JUDGMENT : - 1. THIS writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the petitioners, inter-alia, seeking quashing of the order dated 7-11-1986 (Annexure 10 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhansi (Respondent No. 1). 2. THE dispute relates to a shop being shop No. 19, situate at Nijhai Bazar, Jhansi. THE said shop has hereinafter been referred to as "the disputed shop". It appears that the Respondent No. 2 filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for the release of the disputed shop, inter-alia, against Sri Khubi Ram, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners and the Respondent No. 3. It was inter-alia, stated in the release application that the disputed shop was the ancestral property of the respondent No. 2, and that in Suit No. 85 of 1976, Sri Kishore v. Kaushal Kishore and others, filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Jhansi, a partition decree was passed in the year 1977, whereby the disputed shop and house No. 264 were allotted to the Respondent No. 2. It was, inter-alia, further stated by the Respondent No. 2 that the disputed shop which was just opposite to the General Merchant market, was let out to the said Khubi Ram; and that the Respondent No. 2 had passed his B. Com. Ist Year and because of limit (lim ?) of his right leg, he could not be of any use in life except to run a shop for himself, and that before the said partition decree was passed, the Respondent No. 2 had started General Merchant business in the shop situate in House No. 189, Mohalla Basudeo on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 per month. 100 per month. It was, inter-alia, further stated by the Respondent No. 2 that the business of the said Khubi Ram had fallen down and he had divided the disputed shop into two parts 6" x 40" and 6" x 40" and Eastern part had been given to his (Khubi Ram) son Har Narain who carried on ready-made clothes shop in it, and in the Western part of the disputed shop, he (the said Khubi Ram) had his business in dealing of grains which was gradually coming down; and that for the last several years the Respondent No. 2 was suffering from both mental and economic depressions. The said release application was registered as Release Case No. 45 of 1981. 3. A written statement on behalf of the said Khubi Ram and the said Har Narain (opposite parties in the release case) was filed, wherein it was, inter-alia, alleged that the said Khubi Ram was the tenant of Sri Janki Sharan, son of Sri Prem Narain Pathak; and that the Respondent No. 2. Om Prakash had no right to move the release application as there was no relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties; and that the Respondent No. 2 was a rich man and the family of the Respondent No. 2 had unlimited agricultural land in village Dhamna, Pargana Bhandar, District Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh; and that the Respondent No. 2 had also nine house at Jhansi; and that the Respondent No. 2 had no experience of the business of General Merchandise but he was an agriculturist and was getting education, and as such, he did not want to run any business in the disputed shop; and that the said Khubi Ram was the tenant in the disputed shop for more than 42 years, and, if he was evicted from the disputed shop, he would suffer irreparable loss and his business would be ruined. A copy of the said written statement has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. 4. THE learned Prescribed Authority by his judgment and order dated 13-8-1982 rejected the said release application filed by the Respondent No. 2. A copy of said judgment and order dated 13- 8-1982 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority has been filed as Annexure 1 to the supplementary counter affidavit sworn on 20- 10-1996 filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 in the writ petition. A copy of said judgment and order dated 13- 8-1982 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority has been filed as Annexure 1 to the supplementary counter affidavit sworn on 20- 10-1996 filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 in the writ petition. Against the said judgment and order dated 13-8-1982 the Respondent No. 2 filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Jhansi which was registered as Rent Control Appeal No. 45 of 1982. 5. DURING the pendency of the said Rent Control Appeal No. 45 of 1982, the said Khubi Ram, the tenant died on 13-5-1983, and the petitioners and the Respondent No. 3 were substituted in his place as his heirs and legal representatives. 6. DURING the pendency of the said Rent Control Appeal No. 45 of 1982, the Respondent No. 2 filed an amendment application, inter-alia, seeking to make the assertions that the rented shop at 189, Basudeo Market where business was carried on by the Respondent No. 2 was not in the main market, and that the Respondent No. 2 was suffering a regular loss since the start of his business. The said amendment application was allowed by the learned Appellate Authority. Ultimately, by the judgment and order dated 22-3-1984, the learned Appellate Authority (Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jhansi) allowed the said Rent Control Appeal No. 45 of 1982, and the case was remanded to the learned Prescribed Authority of being decided in the light of the observations made in the said judgment and order dated 22-3-1984. A copy of the said judgment and order dated 22-3-1984 passed by the learned Appellate Authority has been filed as Annexure No. 2 to the aforesaid supplementary counter affidavit sworn on 30-10-1996 filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2 in the writ petition. 7. AFTER remand of the case to the learned Prescribed Authority, an Advocate-Commissioner was appointed who submitted his report dated 23-11-1984. A Photostat copy of the certified copy of the inspection report along with map has been filed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition. 8. AGAINST the said report of the Advocate-Commissioner dated 23-11-1984, the petitioners filed an affidavit sworn on 3-1-1985 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) by way of objections to the said Commissioner's report. A Photostat copy of the certified copy of the inspection report along with map has been filed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition. 8. AGAINST the said report of the Advocate-Commissioner dated 23-11-1984, the petitioners filed an affidavit sworn on 3-1-1985 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) by way of objections to the said Commissioner's report. The learned Prescribed Authority (First Munsif), Jhansi by his judgment and order dated 11-4-1985 again rejected the said release application filed by the Respondent No. 2. 9. IT was, inter-alia, held by the learned Prescribed Authority that on the basis of the said partition decree, the disputed shop came in the share of the Respondent No. 2 and the Respondent No. 2 was the owner and landlord of the disputed shop and he had right to file the said release application for release of the disputed shop against the opposite parties in the said release case; and that the documents on the record showed that the Respondent No. 2 was doing General Merchant business in the said shop No. 189, Mohalla Basudeo, Jhansi; and that there was no dispute on the fact that there was deformity in one leg of the Respondent No. 2. However, the learned Prescribed Authority held that the need of the Respondent No. 2 for the disputed shop was not bona fide and pressing. IT was further held by the learned Prescribed Authority that as the Respondent No. 2 had failed to prove his bona fide and pressing need, there was no question of consideration of the comparative hardships of the two sides. A copy of the judgment and order of the learned Prescribed Authority dated 11-4-1985 has been filed as Annexure 5 to the writ petition. 10. AGAINST the said judgment and order dated 11-4-1985 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority, the Respondent No. 2 filed an appeal before the District Judge, Jhansi which was registered as Rent Control Appeal No. 35 of 1985. During the pendency of the said Rent Control Appeal No. 35 of 1985, the Respondent No. 2 filed an amendment application, inter-alia, seeking to make assertions that the petitioners had established their business in their house situate in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi. The said assertions made by the Respondent No. 2 were denied by the petitioners, and it was further alleged that Teliyani Bazaria had no commercial prospect. 11. The said assertions made by the Respondent No. 2 were denied by the petitioners, and it was further alleged that Teliyani Bazaria had no commercial prospect. 11. AFFIDAVITS and maps were filed by both the sides before the Appellate Authority, inter-alia, in regard to the question as to whether the petitioners had established their business in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi. 12. THE learned Appellate Authority (IV Additional District Judge, Jhansi) (Respondent No. 1) by his judgment and order dated 7-11-1986 allowed the said Rent Control Appeal No. 35 of 1985 filed by the Respondent No. 2 and also allowed the said release application of the Respondent No. 2 in respect of the disputed shop. It was, inter-alia, further directed that the Respondent No. 2 would pay one's year rent as compensation to the petitioners. It was, inter-alia, held by the learned Appellate Authority in the said judgment and order dated 7-11- 1986 that on the basis of the partition decree, the disputed shop fell in the share of Respondent No. 2, and the name of the Respondent No. 2 had already been mutated in Municipal Board and that the Respondent No. 2 was the owner and landlord of the disputed shop. It was inter-alia, further held that the Respondent No. 2 was suffering from Polio and he could not walk without the support of Baisakhi; and that the Commissioner's report showed that the location of premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla had no business prospect, and the documents filed by the Respondent No. 2 also showed that the Respondent No. 2 was getting constant loss in his business. It was, inter-alia, further held by the learned Appellate Authority that the Respondent No. 2 was permanently disabled and it was difficult for him to look after his agriculture personally and there was no cogent evidence on record to show that the Respondent No. 2 had sufficient income from the agriculture; and that the petitioners had also not filed any evidence to show that the Respondent No. 2 had any other alternative accommodation available for his business. It was, inter-alia, further held by the learned Appellate Authority in the said judgment and order dated 7-12-1986 that the petitioners were doing no affective business in the disputed shop; and that the evidence filed by the Respondent No. 2 at the Appellate stage showed that the house of the petitioners at Teliyani Bazaria had commercial prospect and a number of shops existed around the locality and there was sufficient evidence to show that the petitioners were doing their business of General Merchandise at Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi. 13. IT was, inter-alia, further held by the learned Appellate Authority that the Respondent No. 2 was already doing the business of General Merchandise in a rented accommodation at a monthly rent of more than Rs. 100; and that the Respondent No. 2 was paying more than double rent for his said tenanted shop No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, which was 5 feet x 5 feet, and that locality had no business prospect and the Respondent No. 2 was already suffering from constant loss in his business. IT was, inter-alia, further held by the learned Appellate Authority that the disputed shop had better business prospect and it was situated in the main market. 14. CONSIDERING the entire facts and circumstances, the learned Appellate Authority concluded that the need of the Respondent No. 2, who was permanently disabled and who wanted to establish his business of General Merchandise for which he had already gained experience, appeared to be bona fide and genuine need of the Respondent No. 2. As regards the question of comparative hardships, the learned Appellate Authority in the said judgment and order dated 7-11- 1986 held that since the petitioners were not doing any effective business in the disputed shop and were keeping the disputed shop almost vacant and as the petitioners had already opened their business of General Merchandise at their residential house at Teliyani Bazaria, so the petitioners would not face greater hardship than that of the Respondent No. 2 who had no alternative shop and the tenanted shop was giving constant loss to him. It was, inter-alia, further held that the Respondent No. 2 being a permanently disabled man required sympathetic consideration, and because he could not do any other work, so he would suffer greater hardship than that of the petitioners if the release application was dismissed. 15. THEREAFTER, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. It was, inter-alia, further held that the Respondent No. 2 being a permanently disabled man required sympathetic consideration, and because he could not do any other work, so he would suffer greater hardship than that of the petitioners if the release application was dismissed. 15. THEREAFTER, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. Counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged between the parties. As noted above, a supplementary counter affidavit sworn on 30-10-1996 has also been filed on behalf of the Respondent No. 2. 16. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the petitioners made following submissions: - (1) The disability of the landlord-Respondent No. 2 was given undue importance by the Respondent No. 1 in passing the impugned judgment and order. The landlord-Respondent No. 2 was already doing business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi, and the disability of the landlord-respondent No. 2 was not coming in his way in running the business. (2) The medical report relied upon by the Respondent No. 1 in the impugned judgment and order for holding that the Respondent No. 2 was suffering from Polio and he could not walk without the support of Baisakhi, was not duly proved. (3) The Advocate-Commissioner was appointed to submit his report on the question as to whether the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi wherein the landlord-respondent No. 2 was running his business, was in the market or not. However, the Advocate-Commissioner exceeded the terms of his appointment and submitted his report not only with regard to the said rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi, but also in regard to the disputed shop, namely, shop No. 19, Nijhai Bazar, Jhansi. In support of this submission, learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to Paragraph 9 of the judgment and order dated 11-4-1985 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) passed by the Prescribed Authority (First Munsif), Jhansi. (4) The partition suit was decreed in the year 1977, but the release application was filed by the landlord- respondent No. 2 in the year 1981. This shows that the need of the landlord- respondent No. 2 was not bona fide, and he was doing effective business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi. (4) The partition suit was decreed in the year 1977, but the release application was filed by the landlord- respondent No. 2 in the year 1981. This shows that the need of the landlord- respondent No. 2 was not bona fide, and he was doing effective business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi. (5) The conclusion of the Respondent No. 1 in the impugned judgment and order that the landlord- respondent No. 2 was suffering loss in his business being run in the rented shop in premises No. 189 Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi, was not supported by evidence. (6) Finding recorded by the Respondent No. 1 in the impugned judgment and order that the petitioners were not doing effective business in the disputed shop, was wrong. (7) The Respondent No. 1 in passing the impugned judgment and order did not consider the hardship of the petitioners who were old tenant in the disputed shop, and their only source of livelihood was the business run by them in the disputed shop. (8) There was no evidence on the record to show that any business was being run by the petitioners in their house in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi. In fact, in paragraph 15 of the affidavit sworn on 24-3- 1986 (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) filed on behalf of the petitioners before the Appellate Authority in Rent Control Appeal No. 35 of 1985, it was specifically stated that the Appellate Authority could make surprise inspection to verify as to whether any business was being run by the petitioners in their house in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi or not. However, no such inspection was made by the learned Appellate Authority. (9) The Respondent No. 2 had considerable agricultural land, and as such, his need for running business in the disputed shop was not bona fide. 17. IN reply, learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 made following submissions: (i) The landlord-respondent No. 2 was suffering from polio. He started business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi as no shop was available to the landlord- respondent No. 2. The said rented shop was a small shop measuring 5 feet x 5 feet, and the rent being paid by the landlord- respondent No. 2 in respect of the said rented shop was Rs. He started business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi as no shop was available to the landlord- respondent No. 2. The said rented shop was a small shop measuring 5 feet x 5 feet, and the rent being paid by the landlord- respondent No. 2 in respect of the said rented shop was Rs. 100per month which was double the rent which the landlord- respondent No. 2 was getting from the petitioners in respect of the disputed shop. The said rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi was not situated in the business area, and the landlord- respondent No. 2 was suffering loss in his business being run in the said rented shop. On a consideration of the entire material on record and the aforesaid relevant circumstances, the Respondent No. 1 recorded finding that the need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 for the disputed shop was bona fide and genuine, and the said finding was finding of fact. No interference with the said finding of fact is called for in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on the decision of the Apex Court in Munni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29. (ii) The finding on the question of comparative hardships was recorded by the Respondent No. 1 in the impugned judgment and order on a consideration of the entire material on record and the relevant facts and circumstances, and the said finding was a finding of fact. No interference with the said finding is called for in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of INdia. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 that the petitioners were not doing any effective business in the disputed shop and they had already opened their business at their residential shop in Teliyani Bazaria. On the other hand, the landlord-respondent No. 2 was a disabled man, and he was suffering constant loss in his business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, and he had no alternative shop where he could run his business. IN view of the said facts, the finding on the question of comparative hardships recorded by the Respondent No. 1 in the impugned judgment and order was correct. IN view of the said facts, the finding on the question of comparative hardships recorded by the Respondent No. 1 in the impugned judgment and order was correct. (iii) Learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 further submitted that in every case of eviction, there is bound to be some hardship to the tenant. However, if the need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 is bona fide, the release application cannot be rejected merely because the tenant would suffer hardship due to non-availability of alternative accommodation. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2 on the following decisions: (A) N. S. Datta and others v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1984 (1) ARC 113. (B) Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 272. (iv) One of the relevant considerations for deciding the question of comparative hardships is that the tenant must show that he made sincere efforts to find alternative accommodation, but he could not find the same. IN the present case, the petitioners have not shown that they made any such effort to find out alternative accommodation. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 on the following decisions: (a) Ghafoor v. IVth Additional District Judge, Aligarh and others, 1986 (1) ARC 345. (b) Pramod Kumar Verma v. VIth Additional District Judge, Bijnor and others, 2001 (1) JCLR 613 (All) ; 2000 (1) ARC 185. (c) Bansal Brothers v. XIII Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 2000 (1) ARC 513. 18. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. Taking up the first submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that undue importance was given to the fact that the landlord-respondent No. 2 was suffering from Polio, I am of the opinion that this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is not well-founded. The fact that the landlord- respondent No. 2 was suffering from Polio was a relevant fact for deciding the question of bona fide need. The fact that the landlord- respondent No. 2 was suffering from Polio was a relevant fact for deciding the question of bona fide need. A perusal of the impugned judgment and order passed by the Respondent No. 1 shows that the Respondent No. 1 considered various relevant facts and circumstances proved on the record including the fact that the landlord-respondent No. 2 was suffering from Polio, and on a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances, the Respondent No. 1 held the need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 to be bona fide and genuine. No undue importance has been given by the Respondent No. 1 in the impugned judgment and order to the fact that the landlord- respondent No. 2 was suffering from Polio, and the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners to the contrary is not correct. 19. AS regards the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the disability of the landlord-respondent No. 2 was not coming in his way in running the business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi, the said circumstance in fact supports the case of the landlord- respondent No. 2 that he bona fide needs the disputed shop for running his business. The fact that the landlord-respondent No. 2 was running business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi despite his disability on account of his suffering from Polio shows that while it is not possible for the landlord-respondent No. 2 to take up other activity, such as doing agriculture, he was capable of running business despite his disability on account of his suffering from Polio. 20. TAKING up the second submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the medical report relied upon by the Respondent No. 1 in passing the impugned judgment and order was not duly proved, the said submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. In paragraph 23 of the writ petition, it was, inter-alia, alleged that the medical report was not proved in accordance with law and by any affidavit of the Doctor concerned. In paragraph 25 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the landlord- respondent No. 2 in reply to the writ petition, it was, inter-alia, stated that the Doctor's Certificate was not controverted by the petitioners. In paragraph 25 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the landlord- respondent No. 2 in reply to the writ petition, it was, inter-alia, stated that the Doctor's Certificate was not controverted by the petitioners. The said assertion made in paragraph 25 of the counter affidavit has not been specifically denied in the corresponding paragraph 21 of the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners in reply to the said counter affidavit. Thus the medical certificate filed on behalf of the landlord- respondent No. 2 having not been controverted by the petitioners, it is no longer open to the petitioners to contend in this writ petition that the medical certificate was not duly proved. 21. IT is further noteworthy that the learned Prescribed Authority (First Munsif), Jhansi in its judgment and order dated 11-4-1985 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition), observed in paragraph 7 of the said judgment and order that there was no dispute on this fact that there was deformity in one leg of the landlord-respondent No. 2. In view of the said observation, it is no longer open to the petitioners to raise objection regarding the mode of proof of the medical certificate regarding the disability of the landlord-respondent No. 2 on account of his suffering from Polio. 22. IT is further noteworthy that there was evidence on record which included various affidavits as well as the said medical certificate in regard to the disability of the landlord- respondent No. 2, and the finding recorded by the learned Prescribed Authority and confirmed by the learned Appellate Authority regarding the landlord-respondent No. 2 suffering from Polio cannot be said to be perverse or illegal, and no interference is called for with the said finding on the ground that the medical certificate was not duly proved. Taking up the third submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, namely, that the Advocate- Commissioner had been appointed to submit report only on the question as to whether the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi wherein the landlord-respondent No. 2 was running his business, was situated in the market or not, the learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to paragraph 9 of the judgment and order dated 11-4-1985 (Annexure 5 of the writ petition) passed by the learned Prescribed Authority (First Munsif) Jhansi. I have perused paragraph 9 of the said judgment and order dated 11-4-1985. In the said paragraph 9, the learned Prescribed Authority while dealing with the said rented shop in premises No. 189 Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi observed that in order to find out as to whether there were shops near the said rented shop in premises No. 189. Basudeo Mohalla or not, the Advocate- Commissioner had been appointed. The said observation only shows that the Advocate- Commissioner was required to submit his report regarding the location of the said rented shop No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi, but the learned Prescribed Authority no where said in its judgment and order dated 11-4-1985 that the Advocate- Commissioner was required to submit his report only on the said point, and not on any other point. Therefore, the conclusion sought to be drawn by the learned Counsel for the petitioners from the said observation of the learned Prescribed Authority in paragraph 9 of the said judgment and order dated 11-4-1985 is not correct. 23. IT is further note-worthy that objections in the form of the said affidavit sworn on 3-1-1985 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) were filed on behalf of the petitioners against the said report of the Advocate-Commissioner dated 23-11-1984 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition). A perusal of the said affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners shows that the petitioners did not raise any objection that the Advocate- Commissioner was required to submit his report only on the point of the location of the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi and he was not required to submit his report regarding the disputed shop. Hence, it is not open to the petitioners to contend in this writ petition that the Advocate- Commissioner was not required to submit his report regarding the disputed shop, and still he submitted the same. The third submission raised on behalf of the petitioners thus fails and is rejected. 24. THE fourth submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as noted above, is that even though the partition suit had been decreed in the year 1977, the release application was filed in the year 1981, and this shows that the need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 was not bona fide and the landlord-respondent No. 2 was doing effective business in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi. This submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners has no force. Merely because, the landlord-respondent No. 2 continued to run his business in the said rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi for a few years after partition decree and he did not file the release application immediately after the partition decree in 1977, it does not mean that the need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 as set up in the release application filed in the year 1981 was not bona fide. The said circumstance, on the contrary, shows that the landlord-respondent No. 2 made his genuine efforts to run his business in the said rented shop in Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi, but since he continued to suffer constant loss in the said business on account of the said shop not being in the main market, the landlord-respondent No. 2 ultimately filed release application in the year 1981 for the release of the disputed shop. In any case, it is for the landlord to decide as to when he moves the release application in respect of an accommodation, and if he establishes his bona fide need for the accommodation, the factum of time for filing the release application looses its relevance. 25. COMING now to the fifth submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the conclusion drawn by the learned Prescribed Authority (Respondent No. 1) that the landlord-respondent No. 2 was suffering loss in his business being run in the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi was not based on any evidence, I am of the view that the said submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. There was evidence on record which included various affidavits, extracts of the account books, and the report of the Advocate-Commissioner, and on a consideration of the same, the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) concluded that the documents filed by the landlord-respondent No. 2 showed that the landlord-respondent No. 2 was suffering constant loss in his business. The said conclusion drawn by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on a consideration of the material on record is a conclusion of fact, and the same is neither illegal nor perverse. As such, no interference is called for with the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1). 26. The said conclusion drawn by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on a consideration of the material on record is a conclusion of fact, and the same is neither illegal nor perverse. As such, no interference is called for with the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1). 26. THE fifth submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners thus fails. The sixth submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as noted above, is that the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) that the petitioners were not doing any effective business in the disputed shop was not correct. This submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. Learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) considered the evidence on record including the report of the Advocate-Commissioner, and concluded that the petitioners were not doing any effective business in the disputed shop and were keeping the disputed shop almost vacant. The said finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) is finding of fact. No illegality or perversity has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the said finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1). It is not open to the writ Court to assess the evidence and interfere with the findings of fact on the ground that the same were erroneous. Interference with the findings of fact can, however, be made, if the findings are shown to be illegal or perverse. As noted above, no illegality or perversity has been shown by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) that the petitioners were not doing any effective business in the disputed shop. 27. TAKING up the seventh and eight submission made on behalf of the petitioners together, I am of the opinion that the said submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are not well-founded, and the same cannot, be accepted. 27. TAKING up the seventh and eight submission made on behalf of the petitioners together, I am of the opinion that the said submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are not well-founded, and the same cannot, be accepted. A perusal of the judgment and order dated 7-11-1985 passed by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) shows that the learned Appellate Authority considered in detail the hardships of the Respondent No. 2 as landlord and the hardships of the petitioners as tenant on the basis of the evidence on record and compared the same and concluded that the landlord- respondent No. 2 would suffer greater hardship in case the release application was dismissed. The learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1), inter- alia, considered the facts that the petitioners were not doing any effective business in the disputed shop and were keeping the disputed shop almost vacant and they had already opened their business of general merchandise at their residential house in Teliyani Bazaria. The learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) inter-alia, also considered that the landlord- respondent No. 2 was a permanently disabled man, and he could not do any other work excepting running the business, and the rented shop in premises No. 189, Basudeo Mohalla, Jhansi was giving constant loss to him (Respondent No. 2), and the landlord- respondent No. 2 had no alternative shop excepting the disputed shop. 28. HAVING noticed the said relevant facts and circumstances, the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) concluded that the landlord-respondent No. 2 would suffer greater hardship than of the petitioners if the release application was dismissed. The said finding on the question of comparative hardships recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) is a finding of fact. No illegality or perversity has been shown by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the said finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on the question of comparative hardships, and as such, no interference is called for with the said finding in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No illegality or perversity has been shown by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the said finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on the question of comparative hardships, and as such, no interference is called for with the said finding in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As regards, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that there was no evidence on record to show that any business was being run by the petitioners in their residential house in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi, I am of the opinion that the said submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. There was evidence on record which included the affidavit of the landlord-respondent No. 2 sworn on 10-2-1986 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition), the affidavit of Hari Mohan Sharma filed on behalf of the landlord- respondent No. 2, counter affidavit sworn by Smt. Mannu Bai on 24-3-1986 filed on behalf of the petitioners, map regarding the location of the house in Teliyani Bazaria filed on behalf of the petitioners (Annexure 9 to the writ petition), and affidavit of the landlord-respondent No. 2 sworn on 19-4-1986 with accompanying map (Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit filed in this writ petition) regarding the location of the shop of the petitioners in Teliyani Bazaria. Having considered the evidence on record, the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that the petitioners were doing business of general merchandise at Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi. The said conclusion drawn by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) is a conclusion of fact. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has not shown any illegality or perversity in the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1). 29. AS there was sufficient evidence on record, there was no occasion for the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) to make inspection of the house of the petitioners in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi as suggested in paragraph 15 of the said counter affidavit of Smt. Munni Bai sworn on 24-3-1986 (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) filed on behalf of the petitioners. No illegality was committed by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) in not accepting the said suggestion made in the said paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit. 30. No illegality was committed by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) in not accepting the said suggestion made in the said paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit. 30. TAKING up the ninth submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, namely, that the landlord-respondent No. 2 had considerable agricultural land, and as such, his need was not bona fide, it is noteworthy that the leaned Appellate Authority has considered the said submission and has rejected the same. The learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) inter alia, considered the circumstances that the landlord-respondent No. 2 was permanently disabled and it was difficult for him to look after his agriculture personally, and there was no cogent evidence on record to show that the landlord- respondent No. 2 had sufficient income from the agriculture. Considering the said circumstances as noticed in the judgment of the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1), I am of the opinion that merely because the landlord-respondent No. 2 happened to own the agricultural land, it could not be concluded that his need for running the business in the disputed shop was not bona fide. Coming now to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2, let us take up the first submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord- respondent No. 2. The learned Counsel refers to various facts and circumstances established by the evidence on record and submits that the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) considered the entire material on record and the said relevant facts and circumstances and recorded finding of fact on the question of bona fide need which could not be interfered with in exercise of extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I am of the opinion that the submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord- respondent No. 2 is well founded, and the same deserves to be accepted. The learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) has considered the entire material on record and has recorded finding on the question of bona fide need taking into account various relevant facts and circumstances established by the evidence on record. The said finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) is finding of fact. There is neither any illegality nor perversity in the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1). The said finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) is finding of fact. There is neither any illegality nor perversity in the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1). Hence, no interference is called for with the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on the question of bona fide need. 31. IN M/s India pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M. A. Baker and another, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 45, the Apex Court held that the conclusions of facts cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The findings on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord recorded by the Courts below by appreciating the entire evidence cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 32. TAKING up the second submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 that the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on the question of comparative hardships on a consideration of the entire material on record and the relevant facts and circumstances, cannot be interfered with in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I am of the opinion that the said submission of the learned Counsel for landlord-respondent No. 2 is correct. The learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) considered the entire material on record and recorded finding on the question of comparative hardship taking into account various relevant facts and circumstances established by the evidence on record. The said finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on the question of comparative hardships is finding of fact. There is neither illegality nor perversity in the said finding. As such, no interference is called for in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on the question of comparative hardship. There is neither illegality nor perversity in the said finding. As such, no interference is called for in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the said finding of fact recorded by the learned Appellate Authority (Respondent No. 1) on the question of comparative hardship. In Munni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2, the Apex Court laid down that the finding on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord was finding of fact, and the same cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 33. IN Ashok Kumar and others v. Sita Ram, 2001 (2) JCLR 249 (SC) ; 2001 (2) ARC 1 (SC), the Apex Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 9 and 15 of the said ARC): " (9) The position is too well settled to admit of any controversy that the finding of fact recorded by the final Court of fact should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The High Court should not interfere with a finding of fact simply because it feels persuaded to take different view on the material on record. (15) The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter which no reasonable person was likely to take. IN that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. IN a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi- judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. IN a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi- judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. IN exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should beer in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case. " 34. THE third submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2, as noted above, is that in every case of eviction, the tenant is bound to suffer some hardship. However, the contention proceeds, once the need or requirement of the landlord is established, the eviction of the tenant cannot be refused merely on the ground that the tenant would suffer hardship due to non- availability of alternative accommodation. In my opinion, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 is well-founded. In Mst. Bega Begum case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraph 19 of the said AIR): " (19 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11 (1) (h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs a decree for eviction. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs a decree for eviction. " Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down as follows (paragraph 20 of the said AIR): - " (20) Let us now probe into the extent of the hardship that may be caused to one party or the other in case a decree for eviction is passed or is refused. It seems to us that in deciding this aspect of the matter each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable. . . . . . . . . . . " Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down as follows (paragraph 21 of the said AIR): " (21) In view of our findings it has been established that the landlords have not only a genuine requirement to possess the house, but it is necessary for them to do so in order to augment their income and maintain themselves properly. Being the owners of the house they cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to live below the poverty line merely to enable the respondents to carry on their flourishing hotel business, at the cost of the appellants. This shows the great prejudice that will be caused to the plaintiffs if their suit is dismissed. THE plaintiffs have already produced material before the Court to show that their income does not exceed more than Rs. 8,000 to 9,000 per year as the yearly income tax paid by them is Rs. 70 to 80 only. There is no other means for them to augment their income except to get their own house vacated by the defendants so as to run a hotel business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down as follows (paragraph 23 of the said AIR): " (23) It was then submitted by Mr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down as follows (paragraph 23 of the said AIR): " (23) It was then submitted by Mr. Andley, Counsel for the respondents that if the respondents are evicted, they will be thrown out on the road; that hotel is the only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. If the defendants had proved that they will not be able to get any accommodation, anywhere in the city where they could set up a hotel, this might have been a weighty consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the defendants only shows that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that very locality where the house in dispute is situated. There is no satisfactory evidence to prove that even in other business localities there is no possibility of the defendants getting a house. To insist on getting an alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality will be asking for the impossible. THE defendants are tenants and had taken the lease only for 10 years but had overstayed for 20 years and they cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord that they cannot be evicted unless they get a similar accommodation in the very same locality. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further laid down as follows (paragraph 26 of the said AIR): (26) Thus, what has established from the evidence of the defendants is that if they are ejected, they might not get a house as big as the house in dispute in the very locality where the disputed house is situated. There is no clear evidence in the first place to show that there is no other business locality in the city at all or that if there is any other business locality attempts were made by the defendants but they were unable to get any house. Further more, as indicated above, the plaintiffs' necessity is imperative and their requirement is undoubtedly reasonable, because the income which they are receiving including the rent of the house which is in the region of Rs. Further more, as indicated above, the plaintiffs' necessity is imperative and their requirement is undoubtedly reasonable, because the income which they are receiving including the rent of the house which is in the region of Rs. 5,000 per year, is not sufficient to maintain them. Thus, on a careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is tilted in favour of the plaintiff. THE inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweigh the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the defendants. THE High Court has unfortunately not weighed the evidence from that point of view. " This decision thus supports the submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord- respondent No. 2. 35. IN N. S. Dutta case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2, it was laid down that the non-availability of alternative accommodation to the tenant is in itself not the adequate ground to reject the landlord's application for release. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Kamil Khan v. III Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, 1982 (1) ARC 783 and in Suraj Prasad Sharma v. II Additional District Judge, Mirzapur and others, 1983 Allahabad Civil Journal 432 : 1983 (1) ARC 427. 36. THIS decision in N. S. Datta case (supra) supports the submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 that even assuming without admitting that the petitioners had no alternative accommodation in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi, the release application of the landlord-respondent No. 2 could not be rejected merely on the said ground. The last submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2, as noted above, is that even assuming without admitting that the petitioners did not have alternative accommodation in Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi, the petitioners were bound to show that they made sincere efforts to find alternative accommodation, but the petitioners failed to show that any such efforts had been made by them. I am of the view that this submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord- respondent No. 2 is correct. 37. I am of the view that this submission made by the learned Counsel for the landlord- respondent No. 2 is correct. 37. AS laid down in various decisions, one of the relevant factors for deciding the question of comparative hardships is as to whether the tenant has made sincere efforts to find alternative accommodation or not. 38. IN Ghafoor case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2, it was laid down as follows (paragraph 7 of the said ARC); " (7) So far, the submission in regard to the non- consideration of the question of comparative hardship in accordance with law is concerned; suffice it to say that judicial thinking now is that the tenant is under an obligation to lead evidence and satisfy the Prescribed Authority (as well as the Appellate Authority) that reasonable efforts were made by him to secure a suitable alternative accommodation in spite whereof he is not able to find none for himself. See Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 and N. S. Dutta and others v. VIIth Additional District Judge and others, 1984 (1) ARC 113. " In Pramod Kumar Verma case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlord- respondent No. 2, it was laid down as follows (paragraph 12 of the said ARC)" " (12 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It has been found that the son of the landlord having passed B. Com. Examination is unemployed. His elder brother has independent business and the father is also carrying on independent business. He also requires a shop to carry on independent business. On the other hand the petitioner is Goldsmith and carrying on manufacturing and sale of ornaments for the last many years. The burden was upon him as to establish as to what effort he did make to find out alternative accommodation. The application under Section 21 of the Act was filed by Respondent No. 3 in the year 1992 and almost five years have already elapsed. He has not shown as to what efforts did he make to find alternative accommodation. The burden was upon him as to establish as to what effort he did make to find out alternative accommodation. The application under Section 21 of the Act was filed by Respondent No. 3 in the year 1992 and almost five years have already elapsed. He has not shown as to what efforts did he make to find alternative accommodation. One of the test to consider comparative hardship is to find out as to whether the tenant has made efforts to find out alterative accommodation vide Hark Singh v. IVth Additional District Judge, 1999 (1) ARC 365; Kuldeep Kumar v. IXth Additional District Judge and others, 1999 (1) ARC 371 . The son of Respondent No. 3 is unemployed while the petitioner is carrying business for the last more 25 years where he must have earned the amount and could have made efforts to find out alternative accommodation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 39. IN Bansal Brothers case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent No. 2 it was laid down as follows (paragraph 5 of the said ARC): " (5) It is further submitted that the petitioner will suffer greater hardship in case he is evicted as the petitioner is carrying on business for the long time. It has not been shown that the petitioner made any sincere effort to find out any alternative accommodation. The application was filed in the year 1989 and almost nine years have passed. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find it to be a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. " 40. IN the present case as noted above, the petitioners have not shown as to what efforts they made for finding alternative accommodation even if their version regarding Teliyani Bazaria, Jhansi is assumed to be correct. IN the circumstances, no interference is called for with the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Authority on the question of comparative hardships. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 23-2-1987 as confirmed by the order dated 11-9-1987 is discharged. 41. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 23-2-1987 as confirmed by the order dated 11-9-1987 is discharged. 41. HOWEVER, on the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.