Judgment Harbans Lal, J.-These four criminal misc. petitions have been filed under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing the proceedings on the ground of inordinate delay in the trial of these cases. As the ground taken in all these cases is common and all the cases are pending in the same Court and the arguments are also identical, these petitions are being disposed of by this common order. 2. All these four petitions arise from a criminal regular case pending in the Court of learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sojat and all these cases pertain to offence under Section 7/16, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PFA Act’). A perusal of the order sheets in these cases reveals that there was no objection raised from the side of accused petitioners to the adjournments made in these cases at any point of time and it cannot be said that due to the delay any prejudice has been caused to the accused petitioners in their defence. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. .4. It may be stated at the outset that the constitutional position with regard to speedy trial being one of the dimensions of fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India is now well-settled but application of this doctrine is a vexed question. No doubt, the speedy trial is an implied ingredient of fair trial, the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. A single Bench of this Court has, on the basis of the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, provided following guidelines for quashing the criminal trial on the ground of delay in the case of Chhote Lal Jain vs. State of Rajasthan (1992) 2 WLC 77 (Raj) : (1992 Cri LJ 2620) (Para 12): .(i) A speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is no more in dispute. But, the question whether this fundamental right has been violated or is likely to be violated on account of the delay in the trial will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no outer limit can be fixed in a general way for all the cases: .(ii) While considering the length of delay, the Court will take into account the period consumed in the investigation of the case and the delay caused in actual proceedings in Court after filing of the charge-sheet. A speedy investigation and trial are equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) While deciding such question, the Court shall take into account the working of the Judicial system in India and the lack of satisfactory working conditions in judicial Courts, including larger pendency and institution of the cases, inadequacy of Judge Strength and under-staffing etc.’ .(iv) In a pending case to decide the question whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial Court to secure the ends of justice will depend on several factors to be taken into consideration, such as, the gravity and seriousness of the offence, whether the delay was occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself , whether the accused objected at any stage when such delay occasioned and whether the accused is prejudiced in his defence on account of the delay: .(v) If the delay has caused prejudice to the accused in the conduct and his defence, the pending criminal proceedings should be normally quashed as in that situation it could be said that the accused has been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself and the trial is not fair and reasonable; In grave and serious offences against the society or in relation to Nation’s economy, defence or security, the criminal proceedings should not be normally quashed on the ground of delay simpliciter without anything .(vi) In trivial offences having no or very little impact on the society, quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay simpliciter shall be in the interest of justice as it will provide a room for serious and grave offences and will lessen the burden of the Court with heavy work-load. 5. 5. In a recent Judgment in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka 2002 AIR SCW 1841: (2002 Cri LJ 2547), the Constitutional Bench comprising of seven Judges of Hon’ble Apex Court after considering Articles 21, 32, 141, 142, 226 of the Constitution and Sections 309, 311 and 258, Cr. P.C. and all its earlier decisions on the point has overruled the Judgment s in both the cases of Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar (1998 Cri LJ 4596) (SC) and in the case of Common Cause vs. Union of India (1996 Cri LJ 2380) (SC) and has approved the law laid down in the case of A. R. Antulay vs. R. Section Nayak AIR 1992 SC 1701 and has observed thus:-- “In its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused, the Court cannot devise and almost enact bars of limitation beyond which trial shall not proceed and arm of law shall lose its hold though the Legislature and the Statutes have not chosen to do so. Bars of limitation, judicially engrafted, are, no doubt, meant to provide a solution to the aforementioned problems. But a solution of this nature gives rise to greater problems like scuttling a trial without adjudication, stultifying access to justice and giving easy exit from the portals of justice. Such general remedial measures cannot be said to be apt solutions. For two reasons held, such bars of limitation uncalled for and impermissible; first, because it tantamounts to impermissible legislation an activity beyond the power which the constitution confers on judiciary, and secondly, because such bars of limitation fly in the face of law laid down by Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay’scase and, therefore, run counter to the doctrine of precedents and their binding efficacy. Prescribing periods of limitation at the end of which the trial Court would be obliged to terminate the proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused, and further, making such directions applicable to all the cases in the present and for the future amounts to legislation, which, cannot be done by judicial directives and within the arena of the judicial law-making power available to constitutional Courts, howsoever, liberally Court may interpret Arts. 32, 21, 141 and 142 of the Constitution. The dividing line is fine but perceptible. 32, 21, 141 and 142 of the Constitution. The dividing line is fine but perceptible. Courts can declare law, they can interpret law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly meant for the legislature. Binding directions can be issued for enforcing the law and appropriate directions may issue, including laying down of time limits or chalking out a calandar for proceedings to follow, to redeem the injustice done or for taking care of rights violated, in a given case or set of cases, depending on facts brought to the notice of Court. This is permissible for judiciary to do. But it may not, like legislature, enact a provision akin to or on the lines of Chap. XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The dictum in A.R. Antulay’s case is correct and still holds the field. The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A. R. Antulay’s case, adequately take care of right to speedy trial. Court upholds and re-affirms the said propositions.” 6. Itis, thus, abundantly clear that the law with regard to the right to speedy trial as laid down in A. R. Antulay’s case (1992 Cri LJ 2717) (SC) has been approved and upheld and the guidelines provided by a learned single Bench of this Court in Chhote Lal Jain’s case (1992 Cri LJ 2620) (Supra) as extracted above are based on the law laid down in A. R. Antulay’s case. 7. The guideline No. (iii) clearly prescribes that while deciding the question as to whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed or not, the Court has to take into account the working of the judicial system in India and the lack of satisfactory working conditions, pendency, institution of large number of cases, inadequacy of judge strength and under-staffing. As per guideline No. (iv), it has also to be. taken into account the gravity and seriousness of the offence and the tactic or conduct of the accused himself and to see as to whether he objected at any stage when the delay was occasioned and whether by the delay any prejudice has been caused to him or not. 8. As per guideline No. (iv), it has also to be. taken into account the gravity and seriousness of the offence and the tactic or conduct of the accused himself and to see as to whether he objected at any stage when the delay was occasioned and whether by the delay any prejudice has been caused to him or not. 8. It caimot be disputed that the offence under Section 7/16 of PFA Act is an anti-social offence against the society as a whole and if in such offences affecting the health of the society at large the trials are cut short merely on the ground of delay, they are likely to damage the health of public at large besides harming them monetarily and sending a wrong message about the efficacy of system of Judicial Administration. 9. No doubt, the liberty of the citizens must be zealously safeguarded by the Courts; nonetheless the Courts should also keep in mind the interest of the victim and above all collective interest of the community and the safety of the nation so that the public may not lose faith in the system of judicial administration and indulge in private retribution. 10. It is pertinent to note that in all these cases in which criminal proceedings are sought to be quashed, the order sheets reveal that at no point of time there was any objection from the side of accused petitioners against adjourning the matters without any effective proceedings on the dates fixed in those cases. The cases have been adjourned on a number of occasions in a routine manner. The staff of the Court has not issued process against accused or the witnesses on numerous occasions and the cases have been adjourned on several occasions due to the absence of Presiding Officer being on leave or due to their transfers and due to members of the Bar suspending work or not appearing in the Courts for one reason or the other and on some of the dates the cases have to be adjourned due to the absence of accused also. The delay has also been occasioned due to non-receipt of parts of sample from CM and HO and on a number of occasions the requisition for the same had not been issued due to slackness or lethargy or overwork of staff and it is a patent fact that the accused petitioners have never objected at the time when this delay was being occasioned and thus the accused petitioners indirectly contributed in the delay in the proceedings of the cases. It is also apparent from the proceedings that in all these cases not many witnesses have remained to be examined and it is also likely that in two cases in which records have not been summoned by this Court, the concerned witnesses might have been examined by now. Therefore, to scuttle and cut short the trial at this juncture, when the trial in all these cases is at its fag end, does not appear to be just, proper and reasonable and in keeping with the guidelines laid down by this Court as well as by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the cases, it appears to be just and reasonable to direct the trial Court to expedite and complete trial within a fixed period and in case the trial is not completed despite the directions of this Court, the petitioners may approach this Court again for appropriate orders in their cases. 12. It has also been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that this Court ought not to disregard the earlier single Bench decisions of this Court and in case it takes a different view from the one taken in earlier Judgment s by this Court, it has to and ought to refer the cases for decision by larger Bench. In this regard, he has placed reliance upon AIR 1984 SC 1798 (Ayyaswami Gounder vs. Munnuswamy Gounder and AIR 1999 SC 1494 (State of Tripura vs. Tripura Bar Association). There cannot be any two opinions with regard to the principle of law laid down in these authorities regarding following the precedents and I respectfully agree with the views expressed in these authorities. There cannot be any two opinions with regard to the principle of law laid down in these authorities regarding following the precedents and I respectfully agree with the views expressed in these authorities. Indeed, judicial propriety, discipline and decorum warrant and mandate that in the event of learned single Judge not agreeing with the earlier Judgment of another single Judge of the same High Court or a Division Bench not agreeing with the earlier Judgment of another Division Bench, the matter ought to be referred for decision by a larger Bench. That is the law laid down and applied in the case of P. Ramchandra Rao (2002 Cri LJ 2547) (SC) (Supra), also. 13. In the instant cases, there is no question of my disagreeing with the earlier view taken by the learned single Judge in various cases. As a matter of fact, I have followed the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Chhote Lal (1992 Cri LJ 2620) (Supra). The other cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, wherein, the proceedings have been quashed have been decided on the peculiar and particular facts of those cases and in deciding these cases, the guidelines provided by this Court, as extracted above, have not . been discussed and, therefore, these cases are not required to be referred for decision by a larger Bench. 14. Inthe result, all these petitions are dismissed. However, it is directed that the learned trial Court shall expedite the trial by fixing these cases from day to day as far as possible and ensure and enforce the presence of remaining witnesses, if any, on the dates fixed by it. The trial Court shall endeavour to decide these cases within a period of three months from the receipt of copy of this order/record. It is also made clear that the petitioners shall be free to move this Court again if the cases are not decided within the aforesaid period of three months due to the default on the part of the prosecution and not due to the default of petitioners themselves. A copy of the order be placed in each file. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned trial Court forthwith along with record.