A. LALA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition was made by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Calcutta-II Commissionarate, challenging the two orders passed by the CEGAT on 5th of March, 1998 and 18th of September, 1998. ( 2 ) FROM the first order it appears that there was a difference of opinion in between judicial and technical members of the tribunal when the matter was referred to consider by a third member and such order of the tribunal is dated 18th of September, 1998. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the dealers of steel materials. They purchase large number of steel materials from the companies like TISCO and SAIL. They pay their usual excise duties. They sell it to small traders who, in turn, entitled for benefit under MODVAT scheme made for themselves. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are not at all entitled for such benefit. Good, bad, indifferent, Commissioner of Central Excise adversely held against the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and imposed penalty upon themselves. However, being aggrieved by or dissatisfied therewith such respondents preferred an appeal before the CEGAT. In CEGAT when the judicial member therein affirmed the order of the Commissioner of Central Excise in imposing penalty but the technical member held otherwise. Therefore, there was a point of difference. The matter was rightly referred to a third member who was also a technical member. Such technical member was also held in favour of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Hence, taking the majority view tribunal opined in favour of the respondents. The reference application was also made before the tribunal when on 22nd June, 1999 the tribunal held that it is well settled position that sufficiency of evidence is not a question of law as held by the Apex Court in the case of Mennakshi Mills i. e. 31 ITR 28 and the applications were rejected. Although the copy of the order passed by the tribunal in the reference application but not prayer has been made in connection thereto in this writ petition. Whatever prayers made herein those are in respect of prior investigation of facts which are already merged with the subsequent orders by legal analysis. ( 4 ) THE writ petition is made on 2nd of March, 2000. The writ petition was affirmed on 15th of October, 1999. Whatever prayers made herein those are in respect of prior investigation of facts which are already merged with the subsequent orders by legal analysis. ( 4 ) THE writ petition is made on 2nd of March, 2000. The writ petition was affirmed on 15th of October, 1999. In the mandate Central Excise Act, 1944 by the Financial Bill of 1999, section 35h was sufficiently governing the field of statement of case or application to the High Court from such order of the tribunal in refusing to refer the matter in question of law for its consideration. The petitioner did not choose to avail either of the opportunities prescribed under the law applicable for the relevant point of time but invoke the writ jurisdiction of the Court. For the purpose of redressal of the grievance in connection with the factual investigation prior to the same. In further the writ petition was moved before Division Bench of this Court taking the plea that the order of CEGAT is governed under Articles 323a and 323b of the Constitution of India, therefore, he Division Bench is the proper form. Ultimately, the Division Bench opined that the application of L. Chandrakumar's case which was likely to the view point of the petitioner, reported in 1997 (92) ELT 318 (SC) is not applicable in the present case, therefore, the jurisdiction of the single Bench is wide enough to hear out the matter and come to a definite conclusion in this respect. Hearing of the writ petition before this Court is the outcome of the same. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to me, the writ Court cannot behave like a fact finding Court for which the jurisdiction appears to have been invoked. I repeat and say, the process of fact finding by the appropriate authority is ultimately merged with the order of the CEGAT. Such order of the CEGAT being the final fact finding authority is binding amongst the parties. The same is the ratio of the Supreme Court in 1986 (161) ITR 365 (Patnaik and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa ). There is no question of reappreciation of the factual position even in reference it is far to say about the writ Court. The same is the ratio of the Supreme Court in 1986 (161) ITR 365 (Patnaik and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa ). There is no question of reappreciation of the factual position even in reference it is far to say about the writ Court. Not only for that position of reference applications before the final fact finding authority i. e. CEGAT but the CEGAT has come to a definite conclusion that sufficiency of evidence is not a question of law even on the basis of the Supreme Court judgment Mennakshi Mill's case reported in 1957 (31) ITR 28 (supra ). Even if find that petitioner can get a relief, the relief is to be out from the order of the tribunal refusing to refer the matter to the High Court but not independently from the original order passed by the departmental authority or from the observation of the tribunal before coming to a final conclusion. Even from the refusal of reference, the petitioner could have come to the High Court and from there to the Supreme Court but the petitioner, even being a Governmental authority did not choose to do so. On the other hand, petitioner wanted to say before the Court that the writ jurisdiction was invoked due to violation of fundamental right of such Governmental authority. I am surprised that how the fundamental right to a Governmental authority has been violated is unknown to this Court. The Central Excise Authority is nothing but a creature of statute unlike the ordinary citizen. They have to follow the legal process. They cannot bypass such process and allow the time to expire and invoke the writ jurisdiction to avail of the alternative mode of justice by way of a writ proceeding. Even to that extent, a five Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 (A. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Anr.) held that if such authority has disabled himself to avail of the statutory remedy by his own fault, he cannot certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the Court dealing with his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to exercise its discretion in his favour. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner become over-enthusiast to cite certain decisions ignoring the legal parameters as aforesaid. He cited two Division Bench judgments reported in 1998 (100) ELT 29 (Ker) (Premier Irrigation Equipment Ltd. v. Union of India) and 1999 (114) ELT 826 (MP) (Neo Sacks Limited v. CEGAT, New Delhi ). However, according to me, the Division Bench judgments are restricted on the power of judicial review in considering question of alternative remedy. But it has got nothing to do in the nature of the dispute available herein. According to me, even judicial review is a clear bar when a statutory authority has not obtained the procedure of alternative mode of remedy available for them on the principle laid down in five Judges Bench of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 (supra ). ( 7 ) THE judgment, reported in AIR 1961 SC 372 (Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Companies, District I, Calcutta and Anr.) is no manner applicable in the present case. I repeat and say that the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner suffers from mis-conception of law. At no point of time, the Court says that alternative remedy is bar unless and until it is clearly prohibited. But such alternative remedy cannot be made available to a defaulting statutory authority to overcome the situation. The public exchequer is not made for the same. Public money has same value which cannot be used to save any incompetent or unruly authority. In such case, costs of such dispute should borne out from his/her or their salary or salaries for misutilising public office. ( 8 ) FACTUALLY, the petitioner is not asking any judicial review but factual review either by the writ Court itself or by sending the matter back ignoring the legal principles to the tribunal which is the final fact finding authority. I fail to appreciate the stand-point of the petitioner even on the factual matrix because the original order passed by the Commissioner, Central Excise Authority for which the petitioner is harping more and more has gone against the respondents. The respondents have proceeded as against such order and able to get an order in their favour by the tribunal which is the final fact finding authority. They have also lost in reference case. The respondents have proceeded as against such order and able to get an order in their favour by the tribunal which is the final fact finding authority. They have also lost in reference case. Therefore, how such order can be recalled in the writ jurisdiction in the garb of so called judicial review when it is finally exhausted either factually or legally best known to them. Therefore, the writ petition cannot succeed. Therefore, the same stands dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Although no order is passed as to costs but the above observation with this regard will be treated as part of the order for future action, if any. Let an urgent xeroxed certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties within 2 weeks from the date of putting the requisites. Petition dismissed