ORDER : G.B. Pattanaik, J. When these appeals had been placed before a Bench of two learned Judges, finding some apparent conflict between two three-Judge Bench decisions of this Court, one in Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah, (2001) 3 SCC 530 , and the other in Meharban v. State of U.P., (1997) 6 SCC 54 , the Bench was persuaded to refer the question for being answered by a larger Bench. 2. Both the aforesaid two decisions deal with the interpretation of the provisions of Section 51-A of the Land Acquisition Act (for short "the Act"). Section 51-A of the Act was engrafted into the statute book by way of an amendment in the year 1984 by Act 68 of 1984. The provisions of the said Section 51-A are extracted hereinbelow in extenso: "51-A. Acceptance of certified copy as evidence - In any proceeding under this Act, a certified copy of a document registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), including a copy given under Section 57 of that Act, may be accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such document." 3. Prior to the aforesaid provisions in the Act there had been some conflicting decisions of this Court as to the admissibility of the certified copy of the sale deeds being produced as a basis for determination of the market value of the acquired land. In Meharban v. State of U.P. a three-Judge Bench of this Court to which one of us (Justice Pattanaik) was a party, considered the provisions of Section 51-A and casual observation has been made without any detailed discussions of the relevant provisions to the effect "Since none connected with the sale deeds was examined, the sale deeds are inadmissible in evidence though certified copies marked under Section 51-A are available. So, all the sale deeds stand excluded" (SCC p. 58, para 13). 4. Neither the reasons for engraftment of Section 51-A in the statute book by amendment, nor the language of the provision and its impact has really been considered except the broad/casual observations made in the said judgment. So, all the sale deeds stand excluded" (SCC p. 58, para 13). 4. Neither the reasons for engraftment of Section 51-A in the statute book by amendment, nor the language of the provision and its impact has really been considered except the broad/casual observations made in the said judgment. In the later case, which is also of a three-Judge Bench in Narasaiah, the two earlier judgments of the Division Benches of this Court i.e. (i) Inder Singh v. Union of India, (1993) 3 SCC 240 , and (ii) P. Ram Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1995) 2 SCC 305 , had been placed for decision of a three-Judge Bench. The Court in the aforesaid case made a detailed examination of the provisions of Section 51-A of the Act, the very purpose for which it was inserted by way of amendment by Act 68 of 1984, some provisions under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as well as the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 128 : 1966 Cri LJ 106 and came to the conclusion that in view of Section 51-A of the Act, the certified copies of the sale deeds produced in the land acquisition proceedings must be held to be admissible in evidence. But, what would be its evidentiary value in the matter of determination of market value of the acquired land would depend upon several relevant factors. Two earlier two-Judge Bench decisions of this Court in Inder Singh case3 and P. Ram Reddy case4 were held to be not correct in law. This view of the three learned Judges of this Court in V. Narasaiah has again been followed by a Bench of two learned Judges in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh, (2001) 6 SCC 254 . 5. It is, no doubt, true that casual observations made in the earlier three-Judge Bench decision runs contrary to the later three-Judge Bench decisions of this Court referred to above and unfortunately the earlier three-Judge Bench decision has not been brought to the notice of the later Bench. But since in the earlier judgment there has been no discussion with regard to the interpretation of Section 51-A of the Act and only an observation has been made, we do not think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench. 6. But since in the earlier judgment there has been no discussion with regard to the interpretation of Section 51-A of the Act and only an observation has been made, we do not think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench. 6. Having considered the provisions of Section 51-A of the Act independently, we affirm the conclusion arrived at by this Court in V. Narasaiah. We accordingly so hold and direct that the appeals may now be placed before the Division Bench which had referred the matter to a three-Judge Bench, for disposal. 7. Needless to mention even before arriving at our independent conclusion on the provisions of the Act under consideration, we had asked for the views of all the counsel appearing on both sides who have agreed to the same.