JUDGMENT: The substantial question of law framed in the second appeal is as follows: Where the plaintiff and the defendant did not dispute the identity of the property, to which the defendant is the tenant, whether it is open to a Court to non-suit the plaintiff solely on the ground that a wrong door number has been given to the property? 2. The plaintiff in O.S. No.1534 of 1982 on the file of the Additional District Munsif, Madurai, is the appellant in the second appeal. It filed the suit for recovery of possession alleging as follows: It is the owner of the suit property. It orally leased out the same to the respondent on monthly rent. It requires the property to locate its Information Centre, and for opening a book stall regarding Saiva Sithanda philosophy and various literary works. The respondent refused to surrender possession of the property despite notice and request. 3. The respondent resisted the suit contending inter alia that he is a tenant only in respect of the site, that the superstructure was put up by him, and that he is entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. 4. The trial Court framed the necessary issues and on the oral and documentary evidence accepted the case of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 10.5.1990. However, on appeal by the respondent in A.S. No.51 of 1990, the learned Principal Sub-Judge, Madurai by judgment and decree, dated 23.8.1990 reversed the decision of the trial Court, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 5. It is as against that the present second appeal has been filed. 6. Both the Courts below found that the appellant is the owner of the property, and that the claim of the respondent that the superstructure had been put up by him is not true. While the trial Court held that the notice to quit issued by the plaintiff/ appellant was valid, the lower appellate Court held that the notice had not been given in respect of the suit property, and that, it did not therefore, satisfy the requirements of Sec.108 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. While the trial Court held that the notice to quit issued by the plaintiff/ appellant was valid, the lower appellate Court held that the notice had not been given in respect of the suit property, and that, it did not therefore, satisfy the requirements of Sec.108 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. The only question that is to be answered in the second appeal is- Whether the notice is quit is a valid one, and whether the parties had understood that the notice to quit was only in respect of the suit property? 8. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in the notice to quit, marked as Ex.A-5, while describing the suit property, instead of giving the door number as 97A-1, it had been given as 97A. But the parties knew that the notice was only in respect6 of the suit property of which the respondent was the tenant and the minor discrepancy should not be made much of. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent had denied the title of the appellant to the suit property, and it would amount to forfeiting his rights and on this ground also the appellant would be entitled to have a decree. 9.Per contra Mr.T.R.Mani, learned Senior Counsel, submitted as follows: It was not as if the plaintiff was not aware of the mistake committed in the notice, that it was aware, would be evident from the fact that it chose to have the plaint amended with regard to the description of the property in the schedule, and when the notice prior to suit did not satisfy the requirements of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, as regards the identity of the property, it was not open to the plaintiff to seek a decree on the basis of a defective notice. The learned senior counsel also drew my attention to the pleadings and in particular to the written statement where it has been specifically mentioned that the suit notice is not valid. As regards the denial of title, though the learned senior counsel conceded that there was indeed, a denial of title by the respondent, still it would, if at all, gives a new cause of action and the plaintiff’s remedy would be a fresh suit. As regards the denial of title, though the learned senior counsel conceded that there was indeed, a denial of title by the respondent, still it would, if at all, gives a new cause of action and the plaintiff’s remedy would be a fresh suit. In this connection, the learned senior counsel submitted that the principle, the denial in the course of the proceedings could be taken note of in the same proceedings, would be applicable, only to special enactments like the Rent Control Act, the City Tenants Protection Act, etc., but not in respect of the rights arising under the Transfer of Property Act and the pristine status of the Transfer of Property Act, has to be maintained and the scope should not be enlarged so as to cover cases of this nature. 10. The only question relates to the validity of the notice. The requirements of Sec.106 Transfer of Property Act are satisfied in every respect by Ex.A-5/notice with regard to the door number. In the body of the plaint, the door number is given as 97-A. Only in the schedule, it has been got amended as 97A-1. It is not the case of the respondent that he is in possession of some other property. The parties were fighting only over the suit property. The pre suit notice related only to the suit property. The reply by the respondent was only in respect of the suit property. The defect if any in Ex.A-5/notice is only a mistake due to over-sight. When the parties had understood that it was only in respect of the suit property the notice had been issued, the discrepancy with regard to the door number has to be ignored. 11. In G.Krishnan v. Meenkashikutty Amma, A.I.R. 1977 Ker. 199, the tenancy was created on 13.4.1956. The respondent issued a notice to the petitioner on 15.12.1969 calling upon the petitioner to surrender the property by the end of the month, January, 1967. In the reply to that notice, dated 26.12.1969 no objection was taken about the insufficiency or the invalidity of the notice sent. In the petitioner for eviction, it was clearly stated that a notice terminating the tenancy notice ending with January, 1970 was issued to the petitioner. In the counter filed by the petitioner, it was controverted saying that the notice sent terminating the tenancy was not valid in law. In the petitioner for eviction, it was clearly stated that a notice terminating the tenancy notice ending with January, 1970 was issued to the petitioner. In the counter filed by the petitioner, it was controverted saying that the notice sent terminating the tenancy was not valid in law. It was held by the Kerala High Court that the date given in the notice was clearly a mistake. The learned Judge observed that by a notice issued in 1969, the tenant could not be called upon to surrender the property in January, 1967. It was impossible of performance. No argument was necessary to conclude that what was meant that the tenant should surrender in January, 1970, and it should be presumed that the tenant also understood it to be so. If understood otherwise it would defeat justice and make a mockery of law. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judge referred to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Tika Ram v. Sri Thakur, A.I.R. 1934 All. 787, which in its turn relied on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in Harihar Banerji v. Ramahashi Roy, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102, wherein it was held that a notice should ordinarily be liberally construed and where in a case like this, there was no danger of the tenant being misled action for eviction should not be allowed to be defeated. The Privy Council observed: "There was no danger of the tenant being misled. This is certainly a lame and inaccurate notice, but such as it is, we must endeavour to give it a rational interpretation. This is not drawn with strict precision but I think it is sufficiently clear." In the Allahabad decision, the notice, dated 9.11.1927, called upon the defendants that they should vacate the land on 13.5.1927, which was impossible of performance. 12. In my view, the Kerala judgment will clearly apply to the facts of the present case. There was no real ambiguity. So far as the respondent in the present case was concerned, he knew what was required of him and in respect of which property. 13. 12. In my view, the Kerala judgment will clearly apply to the facts of the present case. There was no real ambiguity. So far as the respondent in the present case was concerned, he knew what was required of him and in respect of which property. 13. In Calcutta Credit Corporation Limited v. Happy Homes (Pvt) Limited, (1968)2 S.C.J. 291: (1968)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 42: (1968)2 An.W.R. (S.C.) 42: A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 471, it has been held that, "A notice which is defective may still determine the tenancy, if it is accepted by the landlord. A notice which complies with the requirements of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act operates to terminate the tenancy, whether or not the party served with the notice assents thereto. A notice which does not comply with the requirements of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act in that it does not expire with the end of the month of the tenancy, or the end of the year of the tenancy, as the case may be, or of which the duration is shorter than the duration contemplated by Sec.106, may still be accepted by the party served with the notice and if that party accepts and acts upon it, the party serving the notice will be estopped from denying its validity." The tenant/ respondent in the instant case did not raise any objection as to the identity of the property in the reply notice. 14. In Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu, (1977)2 S.C.J. 43: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1120, it has been held that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The notice to quit must be construed in a common sense way and it ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw and should not be read in a hyper-technical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantism or over refined subtlety. 15. In Selvaraj v. Sri Kamakshi Amman Devasthanam, (1986)1 M.L.J. 45 , the notice to quite recited that the tenancy would be terminated by 30.5.1974. The defendant did not make a grievance about the defect in the notice to quit either in the written statement or during the trial of the suit. 15. In Selvaraj v. Sri Kamakshi Amman Devasthanam, (1986)1 M.L.J. 45 , the notice to quite recited that the tenancy would be terminated by 30.5.1974. The defendant did not make a grievance about the defect in the notice to quit either in the written statement or during the trial of the suit. The learned Judge held that on the facts of the case it was possible for infer that the defendant/ tenant had waived the notice and therefore the error in the date mentioned in the notice was cured by waiver. 16. Though Mr. T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel pointed out that in the written statement it is stated that the notice is defective, it is to be noted that the reply notice did not point out the specific defect in the notice of termination. The objection is only a general routine objection and it cannot be considered as an objection regarding the description of the property given in the notice. 17. In Subha Raja v. Gurusamy, (1988)1 L.W. 4 (J.S.), it has been held that the notice to quit is not to be construed in a hyper-technical manner or with a view to find fault with it, which would render it defective, it should be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 18. I am clearly of the view that the objection raised by the respondent as to the defect in the notice cannot be accepted. To reiterate, the parties knew what they were talking about and it is not the case of the respondent that the notice was not in respect of the suit property. The respondent had understood what the notice was about and had sent a reply to the effect that he had put up a superstructure and the claim of the appellant to the superstructure should not be countenanced. 19. For all the reasons stated above the judgment of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. There is a serious lapse on the part of the appellate Judge in considering the notice as defective in the sense that it did not relate to the suit property. He had tried to be hypertechnical which is forbidden by a catena of decisions. It should be also be noticed that the suit is of the year 1980. For 22 years the respondent has successfully maintained his position in respect of the suit property. He had tried to be hypertechnical which is forbidden by a catena of decisions. It should be also be noticed that the suit is of the year 1980. For 22 years the respondent has successfully maintained his position in respect of the suit property. If we are to construe that the notice is defective and therefore the conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court is correct, we will be parties to something unjust. The substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant. The second appeal succeeds. The judgment and the decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court restored with costs fixed at Rs.3,000.