ORDER : 1. The appellant was tried for offences under Section 376/511 Indian Penal Code The prosecution case in brief is that: Sharifa Khatun, a young girl of about 10 years, was working as maid servant in the house of the appellant-Ayub Hussain Mandal. On 20.11.1991, at about 7 p.m., after completing the work in the house of the appellant, she was to return to her house. The appellant accompanied her on the ground that he would escort her to her house. On the way, he dragged her to a nearby paddy field and committed rape on her. The appellant gagged the mouth of the prosecutrix by putting handkerchief but somehow she managed to remove the same and raised hue and cry. Thereupon, the villagers, including her brother Jakir, arrived at the place of the occurrence and the accused fled away. The girl after reaching house reported the matter to her mother and others present there. At that time, P.W.2 - father of the girl was not at the residence as he had gone to Gaosaigaon to earn his livelihood. He returned after 5 or 6 days after hearing about the incident from one Baskar Ali. Thereafter, P.W.2 went to the Police Station, but the police refused to accept the complaint. Then he approached the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in turn, directed for registering the complaint and, thereafter, the F.I.R. was lodged. 2. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as seven witnesses including the Doctor and the Investigating Officer. After trial, the learned Sessions Judge giving benefit of doubt recorded the order of acquittal in favour of the appellant. The trial Court found that there was inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R.; there was enmity between the appellant and P.W.2 family; the medical evidence did not support the case of the prosecution; material witnesses like Jakir, Kasim, Jahira and mother of the victim girl were not examined and there were material contradictions between the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and that of the evidence of P.Ws.3, 4 and 5. 3. On appeal by the State, the High Court did not agree with the reasons given by the trial Court for acquitting the appellant. After re-appreciating the evidence placed on record, the High Court found that the reasons given by the trial Court were not justifiable and they were untenable. 3. On appeal by the State, the High Court did not agree with the reasons given by the trial Court for acquitting the appellant. After re-appreciating the evidence placed on record, the High Court found that the reasons given by the trial Court were not justifiable and they were untenable. In that view, the High Court upset the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant for offences under Section 376/511 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for a period of 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, further imprisonment for three months and if the fine is realised the aforesaid amount shall be paid to the victim. Aggrieved by this judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court, the appellant is before us. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant in his arguments at the very outset submitted that the High Court has committed a serious error in reversing the order of acquittal when the trial Court had given cogent and convincing reasons for acquitting the appellant. The High Court ought have been slow in interfering with the order of acquittal. Learned counsel further reiterated in his argument the very reasons recorded by the trial Court for acquitting the appellant. He emphasised that the appellant was falsely involved at the instance of Kasim and the prosecution witnesses were tutored by him. The evidence of victim girl ought not have been believed having regard to the other evidence that has come on record. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State made submissions in support and justification of the impugned judgment of the High Court. 6. We have carefully considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of the witnesses examined in support of prosecution case particularly that of P.Ws.2 to 5 on the ground that there was enmity between the accused and the family of P.W.2 and that there were material contradictions in their statements. The delay in lodging F.I.R. also weighed with the trial Court. According to the learned Sessions Judge, medical evidence did not support the case of the prosecution fully. 7. The High Court, as is evident from the impugned judgment, has dealt with every one of the reasons given by the trial Court for acquitting the accused and has dislodged them by recording its own reasons. According to the learned Sessions Judge, medical evidence did not support the case of the prosecution fully. 7. The High Court, as is evident from the impugned judgment, has dealt with every one of the reasons given by the trial Court for acquitting the accused and has dislodged them by recording its own reasons. It is pointed out that the trial Court did not give much importance to the evidence of P.Ws.2 to 5 on the ground that there was enmity between the family of P.W.2 and the accused. The High Court has pointed out that if there was enmity between the family of P.W.2 and that of the accused, it was improbable and unnatural that the victim girl could be allowed to work in the house of the appellant. As far as delay in lodging the F.I.R. was concerned, the High Court has taken a practical view having regard to the facts of life. The High Court has also pointed out that in cases involving offence of rape, the victims or members of the family of the victim will be hesitant and reluctant to rush to file a complaint as there will be other factors working in their minds, such as the reputation of the family and the career and future of the victim, particularly if the girl is unmarried. The High Court keeping in view the decisions of this Court in this regard has rightly held that the delay in lodging the F.I.R. was not fatal. It is also observed that no cross-examination was made on the point as to the delay caused in lodging the F.I.R. The High Court held that the evidence of prosecutrix i.e. P.W.1 in this case was trustworthy and it was acceptable as P.W.1 in her evidence has narrated about the entire incident giving all particulars. It should also be kept in mind that the age of the prosecutrix at the time of the incident was about 10 years. She also specifically denied that she deposed in the Court as tutored by Kasim. 8. It is true that the names of P.Ws.3,4 and 5 were not told by P.W.1 while narrating about the incident to her mother and others and their names do not find place in the F.I.R.. But the fact remains that P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 have given their evidence and have supported the prosecution case. 8. It is true that the names of P.Ws.3,4 and 5 were not told by P.W.1 while narrating about the incident to her mother and others and their names do not find place in the F.I.R.. But the fact remains that P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 have given their evidence and have supported the prosecution case. Merely because P.W.1 did not give their names, their evidence cannot be disbelieved when the aspect of enmity was not accepted by the High Court. 9. As far as medical evidence is concerned the High Court has stated that a too technical view cannot be taken having regard to the evidence of the Doctor that abrasion on hymen may be caused due to rape coupled with the evidence of victim girl herself. In our view the High Court was right. No doubt Kasim, mother of the victim girl and other witnesses present at the residence of P.W.2 when P.W.1 came and told about the incident were not examined. On facts and circumstances of this case mere non-examination of these witnesses, in our view, was not material having regard to the evidence that is brought on record particularly the evidence of victim girl herself. No doubt, non-examination of material witnesses may go against prosecution in some cases but not in all cases. The High Court observed that if a false case was to be foisted against the appellant at the instance of Kasim the complaint could have been lodged on the very day of the incident without waiting for the arrival of P.W.2. Thus the High Court, in our view, has rightly reversed the order of acquittal. It is not a case of mere taking a different view. It is well settled that the High Court would be slow in interfering with the order of acquittal but at the same time in an appeal against an order of acquittal the High Court has got same powers to review and re-appreciate the entire evidence as in an appeal against order of conviction and if reasons recorded by the trial Court for acquittal are unjustified and untenable, the High Court can certainly interfere. It is one such case where the reasons recorded by the trial Court are unjustifiable and unsustainable. Hence, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.