Judgment Rajesh Balia, J.-This special appeal raises a question about the validity of option given by the predecessor of appellants in surrendering the surplus land of his holdings as determined in ceiling proceedings. 2. The ceiling proceedings were initiated in the case of Ugam Singh, whose sons are the present appellants, under Chapter Ill-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Ugam Singh, an exJagirdar, had certain lands in villages Chohtan, Kaparau, Itada and laisar in Distt. Barmer. Said Ugam Singh had claimed certain lands to be not his holdings on the basis of transfers made by him. These proceedings relate to one of such lands which according to him did not belong to him and was held by the respondents. The lands in respect of which the transactions for transfer claimed by said Ugam Singh, were all transfers made in favour of (1) Jaswanta Ram by way of a registered sale deed. This transfer related to 8 bighas 19 biswas of land of Khasra No. 550/3 and 12 bighas 10 biswas of Khasra No. 551/3 at village Chohtan. (ii) Another land which was claimed by Ugam Singh, not to be his own but transferred by him under a written document, was to Multanmal sb. Parasram of Choutan. This related to 271 bighas of land of Khasra No. 675 situated in village Hada, which is the subject matter of this appeal, (iii) Lastly, the third transfer alleged to be made by Ugam Singh was of 322 bighas of land in Khasra No. 110/5 in village Jaisar by way of a gift deed in favour of Peerchand s/o Bheekchand. 3. In the first instance, by order dated 18.11-71 the Competent Officer under Chapter Ill-B, viz., the Assistant Collector(Ceiling), Banner, accepted the claim of the declarant by holding that the three lands, referred to above, were not includible in the holding of Ugam Singh and excluding the aforesaid lands determined the holding of Ugam Singh. It was found that Ugam Singh had two members in his family and according to Rule 16 he could hold 30 standard acres of land. Therefore, he did not have any surplus land in his hand which could be acquired in the ceiling proceedings. The proceedings were accordingly dropped. 4. While determining the ceiling case of Ugam Singh on 18. It was found that Ugam Singh had two members in his family and according to Rule 16 he could hold 30 standard acres of land. Therefore, he did not have any surplus land in his hand which could be acquired in the ceiling proceedings. The proceedings were accordingly dropped. 4. While determining the ceiling case of Ugam Singh on 18. 11 .71, it was noticed by the Competent Authority that all transfers were prior to 312.69, and therefore, recognisable. 5. We may notice here that under Chapter Ill-B, as it stood originally under Section 30D, all transfers of whatever nature except by way of partition amongst co-sharers, after 25th Feb., 1958 were not recognisable. However, subsequently through amendment of Chapter 111-B vide Amending Act No. 1 certain transfers made upto 312.69 were recognised by inserting Section 30DD. 6. However, ceiling proceedings were reopened under Section 15(2) of the Rajas-than Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter called, ‘Act of 1973’) and a fresh order was made determining the holdings as on 4.66 by Ugam Singh on 12.81. Additional Collector, Barmer, the Competent Authority, did not recognise any of the three transactions referred to above for different reasons. The transaction in respect of lands comprised in Khasra No. 675 at village Itada was not recognised for the reason that it was not evidenced by a registered deed but was only under a written deed which did not pass any title in the land to Multanmal or his successors and interests. 7. In the proceedings, Ugam Singh while claiming the land in question not under his holdings, treating to be a completed sale had also given his option for surrendering the surplus land in case he is found to be in possession of more land than permitted under the ceiling laws. He exercised option for surrendering the land situated in village Itada comprised in Khasra No. 675, which he had transferred under a written but unregistered deed to Multanmal. Multanmal has transferred the said land by registered sale deeds in favour of petitioners- respondents in 1978. This transfer has come after determination of ceiling case in first instance vide order dated 111.71 8. According to this order, Ugam Singh had 28.647 standard acres of surplus land. A conditional order for resumption of the land offered by petitioner for -surrender was given. This transfer has come after determination of ceiling case in first instance vide order dated 111.71 8. According to this order, Ugam Singh had 28.647 standard acres of surplus land. A conditional order for resumption of the land offered by petitioner for -surrender was given. The land situated in village Jaisar was subject matter of some pending litigation, accordingly, it was ordered that the determination of surplus land and acquisition of surplus land is subject to adjustments as per decision of the Court in respect of the land situated in Jaisar and if the land is held to be Gochar land, the total holdings of the petitioner be reduced by that measure and so also the surplus land shall also stand reduced to that extent. In pursuance of this, option was given by the predecessor of appellants in the course of his ceiling case under Chapter Ill-B read with Section 15(2) of the Act of 1973. The said land was sought to be acquired by the State which by that time had come in possession of the respondents No, 4 to 7 under registered sale deed as purchasers from said Multanmal, the transferee from Ugam Singh. 9. Faced with theloss of that land, which was in possession of successor in interest of Multanmal, namely Mala & Bhola sons of Prahlad and Shinya & Natha sons of Lala Ram filed an application before the Addl. Collector that the land in question is encumbered inasmuch as the land in question was transferred under a written deed by Ugam Singh in favour of Multanmal, who was put in possession under said transfer. The applicants are claiming through said Multanmal, as purchasers of land under registered deed. The applicants have a right to remain in possession against the transferor, therefore the said Ugam Singh can not give a valid option to surrender their lands unless the first surrenders unencumbered lands in his possession. In the first instance holder’s unencumbered land be resumed, and thereafter only excess surplus land, if any, required to be resumed then for that encumbered land can be persued. 10. This application was allowed by Addl. Collector on 26th March, 1983 by holding that the land in question is encumbered land and the option given by Ugam Singh not valid in law. He, therefore, directed to acquire unencumbered land remaining with the holder Ugam Singh. 10. This application was allowed by Addl. Collector on 26th March, 1983 by holding that the land in question is encumbered land and the option given by Ugam Singh not valid in law. He, therefore, directed to acquire unencumbered land remaining with the holder Ugam Singh. This order was made on 26th March, 198 11. We are told that in the first instance though in pursuance of order dated 12.1981 the lands in possession of Mala, Bhola, Bhinya and Natha were recorded in the name of the State by mutating the name of State as holder of the land in place of Mala, Bhola, Bhinya and Natha, who had been at that time recorded as Khatedars since 1978 when their names were entered as Khatedars in pursuance of registered sale deed in their favour by Multanmal. Thereafter, in pursuance of order passed by Addl. Collector allowing their application for acquiring surplus land from Ugam Singh, the said entries were reversed and the petitioners-respondents names were restored in land records as Khatedars. But actual physical possession always remained with the petitioners. 12. In pursuanceof the order dated 26.3.83, the lands comprised in Khasra No. 65 1/6 and 437/1/1 were acquired which were unencumbered lands of Ugam Singh. After taking possession of aforesaid unencumbered land of Ugam Singh, vide order dated 2 7.84, the said land has been distributed amongst different applicants vide Amix. 11 dated 2 7.84 and the allottees were put in possession thereof 13. Thepetitioners-respondents had further stated in unequivocal terms in their application for stay alongwith writ petition that the petitioners are in actual physical possession of the land in question. However, after the Board of Revenue passed the order setting aside the order passed by Collector, Banner dated 26.3.1983, again mutation entries have been made in the land records on 25.91. Still the petitioners continue to remain in physical possession of land comprised in Khasra No. 675. This assertion was not denied by any of the non-petitioners in writ petition at any time. Their possession was protected by interim order during pendency of writ petition, which has ultimately been allowed by learned Single Judge. 14. Still the petitioners continue to remain in physical possession of land comprised in Khasra No. 675. This assertion was not denied by any of the non-petitioners in writ petition at any time. Their possession was protected by interim order during pendency of writ petition, which has ultimately been allowed by learned Single Judge. 14. There is thus no dispute that as on now the petitioners- respondents are in possession of land claimed by the appellants’ father to have been transferred by him and not held by him as on 4.66 and the surplus land required to be acquired has in fact been acquired under ceiling proceedings by taking over unencumbered land of Ugam Singh and has since vested in State. Thereafter said land has in fact been distributed to different allottees vide Ex. 11. The appellants are not in possession of said land. 15. The facts about actual physical possession with the petitioners-respondents had not been disputed or denied by the respondents No. 1 to 3, who had filed detailed reply to the writ petition. They had not chosen to file reply to the stay petition denying the fact of actual physical possession of the land with the respondents-petitioners nor the present appellants have chosen to file any reply to the writ petition or stay petition at any stage which was pending since 1991 and has been decided only on 16.2.2000. The interim order that has been passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 29.8.9 1 restraining the respondents from taking possession in pursuance of the order of the Board of Revenue had continued to operate throughout the pendency of the writ petition. Thus, it could fairly be taken that the possession of land, subject matter of transfer, in favour of Multanmal by written deed continues with the transferees of Multanmal and the acquisition of surplus land out of the lands of Ugarn Singh is satisfied by acquiring the unencumbered lands comprised in other Khasra numbers situated in village Itada, as referred to above. Therefore, so far as State is concerned, it has no surviving litigating cause for acquiring the surplus land under the ceiling proceedings of Ugani Singh. There cannot be two acquisitions of the surplus lands in the case of Ugani Singh. Therefore, so far as State is concerned, it has no surviving litigating cause for acquiring the surplus land under the ceiling proceedings of Ugani Singh. There cannot be two acquisitions of the surplus lands in the case of Ugani Singh. Perhaps, aforesaid situation was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge and it was given to understand that land is yet to be acquired by the State in pursuance of the ceiling proceedings, which made the learned Single Judge to lament on inaction on the part of the State authorities. 16. So far as the question of completing the ceiling proceedings by taking possession from the holder is concerned, stands completed in all aspects. There is no challenge before us about the determination of lands held by Ugam Singh as on the relevant date namely 4.1966. So also there is no dispute before us about the extent of surplus land held by said Ugam Singh and his liability to surrender excess land and authority of the State to acquire the surplus land from Ugam Singh stands concluded with the order of the Competent Authority passed in 1981 after reopening of the proceedings under Chapter Ill-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. 17. The limited controversy, which has been raised before us and which arise out of the facts stated above, is whether a person in possession under a written document of transfer has any legal right against the transferor which can be considered as an encumbrance or burden on the property vis a vis a transferor so as to compel the holder of the land to surrender in the first instance such other land which are unencumbered before he can opt to surrender the land in possession of the transferee having right to remain in possession and owner is debarred from enforcing his rights of ownership on principle of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. 18. 18. There is no contention before us on this principle either that a holder of the land in whose case surplus land has been found to be in his holding is under an obligation to surrender in the first instance those lands which are unencumbered by giving an option in that regard whether with reference to the requirement under second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 30-E of Chapter Ill-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 or under Section 16(4) read with Section 18 of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973. It is also not the matter of contention before us that State can be compelled in the first instance to acquire the unencumbered land before reaching the encumbered lands, in the hands of transferees or otherwise who holds such Encumbrance or burden over such land, which has been created by the act of transteror, for the purposes of satisfying the claim of the State to acquire surplus lands of the holder. 19. In these circumstances, the only question that arises for consideration is whether a person who is holding a land under a written deed of transfer from the holder has any legal right which can be considered as an encumbrance for, the purposes of second proviso to Section 30E(2) of Chapter Ill-B or under Section 16(4) read with Section 18 of the Act of 1973. 20. In this connection, we have noticed above the stand taken by the appellants that under the declaration filed in the first instance under Chapter Ill-B as well as declaration after reopening of the ceiling case under Section 15(2) of the Act of 1973 certain lands had claimed been by Ugam Singh, who was to exercise his option, to be not included in his holdings as on 4.1966 as he has parted with those holdings and those lands had been transferred prior to 31st Dec., 1969. He had relied on the amendment made in Chapter Ill-B vide Rajasthan Tenancy Amendment Act 1970. The land in dispute was admitted by the appellants to have been transferred in favour of one Multanmal under a written document albeit it was ultimately found that such document was not a registered one, therefore, no interest in immovable property could take place. He had relied on the amendment made in Chapter Ill-B vide Rajasthan Tenancy Amendment Act 1970. The land in dispute was admitted by the appellants to have been transferred in favour of one Multanmal under a written document albeit it was ultimately found that such document was not a registered one, therefore, no interest in immovable property could take place. The fact remains that the said Ugam Singh did not claim the lands comprised in Khasra No. 675 at village Itada to be his own. At no point of time it was in dispute that said Ugam Singh was not in possession of the land in question but the transferee or persons claiming through transferee were in possession of the land of Khasra No. 675 situated in village Itada. The exact dale of the unregistered document has not come on record specifically inasmuchas both the orders passed by Competent Officer record the nature of transfers. While the first order record a finding that transfers were made prior to 31st Dec., 1969, the certified typed copy of second order of 1981 shows the date of the document as 20th July, 1972 which apparently appears to be incompatible with the findings in the first order recording all the three transfers to be anterior to 312.69 and that fact has not been disputed. Both the orders of 1971 as well as of 1981 records the transfer in question to be under a written deed. 9.21. Be that as it may, that much is not in doubt on the basis of admission of Ugam Singh, whose successors in interest are the appellants that Multanmal was put in possession in pursuance of a written deed of transfer. The petitioners respondents claim their right on the basis of a registered sale deed executed in their favour by Multanmal and are in physical possession of the land since that time. The rights of person in possession under such incomplete or defective transfers is well recognised under the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which read as under:53A. The rights of person in possession under such incomplete or defective transfers is well recognised under the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, which read as under:53A. Part performance.-Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof , or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer, has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor, by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof 22. Aperusal of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act shows that it not only deals with transfer of possession under an agreement to transfer by way of part performance where some performance of conditions is yet to be done by both or either parties to such agreement but also provides in the case of a completed transaction in all respects except completion of some formalities under law relating to such transfer of immovable property. It says in unequivocal term that notwithstanding an instrument of transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force and the transferor or any person claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property which the transfere hat taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract. 23. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that since the respondents have not acquired, any right from the appellants directly, they are not entitled to any protection under Section 53A and cannot be said to have any legal right to remain in possession, in our opinion, cannot be accepted on reading the plain language of the provision itself It not only protects the rights of the immediate transferee but also protects the right of any person claiming under such transferee an instrument of transfer which has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force. 24. We may notice here that the position of a person in possession under an incomplete transaction under a contract to transfer for consideration, which is in writing, signed by the transferor, and the transferee in art performance of the contract has taken possession of he property or any part thereof and has done some act in furtherance of the contract and also that the transferee is willing to perform his part of the contract, in such case the transferor is debarred from enforcing his right of ownership against such putative transferee. Right of such transferee to remain in possession is, therefore, protected against the transferor or any person claiming under him notwithstanding the fact that the title does not pass in favour of such person. Until such transfer takes place in accordance with law, though the title to the immovable property remains with the holder, a person in possession under such document retains indefeasible right against the holder of the title or any persons claiming through him from being evicted from that land by him. He cannot be evicted by the holder on the basis of his title alone. He cannot be evicted by the holder on the basis of his title alone. Of course, this right against enforcement of right by the title holder is only against the transferor or any person claiming through him and not against any other person. For example, where a person, in possession under incomplete transaction, satisfies the conditions of Section 53A in its first part, or he is in possession under a completed transaction in the sense that no act in furtherance of the contract of transfer is to be performed by any of the parties except completing formalities of giving effect to such transfer, is dispossessed from the land by a trespasser, Section 53A does not protect such trespasser from enforcement of right by the owner for recovery of possession from him because the trespasser does not claim his possession through the transferee. The title holder is not under any legal disability to enforce his right against a trespasser. The same position does not operate in case of a person who holds the land from the original putative transferee. The very pertinent expression used for the purpose of protecting the interest of such transferee are “transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of property”. Therefore, a person who has acquired the right from Multanmal by registered sale deed gets all the rights which the Multanmal had in respect of the land in question. As Multanmal did not had any title, the transferee from him also did not get any title on the basis of registered sale deed but transferee from Multanmal get the same protection against true owner as Multanmal had. In other words, the right which Multanmal had over the land are subject to transmission by inheritance as well as by transfer inter-vivos. The rights which exist in in favour of Multanmal against Ugam Singh are thus property itself and are transferable like any other property. This right to the detriment of right of Ugam Singh as owner must be deemed to be a burden on transferor’s right to property. 25. Learned Counsel for the appellants has himself not disputed the proposition so long as the property in question remains with the first transferee. What has been really agitated before us is that respondents who are subsequent transferees from Multanmal cannot have the same protection, which in our opinion is incorrect. 25. Learned Counsel for the appellants has himself not disputed the proposition so long as the property in question remains with the first transferee. What has been really agitated before us is that respondents who are subsequent transferees from Multanmal cannot have the same protection, which in our opinion is incorrect. Reading of the clear provisions of Section 53A admits of no doubt. It not only prohibits the transferor and any person claiming through or under him from enforcing any right in respect of the property which the transferee has taken or continued in possession in part performance of the contract but it also prohibits the enforcement of such rights against any person claiming through or under the transferee. Such right the transferee of a person claiming through or under him can successfully defend his right against any claim of transfer whether in his capacity as a defendant or as a plaintiff 26. This position is amply clear from the decision of Supreme Court in Hamzabi vs. Syed Karimuddin, (2001) 1 SCC 414 . It was a case in which one Mohd. Hussain created a usufructuary mortgage of his house in favour of Mohd. Yarn Khan on 8.7.5 1 and in pursuance of that mortgage said mortgagee Mohd. Yarn Khan was put in possession. Thereafter on 8.7.53 said Mohd. Hussain agreed to sell his house to Mohd. Yarn Khan, in respect of which he received Rs. 15 as earnest money but before the sale-deed could be executed by Mohd. Hussain, he died. Thereafter an 20th June, 1954 a sale deed was executed by son and daughter of Mohd. Hussain in favour of Mohd. Yarn Khan. This document recorded that the sale of house was effected for a consideration of Rs. 900 and that entire consideration was received either by mortgage amount or by payment of the remaining amount. This document too was not registered. Thereafter Mohd. Yarn Khan improved the property and made various additions and alterations. As the sale deed had not been registered but Mohd. Yarn Khan had been put in possession under a completed transaction without transfer of title and he continued in possession. 27. In these circumstances/on 12th Jan., 1965 a sale deed was executed by the heirs of Mohd.Hussain in favour of a third person after receiving consideration from him. The new purchaser filed a suit for redemption of mortgage against heirs of Mohd. 27. In these circumstances/on 12th Jan., 1965 a sale deed was executed by the heirs of Mohd.Hussain in favour of a third person after receiving consideration from him. The new purchaser filed a suit for redemption of mortgage against heirs of Mohd. Yarn Khan. The trial Court as well as High Court decreed the suit on the ground that in the absence of any registered sale deed no title passed on to Mohd. Yarn Khan, therefore, a transferee for value without notice had right to enforce his title against the person in possession without title. 28. On further appeal before the Supreme Court, the decree passed by the two Courts below was reversed. By a conjoint reading of Section 53A and proviso to Sec. 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court said that by act of the parties, notwithstanding transfer of title has not taken place, the equity of redemption, which existed in favour of Mohd. Hussain, extinguished on account of operation of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court said: "there Is no dispute that the agreement to sale dt. 8.7.1953 was a concluded con tract.. Yarn Khan, the actual mortgagee and putative vendee had acted in terms of the agreement for sale dated 8.7.3953 Short of actual registration of the deed of sale, there was nothing else that Yarn Khan could do ‘As a matter of fact, they have performed the whole of it. All that remains to be done is the execution of a lease deed by the lessor in favour of the lessee and of getting it registered.’ The four conditions Under Section 53-A of the Act having been fulfilled by the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, it must be held that the respondent No. 1 is debarred from claiming possession of the mortgaged property.” 29. Apparently, the judgment is founded on the principle that the subsequent transferee who was claiming through the person who could not have enforced rights against the person in possession under an earlier completed contract. His transferee also could not enforce such right against person in possession under first transaction, which though completed, but in respect of which procedural formalities had not been completed. 30. Moreover, this judgment also reflects the distinct position between a person in possession simply under an agreement to sale, which is not a concluded contract, and a person under the concluded contract. 30. Moreover, this judgment also reflects the distinct position between a person in possession simply under an agreement to sale, which is not a concluded contract, and a person under the concluded contract. In a case of incomplete transaction transferee has to show his willingness to perform his part of contract which has remained to be performed before he can claim benefit of Section 53A to stall a claim of title holder for securing possession from him. This position is assumed where there is, a concluded contract and both party have done all acts in furtherance of the terms of contract and only requirement remains is registration of the written deed of transfer. The Court in coming to this conclusion has referred to an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Maneklal Mansukhbhia vs. Hormusjii Jamshedji Ginwalla, AIR 1950 SC 1 . 3.31. Therefore, it is evident that a transferee under a written contract which has been completed in all respects does have a legal right in his favour to stop the title holder from enforcing his right in the property. Such right extends not only to prevent the title holder from enforcing his right against him but that right he also has against the person claiming though the title holder transferor. In the same manner, such of transferee’s right pass on to the person claiming through such transferee. Therefore, it must be held that the petitioners-respondents -transferees from Multannial had a subsisting legal right to stop appellants from enforcing their right of ownership against them so long they remained in possession by compelling them to surrender their unencumbered land in first instance, before land in their (transferee’s) possession could be surrendered. Permitting otherwise will result in permitting transferor to enforce his right as a title holder to the prejudice of petitioners, which under Section 53A, he is not permitted to do. What a person cannot do directly, he cannot be permitted to do indirectly. 4.32. It may be noticed that under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act expression used for the person who secures possession under an agreement to sale or a completed transaction is ‘transferee’. In the contest of doctrine of part performance, the putative purchaser is treated as ‘transferees and not a putative transferee. In other words, vis a vis transferor he holds the position of’a transferee’, which others may not recognise. 5.33. In the contest of doctrine of part performance, the putative purchaser is treated as ‘transferees and not a putative transferee. In other words, vis a vis transferor he holds the position of’a transferee’, which others may not recognise. 5.33. The exercise of option by Ugam Singh to discharge his obligation of surrendering the land was obviously an attempt to exercise his right of ownership to denude,the petitioners- respondents from possession of the property which they held as his transferee. The question, therefore, arises in such circumstances whether the respondents have a right to prevent the appellants from taking this recourse to protect rights against them. 6.34. It is true that so far as the question of determination of ceiling in the hands of the person is concerned and declaration of surplus area in the hands of the holder is concerned, transferees have no right to be heard until that stage. But same inhibition does not exist one the proceedings for determination of ceiling area and findings about surplus land is arrived at. The proceedings for acquisition of land starts only thereafter. In this connection, it is apposite to invite attention to the relevant provisions which have bearing of the controversy. 7.35. Under Chapter second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 30E reads as under: “Provided further that the option offered, by the foregoing provisos shall subject to the limitation that, where the person surrendering excess land under, this sub-section holds lands, of which some are encumbered and some are not encumbered, the encumbered lands, shall so far as may be, be surrendered in preference to encumbered lands.”