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2002 DIGILAW 1280 (PNJ)

Ram Saran v. Gobind Sharma

2002-11-21

V.M.JAIN

body2002
Judgment V.M.Jain, J. 1. This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner- tenant against the orders passed by the Courts below, whereby The ejectment order was passed against him by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. 2. The facts in brief are that Gobind Shanna (landlord) filed an eviction petition under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 against Ram Saran (tenant), seeking his eviction from the house in question on the ground that he was the owner/landlord of the house in dispute, where Ram Saran was the tenant under him at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month, besides house tax and that the tenant had failed to pay the rent and house tax for the period 1.10.1986 to 30.9.1989 amounting to Rs. 3600/- besides house tax amounting to Rs. 360/-. It was further alleged that Gobind Sharma-landlord required the house in dispute for his bona fide personal necessity. It was further alleged that the tenant had materially impaired the value and utility of the house in dispute. The said petition was contested by the tenant, by filing written reply, alleging therein that he was the tenant under Kishan Lal, on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-for the last 40 years and was paying the rent to him regularly. It was alleged that Kishan Lal, in collusion with Gobind Sharma, wanted to forcibly dispossess him from the demised premises, whereupon he had filed a suit for permanent injunction, which was pending in the civil court. It was alleged that he had already paid the rent upto the month of January, 1989 to Kishan Lal and thereafter he had sent the rent for the month of February, 1989 through money-order, but it was not accepted. It was alleged that the rent for the period from February, 1989 to September, 1989 has been tendered along with Interest and costs. It was alleged that Gobind Sharma had not disclosed in the eviction petition as and when he has purchased the house from Kishan Lal. It was denied that Gobind Sharma required the house in dispute for his bona fide personal necessity. It was alleged that in fact he was living in his own house, which was a big one having considerable open area. It was denied that he had diminished the value and utility of the house in dispute. It was denied that Gobind Sharma required the house in dispute for his bona fide personal necessity. It was alleged that in fact he was living in his own house, which was a big one having considerable open area. It was denied that he had diminished the value and utility of the house in dispute. On the pleadings of the parties, various issues were framed. 3. After hearing both sides, learned Rent Controller found that the landlord required the house in question bona fide for his personal necessity and hence, ordered the ejectment of the tenant from the house in dispute on that ground. The appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed by the Appellate Authority, upholding the findings of the learned Rent Controller, with regard to the personal necessity of the landlord. Aggrieved against the same, the tenant filed the present revision petition in this Court. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 5. It has been submitted before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that the Courts below had erred in law in holding that the landlord required the premises bona fide for his personal necessity. It was submitted that in fact the civil court decree, passed on the basis of family settlement, vide which the house in question came to the share of Gobind Sharma, was collusive and was not bona fide and was a sham transaction and that no case was made out for ordering the ejectment of the tenant from the demised premises. It was submitted that the Courts below had erred in law in refusing to consider the question regarding the validity of the decree. Reliance was placed on the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Devi Dass v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1213, Krishan Lal v. Ham Chander Sain, 1990 Haryana Rent Reporter 132 and also on the law laid down by this Court in Chander Bhan v. Jai Parkash and Anr., 1992 Haryana Rent Reporter 386 and Mrs. Rehha Sharma v. Smt. Shanker Devi and Anr., (1988-1)93 P.L.R. 315. 6. However, I find no force in these submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. Rehha Sharma v. Smt. Shanker Devi and Anr., (1988-1)93 P.L.R. 315. 6. However, I find no force in these submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. It was found by the Appellate Authority, after discussing the entire evidence led by the parties, that previous owner Kishan Lal had suffered civil court decree in favour of present landlord-Gobind Sharma and that Gobind Sharma was his nephew, being the son of his elder brother. It was also found that the civil court decree was passed on the basis of family settlement. Reliance was placed on the copy of judgment Ex.A2 and decree Ex.A3 passed by the civil court, declaring Gobind Sharma as the owner of the house in question. It was held by the Appellate Authority that the validity of the said judgment and decree could not be challenged before the Rent Controller and that Gobind Sharma became the owner of the demised premises. He had stepped into the shoes of the previous owner namely, Kishan Lal. While upholding the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises, the learned Appellate Authority had placed reliance in the case reported as (1991-199) P.L.R. 483 Vinod Kumar v. Harbans Singh. In the reported case, the demised premises had fallen to the share of landlord by virtue of civil court decree suffered by his father. After considering the requirement of the landlord, it was held by this Court that the landlord was entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant from the demised premises. In the present case as well, Gobind Sharma having become the owner of the demised premises by virtue of civil court decree, passed on the basis of family settlement, was certainly entitled to seek the ejectment of the tenant from the demised premises, subject of course to the proof of bona fide personal necessity. 7. In Ramesh Chand and Ors. v. Raj Kumar, J.T. 2002(5) S.C. 69, the father had given the property in question to his mentally retarded son, in a family arrangement/settlement. Subsequent thereto, the son had filed the ejectment petition against the tenant, on the ground of personal necessity. 7. In Ramesh Chand and Ors. v. Raj Kumar, J.T. 2002(5) S.C. 69, the father had given the property in question to his mentally retarded son, in a family arrangement/settlement. Subsequent thereto, the son had filed the ejectment petition against the tenant, on the ground of personal necessity. It was under those circumstances, that it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that even if the alleged family settlement/arrangement was strictly not a family arrangement/settlement, the arrangement made by the father, who was undisputedly the owner of the property, in favour of his mentally retarded son, for the benefit of the latter, could no be said to be an arrangement not permissible in law. It was held that prima facie, the arrangement incorporated in the document, could be viewed as a settlement of the property by the father in favour of his son. It was further held that the question of title (on the basis of the said document) was not required to be decided in the said petition, but for the purposes of proceeding under the Rent Control Act, the owner had become the landlord and in this view of the matter, it was not open to the tenant to question, the necessity for arrangement/settlement or the legality of the title vested in the landlord. In my opinion, the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, in this authority, would fully apply to the facts of the present case. In the present case as well, Kishan Lal was the full owner of the property in question. On the basis of a family settlement, he suffered a civil court decree in favour of his nephew, Gobind Sharma, vide copy of the judgment, Ex.A2, and copy of the decree, ExA3, dated 30.9.1989. It was subsequent thereto that Gobind Sharma filed the eviction petition against the tenant, on the ground of personal necessity. In my opinion, if Gobind Sharma had become the owner of the property in question, by virtue of a family settlement and was declared as such by the civil court decree, even if it was a collusive, the authorities under the Rent Control Act would not be competent to consider the validity of the civil decree, passed in favour of Gobind Sharma and against the previous owner, namely Kishan Lal. 8. 8. The various authorities, relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, in my opinion, would have no application to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the question before the authorities under the Rent Control Act, was as to whether the Civil Court decree was a valid document or otherwise. If the plea taken on behalf of the petitioner- tenant is accepted, the authorities under the Rent Act were required to consider; the legality and validity of the civil court decree, which cannot be done. It is not a case where the tenant is challenging the transaction as a sham transaction, which could certainly be gone into by the authorities under the Rent Act. 9. In Devi Doss v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1213, (supra), the order of ejectment was passed in favour of the landlord against the tenant on the ground that the landlord required the premises for his own use and occupation. The landlord had purchased the building from the original owner. The case of the tenant was that the sale by the original owners in favour of Mohan Lal (landlord) was not a bona fide one and had been made with the ulterior motive of evicting the tenant. The appellate authority rejected the case of the tenant, taking the view that the tenant could not challenge the validity of the sale-deed, executed in favour of Mohan Lal (landlord) because the tenant was not a party to it. It was under those circumstances that the Honble Supreme Court had set aside the orders of eviction and the case was remitted to the trial Court for recording a finding on the question as to whether the safe of the building to Mohan Lal was a bona fide transaction upon the evidence on record. In my opinion, the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in this authority would have no application to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in the reported case, the validity of the transaction of sale was in question and it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that the trial Court shall give a finding on the question as to whether the sale transaction was a bona fide transaction or not. In the present case, as referred to above, Gobind Sharma had become owner of the suit property on the basis of a civil court decree. In the present case, as referred to above, Gobind Sharma had become owner of the suit property on the basis of a civil court decree. Similarly, in Krishan lal v. Ham Chander Sain, 1990 H.R.R. 132 (supra), the trial Court held that the transaction on which the landlord relied upon, in support of his title, was a sham transaction, but the appellate court, without disturbing that finding, ordered the eviction on the ground that the landlord required the premises for his bona fide need. It was under those circumstances that the Honble Supreme Court set aside the ejectment order and remitted the case to the appellate Court for fresh disposal, observing as to how the appellate Court could order eviction if the landlord had not acquired the title under the, transaction in question. The law laid down in this authority would have no application to the facts of the present case. 10. In Chander Bhan v. Jai Parkash, 1992 H.R.R. 386 (supra), also the tenant had challenged the validity of the sale-deed as a sham transaction, effected with a view to eject the tenant from the premises. It was under those circumstances that it was held by this Court that the appellate authority was not correct in holding that the tenant was not entitled to question the validity of the sale deed. Similarly, in Mrs. Rekha Sharma v. Smt. Shankar Devi, (1988-1)93 P.L.R. 315 (supra), it was found by this Court that the father had given a portion of the house to his daughter as gift and that portion was occupied by the tenant and eviction proceedings had been initiated by the daughter against the tenant, whereas the plea of the tenant was that the gift was mala fide and was a device to eject the tenant. Under those circumstances, it was held that the authorities under the Rent Act could determine as to whether the gift was a valid or sham transaction. In my opinion, the law laid down in this authority would also have no application to me facts of the present case, considering that in the present case, Gobind Sharma had become the owner of the property in question, on the basis of the civil Court decree, which was passed in pursuance of the family settlement and the legality of the civil Court decree could not be challenged before the authorities under the Rent Act. Thus, in my opinion, Gobind Sharma, being the owner of the demised premises, by virtue of the civil Court decree, was entitled to seek the ejectment of the tenant. 11. As referred to above, in the present case both the courts below had found it as a fact, based on evidence led by the parties, that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide for himself and his finally members which constitutes four sons including three married sons having children. It was found that as many as 18 members were living in one house, presently occupied by the landlord and his large family and that the existing accommodation with them was highly insufficient. Both the Courts had found that the landlord required the house in question bona fide for personal necessity. I have absolutely no reason to disagree with the findings of the courts below regarding the bona fide personal necessity of the landlord. It is now well settled that the requirement of the landlord will be seen from the point of view of the landlord himself. Of course, the landlord is required to show that his requirement is bona fide. In the present case, it has been found by the courts below, on the basis of the evidence led by the parties, that the existing accommodation with the landlord was highly insufficient and he required the premises bona fide for himself and his family members. 12. In view of my detailed discussion above, I uphold the findings of the Courts be low, with regard to the bona fide personal necessity of the landlord. Accordingly, finding no merit in this petition, the same is hereby dismissed. However, the petitioner-tenant is allowed two months time from today to vacate the demised premises.