Judgment S.N.Jha, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order contained in Memo no. 520 dated 12.8.2000 of the Director, Bihar Hindi Granth Academy, by which the petitioner has been dismissed from service, and for other consequential and incidental reliefs. 2. The case of the petitioner, an Administrative Officer of the Bihar Hindi Granth Academy (in short, the Academy), is that he was appointed on the post of Clerk in the Academy on 2.3.71 and in course of time promoted as Administrative Officer on 26.7.88. According to the petitioner, the appointing authority is the Executive Committee of the Academy and the Director simply carries out the decision of the Executive Committee and the Chairman. However on 7.12.93 he was placed under suspension by the Director. The above suspension order was passed in view of a criminal case being Case No. CA 364/94. The petitioner challenged the continuance of suspension before this Court in CWJC No. 9526/98. Vide order dated 8.2.99 this Court declined to interfere with the order but as the suspension had continued for more than five years, the petitioner was permitted to make representation on the ground that Circular of the State Government provided for review of suspension after two years if the criminal case leading to suspension remained pending provided the Circular is applicable to employees of the Academy. In the meantime, the Academy was directed to pay arrear of subsistence allowance. Soon after, in the criminal case on 13.12.99 the petitioner was discharged by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna City. The petitioner thereafter made representation on 17.12.99 with copy of the judgment. Therein he prayed to revoke the suspension order and pay him arrear of salary etc. He also sent reminders. Instead of issuing any order on the representation and revoking suspension the petitioner was dismissed from service by the impugned order on 12.8.2000. This was done without initiating any departmenj tal proceeding and making enquiry. According to the petitioner the dismissal is in complete violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Bihar Service Code. 3. The Academy has filed counter affidavit controverting the case of the petitioner. It has been stated that the Academy was established under the resolution of the Government of Bihar on 13.2.70 and thereafter registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as an autonomous body. 3. The Academy has filed counter affidavit controverting the case of the petitioner. It has been stated that the Academy was established under the resolution of the Government of Bihar on 13.2.70 and thereafter registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as an autonomous body. The Academy is a temporary body which can be dissolved by a resolution by 3/5th of its members with the consent of the Government of Bihar. The Government of Bihar grants aid to the Academy every year for running its establishment. No post in the Academy is permanent. All the employees work on temporary basis and they do not stand on par with government servants. The Academy functions through by-laws which have not been approved by the State Government. Regarding temporary nature of posts in the Academy and non-accrual of any lien on the post by any employee thereof reliance has been placed on a judgment of this Court in Thakur Yadubansh Narain Singh V/s. Hindi Granth Academy (CWJC No. 2816/81) decided on 11.5.82. The petitioner thus, according to the Academy, cannot claim any violation of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India or Bihar Service Code. 4. Apropos the averments in the writ petition it has been stated in the counter affidavit that in absence of the Executive Committee, the powers of the Academy are vested in the Chairman and the impugned order has been passed by him and therefore it does not suffer from want of jurisdiction. On merit it has been stated that the petitioner committed embezzlement for which complaint case, referred to above, was instituted against him. The Magistrate passed an order of discharge but the order was set aside by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Patna in Cr. Rev. No. 545/99 with a direction to the court below to frame charge against the petitioner and to proceed with the trial in accordance with law. After remand the Judicial Magistrate framed charge under Sections 406 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code on 13.3.2002 and the case is now in the stage of trial. As regards dismissal from service without regular departmental proceeding it has been stated that the petitioner happens to be a man with muscle power and has become a terror in the Academy. As regards dismissal from service without regular departmental proceeding it has been stated that the petitioner happens to be a man with muscle power and has become a terror in the Academy. On various occasions he threatened the employees of the Academy who happen to be witnesses in the criminal case, for which complaint was made to the Director by the concerned employees. When the Director tried to take action against the petitioner on 11.7.2000 the petitioner abused him and threatened him with dire consequences. On 11.7.2000 notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause. Instead of showing cause the petitioner came to the chambers of the Director on 12.8.2000 and again abused him in presence of the employees of the Academy. In the circumstances the Chairman was left with no option but to direct dismissal of the petitioner and accordingly the impugned order of dismissal was issued on 12.8.2000. 5. In course of hearing of the case it was half heartedly submitted on behalf of the respondents that the writ petition is not maintainable as no writ can be issued against the Academy which is not State or an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In reply, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that though the Academy has been registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act it functions under the total control of the State Government in administrative as well as financial matters. The appointment of the Director is made by the State Government and the Minister, Higher Education is the ex-officio Chairman. The functions of the Academy are controlled by the Commissioner & Secretary, Higher Education. Counsel pointed out that in the earlier writ petition i.e. CWJC No. 9526/98 also such objection was raised on behalf of the respondents. 6. It appears that dealing with a similar plea on behalf of the Academy in the case of one Mihir Kant Mishra (CWJC No. 3753/2001), a learned Single Judge of this Court observed as under: - "This Court is unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that he was in Government service and entitled to protection available to Government servants. There is nothing to indicate that the provisions of Bihar Service Code are applicable to the employees of the Academy. There is nothing to indicate that the provisions of Bihar Service Code are applicable to the employees of the Academy. In such circumstances, the only duty of the respondents was to act fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice." I am inclined to agree that the petitioner cannot be treated as a government servant; nevertheless the writ petition cannot be said to be not maintainable against the Academy. Considering the nature and extent of the government control over the affairs of the Academy it cannot be said to be an ordinary Society existing on its own. Not being a government servant the petitioner cannot claim protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. But as observed by this Court in the case of Mihir Kant Mishra (supra) the respondents are required to act fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. 7. The only point for consideration is whether the respondents were justified in dismissing the petitioner from service without enquiry and proceeding. As noticed above, the petitioner was dismissed, without enquiry, on the ground that he abused the Director on more than one occasion and also threatened the witnesses. It may be mentioned here that in terms of proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution a government servant too can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, where the authority empowered to do so is "satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry". It may be mentioned in this context that pleasure doctrine in the matter of employment of a public servant though incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution is circumscribed by clause "except as expressly provided by this Constitution". The safeguards are provided in Article 311. The second proviso to Article 311(2) however is again in the nature of exception and lays down that in cases specified under clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof, the requirement of enquiry under Clause (2) can be dispensed with. 8. The scope of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution came in for examination by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India V/s.Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 . 8. The scope of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution came in for examination by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India V/s.Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 . By majority the Court held, that once the requirement of the relevant clauses of second proviso are satisfied the services of a civil servant can be terminated without following audi alteram partem rule. It was held that since the requirement of an enquiry under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution is expressly excluded by the second proviso, there was no question of introducing the same by back door. The Court however pointed Out that two conditions must be satisfied to sustain any action thereunder - (i) there must exist a situation which renders holding of an enquiry not reasonably practicable, and (ii) that the disciplinary authority must record in writing reason in support of its satisfaction. The Court clarified though the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority is otherwise final, it is subject to power of judicial review. 9. I have referred to the relevant provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel rendered in the context of Articles 311(2) proviso (b) in order to point out the principle underlying dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a government servant without enquiry. Though the provisions are not applicable to employees not coming within the purview of Article 311 of the Constitution, the principles or the parameters for exercising the power thereunder can be applied in other cases too. As observed above, where the provisions of Article 311 are not attracted, the employer is supposed to act in accordance with rules of fairness and natural justice. 10. In the instant case, in the impugned order, after recording that the services of the petitioner are terminated it has been mentioned that he has created an environment of terror and the manner in which he has terrorised the witnesses of the criminal case and abused his superior officers, it does not appear practicable to hold any disciplinary enquiry. 10. In the instant case, in the impugned order, after recording that the services of the petitioner are terminated it has been mentioned that he has created an environment of terror and the manner in which he has terrorised the witnesses of the criminal case and abused his superior officers, it does not appear practicable to hold any disciplinary enquiry. It may be mentioned that the counter affidavit too refers to the incidents of 11.7.2000 and 12.8.2000 when the petitioner allegedly abused the Director and another incident (particulars whereof have not been disclosed) when the employees of the Academy who figure as witnesses in the criminal case were allegedly threatened by the petitioner. It has been stated that those persons made complaint to the Director and in the light of the complaint when the Director tried to take action, the petitioner abused him on 11.7.2000 and also threatened with dire consequences. The point for consideration is whether these allegations/ averments make out a situation in which the disciplinary proceeding could not be held. As noted above, while dwelling upon the scope of Article 311(2) proviso (b) in the case of Tulsiram Patel the Supreme Court held that the power thereunder can be exercised only when there exists a "situation" which renders holding of any enquiry not reasonably practicable. In the case of Chandigarh Administration V/s. Ajay Manchanda & Ors., (1996)3 SCC 753 , the Supreme Court observed that situation, in context, must be construed as situation obtaining at the relevant place and at the relevant time. In other words, circumstances should show that at the relevant place and at the relevant time it was not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry. In the instant case there does not appear to be any indication in the counter affidavit that the respondents wanted to hold any departmental enquiry at all. The question of dispensing with the enquiry can arise only when the (sic) practicable to hold. All that is suggested is that a criminal case is pending against the petitioner, charge wherein was framed only on 12.3.2001. At or about that time witnesses were threatened and terrorised. The witnesses are not witness of departmental enquiry witnesses of the criminal case. The question of dispensing with the enquiry can arise only when the (sic) practicable to hold. All that is suggested is that a criminal case is pending against the petitioner, charge wherein was framed only on 12.3.2001. At or about that time witnesses were threatened and terrorised. The witnesses are not witness of departmental enquiry witnesses of the criminal case. In the facts and circumstances, it appears to me that the so - called satisfaction of the authority that it was not practicable to hold disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner was a camouflage for dismissing the petitioner from service. In the case of Ajay Manchanda (supra) complaint was made to the SSP regarding extortion and continued harassment of an accused in custody by the Investigating Officer. The SSP directed the DSP to conduct enquiry. The DSP found the complaint to be true. The DSP reported that due to threats given by the delinquent SI the complainant and the witnesses were so terrorised that they were unable to pursue the matter in the court of law or enquiry or make formal statement before the DSP and therefore the departmental enquiry would not serve any purpose. 11. Recently in our State a certain transfer order with respect to an Enforcement Sub-Inspector posted in the Transport Department was sought to be cancelled by a member of Legislative Assembly who happened to be the brother of the States Chief Minister and brother-in-law of the President of the ruling Party - at his instance. The MLA barged into the office chamber of the Transport Commissioner (who had issued the transfer order) along with two body Guards armed with AK 47 rifles and 10-15 persons armed with fire arms when the Transport Commissioner was holding official meeting. Those present at the meeting were directed to leave by show of arms. The door of the chamber was thereafter closed and on the gun point the Transport Commissioner was forced to put his signature on a piece of paper purporting to be an order transferring the concerned Enforcement Sub-Inspector back to the place where he was earlier posted. The incident was later reported by the Transport Commissioner to the Chief Secretary as well as the Chief Minister but they did nothing in the matter. The incident was later reported by the Transport Commissioner to the Chief Secretary as well as the Chief Minister but they did nothing in the matter. While considering validity of the dismissal order passed later against the said Enforcement Sub-Inspector, without enquiry in terms of Article 311 proviso (b), in the case titled Sita Ram Paswan V/s. The State of Bihar & Ors., 2001(2) PLJR 717 , a Division Bench of this Court held that when the Sub-Inspector had protection of a powerful MLA who was brother of the Chief Minister and brother- in-law of the President of the ruling Party, it was not possible to expect that any action could be taken against him since the coplaint to the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister had failed to yield any response and in such a situation the competent authority was left with no option but to exercise the power under Article 311 (2) proviso (b), and thus upheld the dismissal accepting the States plea that in the facts and circumstances it was not reasonably practicable to hold departmental enquiry. 12. I have referred to above cases to indicate the situation in which enquiry can be dispensed with. The substance of the matter in my opinion is whether it is practicable to hold departmental enquiry or not. The situation at the time of enquiry must be such as to exclude the possibility of holding any enquiry. The fact that certain employees of the Academy who happened to be witnesses in another case were threatened does not appear to be sufficient to create a situation as to exclude the possibility of enquiry. The acts allegedly committed by the petitioner in threatening the witnesses or abusing the Director may constitute misconduct for which he could/can be separately proceeded against but would not justify dispensing with the enquiry for passing order of dismissal etc. In Chief Security Officer & Ors. V/s. Singasan Rabi Das, AIR 1991 SC 1043 , the ground of humiliation to witnesses was not held to be sufficient for dispensing with the departmental enquiry. As a matter of fact, as observed above, it does not appear that the respondents contemplated to hold any departmental enquiry at any point of time. The petitioner was under suspension since 1993 and the respondents were merely pursuing the criminal case. As a matter of fact, as observed above, it does not appear that the respondents contemplated to hold any departmental enquiry at any point of time. The petitioner was under suspension since 1993 and the respondents were merely pursuing the criminal case. The alleged satisfaction that it was not practicable or reasonably practicable to hold disciplinary enquiry seems to be a ploy to dismiss the petitioner from service. The impugned order of dismissal thus does not appear to be bona fide and cannot be sustained. 13. In the result, the impugned order dated 12.8.2000 dismissing the petitioner from service, as contained in Annexure 6 of the writ petition, is set aside but with a liberty to pass fresh order in accordance with law. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.