K. K. Sood, Assistant Manager (Quality Control) v. Food Corporation of India
2002-11-18
M.M.KUMAR
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - Challenge in this petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the Code) is to order dated 28.9.2001 passed by Additional District Judge, Sangrur in which the appeal of the defendant-respondents impugning the order dated 15.2.2001 was accepted. The Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sangrur in his order dated 15.2.2001 has issued interim directions restraining the defendant-respondents from implementing the order dated 30.9.1996/1.10.1996 till the disposal of the suit. A further direction was issued to defendant-respondents for releasing the salary of the plaintiff-petitioner as Assistant Manager (Quality Control) forthwith. 2. Brief facts of the case which have led to the filing of the present petition and necessary for deciding the controversy raised are that the plaintiff-petitioner has filed Civil Suit No. 253 on 12.10.1996 seeking a declaration to the effect that order No. VIG.4(540)/95-NZ/PB/9347, dated 30.9.1996/1.10.1996 passed by defendant-respondents is illegal, void and is thus liable to be set-aside. Another prayer made in the suit is for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from implementing the aforementioned order against the plaintiff-petitioner. It is appropriate to mention that vide order dated 30.9.1996/1.10.1996, the defendant-respondents while exercising power under Regulation 56 of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, have imposed a penalty on the plaintiff-petitioner and had reduced him to the lower post of Technical Assistant Grade-1 for a period of two years and his pay was directed to be fixed at the stage that he would have drawn had he not been promoted. He was to be considered for promotion after expiry of penalty period according to his suitability. Along with the suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code seeking interim direction restraining the defendant-respondents from giving effect to the aforementioned order of penalty was made. The civil Judge vide his order dated 15.2.2001 allowed the application and issued interim directions by recording the finding that the plaintiff-petitioner was still working as Assistant Manager (Quality Control) in the Corporation and was discharging his official duties. It was further recorded that the defendant-respondent have not pleaded that the plaintiff-petitioner has absented or has absconded.. The Civil Judge further concluded that a prima facie case existed in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner and non-payment of the salary would cause him extreme inconvenience and irreparable loss.
It was further recorded that the defendant-respondent have not pleaded that the plaintiff-petitioner has absented or has absconded.. The Civil Judge further concluded that a prima facie case existed in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner and non-payment of the salary would cause him extreme inconvenience and irreparable loss. Therefore, directions were issued to defendant-respondents to release his salary as Assistant Manager (Quality Control). It was further observed that in case the plaintiff-petitioner failed in the suit then the difference of pay of the post of Assistant Manager (Quality Control) and that of Technical Assistant Grade-I would be refunded by the plaintiff-petitioner. 3. On appeal the Additional District Judge set-aside the order of the Civil Judge by holding that no finding has been recorded by the Civil Judge and the impugned order dated 30.9.1996/1.10.1996 was prima facie illegal or void. The order passed by the Additional District Judge reads as under :- "While passing the impugned order, the learned trial Court has rightly observed that it would be a matter of evidence whether the impugned order has been implemented or not and that impugned order is still under judicial scrutiny. So it will be seen after taking evidence of both the parties, if the impugned order suffers from any illegality. The learned trial court while passing the impugned order has not held the impugned order to be prima facie illegal or void. When the learned trial Court has not found the impugned order to be prima facie illegal or void, it was not justified in restraining the defendants from implementing it. Vide impugned order, the plaintiff was reverted from the post of A.M. (Q.C.) to T.A. (Grade 1). In case, the implementation of the impugned order is stayed and the plaintiff is allowed to work as Assistant Manager (Quality Control) and ultimately, it is found that impugned order was rightly passed, it would amount to allowing plaintiff to work in the post, to which he was not entitled. On the other hand, the plaintiff is not going to suffer any irreparable loss if the impugned order is allowed to be implemented. In case, finally the impugned order is set-aside, the plaintiff would be entitled to all consequential benefits including arrears of difference of pay.
On the other hand, the plaintiff is not going to suffer any irreparable loss if the impugned order is allowed to be implemented. In case, finally the impugned order is set-aside, the plaintiff would be entitled to all consequential benefits including arrears of difference of pay. In service matter, the order of punishment is only stayed if the same is mala fide and penalty is illegal and void but the learned trial court while allowing application for ad-interim injunction of the plaintiff has not come to the conclusion if the impugned order is patently illegal or void. In the circumstances stated above the discretion exercised by the learned trial court in allowing the application for ad interim injunction and restraining the defendants from implementing the impugned order of punishment is not proper and in accordance with the well recognised principles. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is accepted and the impugned order is set-aside and application for ad interim injunction of the plaintiffs, stands dismissed. However, it is made clear that no observation made in this order shall have any bearing on the merits of the main case." 4. Mr. G.S. Bal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner has argued that the salary of the petitioner since 1.10.1996 has not been paid even for the post of Technical Assistant Grade-1. According to the learned counsel even if the impugned order is accepted as it existed then the period of penalty has come to an end with effect from 1.10.1998 and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be considered for promotion as Assistant Manager (Quality Control) because large scale promotions from Technical Assistants Grade-1 to Assistant Manager (Quality Control), have been made during June/July, 2000. The learned counsel has further argued that the plaintiff-petitioner has always been conceded to be working on the post of Assistant Manager (Quality Control) and on that basis the Civil Judge has concluded that the plaintiff-petitioner was entitled to the salary as Assistant Manager (Quality Control). 5. Mr. Ashwani Prashar, learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has pointed out that the petitioner has been continuously absent from duty after 1996 and on 26.9.1996, he has been placed under suspension. The learned counsel has further pointed out that on transfer of the plaintiff-petitioner from Moga to Nihalsinghwala on 18.12.1996 he never joined his duty.
5. Mr. Ashwani Prashar, learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has pointed out that the petitioner has been continuously absent from duty after 1996 and on 26.9.1996, he has been placed under suspension. The learned counsel has further pointed out that on transfer of the plaintiff-petitioner from Moga to Nihalsinghwala on 18.12.1996 he never joined his duty. A copy of the transfer order dated 18.12.1996 mark A.1 and a communication sent by Assistant Manager Nihalsinghwala dated 13.2.1997 mark A.2 have also been placed on record. According to the learned counsel, the reason of his absence is that he never wanted to join as Technical Assistant Grade-1. When the plaintiff-petitioner insisted on signing of the official documents in his capacity and status as Assistant Manager (Quality Control), then he was asked by the Assistant Manager to sign all the papers in his capacity a Technical Assistant Grade-1. Therefore, the learned counsel has submitted that neither any salary could be paid to the plaintiff-petitioner either as Technical Assistant Grade-1 or as Assistant Manager (Quality Control). The learned counsel then argued that the order passed by the Addl. District Judge does not suffer from any legal infirmity because no irreparable loss is likely to accrue to the plaintiff-petitioner on account of penalty of reduction in rank for two years and in case he succeeds in the suit then the difference of salary would be paid. 6. The short question which was to be considered in the present petition is whether the plaintiff-petitioner is entitled to get salary on the post of Assistant Manager (Quality Control) or Technical Assistant Grade-1 for a period of two years and that too if he has worked on the post. The documents which are referred by the learned counsel that the plaintiff-petitioner for the purposes of proving that he had continued to work as Assistant Manager (Quality Control) cannot constitute basis for this court to conclude that he has been holding the post of Assistant Manager (Quality Control). In none of the communications it is intimated that the order dated 30.9.1996/1.10.1996 has ever been withdrawn or set-aside. It is also true as held by the Addl. District Judge that nothing has been pointed out with regard to the illegality of the impugned order.
In none of the communications it is intimated that the order dated 30.9.1996/1.10.1996 has ever been withdrawn or set-aside. It is also true as held by the Addl. District Judge that nothing has been pointed out with regard to the illegality of the impugned order. The question of absence of the plaintiff-petitioner, his consequential suspension and whether he was holding the post or not, cannot be determined in the present proceedings because his absence and consequential suspension would certainly give rise to a new cause of action and is not covered by the dispute raised in the suit. However, the related question of absence from duty after 1996 may be the subject matter of proceedings in the civil suit from which the present revision petition has arisen. I am further of the view that the Addl. District Judge has taken the correct view by observing that the plaintiff-petitioner would be given difference of salary if his suit was decreed. The order has also not been found to be prima facie illegal. Therefore, I do not find any valid ground to invalidate the order passed by the Addl. District Judge and for that reason, I am not inclined to exercise my revisional jurisdiction. For the aforementioned reasons, the revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. Revision dismissed.