T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners, who are A-1 to A-7 in the crime that has been registered against them in Cr. No. 6/acb-CR/2000 dated 18-3-2000 by the Anti-Corruption Bureau under section 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2) of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ( the Act for brevity), seek to quash the said proceedings initiated against them. ( 2 ) THE first petitioner is the father, the petitioners 2 to 4 are his sons and the petitioners 5 to 7 are his daughters. The first petitioner is a public servant working as the assistant Social Welfare Officer in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioners 2 to 7 are admittedly not public servants. ( 3 ) THE factual matrix germane in the context for effective adjudication of the matter may be set forth in the first instance thus: the petitioner entered into the service in the Department of Social Welfare in the year 1972 as Grade-I Warden and since then has been serving in the Department and receiving his due promotions one after another. The mother of the petitioner was then doing wholesale business in vegetables and also in liquor. The family of the first petitioner was a Hindu joint family having considerable fixed assets. His mother carried the liquor business till 1987 and then carried the wholesale vegetable business till 1990 when she passed away. After her demise, the joint family business was carried on by the wife of the first petitioner till her demise. Thereafter, it was taken up by the sons of the first petitioner. Thus, the family acquired considerable immovable assets in the said business. In the year 1997 when the government introduced a scheme, what is known as Voluntary Disclosure of Income scheme ( vdis scheme for brevity), the petitioners 2 to 7 have declared their assets and since then they have become regular income tax assessees. The properties thus held and the income thus declared by them under the VDIS Scheme are the personal properties of the petitioners 2 to 4. The properties thus held and the income thus declared by them under the VDIS Scheme are the personal properties of the petitioners 2 to 4. ( 4 ) WHILE things stood thus, on 7-3-2000 the Income Tax authorities raided the house of the first petitioner and having found no infraction of any of the provisions of the income Tax Act and consequently no action could be taken against them under the said act, instead of returning the documents and other material illegally seized by them exercising the powers under Section 132 of the said Act, they prevailed over the Anti-Corruption bureau of the State in having registered a crime against the petitioners on 18-03-2000 in Cr. No. 6/acb-CR/2000 under Sections 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2) of the Act and under Section 109 of the Indian penal Code ( the IPC for brevity ). Thereafter a raid was conducted by the Deputy superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption bureau in the house of the first petitioner. ( 5 ) THE petitioners challenged the action on the part of the Anti-Corruption Bureau by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India separately. Thereafter, they filed the present application invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( cr. P. C. for brevity ). ( 6 ) SRI S. Ramachandra Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, contends that it is nothing but a sheer abuse of the process of the Court in having registered a crime against the petitioners by the Anti-Corruption Bureau authorities when no infraction whatsoever was found by the authorities under the Income Tax Act when raided the house of the petitioners. The learned senior Counsel would contend that the crime registered against the petitioners 2 to 7 cannot be maintained inasmuch as they are not the public servants and the crime under Section 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2) of the act would be registered only against the public Servants. The learned senior Counsel further contends that Section 109 of the IPC has no application in this case inasmuch as the offences envisaged under that Section shall be one of the offences enumerated under section 40 of the IPC but certainly not the offences envisaged under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act. The learned senior Counsel further contends that Section 109 of the IPC has no application in this case inasmuch as the offences envisaged under that Section shall be one of the offences enumerated under section 40 of the IPC but certainly not the offences envisaged under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act. Finally, he would content that the act being a penal statute should be construed strictly. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, the learned additional Advocate General contends that all these contentions have been raised in the writ petitions filed by the petitioners and a division Bench of this Court having answered the same while disposing of those writ petitions, nothing remains for the petitioners to agitate in this Criminal Petition. The learned Additional Advocate General further contends that the case of the petitioners is squarely covered a judgment of the Apex court and, therefore, all the contentions raised in this petition are not germane for consideration. ( 8 ) AVOWEDLY, the petitioners 2 to 7 are not public servants. Under the various returns submitted by them under VDIS scheme, their assets had been assessed and the Income Tax was leveled thereon. A crime has been registered against the first petitioner under section 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2) of the act for the alleged prossessing of disproportionate assets far exceeding the known sources of income. The petitioners 2 to 7 have now been sought to be roped in by invoking Section 109 of the IPC along with the first petitioner. In this backdrop, the contentions of the petitioners; that the very basis of the registration of crime against the petitioners by the Anti-Corruption Bureau on the material illegally passed on by the income Tax Department, having failed in their attempt by raiding the house of the first petitioner is illegal; cannot at this stage be adverted to and is to be left to be considered only at a later stage since it is a contentious issue and is got to be decided at a later stage after adduction of evidence on either side. The other contentions of course are germane for consideration. The other contentions of course are germane for consideration. Although majority of the contentions have been raised before a division Bench of this Court in the two writ petitions filed by them, yet, the other contention as to whether the petitioners 2 to 7 can be proceeded against invoking section 109 of the IPC, can independently be considered, having not been adverted to by the Division Bench in the writ petitions. In this regard, the contention of the learned senior Counsel is two-fold. The offence enumerated in the Act having not been the offences envisaged under Section 40 of the ipc, Section 109 cannot be invoked; and the petitioners 2 to 7 being the non-public servants cannot be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2) of the Act. ( 9 ) APROPOS the first contention, a perusal of Section 40 of the IPC shows that the word offence except as mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of the said Section denotes a thing made punishable under various Sections of the IPC. However, in clause (2) of the said section while enumerating various offences under the IPC, it is also made clear that the word offence denotes a thing punishable under IPC or any special or local law as defined under the Code. In view of clauses (2) and (3) of Section 40 which leaves no room for any doubt, the contention that the offence envisaged under Section 109 of the IPC must be the offence contemplated under Section 40 of the IPC and the other offences enumerated under the IPC but not the offences under the Prevention of corruption Act, 1988, merits no consideration. ( 10 ) AS regards the other important contention, it requires the scheme of the Act to be considered in the first instance before making an attempt to advert to the contention of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. The Prevention of Corruption act, 1988, which repealed the Prevention of corruption Act, 1947 aimed at consolidating the law for prevention of corruption and bribery in the public life. In the process, the cognate offences enumerated till then under the IPC have been repealed. The Prevention of Corruption act, 1988, which repealed the Prevention of corruption Act, 1947 aimed at consolidating the law for prevention of corruption and bribery in the public life. In the process, the cognate offences enumerated till then under the IPC have been repealed. Not only that, the provisions which envisage the attachment of properties of a public servant under the criminal Law amendment Ordinance, 1944 have also been sought to be added by giving an explicit power to the Special Judge under the Act to exercise the power of a District judge as envisaged under the provisions of the said Ordinance. The Act clearly contemplates not only the trial of the offences punishable under the Actnay any conspiracy to commit such offences, attempt to commit such offence and abetment thereof. The Act envisages clearly taking illegal gratification, other than legal remuneration as an offence by a public servant. It further envisages taking a valuable thing by a public servant either without any consideration or for inadequate consideration as an offence. The Act further envisages the criminal misconduct on the part of the public servant as an offence. Although the expression criminal misconduct has not been defined, instances have been given inter alia in the section, which can be considered as criminal misconduct . These three are the specific offences envisaged by the Act vis-a-vis the public servant. Section 2 of the Act sought to enumerate the categories of public servants though the expression public servant as such has not been sought to be defined under the Act. Under Section 8 thereof, if a private person takes gratification in order to corrupt or influence the public servant by illegal means is an offence. Under Section 9, if the private person takes gratification for exercising his personal influence with the public servant, it is made punishable. Therefore, if the public servant resorts to any of the offences enumerated in Sections 7,11 and 13 of the Act he is liable for punishment and if the private person resorts to any of the offences enumerated in Sections 8 and 9, he too is liable for punishment. These are the offences enumerated under the Act so as to curb the evil of bribery and corruption in public life. These are the offences enumerated under the Act so as to curb the evil of bribery and corruption in public life. ( 11 ) UNDER Section 10 of the Act, abetment of any offence perpetrated by a private person punishable under Sections 8 and 9 by a public servant is made liable. Under Section 12 of the Act, if any private person abets a public servant who commits the offence enumerated either under Section 7 or 11 is also liable. This abetment is clearly made liable under sections 10 and 12 of the Act either by the private person or by the public servant. Attempt to commit the offence is also made punishable under Section 13 of the Act. It may be mentioned here that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a self-contained code. As a matter of that, the Prevention of corruption Act, 1947 was held to be so by the apex Court in para 9 of its Judgment in State of M. P. v. M. V. Narasimhan. The Act, 1988 being a consolidated enactment and fortiori can undoubtedly be considered as a self-contained code. When the Act contemplated various categories of offences, the attempt to commit such offences and abetment thereof and when the Act is a self-contained code, naturally one is expected to consider the provisions thereof either for the alleged offence or attempt to commit such offence or abetment thereof without any need or necessity to fail back on any of the provisions contained either in the IPC or elsewhere. Having considered the scheme of the Act, thus, in my considered view, there is no need even to fall back on any of the provisions mentioned elsewhere. Conspicuously, having regard to the scheme as discussed by me supra, the Act while making criminal misconduct as an offence has not envisaged by any specific provision to treat the abetment thereof as an offence. Not only that, such an omission cannot merely be reckoned as an omission having regard to the fact that the act has clearly contemplated abetment as an offence under Sections 10 and 12 thereof. In this context, the contention of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that Section 109 of the IPC cannot be invoked as against a non-public servant gains significance. In this context, the contention of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that Section 109 of the IPC cannot be invoked as against a non-public servant gains significance. ( 12 ) THE learned Additional Advocate general besides relying upon the Judgment of the Apex Court which is germane in the context for consideration in P. Nallammal v. State, seeks to contend by interpreting the statute when there is an omission in the act, one has to necessarily fall back on section 109 of the IPC being a general provision defined under the IPC. It is, therefore, in the view of the learned additional Advocate General, a matter of interpretation for the Courts. ( 13 ) IN view of the rival contentions on either side, it remains to be seen whether such a construction be given to a statute more particularly when it is penal statute. ( 14 ) BEFORE proceeding on that aspect, it is expedient here to consider the other contention of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has not clearly envisaged the private persons but only the public servants. To drive home the said point, the learned senior Counsel seeks to place reliance upon firstly the Judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan (referred to supra 1 ). That was a case under the old Act, 1947. Under the old Act, the categories of public servants have not been enumerated and instead it was said that the public servant as enumerated in Section 21 of the IPC for the purposeof that Act be considered or reckoned as public servants. By then, only 11 categories of public servants were enumerated under section 21 of the IPC. The respondent therein who was private person was sought to be prosecuted under clause (12) of Section 21 of the IPC added by means of an amendment in the year 1964 pursuant to the recommendations made by Santhanam committee. De hors that clause, the respondent was only a private servant being an employee of a Corporation. The respondent therein who was private person was sought to be prosecuted under clause (12) of Section 21 of the IPC added by means of an amendment in the year 1964 pursuant to the recommendations made by Santhanam committee. De hors that clause, the respondent was only a private servant being an employee of a Corporation. In that context, it was sought to be contended before the apex Court that the amended clause (12) could not be invoked in the case of the respondent and the definition of public servant as envisaged originally under Section 21 of the IPC should only be considered for the purpose of the Prevention of Corruption act as i. t amounted to legislation by incorporation. While answering that point, the Apex Court held ultimately that the respondent could also be considered as public servant under the extended definition. In the process, it was observed that under the prevention of Corruption Act, public servants alone fall within the mischief of the Act. The private persons who can be prosecuted for abetment under Section 165-A of the IPC have not come up for consideration. It was not the issue before the Supreme Court that whether the private persons could also be prosecuted either for the offences enumerated under the Act or attempt to commit such offences or abetment thereof. For the said reasons, the said decision of the apex Court is of no avail to the petitioners so as to buttress the contention that private persons cannot be prosecuted under the prevention of Corruption Act. Second in the series on which reliance is sought to be placed by the learned senior Counsel is the Judgment of the Apex Court in M. Krishna Reddy v. Dy. Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad. That was again a case of possession disproportionate assets. Second in the series on which reliance is sought to be placed by the learned senior Counsel is the Judgment of the Apex Court in M. Krishna Reddy v. Dy. Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad. That was again a case of possession disproportionate assets. In para 7 of the judgment while culling out the essential ingredients that constitute the offence punishable under Section 5 (1) (e) of the old act, which is now akin to Section 13 (1) (e) of the new Act, the Apex Court held that the prosecution in the first instance must establish that the accused is a public servant and secondly the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or properties which were found in his possession, thirdly that it must be proved as to what were the known sources of income and lastly it must be proved quite objectively that such sources or property found in possession of the accused are disproportionate to his known sources of income. This Judgment of the Apex Court will not hold in supporting the contention that under the Act only public servants should be prosecuted and none else. Certainly, if a person is sought to be prosecuted for possessing disproportionate assets he must invariably be a public servant and not a private person because Sec. 13 (1) (e) of the Act speaks only a public servant. In that view of the matter, this Judgment will not help in supporting the case of the petitioners herein for the contention that the private persons cannot be brought under the prevention of Corruption Act. It may be mentioned here that the petitioners 2 to 7 are not being prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 13 (1) (e) read with 13 (2) of the Act, but as abettors under section 109 of the IPC. ( 15 ) TURNING to the interpretation part of it, as discussed supra, the Prevention of corruption Act, 1988 is the penal statute undoubtedly. It needs no authority to cite that a penal statute has to be construed strictly. Of course, the learned senior Counsel seeks to place reliance upon some of the judgments of the Federal Court in this regard and, in my considered view, there is no need to dilate my Judgment by referring to those judgments in this case since there can be no room for any doubt for such an interpretation. Of course, the learned senior Counsel seeks to place reliance upon some of the judgments of the Federal Court in this regard and, in my considered view, there is no need to dilate my Judgment by referring to those judgments in this case since there can be no room for any doubt for such an interpretation. One passage need be excerpted as given in n. S. Bindra s. Interpretation of Statutes Book, eighth Edition at page 722 as mentioned hereunder thus:"it is a settled rule of construction of penal statutes that the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It was not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature. " ( 16 ) AGAIN at page 723, under the heading omission how dealt with , it has been mentioned as excerpted hereunder thus:"the general principle of strict construction is well exemplified by comparing the manner in which an omission which it was inferable from the text, was result of accident has been generally dealt with in penal and in remedial Acts. In re Wainewright [ (1843) 12 LJ Ch 426], Lord Lyndhurst, L. C. observed: "it is not the Court s province to supply an omission in an Act, and if any such correction would extend the penal scope of an Act, still less will the court be inclined to correct. " In re puvantur Athamu [ air 1925 Mad. 239 ] was a case where the main question for decision was, whether an offence under section 126, Indian Railways Act or section 7 (c), Martial Law Regulations, was an offence as that word is used in section 149, Indian Penal Code. The public Prosecutor urged that as the words unlawful assembly in Section 141, indian Penal Code, would cover an assembly whose object was to commit an offence under Section 126, Indian railways Act (vide Section 40, I. P. C.), the same phrase in Section 149 must import that offence into Section 149 also. Wallace and Madhavan Nair, JJ, observed: "but we consider that a criminal statute has to be rigidly interpreted and that Section 40 in terms clearly implies that in Section 149 the word offence only covers offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Wallace and Madhavan Nair, JJ, observed: "but we consider that a criminal statute has to be rigidly interpreted and that Section 40 in terms clearly implies that in Section 149 the word offence only covers offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code. With the reasons for such a provision we are not concerned. " In construing a statute the Court will not supply even an obvious omission if to do so would render an accused person liable to conviction [in re S. S. Vasan, AIR 1945 Mad. 441 ]. " ( 17 ) THE well established cannon of interpretation, "casus omissus" cannot be invoked in respect of a penal statute so as to create an offence. An omission howsoever obvious it might be, cannot be sought to be supplied by the process of interpretation so as to create an offence. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in M. Narayana v. State of kerala quoted with approval the decision of the Judicial Committee in DYKE v. Ellioti, which may profitably be excerpted hereunder thus:"no doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument". ( 18 ) HAVING regard to the above discussion, now when the Prevention of Corruption act has conspicuously not envisaged the abetment of criminal misconduct more particularly the one enumerated in section 13 (1) (e) of the Act as an offence seeking to fall back upon the general provisions of the IPC under Section 107 punishable under Section 109 thereof seems to be not permissible. This, interpretation supports the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners. Nonetheless, perhaps, all this is not germane for consideration in view of the latest pronouncement of the Apex Court in p. Nallammal v. State (referred supra 2 ). The apex Court in para 17 of its Judgment held that the legislative intent is manifest that the abettors of different offences under section 13 (1) (e) of the Act should also be dealt with along with the public servant in the same trial held by the Special Judge having regard to the explanation appended to Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act. In para 24 of its judgment, while adverting to the contentions of the learned Counsel who seeks to exemplify by means of illustrations which can be clearly brought under the expression abetment and finally held in para 25 that such illustrations are apt examples of how the offence under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act can be abetted by non-public servants and the only mode of prosecuting such offender is through the trial envisaged in the prevention of Corruption Act. Thus, it has been upheld ultimately that a non-public servant or a private person can be prosecuted for the offence of abetment of the offence punishable under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act perpetrated by a public servant. For the first time, such an interpretation was given by the apex Court in the annals of the law for preventing the corruption and bribery in the public life. The Judgment in P. Nallammal s case (2 supra) has been followed with approval in a latter Judgment by the Apex court in State of U. P. v. Udai Narayan and another. The law declared by the Apex Court in the above two Judgments shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India as per Article 141 of the Constitution. The law declared by the Apex Court in the above two Judgments shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India as per Article 141 of the Constitution. Following the above binding precedents, I cannot but hold that the petitioners 2 to 7 can be prosecuted as abettors for the offence alleged to have been committed by the first petitioner under Section 13 (1) (e) read with Sec. 13 (2) of the Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in that view of the matter merits no consideration. ( 19 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the criminal Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.