General of police before the High Court and the High court had to send the complaint to the Sub- judge or to the District Judge if the High court was of the view that the District judge was competent. He further contends that High Court on receiving the complaint did not send the complaint to the competent forum, which it thought to be competent, but referred the matter to a committee of two Judges who almost indicted the appellants and then referred the matter to the District Judge who had only to perform certain formalities. Thirdly, it was contended by the learned Counsel that one of the accused was an IAS Officer and that no sanction under Section 197 Cr. PC was obtained and as such in the absence of sanction under Section 197 Cr. PC he could have not been ordered to be prosecuted. He contended that an order under Section 195 read with 340 Cr. PC would not give power to the Magistrate to try a public servant unless there was a sanction by the President of India under Section 197 Cr. PC he could have not been ordered to be prosecuted. He contended that an order under Section 195 read with 340 Cr. PC would not give power to the Magistrate to try a public servant unless there was a sanction by the President of India under Section 197 Cr. P. C. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the argument of the learned Counsel that it was either the sub-Judge or the High Court which had jurisdiction to order prosecution, it would be necessary to have a glance of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the Land Acquisition Act. In section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition Act it is laid down;"3. (D) the expression court means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a Special Judicial Officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the court under this Act. "under Section 26 of the Act it is laid down that;"26. Form of awards : (1) Every award under this part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, clause (2), and section 2, clause (9) respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908 ). " section 53 lays down that; "53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court:save insofar as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply to all proceedings before the court under this Act. "and under Section 54 it is laid down that;"54. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court:save insofar as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply to all proceedings before the court under this Act. "and under Section 54 it is laid down that;"54. Appeals in proceedings before Court: subject to the provisions of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the court and from any decree of the High court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908, and in order XLV thereof. "so, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that, in terms of section 3 (d) "court" has been defined as the Court of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless a Special Judicial officer is appointed to function as the court under the Act which would mean that principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which is the District Judge, under the Civil courts Act and Civil Procedure Code, who would have the jurisdiction, only if the government has not appointed a Special judicial Officer to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. It is contended that, once a Special Officer is appointed in terms of Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition act the jurisdiction to try the matters under the Land Acquisition Act is taken away from the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Therefore, the District Judge would not have anything to do with the matter arising under Section 340 read with 195 Cr. P. C. It is further contended that, in terms of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition act appeal would lie to the High Court against the orders passed by the Court under land Acquisition Act as such the jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain appeal against the order of Sub-Judge stands ousted. P. C. It is further contended that, in terms of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition act appeal would lie to the High Court against the orders passed by the Court under land Acquisition Act as such the jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain appeal against the order of Sub-Judge stands ousted. The learned Counsel contended that, it is not as a matter of fact a Sub-Judge in terms of Civil Procedure Code or in terms of Civil courts Act who is empowered to decide matters under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act but it is a court within the meaning of Section 3 (d) of the Land acquisition Act. It is also contended that land Acquisition Act is a self contained Act and lays down the whole procedure with regard to the land acquisition and also lays down the methodology and the fora for redressal of grievance of those whose land is acquired. Being a self contained Act for redressal of grievances with regard to adequacy of compensation and allied matters the forum is the court in terms of section 3 (d) of the Act and the High Court. in the hierarchy there is no place for the district Judge. ( 4 ) NOW, these arguments will have to be examined in the light of the relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal procedure. Section 195 of Cr. P. C lays down;"195. in the hierarchy there is no place for the district Judge. ( 4 ) NOW, these arguments will have to be examined in the light of the relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal procedure. Section 195 of Cr. P. C lays down;"195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence :- (1) No Court shall take cognizance :- (a) (i) of any offence punishable under section 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or (hi) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian penal Code (45 of 1860), namely sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, section 475 or Section 476 of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding, in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term court means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal court, and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such civil court is situate. Provided that : (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed. "section 340 lays down;"340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195 : (1) when, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, or as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such magistrate, and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the court as the Court may appoint; (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court. (4) In this section, "court" has the same meaning as in Section 195. "now, reading Section 195 and Section 340 of Cr. PC together we find that, we are concerned mainly with Section 195 (1) (b) (i) and Section 195 (I) (b) (iii ). Section 195 (1) (b) (i) lays down that when such an offence (as are mentioned in the section) is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except on the complaint in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Similar is the case in respect of section 195 (1) (b) (iii ). Therefore, if an offence is committed under Section 195, cognizance can be taken by the Court only on a complaint of two entities one is the court in relation to which the offence was committed and the other is the Court to which that Court is subordinate. Therefore, keeping in view the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the provisions of Cr. P. C the only question which needs to be answered is whether a "court" established under Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition act is a "court" subordinate to the District judge. ( 5 ) IN the present case the District Judge has filed the complaint after holding an enquiry in terms of Section 340 Cr. PC and therefore, made a complaint in writing. If this Court holds that the Court established under Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition act is a Court subordinate to the District judge, then this appeal has to fail but if it holds otherwise then the appeal will have to succeed. PC and therefore, made a complaint in writing. If this Court holds that the Court established under Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition act is a Court subordinate to the District judge, then this appeal has to fail but if it holds otherwise then the appeal will have to succeed. Which is a Court subordinate has also been explained in sub-section (4) of section 195 Cr. P. C. Section 195 has been reproduced hereinabove. Now, according to this sub-section, a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which the appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court. The second part of the sub-section is not relevant because it applies to those Courts and cases in which ordinarily no appeal lies, but in Land acquisition cases the appeal lies therefore we are concerned with first part of it. Then, proviso (a) lays down that, where appeals lie to more than one Court the appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the relevant Court. We are not concerned in the present case with the proviso (b) because only one appeal lies from the orders of the Court under Land acquisition Act and that lies to the High court. ( 6 ) NOW, in the light of examination of these provisions, the words court to which appeals ordinarily lie assume importance. The learned Counsel s contention is that, in all cases of land acquisition appeals lie to the High Court therefore the words ordinarily do not assume importance in the present case. These words would assume importance had there been some cases in which the appeals would lie to some Special Courts but since appeals only lie to the High Court in land acquisition cases, it was the High Court or the Sub-Judge s Court which could have filed a complaint. On the other hand, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for respondents that Sub-Judge s Court is not only the Court created under the Land acquisition Act, it has manifest responsibilities and jurisdiction to entertain suits and ordinarily, in almost all suits depending upon their valuation, appeals lie to the District Judge, therefore, ordinarily the District Judge is the appellate Court as far as Sub-Judge s Court is concerned, therefore, there is nothing in the provision to suggest that the District Judge could not have filed the complaint. ( 7 ) IN order to appreciate the rival arguments, it is necessary to refer to some of the judgments. The learned Counsel for the appellants has relied upon a judgment of supreme Court being Kuldip Singh v. The state of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 391 . This is a judgment of Constitution Bench. In order to appreciate the law laid down by their lordships it would be necessary to refer to the necessary facts. One Amar Singh filed a civil suit against one Kuldip Singh for recovery of a large sum of money on the basis of a mortgage in the Court of subordinate Judge of First Class. The defendant filed a receipt which purportedly showed that Rs. 35,000/- had been paid towards satisfaction of the mortgage and in the witness box he had sworn that he had paid the money and had received the receipt. The Court held that the receipt did not appear to be a genuine document and that defendant s evidence was not true. Accordingly it passed a preliminary decree against the defendant for the full amount of the claim on 15-3-1950. Final decree followed on 15-7-1950. An appeal was taken to the High Court which was dismissed on 9-5-1951. The High Court also held that receipt was a suspicious document and the defendant s evidence was not reliable. The plaintiff thereafter moved an application before the trial Court asking that a complaint be filed against the defendant under sections 193 and 471 IPC. When the decree was passed the Court was presided by one mr. Barlow. When the application was made for filing the complaint Mr. Barlow was transferred and Mr. Augustine was the subordinate Judge. Before that application could be heard Mr. Augustine was also transferred and no Subordinate Judge of the First Class was appointed in his place. One Mr. K. K. Gujral, a Subordinate Judge of the Fourth Class was sent to the area and was asked to decide the matter, but as he was only a Subordinate Judge of Fourth class he made a report to the District Judge that he had no jurisdiction because the offence had been committed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of First Class. The district Judge then transferred the matter to the Senior Subordinate Judge Mr. Preetam singh and he made a complaint which was subject-matter of challenge before the supreme Court. The district Judge then transferred the matter to the Senior Subordinate Judge Mr. Preetam singh and he made a complaint which was subject-matter of challenge before the supreme Court. After Mr. Preetam Singh passed an order which was challenged in an appeal before the Additional District judge Mr. J. N. Kapoor. The learned Judge held that the Senior Subordinate Judge mr. Preetam Singh had no jurisdiction to make the complaint because he was not successor of Mr. Barlow. On merits it was held that there was no case. Thereupon, the matter went to the High Court in revision. The learned Judge at the High Court held that the Senior Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction and the material disclosed a prima facie case. Accordingly he set aside the Additional District Judge s order and restored the order of Senior Subordinate judge making the complaint. The Supreme court framed three questions for an answer. We are only concerned with the first two questions and therefore we will not refer to third question. The first question was concerning the jurisdiction of Senior subordinate Judge Mr. Preetam Singh to entertain the application and make the complaint, the second question was whether the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain appeal against Mr. Preetam singh s order. The Court then referred to certain provisions of Cr. PC including sections 476 and 476-A of the old Code of criminal Procedure (Sections 346 and 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) but the question which was before the supreme Court and the provision which was relevant are same. In paras-10 and 11 of the judgment the Supreme Court stated;" (10) Section 476 authorises the appropriate court, after recording a finding that it is expedient in the interests of justice, etc. , to, among other things, make a complaint in writing and forward it to a Magistrate of the first Class having jurisdiction. That was done by Mr. Pritam Singh. So the only question we have to decide on this part of the case is whether the Court of the Senior Subordinate judge over which Mr. Pritam Singh presided was the Court to which the Court of mr. Barlow was subordinate within the meaning of Section 195 (3 ). (11) Now it is to be noticed that subordination has been given a special meaning in this section. Pritam Singh presided was the Court to which the Court of mr. Barlow was subordinate within the meaning of Section 195 (3 ). (11) Now it is to be noticed that subordination has been given a special meaning in this section. It is not any superior Court that has jurisdiction, nor yet the Court to which the former Court is subordinate for, what might be termed, most general purposes, but only the Court to which it is subordinate within the meaning of Section 195 (3 ). "then the Supreme Court connected section 476 with Section 195 (3) which has no amendment and in para-13 the Supreme court stated that, these provisions have given rise to much conflicts in the High Courts and the controversy had centered around the word "ordinarily". Then the Supreme Court in detail dealt with the judgments of various high Courts and also to the effect of the various judgments of the High Courts. There were judgments in which it was held that ordinarily would mean in the majority of the cases, A sample case was examined by the Supreme Court which was Wadero Abdul rahman v. Sadhuram, 1931 Sind 163 (AIR vi8 ). The Supreme Court rejected this opinion on the ground that no meaning had been given to the proviso to sub-clause (3) and it has held. "if appeals lie to a particular court e. g. , the District Court, in the majority of cases and to another Court, say the high Court, only in a few cases then the inferior Tribunal is a fixed quantity and so the need to choose between the inferior and the superior Court cannot arise" The supreme Court held that, if this view was accepted that would make the sub-clause (a) to the proviso otiose. It also said that, it does not necessarily follow that the appeal in majority of cases shall always lie to the inferior Court. The Supreme Court also said that, if the majority of cases is taken to be the test then in each and every case statistics would have to be ascertained and it will have to be found in each and every case as to where the majority of appeals lie. So, the Supreme Court rejected this view that word "ordinarily" would mean " in the majority of cases ". So, the Supreme Court rejected this view that word "ordinarily" would mean " in the majority of cases ". Another view for which the sample was taken was the case of M. S. Sherif v. Govindan, 1951 Mad 1060 (AIR V 38 ). According to this view the word ordinarily would mean that the higher court is the one to which there is an unrestricted right of appeal and so cannot apply when any restriction intervenes such as when the right of appeal is limited to a particular class c, cases or is hedged in by conditions. The Supreme Court after considering these two views held that many more views are also possible but did not venture into exploring them and then held:"in our opinion, the matter is to be viewed thus. The first question to be asked is whether any decrees, orders or sentences of the original Court are appealable at all. If they are not and the Court is a Civil Court, then under Section 195 (3), the appeal against the order making or refusing to make a complaint will be to the principal court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. If, however, appeals from its various decrees and orders lie to different Courts, then we have to see to which of them they "ordinarily " lie and select the one of lowest grade from among them. In para-16 the supreme Court held: "16. In determining the Court or Courts to which an appeal will ordinarily lie, we have to see which Court or Courts entertain appeals from that class of Tribunal in the ordinary way apart from special notifications or laws that lift the matter out of the general class. Our meaning will be clearer when we turn to the case in hand and examine the Punjab courts Act of 1918. "then, after examining the Punjab Courts act, 1918 the Supreme Court found that there were three forms of Courts of appeal depending upon the nature of the suit and its value. Then again they framed the question as to whether in each of these classes of cases an appeal can be said to lie ordinarily to one or other of these appellate Tribunals. Then again they framed the question as to whether in each of these classes of cases an appeal can be said to lie ordinarily to one or other of these appellate Tribunals. Then finally stated : "but appeals do "ordinarily" lie either to the District Court or the High Court; and as the District Court is the lower of these two tribunals that must be regarded as the appellate authority for the purposes of Section 476-B. Criminal p. C. " Then the Supreme Court also held that: "it would however, be wrong to say that the nature of the proceedings in the case must be wholly ignored. . . . . . " then it said: "therefore, to that limited extent the nature of the proceedings must be taken into account, but once the genus of the proceedings is determined, namely whether civil, criminal or revenue, the hierarchy of the superior Court for these purposes will be determined, first by the rules that apply in their special cases and next by the rule in section 195 (3) which we have just expounded and explained. " For the next question the supreme Court examined the relevant laws and Punjab Courts Act and made it clear that it would apply to Punjab alone because other statues for other States were not before them. ( 8 ) NOW, in the light of this judgment of the Supreme Court which is the only judgment directly on the question, while examining the present case where the offence is allegedly committed in a Court constituted under the Land Acquisition Act, we are of the view that the nature of the proceeding itself becomes very important. It is a fact that the Court is a Sub-Judge s court and the decrees and judgments of the Sub-Judge s Court are appealable both in the High Court as well as in the District court but all Sub-Judges are not Courts within the meaning of sub-section (d) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act. As a matter of fact when a matter is being dealt with under the Land Acquisition Act the "court" is the Court within the meaning of land Acquisition Act. Whatever be the value of the subject-matter, an appeal against the award passed by the land Acquisition court lies to the High Court under the land Acquisition Act itself. As a matter of fact when a matter is being dealt with under the Land Acquisition Act the "court" is the Court within the meaning of land Acquisition Act. Whatever be the value of the subject-matter, an appeal against the award passed by the land Acquisition court lies to the High Court under the land Acquisition Act itself. Therefore, the specie of the case becomes important. There are matters which are dealt with by Sessions judge where appeals lie only to the Supreme court as was the case under TADA. The designated Court s judgments, convictions and sentences were appealable only to supreme Court. If an offence was committed during the proceedings under TADA would an application under Section 340 lie before the High Court because High Court ordinarily entertains the appeals against convictions and even decrees passed by a District Court or a Sessions Court? While convicting an accused under TADA the District Judge/ sessions Judge would be acting as a designated Court under the particular Act. Therefore in our view when a Sub-Judge passes a judgment or award he is not essentially working as a Sub-Judge but as an authority/court created under the Land acquisition Act. ( 9 ) THERE are various judgments which have been produced by the learned Counsel for the parties. One of the judgments is p. D. Devaswom v. U. Pylee, AIR 1970 kerala 30 (FB), by a Full Bench of Kerala high Court. In para-8 the Court held; "8. Sections 12 and 13 of the Kerala Civil courts Act run as follows:"12. Appeals from decrees and orders of district Court or Subordinate Judge s court:save as provided in Section 13 regular and special appeals shall, when such appeals are allowed by law, lie from the decrees or orders of a District Court or a Subordinate Judge s Court to the High court. 13. Appeals from decrees and orders of district Court or Subordinate Judge s court:save as provided in Section 13 regular and special appeals shall, when such appeals are allowed by law, lie from the decrees or orders of a District Court or a Subordinate Judge s Court to the High court. 13. Appellate jurisdiction of District and subordinate Judge s Court:appeals from the decrees and orders of a Munsiff s court and where the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees, from the orig: A decrees and orders of a Subordinate Judge s Court shall, when such appeals are allowed by law, lie to the District Court: xx xx xx xx"this means that appeals from the decrees or orders of a Subordinate Judge s Court lie (when such appeals are allowed by law) to the High Court excepting that where the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit does not exceed Rupees 10,000/- the appeal shall lie to the District Court. For section 13 to apply so as to make the forum of appeal the District Court instead of the high Court, the appeal must be from a decree or order in a suit, for, it is only when the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit does not exceed Rs. 10,000/- that it comes into play. When the appeal is from a decree or order in a proceeding which is not a suit, Section 12 alone applies, and, irrespective of the value of the subject matter - in most such proceedings the subject matter would have no money value and the suits Valuation Act would not apply to give it one - the appeal would lie to the High court. Section 11 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act speaks of "original suits and proceedings of a civil nature" clearly recognising that there are proceedings of a civil nature which are not suits within the meaning of that statute, that statute is, by its very nature, a supplement to the Civil Procedure Code, and, in particular, by Sections 12 and 13, prescribes the forum for an appeal under Section 96 of the Code, and it is obvious that it uses the word "suit" to mean a suit within the meaning of the Code, namely, a proceeding "instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed". A proceeding in "the Court" under the land acquisition statutes is not instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed by the rules in the First Schedule to the Code and it follows that, though the proceeding is a proceeding of a civil nature, it is not a suit in the sense in which that word is used in section 13 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act. Therefore, appeals from the decrees or orders of a Subordinate Judge s Court in such proceedings lie to the High Court under section 12 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act irrespective of the value of me subject matter; and, in no circumstances, can Section 13 apply so as tc make an appeal maintainable in the District Court. " the learned Counsel for the appellants have also relied on Laxmi Chand v. Gram panchayat, Kararia, AIR 1996 SC 523 , in which the Supreme Court held that cases arising under Land Acquisition Act could not be entertained by the civil Courts and the civil Courts jurisdiction was barred. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, in our view, the Sub- Judge was not at all functioning as a civil court and ordinarily the judgment passed in sub-Judge s Court are appealable before the district Judge but the cases handled by him under Land Acquisition Act are not handled by him as a Civil Judge. Again at the cost of repetition we may refer to sub-section (d) of section 3 which lays down that the court would mean Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction only if the Government has not appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform the functions of the Court under this Act. Again at the cost of repetition we may refer to sub-section (d) of section 3 which lays down that the court would mean Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction only if the Government has not appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform the functions of the Court under this Act. This Special Judicial Officer can be a Sub-Judge, a Munsiff or even a District judge but in terms of Section 3 would be principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Therefore, the specie of the case, in our view, assumes much importance. It has been held by a Full Bench of Orissa High Court in Land Acquisition Officer v. Mst. Rahin, air 1971 Ori 71 (FB), that once a notification under Section 3 (d) is issued by the Government appointing Principal subordinate Judges as courts the District judge cannot function as court under the act. We have also gone through the report of the two Judges Committee which was sent to the learned District Judge and we are not sure that this report would have not had any influence on the District Judge. We may presume that this report and acceptance of this report by the Full Court would have no influence on the District Judge while discharging his duties but at the same time it creates a reasonable doubt as to whether such report of a committee of two Judges would have effected the outcome of the proceedings under Section 340 Cr. P. C, but since we are inclined to accept the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellants that District Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 340 Cr. P. C. , therefore, in order that no party gets prejudiced, we do not go to the merits of the case. ( 11 ) AN argument was made in respect of one of the appellants being appellant in crl. A. No. 587/99 who happened to be an las Officer that complaint could have not been filed against him without prior sanction of the Central Government as envisaged under Section 197 Cr. P. C. It is contended that it is a prerequisite for taking cognizance against a public servant. A. No. 587/99 who happened to be an las Officer that complaint could have not been filed against him without prior sanction of the Central Government as envisaged under Section 197 Cr. P. C. It is contended that it is a prerequisite for taking cognizance against a public servant. Though we are of the view that this argument could only be advanced if a complaint was filed but as the matter had already been argued and the facts are clearly known to this Court as well as to the parties and as the matter is pending for a long time, therefore, we are adverting our attention to this argument as well. Sections 190 to 199 which are contained in Chapter-XIV of the Code of criminal Procedure relate to "conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings" and in fact Sections 191 to 199 are exceptions to section 190 the general scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure being that anybody can set in motion a Criminal Court for taking cognizance if an offence is committed. Section 190 lays down that a Magistrate subject to the provisions of the Chapter i. e. , chapter-XIV, can take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of any fact which constitute such an offence, or, upon a police report, or, upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence had been committed. So, section 190 gives the power to Magistrate to receive a complaint of facts from anybody. It also gives a Magistrate power to take cognizance on the report of anybody else and even on his own knowledge, but the exceptions are created in Sections 191 to 199. These exceptions operate in altogether different fields. We need not go into all the sections to point out that every Section from Sections 191 to 199 operate in different fields but we will certainly refer to sections 195 and 197 with which we are presently concerned. Generally speaking, section 197 lays down that if an offence is committed by a public servant in the discharge of his duties, Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence unless there is sanction of the appropriate Government. So, the important ingredient is "discharge of duties". The words appearing in Section 197 are, "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty". So, the important ingredient is "discharge of duties". The words appearing in Section 197 are, "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty". So, the test would be whether an offence was committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty and if this test is fulfilled a sanction under section 197 Cr. P. C is necessary. But, under Section 195 it is not an offence committed by public servant in discharge of his duties that is relevant but an offence committed in relation to any proceedings in any Court is relevant. So, the offences which are taken care of by Sections 195 are not the offences which are taken care of by Section 197. However, sometimes they may overlap. A person while discharging his official duties may commit an offence by some acts in relation to proceedings in any Court, but essentially these two provisions operate in two different fields. The appellant who is the public servant is not sought to be tried for an offence committed during discharge of his official duty but he is sought to be tried for ommitting an offence in relation to proceedings in the Court. May be the acts or omissions which he dealt during the proceedings in the Court were the acts discharged by him in discharge of his duties out primarily he is being sought to be prosecuted for an offence allegedly committed by him during a proceeding in a court. Therefore, in our view Section 197 is not at all applicable to the appellant in crl. A. No. 587/99 and when it is alleged that an offence has been committed in a proceeding before any Court, no sanction under Section 197 Cr. P. C is necessary even if the accused is a public servant as in our view Section 197 does not control section 195. Even otherwise, the purpose of sections 195 and Section 197 is same that persons should not be put to unnecessary harassment. Safeguards to public servants are provided under Section 197. Since public servants are exposed to multifarious activities they can earn enemies as well as friends and therefore they are vulnerable even to malicious prosecutions. Section 197 provides them with a cover. Safeguards to public servants are provided under Section 197. Since public servants are exposed to multifarious activities they can earn enemies as well as friends and therefore they are vulnerable even to malicious prosecutions. Section 197 provides them with a cover. Similarly, when matters are fought in the Courts the parties behave like enemies and there is always a danger that a party may try to prosecute another party on the basis of his role during the proceedings, therefore, a cover is provided to litigants as well as witnesses and all others who are involved in a proceeding under Section 195 Cr. P. C. These are two different fields and once the Court comes to a conclusion that a complaint has to be filed, Section 197 will not operate. In our view, both these Sections operate in two different fields. Whereas Section 197 takes care of offences committed in the discharge of duties by public servants. Section 195 takes care of offences committed during a proceeding in the Court. Section 195 does not take into account as to who is the offender but only takes into account whether an offence has been committed during the proceeding. Therefore, the argument fails. ( 12 ) IN the light of what has been stated herein above, we set aside the order passed by the District Judge, but in the facts and circumstances of the case direct the registrar to place the matter before the hon ble Chief Justice who may place the matter before an appropriate Bench for orders under Section 340 Cr. P. C. Decidedly the court under Land Acquisition Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court as all appeals lie to the High Court. We would have ordered an enquiry under Section 340 cr. P. C by the Sub-Judge himself but as the matter had earlier been considered by two judges of this Court though administratively and the report of such committee had been approved by the Full Court, therefore, we direct that the matter be heard and decided by the High Court reminding ourselves with the old maxim that justice must not only be done but also seen to have been done.