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2002 DIGILAW 1221 (PAT)

Ram Tabakya Singh v. State Of Bihar

2002-11-14

SOMESHWAR NATH PATHAK

body2002
Judgment SOMESHWAR NATH PATHAK, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.9.1991 rendered by IV Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, in Sessions Trial Number 90/87/2/1988. Appellant Ram Tabkya Singh and Ram Balak Singh were convicted under Section 148, IPC & 27 of the Arms Act and they were sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years and three years respectively. Accused-appellants Ram Nandan Singh, Ram Pravesh Singh, Ram Ekbal Singh, Ram Swarup Singh, Santosh Singh, Satyendra Singh, Kamdeo Singh, Sudama Singh and Ram Tabkya Singh son of Raja Ram Singh were convicted under Section 452, IPC and they were sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years. Accused-appellants Ram Nandan Singh, Ram Pravesh Singh, Ram Ekbal Singh, Ram Swarup Singh, Kamdeo Singh, Sudama Singh & Ram Tabkya Singh son of Raja Ram Singh were further convicted under Section 148, IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years. Accused-appellants Ram Ekbal Singh, Santosh Singh & Satyendra Singh were convicted under Section 147, IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year. 2. Accused-appellants Ram Nandan Singh, Ram Pravesh Singh, Ram Swarup Singh, Satyendra Singh, Kamdeo Singh and Ram Tabkya Singh son of Raja Ram Singh were further convicted under Section 324, IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years. Accused- appellants Ram Ekbal Singh, Santosh Singh and Satyendra Singh were further convicted under Section 323, IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year. 3. The Prosecution case was based on the written report of Bishnudeo Sharma, alleging therein that on 31st July, 1985 at 8 p.m. the informant and his other relations namely, Ganauri Singh and Ram Bilash Singh were resting on their cots and were listening to the radio programme. Suddenly, accused-appellants along with two others appeared at the darwaza of the informant. Ram Balak Singh was armed with pistol and RamTabkya Singh son of Mathura Singh was armed with double barrel-guns. Other persons were armed with lathi and bhasuli. The informant and his brothers were subjected to assault with the weapons, the accused-appellants and his other members of the unlawful assembly were armed with. The injured persons tried to save themselves by straying into the nearby paddy and chilly fields. Other persons were armed with lathi and bhasuli. The informant and his brothers were subjected to assault with the weapons, the accused-appellants and his other members of the unlawful assembly were armed with. The injured persons tried to save themselves by straying into the nearby paddy and chilly fields. The cause of the occurrence as alleged in the written report was that the accused wanted to purchase the land belonging to Jagdish Pandey and since they failed to purchase the same they committed the alleged occurrence. 4. There were other litigations pending between the parties as well. 5. The accused-appellants had taken a defence of false implication on account of admitted enmity. 6. The prosecution had examined in all ten witnesses to prove its case, PW 10 was a formal witness, PW 9 was the I.O. PWs 1, 5 and 6 were the injured persons of the case. PWs 2, 3 & 4 were the other so-called eye-witnesses of the alleged occurrence. PW 8 was a doctor who treated and issued injury reports for the injuries found on PWs 1, 5 and 6. The trial Court on the basis of the evidence of the injured witnesses and the circumstantial evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 4 here the accused-appellants guilty and sentenced them, as stated above. 7. The evidence of the witnesses was criticised on the ground inter alia, that there was admitted enmity between the parties on account of litigations and, therefore, there were good probabilities of false implication of the accused-appellants. Moreover, the cause of occurrence, as given in the written report was not sufficient to motivate the appellants to commit the alleged occurrence on the alleged date and time. This is so because the accused-appellants could obtain the sale-deed for the land in question which was later sold to the informants family, by initiating a proceeding under the ceiling Act. The trail Court has dismissed this plea of the appellants on the ground that for obtaining sale-deed under the provisions of Ceiling Act. The appellants would have to pay high price than the same on which they would have sought to secure the sale-deed. Moreover, in view of the admitted litigating terms between the parties, the trial Court thought that probability of the occurrence was very much there because enmity cuts both ways. The appellants would have to pay high price than the same on which they would have sought to secure the sale-deed. Moreover, in view of the admitted litigating terms between the parties, the trial Court thought that probability of the occurrence was very much there because enmity cuts both ways. So in the opinion of the trial Court there were good probabilities for the alleged occurrence, in my opinion, also trial court did not commit any illegality or factual error here. 8. So far the occurrence in particular is concerned, the Court had to rely on the evidences of PWs 1, 5 and 6, who were the injured witnesses and all these witnesses had received multiple injuries on their persons, as the evidence of the doctor (PW 8) showed of course, PWs 2, 3 and 4, who were the so-called independent witnesses had failed to figure as eyewitnesses in their statements before the I.O. and so their claim of witnessing the alleged occurrence of assault from the beginning to the end was dismissed by the trial Court, but the testimony of these witnesses to the effect that they had appeared at the scene of occurrence and had seen the injured persons was believed by the trial Court and this added a circumstance to the allegation that on the alleged date and time the informant and his brothers and other relations were subjected to assault by the accused- appellants. The evidence of the above witnesses did not suffer from any vital discrepancy, so far the occurrence of assault on material particulars was concerned, so I do not think that the trial Court committed any factual error here also. 9. So far the defence of the accused-appellants was that they had been falsely implicated, and they had taken the further plea that they were themselves subjected to assault on the same date and time and at the same place for which they had filed a complaint case. Their plea was disbelieved by the trial Court because they failed to go to any doctor in any State hospital on the date of occurrence itself. They rather went to a private doctor on the next date (1.8.1985). Moreover, their plea that the doctor in the hospital was not available was also disbelieved by the trial Court because in the government hospitals doctors are available even on emergency duty. They rather went to a private doctor on the next date (1.8.1985). Moreover, their plea that the doctor in the hospital was not available was also disbelieved by the trial Court because in the government hospitals doctors are available even on emergency duty. Moreover, the injury reports of the accused-appellants Ext. A & A/1 brought on the record have not been proved by the doctor himself rather by someone else. So, in this view of the matter, the trial Court felt that the accused- appellants had taken a false plea of injury sustained by them, although their defence did support an occurrence of 31.7.1985, because it supported their presence at the P.O. on this date. 10. So far the case under Section 307, IPC was concerned it was disbelieved by the trial Court on the ground some of the accused- appellants were armed with fire-arms as also other lethal weapons, and so if they would have any intention to kill the victims, they would have easily accomplished their task, there being no intervening circumstance. However, the trial Courts conviction of some of the accused-appellants under Section 324, IPC does not appear to be based on correct appreciation of the law contemplated under Section 324, IPC. All the three injure a persons as it appears from the evidence of PW 8, had received lacerated wounds and bruises, on various parts of their bodies, but none of the injuries were caused by sharp cutting weapons or by fire-arms. The doctor described injuries on all the three injured persons of the case to have been caused by hard and blunt substance. Of course, some of the accused-appellants were carrying garasa and bhasidi, but the hatura of injury sustained by the injured did not indicate that sharp cutting portion of garasa or bhasuli was used to inflict the alleged injuries upon the victims. So I am of the opinion that the trial Court committed as legal flux pas by convicting some of the accused-appellants under Section 324, IPC and awarding them sentence under this section. Of course, the conviction and sentence under Section 148 was legally valid because a member of an unlawful assembly carrying sharp cutting weapons can very well be held guilty for the aforesaid offence. Of course, the conviction and sentence under Section 148 was legally valid because a member of an unlawful assembly carrying sharp cutting weapons can very well be held guilty for the aforesaid offence. Moreover, simply by carrying sharp cutting weapons which is not used by its blade portion of the same, I do not think any body can be legitimately convicted for the offence under Section 324, IPC. So I am of the opinion that the order of conviction and sentence of the aforesaid appellants under Section 324, IPC was bad in law. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I think the conviction of the appellants for other offences as indicated above, does not call for an interference by this Court. The conviction of the appellants under Section 324, IPC, therefore, deserves to be set aside. It is, accordingly, set aside. So far the convictions of the appellants for the other offences which have been mentioned above, those are maintained. The sentences awarded against the appellants, as stated above, for the other offences, is also maintained. 11. With the above modification in the order of conviction and sentence, this appeal is dismissed.