L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE 1st respondent in Election OP. No. 15 of 2000 on the file of the Election Tribunal (Senior Civil Judge), Adoni (for short the tribunal ), has filed this writ petition against the order of the Tribunal dated 13-8-2002, setting aside her election. ( 2 ) THE writ petition came up for admission on 20-8-2002. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the contesting respondents expressed their willingness to address the arguments on final hearing itself. Accordingly the matter was extensively heard on several dates and is accordingly disposed of finally. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated, the relevant facts are as under. ( 4 ) THE elections to the Adoni Municipal council were held in March 2000. The office of the Chairman for Adoni Municipal council was reserved in favour of scheduled Castes (Women ). The petitioner, 3rd respondent and three other candidates contested in that election. The petitioner secured 26,074 votes, the 3rd respondent secured 25,110 votes and the other candidates secured less number of the votes than the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. Accordingly, the petitioner was declared as elected. ( 5 ) THE 3rd respondent filed Election OP. No. 15/2000 on the file of the Tribunal as provided for under Rule 1 of Rules for decision of Election Disputes, 1967 issued in g. O. Ms. No. 118 dated 17-8-1967 (hereinafter referred to as the election Rules ). The 3rd respondent challenged the election of the petitioner herein on four grounds, viz. , (A) The petitioner does not belong to scheduled Caste; (b) The petitioner had resorted to booth capturing and rigging; (c) The petitioner was a Class I contractor registered with the municipality as on the date of the election; and (d) Certain valid votes held in favour of the 1st respondent were wrongfully rejected. ( 6 ) THE petitioner filed her counter- affidavit before the Tribunal denying all the allegations. She had asserted that she was never converted to Christianity and continued to be Hindu. She categorically denied the allegations as to the booth capturing, rigging, rejection of valid votes as well as the plea about Class I Contractor. ( 6 ) THE petitioner filed her counter- affidavit before the Tribunal denying all the allegations. She had asserted that she was never converted to Christianity and continued to be Hindu. She categorically denied the allegations as to the booth capturing, rigging, rejection of valid votes as well as the plea about Class I Contractor. ( 7 ) ON the basis of the pleadings, the tribunal framed the following issues:" (1) Whether the 1st respondent belongs to Indian Christian (BC) and not scheduled Caste (Mala) (SC) on the date of filing nomination papers for election as Chairperson of Adoni municipality? (2) Whether the 1st respondent was a registered Class I contractor of adoni Municipality holding office of profit on the date of filing nomination papers for election as chairperson of Adoni Town municipality? (3) Whether the 1st respondent resorted to the following malpractices in the conduct of elections to the Chair-person of Adoni Town municipality: (i) Whether the 1st respondent with coverage support of local m. L. A. , brought about 5000 loyal persons from surrounding villages and employed them to impersonate the Regd. Voters more particularly in Ward nos. 320 and 21? (ii) Whether in Ward No. 3 1st respondent and her associates terrorised and drew away the petitioner thereby denying her right to ensure fair polling? (iii) Whether in Ward No. 20 the 1st respondent resorted to rigging of votes and more specifically the vote of Advocate sri Dadapeer? (iv) Whether in Ward No. 21, the 1st respondent resorted to booth capturing and putting the ballots together with counterfoils in the ballot box? (4) Whether the Election Officer has wrongly rejected 2304 votes casted by the voters. If it is so, what is its effect on the election of the 1st respondent as Chairperson of adoni Municipality? (5) Whether there is cause of action? (6) To what relief?" ( 8 ) ON behalf of the 3rd respondent, p. Ws. 1 to 8 were examined and documents exs. A-1 to A-15 were marked. On behalf of the petitioner herein, R. Ws. 1 to 17 were examined and Exs. R-1 to R-21 were marked. Exs. X-1 to X-41, some of which, incidentally are copies of originals of the documents filed by the petitioner and the 3rd respondent, were also marked. 1 to 8 were examined and documents exs. A-1 to A-15 were marked. On behalf of the petitioner herein, R. Ws. 1 to 17 were examined and Exs. R-1 to R-21 were marked. Exs. X-1 to X-41, some of which, incidentally are copies of originals of the documents filed by the petitioner and the 3rd respondent, were also marked. ( 9 ) ON a consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal rejected the three allegations as regards booth capturing, rejection of valid votes and the writ petitioner continuing as Class I contractor. However, the Tribunal held issue No. 1 relating to the social status of the writ petitioner against her and accordingly set aside her election. Hence, the writ petition. ( 10 ) SRI T. Surya Kiran Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner is Hindu by birth and continues to be so. He states that she has been issued caste Certificates by the competent authority in the year 1992 (Ex. X-13) as well as in the year 2000 (Ex. X-12 ). It is his contention that issuance of Caste certificates, enquiry into the genuinely of the same, etc. , are governed by the provisions of the A. P. (SC. , ST. , and B. Cs) regulation of Issue of Community certificates Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) and the Rules, 1997 made thereunder. According to him, the Act is a self-contained Code, excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to adjudicate on any of these aspects, had overriding effect on any other legislation as regards the subject matter, and it was not open to the tribunal at all to undertake an enquiry into the social status of the petitioner. He submits that the Tribunal erred in undertaking the enquiry into the correctness of the Caste certificate, despite specific exclusion. On merits, he submits that the Tribunal had deviated from the basic Rules of Evidence, inasmuch as it has placed the burden on the petitioner to establish that she was not a christian and that there was hardly any evidence which the 3rd respondent has adduced to establish her claim. It is also his submission that even if the various documents produced by the 3rd respondent are to be taken into account, none of them can bind to the petitioner, since she was not the author of the same. It is also his submission that even if the various documents produced by the 3rd respondent are to be taken into account, none of them can bind to the petitioner, since she was not the author of the same. The learned Counsel also states that the 3rd respondent has not raised any objection at the time of filing of the nomination and it was not open to her to challenge the election at subsequent stage. ( 11 ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2 are Election authorities. Inasmuch as no irregularity was attributed to the conduct of elections, there was no contest from them. Respondents 4 and 5 were the other defeated candidates, who figured as respondents 2 and 3 in the election Petition. They remained ex parte. The only contestant of the writ petition is, therefore, the 3rd respondent. ( 12 ) SRI T. Veerabhadraiah, learned senior counsel for the 3rd respondent, submits that the scope of enquiry during the verification of nomination is summary in nature and in that view of the matter, it was always open for any candidate or a voter to challenge the correctness or otherwise of the acceptance of any nomination duly placing the relevant material before the Tribunal. He submits that the very Caste Certificates issued to the petitioner were without basis and the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Tribunal amply established this fact. It is also his contention that inasmuch as the very issuance of Caste Certificates was contrary to the facts on record, the jurisdiction of the tribunal cannot be said to have been excluded and, at any rate, the exclusion of jurisdiction is only of the Civil Courts and the Election Tribunal, not being a Civil court, does not come within the purview of exclusion. ( 13 ) BEFORE undertaking discussion on the merits of the matter, the question as to exclusion of the jurisdiction needs to be addressed. ( 14 ) THE A. P. Legislature enacted the Act with the specific purpose of regulating the matter of issuance of the Caste Certificates to the eligible individuals for the purpose of claiming the benefit in matters of admission into educational institutions, securing public employment and contesting elective posts, against seats, or as the case may be, posts reserved in favour of the reserved categories. The Act came into force only in the year 1993 and the Rules were issued thereunder in 1997. Section 3 of the Act prescribes procedure for issuance of certificates and Sections 4 and 5, stipulate the procedure for cancellation of certificates. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was issued Caste Certificate in the year 2000 by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Ex. A-13 under the provisions of the Act and the rules. The Act and the Rules provided for the mechanism of verification into the correctness of the certificates issued to any individual and also the procedure for cancellation of the same. Specified agencies are created for this purpose. Having provided for such a mechanism, the Act had excluded the jurisdiction of the civil courts to adjudicate into any of the aspects. Section 17 reads as under:"17. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil courts: No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any order passed by any officer or authority under "this Act and no stay or injunction shall be granted by a Court in respect of any action taken or to be taken by such officer or authority under this Act in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. "the language of Section 17 is very clear in so far as it proposes to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The original as well as appellate authorities are created under the act and Rules to hear and decide the claims or appeals, as the case may be. ( 15 ) EXISTENCE of jurisdiction in the Civil courts to adjudicate into various matters is always presumed. Any exclusion of the jurisdiction has to be specific. Decided cases as well as the juristic works are to the effect that exclusionary clauses are not absolute. One of the principles is that mere exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court unless an effective and alternative mechanism is provided for the exclusion shall be ineffective. ( 16 ) CONVERSELY where the concerned enactment provides for an authority or tribunal for deciding the matters in respect of the jurisdiction is ousted, the exclusion is considered to be absolute. ( 17 ) ANOTHER exception to the principle of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is where there existed the necessary factual basis for the authority created under the enactment that exercised its jurisdiction. ( 17 ) ANOTHER exception to the principle of exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is where there existed the necessary factual basis for the authority created under the enactment that exercised its jurisdiction. In other words, the enquiry will be into the existence of the jurisdictional fact, the existence of which alone would enable agency created under the Act to adjudicate. In Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta, as well as in Enasmanic Limited v. Foreign compensation, it was held that if there did not exist the jurisdictional fact, to that extent, the exercise of jurisdiction by the agency created under the enactment was void and consequently the jurisdiction of the civil courts cannot be said to have been excluded. ( 18 ) IF we examine the issue involved in the present case with reference to these principles, it is evident that the competent authority prescribed under the Act and the rules had issued the Caste Certificates to the petitioner. The 3rd respondent did not invoke the machinery under the Act for cancellation of the same by the time she filed the OP. Unless it is pleaded that the authority that issued the Certificate to the petitioner did not have the jurisdiction, or it is pleaded that the occasion for the authority to issue the certificate to the petitioner does not exist, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court continued to exist. If at all anything, the facts pleaded by the 3rd respondent constituted the cavise of action for her to move the superior authority created under the Act and the Rules, to cancel the certificates issued to the petitioner. Therefore, in view of the existence of unequivocal provisions in the form of Section 17 and the absence of any factor, scuttling the operation of the exclusionary clause, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the civil court continued to exist to decide the correctness or otherwise of the Caste Certificate issued to the petitioner. ( 19 ) THERE was hardly any discussion on this aspect by the Tribunal in its voluminous judgment. At one point of time, this Court was of the view that existence of the Act and the Rules may not have brought to the notice of the Tribunal. However, from the various observations made by Tribunal, it is evident that it was very much aware of it. At one point of time, this Court was of the view that existence of the Act and the Rules may not have brought to the notice of the Tribunal. However, from the various observations made by Tribunal, it is evident that it was very much aware of it. Its attention was specifically drawn to the same. After filing the Election Petition, the 3rd respondent did prefer an appeal to the district Collector against the Caste certificate issued by the MRO. The collector, in turn, has forwarded the same to the MRO who figured as P. W. 3 in the enquiry. P. W. 3 appears to have not taken further steps since he was otherwise busy and also 011 account of the pendency of the election Petition. In this context, the tribunal observed as under:"the pendency of this election petition would not in any way have come in the way of the Collector, Kurnool or m. R. O. Suryanarayana about their enquiry s which were quite independent and under the provisions of A. P. (SC, ST and BCs) Regulation of issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 and Rules, 1997. "therefore, there was no legal basis for the tribunal to undertake the enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the Caste certificate issued to the petitioner, in view of the bar contained in Section 17 as well as the invocation of the procedure under that Act by the 3rd respondent herself. ( 20 ) SRI T. Veerabhadraiah, learned Senior counsel for the 3rd respondent made an attempt to distinguish the Election Tribunal from civil Court and to state that even if the jurisdiction of the civil Court is said to have been excluded, the Election Tribunal does not come in the purview of the election. It is too difficult to accept such a preposition. When the jurisdiction of the civil Court, which is wide and general, stands excluded, it is rather difficult to imagine that the jurisdiction of a forum, which is very limited, continues to exist. The Rules of interpretation as well as the decided case law does not permit of such a restricted view. ( 21 ) IN the context of election Law also, the supreme Court recognized the existence of a separate authority other than the court, with exclusive powers to decide certain aspects finally. The Rules of interpretation as well as the decided case law does not permit of such a restricted view. ( 21 ) IN the context of election Law also, the supreme Court recognized the existence of a separate authority other than the court, with exclusive powers to decide certain aspects finally. In HM Trivedi v. V. B. Raju, mathew Justice, speaking for the Court held as under:"the requirement of ordinary residence as a condition for registration in the electoral rolls is one created by parliament by Section 19 of the 1950 act, and as we said, we see no reason why Parliament should have no power to entrust to an authority other than a court or a tribunal trying an election petition the exclusive power to decided the matter finally. " ( 22 ) IT is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to decide the correctness or otherwise of the Caste certificate issued to the petitioner herein. ( 23 ) STRICTLY speaking, in view of this finding, it is not necessary to go into the other aspects of the matter. However, with a view to give completeness to the adjudication, it is proposed to verify as to whether the various findings recorded by the Tribunal and the procedure adopted by it conforms to law. ( 24 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner states that the petition was incomplete inasmuch as the relevant particulars as required under Rule 2 (2) of the Decision of election Disputes Rules, 1967 were not furnished. He states that the said provision requires the Election Petition to contain a statement in concise form of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and the particulars of any corrupt practice, which he alleges. The learned Counsel submits that except making a bald allegation that the petitioner was wedded to Christianity, no particulars as to whether the petitioner was christian by birth or whether she was converted into it later, and if so, at what point of time, and in what manner, are not at all furnished. He also submits that the tribunal cannot assume the role of the returning Officer to verify as to whether the nomination of the petitioner would have been accepted at all. He also submits that the tribunal cannot assume the role of the returning Officer to verify as to whether the nomination of the petitioner would have been accepted at all. Relying upon the A. P. Municipal Council (Direct Election of chairman under Section 23) Rules, 1986, he submits that Rule 6 (7) thereof requires that in case the candidate belongs to sc , st or bc the declaration is to be made in Form 3 before an Officer not below the rank of the deputy Tahsildar and the same shall be attached to the nomination. Once that is complied with, it was not open to the returning Officer, much less, to the Tribunal to go into the correctness of it. ( 25 ) SRI Veerabhadraiah, learned Senior counsel for the 3rd respondent, submits that since the verification by the Returning officer was summary in nature, it was always open and competent for the Tribunal to go into the correctness of the acts and omissions of the Returning Officer, if necessary material is placed before it. ( 26 ) IN Biradmal Singh v. Anand Purohit, it was held that having regard to the summary nature of the enquiry by the Returning officer, it was always open to the Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, to go into the correctness of the decision taken by the returning Officer, if necessary material is placed before it. It was held as under:"enquiry during scrutiny is summary in nature as there is no scope for any elaborate enquiry at that stage. Therefore, it is open to a party to place fresh or additional material before the high Court to show that the Returning officer s order rejecting the nomination paper was improper. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings in an election petition are not in the nature of appeal against the order of the Returning Officer. It is an original proceeding. In the instant case, it was open to the respondent election petitioner to place material before the high Court to show that the two candidates were qualified and their nomination paper was improperly rejected. "therefore, if there exists the necessary material before it, subject to course to the permissibility of the adjudication into those aspects, the Tribunal can certainly adjudicate upon it. ( 27 ) THE parameters of such enquiry are also stipulated in that very decision. "therefore, if there exists the necessary material before it, subject to course to the permissibility of the adjudication into those aspects, the Tribunal can certainly adjudicate upon it. ( 27 ) THE parameters of such enquiry are also stipulated in that very decision. In that case, the High Court accepted some of the documents placed before it, which had a bearing upon the age of the contesting respondents. The High Court, by drawing an adverse inference, recorded a finding that the candidate, whose nomination was rejected, had completed 25 years of age on the relevant date, and consequently held that the rejection of his nomination was improper. On the ground that the documents relied upon by the High Court were of no evidentiary value, the Supreme court reversed the finding recorded by the high Court. ( 28 ) ANOTHER aspect of the matter is that the standard of proof that is needed in election petitions is comparable, if not equal, to the one in criminal cases. Further, if two views are possible in a given set of circumstances, the Courts are required to adopt the one, which would uphold the election failure to raise an objection at the time of filing of the nominations, though not fatal in the challenge to an election, was held to be a factor to be taken into account. The burden of proof is invariably upon the person who challenges the election. Now it needs to be seen as to what emerges if the order of the Tribunal is tested on the touchstone of these parameters. ( 29 ) IN the Election Petition, except stating that the petitioner herein was wedded to christianity, no further particulars as to her embracing the Christianity, etc. , were furnished. Para 5 is the only portion of the election Petition in which the allegations on this aspect are contained:"the seat in question is reserved for scheduled Caste women, beyond controversy R-l is not a Scheduled caste woman. She is wedded to christian religion. All the customs prevalent in Christianity are followed by R-l in her lifetime. While a student of Degree College at Repalle she enjoyed scholarships representing herself as a Christian. As a matter of fact she was married to Babu at munipalle village, Ponnur Mandal of guntur District. Her wedding was solemnized by a Christian Pastor. All the customs prevalent in Christianity are followed by R-l in her lifetime. While a student of Degree College at Repalle she enjoyed scholarships representing herself as a Christian. As a matter of fact she was married to Babu at munipalle village, Ponnur Mandal of guntur District. Her wedding was solemnized by a Christian Pastor. There is overwhelming evidence that r-l is a Christian not a Scheduled caste woman. Her election ex facie is void. "the petitioner herein in her counter-affidavit categorically denied each and every aspect contained in the election petition. Therefore, the burden was heavily and exclusively upon the 3rd respondent, to establish that the petitioner was either a born Christian or was converted later into that religion. There was absolutely no evidence on this aspect. The Tribunal had only relied upon certain records of the Education Institutions where the petitioner is said to have studied. It was not in dispute that the petitioner was not the author of or signatory to any of the documents relied upon by the Court. The evidence of not a single witness, examined on behalf of the 3rd respondent (election petitioner), was referred to by the Tribunal. The application form said to have been submitted by the father of the petitioner was relied upon. The father of the petitioner was held to be acting as an agent of the petitioner. No efforts were made to examine him. No one, who has maintained the records, was examined. The only oral evidence that was referred to by the tribunal was the one of P. W. 3, who was criticized by the Tribunal for not maintaining the record properly and indirectly helping the writ petitioner. Having referred to various documents, the tribunal had switched over to discuss the evidence of the petitioner herein as R. W. I except the fact that the petitioner is alleged to have received Scholarship as BC c candidate (converted Christian), no other factor is forthcoming. Even the person who is said to have paid the amount or the one who maintained the record was not examined. Throughout the discussion, the tribunal proceeded as though the burden lies upon the petitioner herein to establish that she was not a Christian. Even the person who is said to have paid the amount or the one who maintained the record was not examined. Throughout the discussion, the tribunal proceeded as though the burden lies upon the petitioner herein to establish that she was not a Christian. Certain peculiar propositions were laid down by the tribunal, some of which are as under:"if there is an open declaration that a person intends to follow another faith or religion (in this case Christianity), it would have the effect of rendering that person to cease to be a Hindu and consequently a member of Scheduled caste notwithstanding the fact whether such conversion was efficacious. In other words, a simple declaration to follow another religion is sufficient to have the effect of ceasing that person to belong to Hindu religion (Para 56 ). ""under the circumstances, it is a delicate question as to what should be done by this Court. I am of the considered opinion that I have to fall in line with the view that once a Hindu (Mala) or a Hindu (Madiga) or for that matter any mother belonging to scheduled Castes converts himself into christianity, he may or may not cease to be a Hindu but, as consequence, he would not be entitled to the protection of Constitution (SC) Order, 1950. . . . . . . . . . The 1st respondent did not lose her caste Hindu (Mala) by virtue of her conversion into Christianity, would not be entitled to the protection under paragraph 3 of the Constitution (SC) order, 1950. (Para 75)". When the petitioner specifically pleaded that she was never a Christian and she married R. W. 2, according to Hindu Rites and Customs, the Tribunal disbelieved it by stating that the Priest was not examined. The tribunal also found fault with the 1st respondent in not summoning the file through which she was given the Caste certificate (Para 92 ). ( 30 ) NORMALLY, any civil Court, which is functioning as such, or as a specialized tribunal does not deviate from the basic principles df evidence, which requires the party approaching it with specific plea, to prove and establish it. ( 30 ) NORMALLY, any civil Court, which is functioning as such, or as a specialized tribunal does not deviate from the basic principles df evidence, which requires the party approaching it with specific plea, to prove and establish it. In this case, the tribunal appears to have adopted the course of requiring an elected candidate to establish her caste, obviously on the basis of certain observations in the judgment of this Court in w. P. No. 16703/90, which incidentally was in relation to the election of the Chairman of the same Municipality. In that case also, the election of the elected candidates was set aside holding that he was not a SC candidate and was a converted Christian. The same was upheld by this Court in that writ petition. The Tribunal made extensive reference to the judgment in W. P. No. 16703/90 ( 31 ) TWO aspects need to be taken into account in this regard. Firstly, when the election petition or the writ petition was decided on the previous occasion. The A. P. (SC, ST. , and B. Cs) Regulation of Issue of community Certificates Act, 1992 and Rules made thereunder were not in vogue. Therefore, the Tribunal as well as this Court did not feel in any way restricted to adjudicate upon the social status of the candidates. Secondly, in the judgment in that writ petition, the learned Single Judge placed the burden upon the elected candidate as under:"no case has been set up by the petitioner (whose election was challenged) that at one time his father converted himself into Christianity and at a subsequent stage they reconverted themselves into Hinduism. "with great respect, it needs to be observed that placing burden upon the elected candidate was not only inversion of the very concept of the burden of proof, but also was contrary to the settled principles of law. It is for the person challenging the election to plead and establish to the satisfaction of the tribunal all the facts constituting the basis of challenge. The Tribunal cannot, under any circumstances, look to what emerges from the side of the elected candidate. In this case, what unfortunately happened is the opposite. It is for the person challenging the election to plead and establish to the satisfaction of the tribunal all the facts constituting the basis of challenge. The Tribunal cannot, under any circumstances, look to what emerges from the side of the elected candidate. In this case, what unfortunately happened is the opposite. Not a word said to have been uttered by the 3rd respondent (election petitioner) during the course of evidence or for that matter that, of any other evidence examined by her, was referred to by the tribunal. If at all there was any reference to the oral evidence throughout the order, it was only that of the petitioner herein and the other witnesses examined by the 3rd respondent. The Tribunal has taken upon itself to pronounce upon the conduct of the authorities constituted under the Act and the Rules. In the context of consideration of an appeal said to have been preferred by the 3rd respondent, challenging the Caste certificate issued to the petitioner, that too after filing of the election petition, the tribunal observed as under:"it can be inferred that the matter was not enquired into for obvious reasons of facilitating the 1st respondent who, admittedly, is supported by the ruling telugu Desam Party having alliance with Bharatiya Janata Party to which the 1st respondent belongs. "these remarks were not only unrelated to the issue before the Tribunal, but were totally uncalled for. The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in adjudicating an issue, which was deserved to be adjudicated by the authorities created under the Act and rules to the exclusion of any other Court or tribunal. ( 32 ) THE learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent in his submissions, oral as well as written, tried to sustain the findings recorded by the Tribunal. Extensive reference was made to the portions of the order, oral and documentary evidence and decided cases on the subject. Having regard to the view taken in the preceding paragraphs, it is felt that it is not necessary to deal with them in further detail. Most of them stand already covered by the discussion undertaken. ( 33 ) I therefore, find that the order of the tribunal cannot be sustained, either on facts or in law. The same is accordingly set aside and the writ petition is allowed.