ORDER 1. The appellants charged with the offences under Sections 143, 144, 148, 325 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 stood acquitted by the learned trial Judge in SC No. 17 of 1992, have come up before this Court on such acquittal being reversed by the High Court in an appeal filed at the instance of the State in Criminal Appeal No. 620 of 1996. The charges relate to an occurrence said to have taken place at about 2.30 p.m. on 14-1-1992 resulting in the death of one K.T. Subbaiah and injury caused to PW I by Accused 4 who was charged in addition under Section 324 IPC. 2. Before the trial court for the prosecution PWs I to 16 have been examined, in addition to marking Exts. P-I to P-28 and Mas I to 13 being d brought on record. PWs 1,2,4 and 10 were said to be the eyewitnesses to the occurrence of which PW I was an injured eyewitness. The injury was said to have been caused by A-4 at the heel portion of the right leg by throwing the katti which he had, as she was running. The learned trial Judge after noticing certain discrepancies, omissions and exaggerations in the evidence and also relying upon the alleged alteration of the time in Ext. P-I as well as keeping e into consideration the enmity between the accused and the complainant group chose to discard in its entirety the oral evidence of the eyewitnesses, to ultimately return a finding of acquittal. 3. The learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court after adverting to a decision of this Court in K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Keralal and on the view that neither the enmity nor the inconsistencies or omissions and exaggerations noticed by the learned trial Judge were of such grave or vital nature as could provide sufficient grounds to totally discard the oral evidence, proceeded to appreciate the evidence independently. The trial court was held to have also committed serious error in omitting to undertake any effort to separate the grain of acceptable truth from even the chaff of exaggeration of improbabilities and consequently thought fit to go into the evidence and undertook an independent evaluation and assessment of the same, in an attempt to find out whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge could have been reasonably or possibly and properly arrived at all, in the manner it has been done. Ignoring the factum of enmity which existed between the parties, which normally could cut either way being a doubleedged weapon in an individual case depending upon the peculiar facts, in any given case, the Division Bench found that the inconsistencies or infirmities noticed by the trial court were not of such basic nature as to vitiate their evidence down to the core, warranting a total discardment of the entire evidence. As a consequence thereof the learned Judges undertook an elaborate discussion, analysis and reappreciation of the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 4 and 10, and found in their opinion to be trustworthy and inspiring confidence for the acceptance of evidence on all broad and relevant and essential features of the case, necessary for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In the view of the learned Judges of the High Court the oral evidence sufficiently fixed not only the place of occurrence as well as the manner of commission of the offence and role of each of the accused and therefore, the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 4 and 10 was more than sufficient to convict the accused for the various charges, framed against them. 4. Mr K. Rajendra Chowdhary, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants strenuously contended that the prosecution, as held by the learned trial Judge has not come up with all truth and the correct origin of the occurrence and that the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge to discard the evidence of the so-called eyewitnesses were not only sufficient but there were other materials which according to the learned counsel even the trial court omitted to advert to, further strengthen the same conclusions arrived at by the trial Judge. Argued the learned counsel further relying upon the judgment of this Court in Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor that the High Court committed an error in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because in its view another view could be possible in the matter without specifically examining or discussing and dislodging the reasons which weighed with the trial court to acquit the accused and that this error seriously vitiates the judgment of the High Court. Our attention has also been drawn extensively to the judgment of the learned trial Judge as well as the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court besides taking us through the evidence of the eyewitnesses as well as other witnesses for the prosecution to reinforce the said submissions on behalf of the appellants. 5. Per contra Mr Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel appearing for the respondent State with equal force and persuasion tried to justify the conclusions of the High Court arrived at to convict the appellants by contending that sufficient and justified reasons have been disclosed by the High Court to necessitate an independent appreciation and consideration of the evidence on record and the correctness of such findings arrived at on the basis of the overwhelming materials on record specifically noticed by the High Court in this regard, some of which were even lightly glossed over and omitted to be considered in their proper perspective, do not call for any interference in this appeal. 6. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel on either• side. In our view, there is no justification to make once again an elaborate reference to all those materials in detail, since reference to the various materials has been made at considerable length, both by the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court, in their own respective manner to justify the conclusions arrived at by them and it would suffice for us to notice whether the High Court was justified in the case on hand to undertake a an independent appreciation of the materials on record to arrive at its own conclusion at variance with those arrived at by the learned trial Judge and with what consequences flowing from such an exercise. So far as the evidence of the eyewitnesses PWs 1, 2, 4 and 10 is concerned we are in agreement with the reasons assigned by the learned Judges of the High Court, that the trial court committed a grave error in making an outright rejection of b the entire evidence and that the reasons assigned for such total rejection are against all well-settled norms and principles of appreciation of evidence. The conclusion of the High Court that the exercise undertaken by the trial court in this regard is erroneous and its conclusions are vitiated on account of perversity of approach is well merited entitling therefore, the High Court to proceed with an independent appraisal and assessment of the evidence. 7. Irrespective of the justification for the High Court, found by us, to adopt such a course and to differ from the findings of the trial court, it requires to be seen whether even the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 4 and 10 sufficiently makes out the offence, with which all the accused have been charged as is required in law. On a fair and careful reading of the evidence we could, if at all, only find concrete material even in the evidence of the above noticed four eyewitnesses to implicate only A-2 in respect of the d offence committed against the deceased. There is specific reference to his presence and role in Ext. P-I and the eyewitnesses have also consistently spoken about his overt acts which are found to accord with the medical opinion as well. Related witness need not always necessarily be an interested witness too and on the materials on record and in view of the faction-ridden village, it would be too much to expect independent witnesses to come out e openly. Thus, the rejection of the materials on the ground of relationship was unwarranted. 8. We find nothing specific or positive material in the evidence to prove any participation of the other accused in the assault upon the deceased to justify their conviction. But so far as Accused 4 is concerned the evidence cogently and in unison specifically refers to an overt act of throwing a katti at PW 1 as she was running, resulting in an injury on her leg for which also he has been found guilty and convicted under Section 324 IPC. But so far as Accused 4 is concerned the evidence cogently and in unison specifically refers to an overt act of throwing a katti at PW 1 as she was running, resulting in an injury on her leg for which also he has been found guilty and convicted under Section 324 IPC. This conviction was well justified and fully supported by the overwhelming evidence on record. Except Accused 2 as indicated supra we do not find any clear or positive evidence to connect either A-4 or any of the other accused with the actual assault upon the deceased. 9. The submission made on behalf of the appellants in an attempt to create a doubt about the entire occurrence itself relying upon the evidence of PW 16 who has stated during the course of cross-examination that when he visited the place during the course of investigation and made "verification with other persons who attended Byre Devara worship place on that day have stated that they did not see any such incident in that place" does not appeal to us for our acceptance in the teeth of the very case common to both parties that there was an occurrence in which both the parties were injured. In the teeth of the suggestions made in the cross-examination of PWs about the counter-case at the instance of even A-I and others the evidence of PW 16, in this connection, only deserves rejection as far-fetched, vague and unreliable. The other materials abundantly make it clear that the actual occurrence took place at the time and place on 14-1-1992. 10. The learned Judges of the High Court, in our view, though rightly interfered with the acquittal of A-2, the same could not be said of the reversal b of the finding of acquittal in respect of the other accused including A-4 whose conviction also could only be sustained in respect of the offence under Section 324 IPC for causing injury to PW 1. The attempt to connect all the accused with the murder of the deceased invoking Section 149 IPC on the basis of a parrot-like repetition of an alleged exhortation to finish the deceased on his arrival at the place of worship seems to be far-fetched. The attempt to connect all the accused with the murder of the deceased invoking Section 149 IPC on the basis of a parrot-like repetition of an alleged exhortation to finish the deceased on his arrival at the place of worship seems to be far-fetched. Mere c presence or association with other members alone does not per se be sufficient to hold every one of them criminally liable for the offences committed by the others unless there was sufficient evidence on record to show that one such also intended to or knew the likelihood of commission of such an offending act. There seems to be no legally acceptable material to prove, in this case that all the accused acted as members of an unlawful 1 assembly, and except that they were found to be closely related nothing concrete to join them to connect with the murder of the deceased has come on record to attract the application of Section 149 IPC. 11. For all the reasons stated above, the appeal shall stand allowed so far as Appellants 1 and 3 to 8 and while setting aside the judgment of the High Court as against them their acquittal by the trial court for the offence of murder of the deceased, Subbaiah shall stand restored. So far as Accused 2 (K.M. Jayappa) is concerned, the appeal shall stand dismissed. As far as Accused 4 is concerned, though acquitted for murder of Subbaiah, and his appeal shall stand partly allowed, insofar as his conviction under Section 324 IPC is concerned it shall stand and his appeal to that extent shall stand dismissed. 12. In the result, the appeal against A-2 is dismissed and he shall undergo the remaining period of sentence imposed upon him. So far as A-4 is concerned, his conviction under Section 324 is upheld and he is sentenced to the period already undergone with an addition of a fine of Rs 1000, in default of payment of which he shall undergo SI for a period of two months. On payment of fine he shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. The other accused whose conviction stood set aside shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.