JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.—The defendant appellant has filed this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31.3.1980 passed by the IInd Additional District Judge, Basti, in Civil Appeal No. 166 of 1979, arising out of Original Suit No. 40 of 1973 in the Court of Civil Judge, Basti. 2. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law : “Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the two courts below were justified in granting a decree for demolition of the building inspite of a delay of five years in bringing the suit?” 3. This Court by order dated 23.5.1980, had stayed the decree for possession and demolition. This order was confirmed by order dated 18.5.1981. 4. The brief facts of the case are that a suit was brought by Mirza Iltiza Husain, father of the plaintiff respondents, against the defendant appellant for demolition of the constructions made by him and possession of the site thereof on the ground that the defendant appellant had made the constructions in 1968 illegally and without the consent of the plaintiffs and as such the building was liable to be demolished and possession restored to the plaintiffs. 5. The case of the defendant was that the ancestor of the defendant appellant had been granted a licence to make constructions over the land in dispute by the ancestors of the plaintiff-respondents and he had spent a huge amount of money on making the constructions which was in the knowledge of the plaintiffs. It was further pleaded that inspite of the knowledge, the plaintiff-respondents did not interfere with the same and as such the suit could not have been decreed without any equitable remedy after such a long lapse of time and that the suit was barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. 6. The courts below decreed the suit deciding an issue as to whether a suit for demolition can be decreed inspite of laches and a mandatory injunction issued for demolition even though the suit was admittedly brought five years after the constructions were made to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. 7. The courts below held that the suit was liable to be decreed since the limitation provided under the Limitation Act for possession of the property was 12 years. 8. 7. The courts below held that the suit was liable to be decreed since the limitation provided under the Limitation Act for possession of the property was 12 years. 8. It has been contended by the defendant-appellant that the plaintiff-respondents are owners and bhumidar of grove plot No. 1918/24. This land was given over and settled in favour of the father of the defendant-appellant ‘Jhinna’ by the original plaintiff Mirza Iltiza Husain as a consideration for services rendered by him, namely, that he had set up a cloth and cattle market for the benefit of the original plaintiff over the land in question. He was paid commission charges of Rs. 5 to Rs. 10 per market day. As a further consideration for the services thus rendered, Jhinna was permitted to construct a house over the land settled in his favour by the original plaintiff. The suit was brought in at the behest of the sons of Mirza Iltiza Husain the original plaintiff due to alleged dispute between the defendant and the plaintiffs over payment of commission in respect of the aforesaid market. It is contended that the defendant appellant had constructed the house in dispute from his own funds on the land settled in favour of his father by the original plaintiff and it is a part of the house constructed by his father. 9. The case of the plaintiff-respondents is that they were owners and bhumidhar of grove plot No. 1918/24 is not denied by the defendant-appellant. The plaintiff-respondents further contend that they were owners of the house as well as constructions standing thereon and that Jhinna was Chowkidar of Mirza Iltiaz Husain and had been allowed to reside in one of the houses standing on grove plot No. 1918/24 which was constructed by the original plaintiffs. The consolidation proceedings were undertaken in the year 1963 in the village in which the disputed property was situate. In 1968, the defendant-appellant began to make certain new constructions over the land which was objected by the plaintiffs at the time the land was being dug but the defendant, however, completed the constructions in November, 1968 inspite of the objections. The consolidation proceedings were undertaken in the year 1963 in the village in which the disputed property was situate. In 1968, the defendant-appellant began to make certain new constructions over the land which was objected by the plaintiffs at the time the land was being dug but the defendant, however, completed the constructions in November, 1968 inspite of the objections. Thereafter Suit No. 40 of 1973, Mirza Iltiza Husain v. Ram Narain, was brought asking equitable and discretionary relief of possession after demolition of unauthorised constructions in the year 1973, i.e., after five years from the date of knowledge and completion of the constructions. 10. On pleadings of the parties in Original Suit No. 40 of 1973, the trial court framed the following issues : “(1) When were the disputed constructions made? (2) Whether the disputed constructions were made by the defendant’s father and the defendant with the permission and consent of the plaintiff? If so, its effect? (3) Whether the suit is barred by estoppel? (4) Whether the suit is barred by time? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of demolition? (6) Whether the suit is barred by Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act? (7) Whether the suit is barred by Section 12 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act?” 11. The trial court decided issue Nos. 1 to 4 together holding that the plaintiffs have proved by oral, documentary and substantial evidence that the khaprail house in which the defendant resides was constructed by Mirza Iltiza Husain which was subsequently let out to the defendant. It was further held that the disputed constructions were raised in 1968 and suit was filed within five years of raising the constructions i.e., within the period of limitation of 12 years and as such the suit was not barred by time. 12. On issue No. 2, the trial court held that the defendant failed to discharge his burden and the plaintiffs have proved that the disputed constructions were made by the defendant without their consent and permission and as such are liable to be removed. 13. 12. On issue No. 2, the trial court held that the defendant failed to discharge his burden and the plaintiffs have proved that the disputed constructions were made by the defendant without their consent and permission and as such are liable to be removed. 13. Issue No. 3, was decided against the defendant and it was held that the owner can bring a suit for possession and demolition within 12 years and in the instant case the plaintiffs had proved that they had checked the defendant from raising further constructions, as such the suit was not barred by estoppel. 14. While deciding issue No. 5, the trial court held that the defendant could not show any law that the constructions raised by a trespasser cannot be ordered to be demolished at the instance of the true owners. It observed that if this state of affairs is allowed to exist, every mighty person will trespass on the land of a weak person and will take the shelter of the argument that constructions made by him cannot be demolished. 15. Issue Nos. 6 and 7 were also decided against the defendant. The trial court recorded a finding that the land underneath the disputed constructions did not settle with the defendant under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act but settled with the plaintiffs, who were owners and occupiers of plot No. 1918/24. The trial court also held that the suit was not barred by Section 123 of the aforesaid Act. 16. The trial court by judgment and decree dated 20.4.1979, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for demolition and possession and the defendant was directed to remove his constructions within 60 days. 17. The defendant-appellant filed a civil appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20.4.1979 passed by the Civil Judge, Basti being Civil Appeal No. 166 of 1979, Ram Narain v. Mirza Mohammad Hasnain and another, before the Court of the District Judge, Basti. The lower appellate court concurred with the findings of the trial court and held that the findings of the learned Civil Judge to the effect that the plaintiffs are owners of the khaprail house is correct and is supported by documentary and oral evidence on record as well as circumstances of the case. The lower appellate court concurred with the findings of the trial court and held that the findings of the learned Civil Judge to the effect that the plaintiffs are owners of the khaprail house is correct and is supported by documentary and oral evidence on record as well as circumstances of the case. It was further held that since the defendant-appellant was not owner of the khaprail house, as such cannot be owner of the sehan land also and had no right or title to raise constructions over the sehan land which was part and parcel of the grove land of the plaintiffs and as such had made unauthorised constructions illegally. In these circumstances, it held that plaintiffs were perfectly justified in filing the suit for demolition and possession of the land in suit. Since the original plaintiff Mirza Iltiza Husain had gone on the spot and asked the defendant not to raise the constructions, the defendant had constructed the house without any right, title and interest in the land, it will be taken that the defendant had done so at his own risk. The findings of the trial court were confirmed by the lower appellate court. 18. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of both the courts below, the defendant-appellant has filed the present second appeal. 19. The legal submissions made by the defendant-appellant are as to whether equitable and discretionary relief can be granted in favour of the plaintiffs when they by their own conduct acquiesced to the act of the defendant in making the constructions without their consent and whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the discretionary and equitable relief in such a delayed suit. Relying upon Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the judgment of the Apex Court in Krothapalli Satya Narayana v. Koganti Ramiah and others, (1994) 2 SCC 439, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the plaintiff-respondents were not entitled to equitable and discretionary relief. He has further relied upon the case of Chheddu Singh v. Kewal, AIR 1963 All 122 , wherein this Court refused to grant the relief of mandatory injunction on the ground that the plaintiff in that case failed to act within three years from the date on which the cause of action arose. He has further relied upon the case of Chheddu Singh v. Kewal, AIR 1963 All 122 , wherein this Court refused to grant the relief of mandatory injunction on the ground that the plaintiff in that case failed to act within three years from the date on which the cause of action arose. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it has been argued that the courts below have not applied their mind in the present case to the question whether the delay of five years in bringing the suit could itself disentitle the plaintiffs to equitable and discretionary relief claimed in the suit. It is submitted that while deciding issue No. 5, the trial court has not considered the question and the delay in bringing the suit but has decreed the suit for two reasons only i.e., (i) the plaintiffs are owners of the land in dispute and (ii) the constructions were made without their consent. 20. The facts of the present second appeal are different from the facts in the cases of Krothapalli Satyanarayana and Chheddu Singh (supra). The facts of these cases are not applicable in the present case since the facts and circumstances involved in the present case are neither identical nor similar and both the aforesaid cases are distinguishable on facts and law. 21. In the present case, the plaintiff-respondents had objected to the constructions being raised by the defendant-appellant in the very beginning even when foundation for raising new constructions by the defendant-appellant was being dug. The courts below have held that the suit has been brought within the period of limitation and this finding cannot be faulted with. 22. The question of acquiescence is a question of fact to be determined on the basis of factual aspect of the case. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact and law that the suit in question is neither barred by limitation nor principles of estoppel and the plaintiff-respondents have rightly relied upon the cases of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , Dudh Nath Pandey (dead by L.Rs.) v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasil (dead by L.Rs.), AIR 1986 SC 1509 and Kondibad Kadam v. Savitri Bai and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 . 23. 23. In view of the above, the concurrent findings given by the courts below as to the right, title and ownership of the plaintiff-respondents as well as maintainability of the suit and the unauthorised constructions raised by the defendant-appellant on the plot in dispute, cannot be disturbed. Since the plaintiff-respondents had objected to the constructions in dispute which were being raised in illegal and unauthorised manner by the defendant-appellant, it cannot be said that the plaintiff-respondents had acquiesced to the constructions. The appellant had neither any right nor title on the land in dispute, as such the suit in question having been filed within five years from the said raising of the constructions, cannot be said to be beyond limitation. In fact, it is within 12 years of the limitation prescribed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 24. The substantial question of law involved in the present appeal is decided accordingly. 25. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No orders as to costs.