S. P. MEHROTRA, J. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,1950 has been filed, inter alia, challenging the suspension order dated 3-5-2002 (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition) passed by the Managing Director, U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Meerut Region, Meerut (Respondent No. 1 ). 2. It is inter alia, alleged in the writ petition that at the time of his suspension by the said order dated 3- 5-2002, the petitioner was working and posted as clerk designated as office Assistant Grade II in the office of the Regional Manager, U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Meerut; and that the petitioner was appointed on the said post and he joined the services on 9th July, 1987 and that with effect from February, 1989, on the directions of his superiors, the petitioner was performing the job of pairokar on behalf of the respondent-department; and that as a pairokar, the petitioner used to contact panel lawyers of the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation (in short "the Corporation") in order to enable them to conduct cases in the law Courts on behalf of the respondent Corporation; and that as a pairokar, the petitioner was working as a link and messenger between the Corporation and the penal lawyers, and that the petitioner was not a law graduate and was not supposed to assist the panel lawyers regarding the line of action and arguments to be given by the lawyers before the Court or regarding his opinion about relevancy or irrelevancy of any fact in connection with the cases; and that for his outstanding work as pairokar the petitioner was issued appreciation letters; and that the petitioner was suspended by the said order dated 3-5-2002 (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition) on five allegations mentioned therein. The petitioner has, inter alia, made allegations in regard to various claim petitions before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Meerut filed on account of an accident which took place on 13th March, 2000, wherein there was collision between Bus No. U. P.-15 D-0167 of the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation with another Bus No. U. P. 15 D-1735 near Morta, Ghaziabad. 3. Notices on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were accepted by Sri Sameer Sharma, Advocate. On 3-9-2002, counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents was filed. 4. 3. Notices on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were accepted by Sri Sameer Sharma, Advocate. On 3-9-2002, counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents was filed. 4. It has, inter alia, been alleged in the said counter-affidavit that the petitioner was given appointment on compassionate ground on the post of office Assistant Grade II in the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation with effect from 9-7-1987 and was deputed in the legal cell of Meerut Region of the Corporation; and that as there was a prima facia case of serious misconduct relating to forgery and collusion so as to cause great financial loss to the corporation, the petitioner was placed under suspension and a charge-sheet dated 13-6-2002 (Annexure No. 5 to the counter-affidavit) has been issued to him; and that although the said charge-sheet has been received by the petitioner, he has not disclosed the same before this Court in the present writ. It has inter alia, been further alleged in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was himself instrumental in getting bogus claim petitions filed against the Corporation and thereafter, he filed forged documents and withheld relevant evidence from being filed before the Tribunal; and that the petitioner also did not place the various letters written by the Advocates to the Regional Manager of the Corporation and misplaced the same so that the correct facts were not placed before the Tribunal; and that since the month of February, 1989 the petitioner was working as an office assistant in the legal cell of the Corporation; and that the petitioner was in- charge custodian of all the records and files relating to Motor Accident Claims cases and his duties not only included contacting the various lawyers and parties but also informing the officers of the Corporation by written comments about the progress of the claim cases; and that the petitioner not only colluded with the claimants by helping them to file bogus claims against the Corporation but also submitting forged documents, withholding relevant evidence from being placed before the Tribunal and not informing the Regional Manager of the Corporation of the various letters written to him by the Advocates concerned and that as there were charges of serious misconduct against the petitioner, which if proved could result in major punishment, he has been rightly placed under suspension. 5. 5. In reply to the said counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, the petitioner has filed today, rejoinder-affidavit. In the said rejoinder-affidavit the petitioner has denied allegations made in the counter-affidavit. The petitioner has, inter alia, further alleged that various documents filed alongwith the rejoinder-affidavit establish that it was not the petitioner but the panel lawyer, Miss Sunita Bharadwaj, who filed false claims and signed herself as Smt. Pinki Gupta, Advocate, and that is why the Corporation itself had removed Miss. Sunita Bharadwaj from the penal of the lawyers of the Corporation. It has inter alia, been further alleged in the rejoinder-affidavit that the petitioner has already filed his reply dated 27-7-2002 against the charge-sheet dated 13-6-2002 given to the petitioner. A copy of the said reply dated 27-7-2002 has been filed as Annexure No. 15 to the rejoinder-affidavit. 6. I have heard Sri Ashok Trivedi and Sri Ashish Mohan, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents. 7. Sri Ashok Trivedi, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the charges mentioned in the impugned suspension order dated 3-5-2002 were vague and the suspension order could not be passed on vague charges. He further submits that the documents filed with the rejoinder-affidavit showed that the charges levelled against the petitioner were wrong and mala fide and were not proved on record, as such, the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002 passed against the petitioner was illegal. 8. In reply Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the charges levelled against the petitioner are very serious in nature, and charge-sheet dated 13-6-2002 has already been given to the petitioner and the petitioner has submitted his reply dated 27-7-2002 to the said charge- sheet dated 13-6-2002, and the enquiry is proceeding. 9. In the circumstances, the contention proceeds, no interference is called for with the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002 passed against the petitioner. 10. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that under Regulation 67 (1) of the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other than Officers) Service Regulations, 1981 (in short the Regulations), an employee against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the enquiry. 10. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that under Regulation 67 (1) of the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other than Officers) Service Regulations, 1981 (in short the Regulations), an employee against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the enquiry. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents that as the enquiry against the petitioner is going on and the charge-sheet has already been given to the petitioner, the suspension order passed in respect of the petitioner is legal and valid and in accordance with Regulation 67 of the Regulations. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the charges against the petitioner are serious in nature, and if these charges are established, major penalty may be imposed against the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner has alternative remedy of filing appeal under Regulation 67 of the Regulations against the suspension order dated 3-5- 2002, and as such, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. From the facts narrated above, it is evident that the suspension order was passed on 3-5-2002. Thereafter, charges- sheet dated 13-6-2002 was given to the petitioner. The petitioner has already submitted his reply dated 27-7-2002 to the said charge-sheet dated 13-6-2002. Thus, the enquiry proceeding against the petitioner is going on. Regulation 67 of the Regulations 1981 provides as follows : "67. Suspension (1) An employee against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority : Provided that any other authority empowered by the Board in this behalf, may place an employee under suspension under this sub-regulation : Provided further that suspension should not be resorted to unless the allegations against the employee are so serious that, in the event of their being established may ordinarily warrant major penalty. (2) An employee in respect of, or against, whom an investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending, may, at the discretion of the appointing authority under whom he is serving, be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his position as an employee of the corporation or is likely to embrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude : Provided that any other authority empowered by the Board in this behalf, may also place an employee under suspension. (3) An employee shall be deemed to have been placed or, as the case may be, continued to be placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority - (a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether the detention is on criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours; and (b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed consequent to such conviction. Explanation.-The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-regulation shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. Explanation.-The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-regulation shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. (4) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon an employee is set aside in appeal under these regulations and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions - (a) if he was under suspension immediately before the penalty was awarded to him, the order of his suspension shall, subject to any such directions as aforesaid, be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal; (b) if he was not under suspension, he shall if so directed by appellate authority, be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal : Provided that nothing in this sub-regulation shall be construed as affecting the power of the competent authority, in a case where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon an employee is set aside in appeal under these Regulations on grounds other than the merits of the allegations on which the said penalty was imposed but the case is not remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, to pass an order of suspension pending further inquiry against him on those allegations so, however, that any such suspension shall not have retrospective effect. (5) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon an employee is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of law and the appointing authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal or removal was originally imposed, whether the allegation remain in their original form or are clarified or their particulars better specified or any part thereof of a minor nature omitted - (a) if he was under suspension immediately before the penalty was awarded to him, the order of his suspension shall subject to any direction of the appointing authority, be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal; (b) if he was not under such suspension, he shall, if so directed by the appointing authority, be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the competent authority on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal. (6) (a) Any suspension order or deemed to have been ordered or to have continued in force, under this regulation shall continue to remain in force until it is modified by any authority specified in sub- regulation (1): (b) Where an employee is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing direct that the employee shall continue to be under suspension till termination of all or any of such proceedings. " 12. From the perusal of the aforesaid Regulation 67 (1), it is evident that an employee against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority. Second Proviso to the said Regulation 67 (1) provides that the suspension should not be restored to unless the allegations against the employee are so serious that, in the event of their being established may ordinarily warrant major penalty. 13. Second Proviso to the said Regulation 67 (1) provides that the suspension should not be restored to unless the allegations against the employee are so serious that, in the event of their being established may ordinarily warrant major penalty. 13. In the present case, as noted above, enquiry proceedings are going on against the petitioner, therefore, suspension order could be passed in respect of the petitioner under Regulation 67 (1) of the Regulations. 14. Further, a perusal of the suspension order dated 3-5-2002 (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition) as well as charge-sheet dated 13-6-2002 (Annexure No. 5 to the counter-affidavit) shows that serious charges have been levelled against the petitioner. In case, these charges are established against the petitioner, major penalty may be imposed against the petitioner. 15. The requisite conditions for passing the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002 were, thus, satisfied. Hence, the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002 cannot be said to have suffered from any illegality. 16. Let us now consider the submission of Sri Ashok Trivedi, learned Counsel for the petitioner that charges mentioned in the impugned suspension order dated 3-5-2002 were vague, and as such, the suspension order was vitiated. 17. I have perused the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002. I find myself unable to accept the said submission of Sri Trivedi. The suspension order gave sufficient indication of the charges levelled against the petitioner and the charges are not vague. Therefore, the suspension order cannot be said to be vitiated on that account. 18. Moreover, as noted above, the charge-sheet dated 13-6-2002 has already been served on the petitioner wherein complete details of the charges have been mentioned. Hence, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner. 19. As regards the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the charges against the petitioner were wrong and mala fide as is evident from the documents filed alongwith the rejoinder- affidavit. I am of the opinion that the correctness or otherwise of the charges levelled against the petitioner will be enquired into in the enquiry proceeding which is going on against the petitioner. The correctness or otherwise of the charges levelled against the petitioner will be decided on the basis of evidence led during the enquiry proceedings. I am of the opinion that the correctness or otherwise of the charges levelled against the petitioner will be enquired into in the enquiry proceeding which is going on against the petitioner. The correctness or otherwise of the charges levelled against the petitioner will be decided on the basis of evidence led during the enquiry proceedings. There is, thus, no occasion for considering the correctness or otherwise of the charges levelled against the petitioner in the present writ petition. Moreover, these are questions of fact which cannot normally be gone into in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 20. Even otherwise, having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, and having considered the seriousness of the charges levelled against the petitioner, I do not think that it is a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. It is further noteworthy that Regulation 69 (1) of the Regulations provides that an employee may file an appeal to the next higher authority from an order passed by the appointing or any other authority. Regulation 69 of the Regulations is quoted below : "69. Appeal (1) An employee shall be entitled to appeal to the next higher authority from an order passed by the appointing or any other authority. (2) Any employee preferring an appeal shall do so in his name. The memorandum of appeal shall contain all material statement and arguments relied upon by the appellant. (3) The appeal shall not contain any intemperate language. Any appeal, which contains such language may be liable to be summarily dismissed. (4) The appeal shall be addressed to the appellate authority and submitted to the authority, against whose order it is preferred through the normal proper channel. (5) The appeal shall be preferred within three months of the date of the order. An appeal, preferred beyond three months but not beyond six months of the date of the order, may be accepted by the appellate authority if sufficient cause is shown for the delay. An appeal preferred beyond time shall be dismissed summarily. " 22. In view of the aforesaid Regulation 69, the petitioner has got an alternative remedy of appeal against the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002. An appeal preferred beyond time shall be dismissed summarily. " 22. In view of the aforesaid Regulation 69, the petitioner has got an alternative remedy of appeal against the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002. In this view of the matter also no interference is called for with the said suspension order dated 3-5-2002 in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 23. Sri Trivedi, learned Counsel for the petitioner lastly submits that some time may be fixed for completion of the enquiry against the petitioner. 24. In reply, Sri Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the enquiry against the petitioner as well as other persons are going on in the matter, but the proceedings are time consuming, and as such, no time limit be fixed for completion of enquiry as the collection of evidence etc. , are taking time. He submits that this is a serious case of fraud and collusion in which several persons including the petitioner are involved, and further relevant material, evidence, details etc. are coming up from time to time, and as such any time limit for the completion of enquiry would adversely effect thorough probe into the matter. 25. Having considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and the nature of the enquiry going on against the petitioner, it is observed that the enquiry against the petitioner would be completed expeditiously provided the petitioner co-operates in the said enquiry. 26. With these observations, this writ petition stands dismissed. Petition dismissed.