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2002 DIGILAW 1247 (AP)

Mummidipalli Syamaladevi v. Regional Director, ESI Corporation, Hyderabad

2002-10-23

GHULAM MOHAMMED

body2002
GHULAM MOHAMMED, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against an order dated 16-2-1996 passed in EIC No. 4/1995 on the file of the Court of the Employees Insurance court and Chairman, Industrial Tribunal-I, hyderabad. ( 2 ) THE mother of the deceased-M durga Prasad moved the Employees insurance Court under Section 75 (c) and (g) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. (for short "esi Act"), inter alia, stating that her son M. Durga Prasad was working as machine Operator in the factory of the 3rd respondent since August, 1989, he was residing in the quarter provided by the 3rd respondent in the factory premises, and died due to electric shock in the early hours of 22-4-1991. Since the accident occurred in the premises of the 3rd respondent- employer i. e. , within the factory premises, this accident is deemed to have been arising out of and during the course of the employment. Though the petitioner was paid ex gratia of Rs. 30,000/- by the 3rd respondent-company, but no compensation was granted under the provisions of the workmen s Compensation Act, as the deceased was covered under the provisions of the ESI Act. Therefore, the mother of the deceased laid the above application claiming the benefits admissible under Section 52 of the ESI Act. ( 3 ) THE respondents 1 and 2 filed a written statement stating that the Scheme of the enactment, on a close analysis, takes care of only such liabilities, as are defined under Section 2 (g) of the ESI Act and that the petitioner s son had not even commenced the work entrusted to him on the day of the alleged accident. The petitioner s son occupied the premises available with the 3rd respondent on his own accord and residing therein as there was no other convenient place available to him. His shift hours commences by 7 a. m. , and taking bath and attending to his nature calls will not amount to and connected to the trade or business of the 3rd respondent-Company and therefore the accident did not arise during the course and out of employment and hence the claim of the petitioner is not proper. It is further stated that the first Information Report did not reveal any suspicious circumstances leading to the death of the petitioner s son. It is further stated that the first Information Report did not reveal any suspicious circumstances leading to the death of the petitioner s son. The action taken by the respondent-Corporation rejecting the case for payment of the dependent s benefits is within the provisions of the Act and the petitioner is not entitled to any of the relief as prayed for in this petition. ( 4 ) THE 3rd respondent-Company has also filed a written statement stating that the deceased was covered under the provisions of the ESI Act and the management duly remitted all the contributions along with the Employer s share to the ESI Corporation. If the dependants of the deceased have any claim they can claim only against the ESI Corporation and not from the respondent No. 3. It is further stated that there was no direct water supply to the bathrooms and hence the employees had to come to the water tank and carry water to the bathrooms every day. Sometimes, the employees residing in the factory premises will go to the water tank situated within the factory premises and take bath there itself for which the management had not objected and this was the practice adopted by the employees living in the quarters provided by the management. Therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the employees to stay compulsorily in the quarters provided by the management. On 22-4-1991 at 7. 05 a. m. , Mr. Durga Prasad was found on the ground near bore-well electrical switchboard and when one of the Supervisors came to the first shift and he was immediately rushed to the ESI Hospital at Erragadda where the Doctors declared him as dead. The said fact was immediately informed to the Employees State Insurance Corporation by accident report on 22-4-1991 itself. The accident notice was also served on the inspector of Factories informing the accident. It is further stated by the 3rd respondent that the deceased Durga Prasad was not on duty at the time of his death and the accident might have been occurred due to electrocution. Therefore, the 3rd respondent is not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner. It is further stated by the 3rd respondent that the deceased Durga Prasad was not on duty at the time of his death and the accident might have been occurred due to electrocution. Therefore, the 3rd respondent is not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner. ( 5 ) ON the strength of the above pleadings the ESI Court has framed the following issues for consideration: " (i) Whether the death of Sri M. D. Prasad the son of the petitioner had occurred during the course of his employment with respondent No. 3? (ii) Whether the respondents 1 and 2 are liable to extend the benefits admissible under Section 52 of the ESI Act to the petitioner? (iii) To what relief?" ( 6 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, PWs. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. Pl to P8 were marked. On behalf of the respondents RWs. 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. Rl to R5 were marked. ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the provisions of section 52 of the ESI Act, and theory of notional interest, the ESI Court found that the dependent is entitled for the benefits only when the insured person dies as a result of employment, and therefore, dismissed the application filed by the mother of the deceased. Hence, this appeal by the appellant framing the substantial questions of law as follows: "when the employee died within the premises of the establishment on account of electrocution by the Motors fixed to the board by the employer, while preparing for moving to duty, is it not death during the course of employment and arising out of employment? does the legal heir not entitled to the benefits under the ESI Act by applying the theory of notional extension?" ( 8 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the deceased was provided with a quarter by the management of the 3rd respondent and he was residing in the said quarter and while preparing to attend to the office, he had gone for taking bath near the bore-well and on account of it he was electrocuted, and died, therefore, his death should be deemed to be occurred during and in the course of the employment. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents contended that the ESI Court on appreciation of the evidence on record came to a correct conclusion and the same cannot be termed as perverse so as to interfere under Section 82 (2) of the ESI Act. It is further contended that the question of liability has to be seen and inasmuch as there was no substantial question of law involved in this appeal the same has to be dismissed. ( 10 ) THE deceased-Durga Prasad was working as Mechanic in the factory of the 3rd respondent since August, 1989. He was covered under the provisions of the ESI Act and the management duly remitted all the contributions along with the employer s share to the ESI Corporation. The ESI Court, however, noticed that the deceased died due to electrocution from a bore-well which is within the factory premises on 22-4-1991. In this background, it is to be seen whether the accident falls within the purview and definition of section 2 (8) of the ESI Act, which reads as follows: " employment injury means a personal injury to an employee caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, being an insurable employment, whether the accident occurred or the occupational disease is contracted within or outside the territorial limits of India. " ( 11 ) FROM an analysis of the evidence, the deceased was staying in the quarters in the factory premises. The residents of the quarters used to carry water from the bore-well which is also situated within the factory premises. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the deceased was preparing to attend to the office, and he has gone for bath near bore-well. The deceased died due to electrocution near the bore-well which is situated near his residential quarter in the early hours on 22-4-1991. He was not attending to any duty connected with his employment as Mechanic in the factory and he has not commenced the work on that date. He died due to electrocution near the bore-well. Therefore, there is no connection between the cause of death of the employee and his employment as mechanic in the factory. He was not attending to any duty connected with his employment as Mechanic in the factory and he has not commenced the work on that date. He died due to electrocution near the bore-well. Therefore, there is no connection between the cause of death of the employee and his employment as mechanic in the factory. In this situation simply because accommodation was provided to the deceased employee by the employer it cannot be said that the death of the employee should be deemed to be arising out of and during the course of the employment. The ESI Court, while extracting Section 52 of the ESI Act and doctrine of the notional extension of employment rejected the contention of the appellant, holding that the dependant of the deceased is entitled for the benefits, when the injured person dies during the course of employment, and as such was not the instant case. ( 12 ) IN Regional Director ESI corporation v. Francis De Costa, 1996 (6) supreme 678 , it was observed by the Apex court as follows: "it cannot be said that the injury suffered by the workman one Kilometer away from the factory while he was on his way to the factory was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment when employee was unable to prove that the accident had any casual connection with the work he was doing at the factory. " ( 13 ) IN S. S. Mafg. Co. v. Bai Valu Raja, air 1958 SC 881 , it was held by the Apex court as follows: "as a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however, that this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer s premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and re- passes in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer s premises. There may be reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer s premises. The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension. " a workman employed in a Salt Works while returning home after finishing his wcrk had to go by a public path, then through a stand area in the open public and finally across a creek through a ferry boat. The workman while crossing the creek in a public ferry boat which capsized due to bad whether was drowned. On a claim for compensation held that on the facts of the case the accident could not be said to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment while crossing the creek inasmuch as the theory of notional extension could not extend to the point where the boat capsized. " ( 14 ) IN BEST Undertaking v. Mrs. Agnes, AIR 1964 SC 193 , it was held by the supreme Court that when a driver when going home from the bus depot or coming to the depot uses the bus, any accident that happens to him is an accident in the course of his employment. ( 15 ) FOR the foregoing discussion, and following the dicta laid down by the supreme Court, I see no substantial question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal. I therefore, see no merits in this appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.