Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 1270 (AP)

Bantu Saidulu v. T. Ramesh

2002-10-31

DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, S.R.NAYAK

body2002
R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ appeal is preferred by the appellant herein, who is not a party to the order impugned in this writ appeal, by seeking leave of the Court. ( 2 ) THE writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 12-4-2002 passed in Writ Petition No. 1674 of 2002. The above writ petition was filed by respondents 1 to 12 herein who are the councillors of Miryalaguda Municipality. In the writ petition, the action of the Revenue divisional Officer, Miryalaguda, the 13th respondent herein, terminating the meeting fixed on 29-12-2001 was assailed as illegal, arbitrary, capricious and against the procedure laid down under sub-sections (3), (4), and (5) of Section 46 of the A. P. Municipalities Act, 1965 (for short "the Act") and for consequential directions to the official respondents to conduct the meeting of no confidence on the motion moved by the writ petitioners and others. The appellant herein is the Vice-Chairman of the miryalaguda Municipality against whom the above no confidence motion was moved. Quite curiously, the petitioners did not implead the appellant as a party-respondent though they assailed the validity of the order of the 13th respondent terminating the no confidence proceedings initiated against the appellant herein. Since the appellant was not a party to the writ petition, quite understandably this serious lapse on the part of the writ petitioners was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the learned Single Judge proceeded to consider the contentions raised by the writ petitioners, and having opined that the notice served on the Councillors did not give three clear days time, found fault with the action of the 13th respondent in terminating the proceedings. The learned judge held that the issuance of three clear days notice contemplated under sub-sec. (5) of Section 46 of the Act is mandatory and since the 13th respondent did not adhere to that mandatory requirement, the impugned order could not be sustained. So opining, the learned Judge has allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of the 13th respondent dated 29-12-2001 terminating the no confidence proceedings initiated against the appellant herein. ( 3 ) THE appellant, being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, has preferred this writ appeal. So opining, the learned Judge has allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of the 13th respondent dated 29-12-2001 terminating the no confidence proceedings initiated against the appellant herein. ( 3 ) THE appellant, being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, has preferred this writ appeal. ( 4 ) SRI Raghuveer Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellant pressed mainly two contentions before us while assailing the validity of the order of the learned Single judge. The learned Counsel contended that the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in law because in the absence of the writ appellant the learned Judge ought not to have proceeded to decide the merits of the matter and ought to have dismissed the writ petition in limine for want of joinder of proper and necessary parties. Sri Reddy contended that the three clear days notice contemplated under sub-section (5) of section 46 of the Act is only directory and not mandatory and in support of the plea he could place certain authorities of the supreme Court as well as this Court before us. ( 5 ) ON the other hand Sri Jandhyala revishankar, learned Counsel for respondents 1 to 12, would contend that the order made by the learned Single Judge could not be regarded as an order prejudicial to the interest of the appellant because the election of the writ appellant as vice-Chairman of the Municipality is not disturbed. In that view of the matter, the learned Counsel would maintain that merely because the appellant was not impleaded as a party-respondent to the writ petition only on that ground the order of the learned Judge, which is otherwise quite sound and valid, need not be interfered with. ( 6 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we find a serious flaw in the writ petition. It cannot be gainsaid that since the no confidence motion initiated by respondents 1 to 12 herein and others resulted in its termination without achieving the object of no confidence motion, undoubtedly the writ appellant should be regarded as a person vitally interested in the order impugned in the writ petition, which is beneficial to him. It cannot be gainsaid that since the no confidence motion initiated by respondents 1 to 12 herein and others resulted in its termination without achieving the object of no confidence motion, undoubtedly the writ appellant should be regarded as a person vitally interested in the order impugned in the writ petition, which is beneficial to him. That apart, it needs to be noticed that sub-section (13) of Section 46 of the Act provides that if the motion is not carried out by majority, or if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence in the same Vice-Chairperson shall be made until after the expiration of one year from the date of the meeting. Since the 13th respondent, by the impugned proceedings dated 29-12-2001, terminated the no confidence motion for want of quorum, the provisions of subsection (13) of Section 46 are attracted and as a result the writ appellant has acquired a right not to be proceeded against him with one more no confidence motion for a period of one year from 29-12-2001. It is trite that this right acquired by the writ appellant is a vital right, looking from his angle. Therefore, when respondents 1 to 12 sought quashing of the order of the 13th respondent dated 29-12-2001 by instituting the writ petition in this Court, they ought to have impleaded the writ appellant as a party-respondent, he being a necessary and proper party to the writ petition. It is trite that the order of the learned Single Judge has the effect of taking away the vested right acquired by the writ appellant by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (13) of Sec. 46 of the Act and such a legal consequence has resulted without giving him an opportunity of being heard. Affected should be apprised is the Constitutional creed. Article 14 of the constitution postulates that whenever the court finds that the affected was not heard before an adverse order was handed down against such person, the Court has the constitutional obligation to step in under article 226 of the constitution to correct the mistake and remedy the consequent injustice. Affected should be apprised is the Constitutional creed. Article 14 of the constitution postulates that whenever the court finds that the affected was not heard before an adverse order was handed down against such person, the Court has the constitutional obligation to step in under article 226 of the constitution to correct the mistake and remedy the consequent injustice. Although the learned Counsel for the appellant cited number of authorities, including S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 sc 136 ; B. Ramanjini v. State of A. P. (2002) 5 scc 533 ; J. ]ose Dhanapaul v. S. Thomas, (1996) 3 SCC 587 ; Rajbir Singh v. State of hanyana, (1996) 2 SCC 19 and Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2000)7 Supreme 209 ), we do not find any necessity to refer to those cases to burden this judgment. As already pointed out supra, since we find that the affected (appellant-herein) was not impleaded as a party respondent to the writ petition and he was totally denied any opportunity of being heard in the matter, the order of the learned Single Judge, with great respect, cannot be sustained in law. ( 7 ) IN the result, we allow the writ appeal and set aside the order of the learned Single judge and dismiss the writ petition with no order as to costs.