ORDER Arun Mishra, J. 1. The deceased, Shivram Singh Thakur, filed the instant writ petition for claiming his full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. He was paid 75% of the subsistence Allowance admissible as per rules. 2. The deceased, Shivram Singh Thakur, was Upper Division Clerk in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. He was initially appointed in the erstwhile Nagpur. High Court as Lower Division Clerk. As a consequence of re-organisation of State with effect from 1-11-1956 he was allocated to High Court of Madhya Pradesh. He was promoted as Upper Division Clerk in the year 1959 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. A Criminal Appeal was pending before Supreme Court. Paper Book was under preparation in the Supreme Court section of this Court. Petitioner was posted in this section. On the charge of interpolating the deposition, he was suspended along with two others, namely; Sarvashri S. Z. Razaqque and S. P. Tiwari. The suspension was ordered on 3-9-1969. The Criminal prosecution was launched, police investigation was done in the case and preliminary enquiry was also conducted by the High Court. In the preliminary enquiry the petitioner along with two others were prima facie found guilty and on criminal investigation the main charge of interpolation was levelled against the petitioner as is apparent from the committal proceedings, and the police investigation documents placed on record by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The Criminal Case which was filed was ultimately quashed on the ground of want of sanction which was necessary to prosecute the accused persons. After criminal prosecution was quashed, the suspension was revoked on 12-3-1979 as per order, P4. The petitioner retired on 31-10-1979 on attaining the age of superannuation. After obtaining the sanction the prosecution was re-started, criminal revision was preferred. Criminal Revision No. 53/1981 was decided as per order, P8, on 12-3-1981. The revision was allowed and the proceedings were quashed by this Court. 3. After quashment of the criminal prosecution second time, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner in the Departmental Enquiry. Reply was filed by the petitioner. It was objected that after retirement, enquiry could not be commenced. The High Court as per order, P15, dated 16-3-1982 ordered withdrawal of Departmental Enquiry. Thus, the Departmental Enquiry was dropped. 3. After quashment of the criminal prosecution second time, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner in the Departmental Enquiry. Reply was filed by the petitioner. It was objected that after retirement, enquiry could not be commenced. The High Court as per order, P15, dated 16-3-1982 ordered withdrawal of Departmental Enquiry. Thus, the Departmental Enquiry was dropped. After conclusion of the Departmental Enquiry, a notice, P16, was issued on 16-3-1982 to show cause as to why the period from 3-9-1969 to 13-3-1979 be not treated as not spent on duty and pay and allowances for the period for which the petitioner remained under suspension be not restricted to what has already been paid to him by way of Subsistence Allowance under the provisions of Sub-Rule (5) and (6) of Fundamental Rule 54-B. Reply P17, was filed by the petitioner. After considering the reply the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice ordered that petitioner could not be said to be having clean chit. Suspension was not wholly unjustified. Thus, the petitioner was not entitled to full salary and was held entitled to Subsistence Allowance already paid to him. This order, P18, was issued on 4-11-1985. The petitioner filed a review petition, P19, before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which was rejected as per order, P20, dated 23-1-1987. In the year 1985 Shri S. P. Tiwari was granted the full pay and salary as his case was found distinguishable from that of Sarvashri S. Z. Razaqque and S. S. Thakur. When Shri Tiwari was granted the full pay the petitioner filed a review petition which was dismissed in the year 1987. Later on, Shri S.Z. Razaqque was granted full pay and allowances as per order, P23, dated 5-3-1990 by the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice modifying the order dated 4-11-1985 and he was held entitled to his salary and allowances minus the amount already drawn for the period of suspension from 3-9-1969 to 13-3-1979. This event led the late petitioner, Shri S. S. Thakur, to file another representation for re-consideration of his case. He filed a representation, P24, on 9-3-1990 which was considered by the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice and was disallowed as per order, P25, dated 22-11-1990. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice found that the case of the petitioner was different and gravity of charges levelled against the petitioner was more. He filed a representation, P24, on 9-3-1990 which was considered by the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice and was disallowed as per order, P25, dated 22-11-1990. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice found that the case of the petitioner was different and gravity of charges levelled against the petitioner was more. Hence, his representation for re-consideration of his case was disallowed. The petitioner filed a writ petition in March, 1991. 4. The original petitioner, Shri S. S. Thakur, has died during the pendency of the writ petition. His legal representatives are continuing this writ petition. The petitioner submits that the cage of the petitioner was not distinguishable from that of Shri S.P. Tiwari and Shri Razaqque who were granted the full pay and allowances. Thus, the petitioner was wrongfully deprived of full pay and allowances for the period of suspension from 1969 to 1979. The petitioner submits that he was not responsible for the interpolation made in the deposition. He was not found guilty either on criminal prosecution or in the Departmental Enquiry. The criminal prosecution was quashed and Departmental Enquiry was dropped. Thus, his suspension was unjustified and there was no material on record to come to the conclusion that the petitioner's suspension was justified. Thus, the petitioner should have been granted full pay and allowances. The petitioner was discriminated with in the matter of payment of full pay. 5. The respondent, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in the return contends that the case of the petitioner was totally distinguishable from that of Sarvashri S. P. Tiwari and S. Z. Razaqque. In the preliminary enquiry conducted by the High Court and criminal investigation done by the police and order of committal made by J.M.F.C. it became clear that it was the petitioner who was responsible for interpolating the original deposition sheet. The case file was in the Supreme Court section at the relevant time and matter was pending before the Supreme Court. It was a serious case of tampering with the judicial record which was admittedly tampered. On the basis of findings of preliminary enquiry and the criminal investigation it could not be said that suspension was wholly unjustified. The criminal prosecution was quashed on technical ground. It was not the case of exoneration of guilt on examination of the merit of the case. On the basis of findings of preliminary enquiry and the criminal investigation it could not be said that suspension was wholly unjustified. The criminal prosecution was quashed on technical ground. It was not the case of exoneration of guilt on examination of the merit of the case. The Departmental Enquiry was also dropped owing to the fact that the petitioner stood superannuated in the year 1979. Thus, the order passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, late Shri G. S. Oza, as he then was, was fully proper. The various orders passed by the successor Chief Justice and the reasonings employed have been placed for perusal. 6. Shri Rajendra Tiwari, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the case of the petitioner is not distinguishable from that of Shri S. P. Tiwari and Shri Razaqque who were granted the full pay and allowances. The preliminary enquiry conducted by the High Court could not be used to give a finding that suspension was not unjustified. He further submits that the case of Shri S. P. Tiwari was no better than that of the petitioner. Mr. Tiwari was found visiting typing institute along with Dr. Goswami. He was found seen in the car of Dr. Goswami who was an accused in the case. Mr. Razaqque was denied the full pay and allowances by the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice, Shri G. L. Oza, in the year 1985 and the case of Sarvashri Thakur and Razaqque was found to be similar and when Mr. Razaqque was later on granted the full pay and allowance in the year 1990 by the successor Hon. the Chief Justice, late Shri S. K. Jha, the case of the petitioner ought to have been treated with parity. 7. The learned counsel, Shri V. S. Shrouti, appearing for the High Court, submits that the case of the petitioner is distinguishable. He was the main culprit responsible for the interpolation. His case was dealt leniently by the High Court. He was allowed to be superannuated. Merely acquittal in criminal case on technical point and dropping of Departmental Enquiry owing the factum of retirement, it cannot be said that the petitioner's suspension was wholly unjustified. The learned counsel submits that it is not in dispute that interpolation was made in the deposition to benefit the accused. It was a serious charge of tampering with the judicial record. The learned counsel submits that it is not in dispute that interpolation was made in the deposition to benefit the accused. It was a serious charge of tampering with the judicial record. Criminal prosecution was ordered by the High Court. There was justification for suspension. Thus, the petitioner was not entitled for full pay and allowances under Fundamental Rule 54-B. 8. Fundamental Rule 54-B makes it clear that only if suspension was wholly unjustified, an incumbent is entitled for full pay and allowances. The relevant portion of Fundamental Rule 54-B is quoted below:- F. Rule 54(B)(3) "Where the authority competent to order re-instatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant, shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8), be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended: Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation (within 60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him) and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay, only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine." 9. Firstly, I am not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that when two others have been granted full pay and allowances, Shri S. P. Tiwari and Shri S. Z. Razaqque, there could not be any discrimination with the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner ought to have been granted full pay and allowances. The petitioner is enforcing the provision of Fundamental Rule 54-B and, in my opinion, it has to be shown that suspension was unjustified. Until and unless that finding is recorded, the order passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justices' cannot be assailed. Merely because two other persons, who may have been lesser or equally guilty, were granted full pay and allowances, that fact by itself cannot come to rescue of the petitioner. There is a concept of equality before law in enforcing the legal provision. Merely because two other persons, who may have been lesser or equally guilty, were granted full pay and allowances, that fact by itself cannot come to rescue of the petitioner. There is a concept of equality before law in enforcing the legal provision. Plea of discrimination can be sustained for a lawful claim not for claiming parity in the matter when one is not entitled to that relief under the rule/law. 10. In the instant case, facts unfold that suspension of the petitioner was not at all unwarranted or unjustified. Preliminary Enquiry report indicates that the petitioner was Incharge of the almirah in which the concerned records were placed and late petitioner made a visit to the Supreme Court section of the High Court on Sunday the 31st August, 1969. As per rule, he should have signed on the attendance note book of the Supreme Court office section but he did not sign it. The Peon, Badri Prasad Mishra, deposed during preliminary enquiry that Shri S. S. Thakur came on 31-8-1969 in the Supreme Court section of the High Court and the lock was opened. He asked Shri Thakur to sign the note book but Shri Thakur avoided it saying that he will sign it later. Shri Thakur also admitted that Dr. Goswami visited his house 12/15 days ago and asked him to expedite the preparation of paper book. Thus, it was concluded against the petitioner that Shri Thakur was taking interest beyond his duties in this case. Shri Thakur was also found handing over the keys of almirahs to the other clerks which was a negligent act. In the order of commital, in para 25, the following observation was made by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st class:- "Vinod Kumari (P.W. 13) deposed in connection with accused Thakur Babu that accused Thakur Babu had come to work in the Supreme Court section on one Sunday. Badri Prasad (P.W. 14) and Ajgar Singh (P.W. 18) who are peons in the High Court also deposed that on 10-8-1969 accused Thakur Babu had come to work in the Supreme Court section and as he was asked to put his signature in the attendance note book, Article A. He replied that he would do so. In addition to this, Ku. Chandra Prabha (PW. 2) deposed that the key of the record used to remain with accused Thakur Babu also. In addition to this, Ku. Chandra Prabha (PW. 2) deposed that the key of the record used to remain with accused Thakur Babu also. From these circumstances, it can be presumed prima facie that the record was forged by accused Thakur Babu." 11. Thus, it cannot be said that there was no justification to order the suspension of late Shri S. S. Thakur. He was rightly suspended. His Subsistence Allowance as per rules was enhanced to 75% of pay and allowances. 12. In my opinion, the suspension was not wholly unjustified but it was on sound basis. Thus, the petitioner was rightly held not entitled to full pay and allowances which was the order passed in the year 1985. The review was applied for and dismissed in the year 1987 and thereafter the late petitioner did not take any action and waited for three years and then filed the application for reconsideration. After Shri Razaqque was granted full pay and allowances in the year 1990, a writ petition was filed in the year 1991 though it is belated. The petition is not being thrown on the ground of delay but on examination on merits of his case. It cannot be inferred that he was wrongfully deprived of full pay and allowances. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in P. L. Shah vs. Union of India and another 1989 (1) SCC 546 , to contend that an order of suspension is not an order imposing punishment on a person found to be guilty. It is the order made against him before he is found guilty. The suspension allowance is paid for the purposes of maintenance of delinquent and his dependents. In P. L. Shah (supra) the Supreme Court has emphasized that in case of delay there should be review of the Subsistence Allowance. It should also be taken into consideration whether the Government servant was in any case responsible for the undue delay in the disposal of the proceedings initiated against him. In that case, delinquent was paid Subsistence Allowance @ 15% and from 1975 to 1982 and from 1982 he was paid 25% of the salary last drawn. However, in the instant case, this situation is not existing. The petitioner was paid maximum of the permissible Subsistence Allowance. In that case, delinquent was paid Subsistence Allowance @ 15% and from 1975 to 1982 and from 1982 he was paid 25% of the salary last drawn. However, in the instant case, this situation is not existing. The petitioner was paid maximum of the permissible Subsistence Allowance. The question is of interpretation of Fundamental Rule 54-B. Even in P. L. Shah the Supreme Court has emphasized that suspension is ordered when a person is not found guilty to ensure smooth disposal of proceedings initiated against him. The question is whether suspension was wholly unjustified so as to entitle the petitioner to claim full pay and allowances for which proposition P. L. Shah does not render assistance to the cause espoused by the petitioner. In M. Gopal Krishan Naidu vs. State of M. P., AIR 1968 SC 240 , the Supreme Court laid down that order under Fundamental Rule 54-B is in a sense a consequential order, in that, it can be passed after an order of reinstatement is made. Opportunity to show cause should be afforded. In the instant case before passing the final order under Fundamental Rule 54-B show cause notice was issued to the petitioner. Thus, it was passed consistently in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Ram Singh Gyasi Singh vs. Factory Manager, J.C. Mills, 1982 MPLJ 369 , Single Bench of this Court, laid down that in imposition of penalty when the Court finds a person guilty many factors play their role. Where Labour Court refused to award back wages to employees by way of punishment for major misconduct the order passed by the Labour Court could not be said to be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The decision is of no avail to the petitioner, determination of the guilt finally is not the requirement of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules. The authority concerned while passing the final order relating to suspension is required to look into all the material circumstances, whether the suspension was wholly unjustified. 14. In Krishna Kant Raghunath Vibhavankar vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1434 , Supreme Court considered the question of suspension pending criminal trial where the accused was acquitted and held that reinstatement with all consequential benefits and back wages could not be granted as a matter of course. 14. In Krishna Kant Raghunath Vibhavankar vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1434 , Supreme Court considered the question of suspension pending criminal trial where the accused was acquitted and held that reinstatement with all consequential benefits and back wages could not be granted as a matter of course. Disciplinary authority may enquire into the misconduct alleged and take appropriate action thereon. In the instant case though the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on technical grounds and criminal prosecution was also quashed on technical grounds. The Supreme Court held that even acquittal in criminal case by itself is not enough for grant of all back wages. In Moolchand Agarwal vs. Jivaji University, Gwalior, 1993 MPLJ 744 , the order dispensing the services of two employees was held to be amounting to hostile discrimination since no action was taken against the other ten employees who were similarly situated and on the contrary, they were awarded. It was a case of pick and choose. University could not demonstrate how the two delinquents formed different groups from the other. No enquiry was conducted against the other ten but in the instant case, criminal prosecution was lodged against all the three. Gravity of charge against the petitioner was more. It cannot be said that it was a case of pick and choose or hostile discrimination. It was not the question considered by the Division Bench where a relief, which a person is not entitled to under the rules, can be granted in the writ jurisdiction. It was not the plea raised or answered. In the State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Vedpal Singh and another, AIR 1997 SC 608 , the Supreme Court held that even if a delinquent is acquitted by the criminal Court due to technical defect that cannot prevent the Government to take appropriate action under the conduct rules. It is to be seen pragmatically in backdrop of the circumstances. No abstract principle of universal application could be laid in that behalf. Materials such as Confidential Reports, etc. can be looked into. If the Confidential Report indicates doubtful integrity, it would not be expedient to direct payment of back wages, though he was acquitted by a criminal Court may be on technical ground or on merits, he is not entitled to back wages. Materials such as Confidential Reports, etc. can be looked into. If the Confidential Report indicates doubtful integrity, it would not be expedient to direct payment of back wages, though he was acquitted by a criminal Court may be on technical ground or on merits, he is not entitled to back wages. The circumstances of the case and conduct of the delinquent do furnish justification in denying him the back wages, lest it cannot be a premium on proclivity for corruption. In para 4 the Supreme Court held as under:- "Corruption is the result of deep-seated moral degradation and unsatiated greed for wealth. The office of public service affords an opportunity to the public servant to abuse of the office in that pursuit to accept illegal gratification for the discharge of the official duty. Criminal prosecution launched against the public servant many a time may end may be due to technical defects in apathy on the part of the prosecution or approach in consideration of the problem of the witnesses, turn hostile or other diverse reasons but the meet of the matter is that on equitable consideration the Government servant claims re-instatement into service. Equity per se may not prevent the Government to take appropriate action under the conduct rules or under Article 311 of the Constitution but many a time they do become fruitless exercise. Resultantly, public servant on re-instatement claims consequential benefits including back wages. On many a occasion, public servant avoids the detection of corruption or by skilful management proof of commission of corruption would be wanting. But his conduct gains notoriety in service and among public in that behalf payment of back wages and impetus and a premium on corruption. The society has to pay the price for corrupt officers from public exchequer. Therefore, when the Court directs payment of back wages or re-instatement, the Court/Tribunal is required to consider the backdrop of the circumstances and pragmatically apply the principle to the given set of facts. No abstract principle of universal application could be laid in that behalf. The confidential reports of the officer prior to initiation of the prosecution do furnish the evidence of conduct of the public servant. No abstract principle of universal application could be laid in that behalf. The confidential reports of the officer prior to initiation of the prosecution do furnish the evidence of conduct of the public servant. It is the duty of the officer to place his material and of the Government to place all the necessary record in that behalf before the Court/Tribunal for consideration and it would be for the Court/Tribunal to consider and decide the matter. This Court has pointed out in several cases the need to record confidential reports objectively and dispassionately with a reformative purpose to enable the public-servant to reform himself to improve quality of the service and efficiency of the administration. Parochial, sectorial or nepotic approach would be deleterious to the efficiency of administration and maintenance of discipline in service: Confidential reports placed on record in this case do disclose such deleterious tendency in writing the confidential reports. One set of officers reported integrity of the appellant and while diametrically in opposite terms the predecessor officer had reported doubtful integrity of the appellant. They do demonstrate the lack of objectivity on the part of some officers in writing the confidential reports. This would be very sad state of affairs impinging upon efficiency of administration. We have confined to the question of payment of back wages with an intention that on re-instatement the appellant would reform himself purging from the proclivity of corrupt practices and prove himself to be a useful public servant to himself, to the family and to the society. In the light of the confidential reports indicating doubtful integrity, we are of the view that it is not expedient to direct payment of back wages, though he was acquitted by the criminal Court may be on technical grounds or on merits, he is not entitled to back wages. As stated earlier the circumstances of the case and conduct of the appellant do furnish justification in denying him the back wages lest it would be a premium on proclivity for corruption." 15. Resultantly, the writ petition is devoid of merits. The same is dismissed. Costs are left to be borne by the parties as incurred.