Judgment B. Prasad, J.-The petitioner is a company which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling of Portland cement. The company is a registered dealer under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as “the RST Act” and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the CST Act”). 2. It is claimed by the petitioner that the Government of Rajasthan issued Notification No. F.4 (72)FD/GR. IV/81-18 dated May 6, 1986. By this notification, partial exemption was granted from the tax payable in respect of inter-State sales in the manner and subject to the conditions mentioned in the notification. The petitioner claims that this partial exemption from tax payable on inter-State sales is given to reduce branchlstock transfers on which no tax is leviable under the CST Act. 3. The petitioner claims that the present writ petition is not related to quantum of exemption available under the notification. The dispute circles around the sale of levy cement. The case of the petitioner is that in computing the tax, levy cement cannot be taken into account. The figures of levy cement have to be excluded from levy of tax. 4. The petitioner further claims that in terms of Clause (1) of the aforesaid notification, benefit is allowable to the petitioner on the basis of its percentages of branch transfers. The base year for the purpose of the notification is claimed to be from April 1, 1984 to March 31, 1985. 5. The petitioner moved an application before the regular assessing authority, i.e., Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Pali. It was requested by the petitioner in the application that the percentages of inter-State sales and branch transfers of non-levy cement be determined for the base year 1984-85. This was required to follow the benefit under the notification dated May 6, 1986. The Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Pali, after veriiring and scrutinising the records of the petitioner determined the following percentages of inter-State sales, branch transfers and intra-State sales of non-levy cement of the base year 1984-85 in terms of the notification. Quantity in MT Excluding levy sales percentages Branch transfers 226839.800 85.28% Inter-State sales 6667.400 2.5 1% Intra-State sales 32488.550 12.2 1% 265995.750 100.00% 6. Quantity in MT Excluding levy sales percentages Branch transfers 226839.800 85.28% Inter-State sales 6667.400 2.5 1% Intra-State sales 32488.550 12.2 1% 265995.750 100.00% 6. Regular CST assessments for the assessment year 1989-90 April 1, 1989 to March 31, 1990 and 1990-91 (April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991) were made by the regular assessing authority. An application for rectification was moved by the petitioner in view of the order dated February 3, 1995 by virtue of which the branch transfers, inter-State and intra-State sales were delineated by the C.T.O., Pali. The rectification applications filed by the petitioner were rejected by the assessing authority vide order dated September 21, 1996 on the ground that claim for partial exemption was not made in time. The order of rejection was challenged by the petitioner. They filed two appeals before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). These appeals were allowed by the appellate authority vide common order dated December 26, 1998 and the matter was remanded back to the assessing authority to allow the benefit of partial exemption in respect of inter-State sales of non-levy cement 7. Itwas observed by the appellate authority that the notification dated May 6, 1986 did not provide for any time-limit for claiming exemption and therefore, compared to base year 1984-85, the petitioner’s inter-State sales have increased in both the years and a direction was made to refund the amount. 8. Thepetitioner has further claimed that the department was under obligation to refund the amount and pay tax. The petitioner has claimed that the assessment for the year 1991-92 was completed on January 10, 1995 and appeal was filed before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). In these proceedings, the petitioner had claimed the benefit of partial exemption under the abovementioned notification. This appeal was however rejected. A second appeal in the matter is pending before the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer. 9. In relation to the assessment years 1992-93 and 1993-94, the petitioner filed appeals against the assessment orders. In these appeals, the appellate authority held in favour of the petitioner and remanded the matter back to the assessing authority and a direction was given by the appellate authority that amount of partial exemption should be refunded with interest. 10. 9. In relation to the assessment years 1992-93 and 1993-94, the petitioner filed appeals against the assessment orders. In these appeals, the appellate authority held in favour of the petitioner and remanded the matter back to the assessing authority and a direction was given by the appellate authority that amount of partial exemption should be refunded with interest. 10. It has been further claimed by the petitioner that in partial compliance of the order of the appellate authority, the assessing authority passed order dated March 26, 1999 for the assessment years 1992-93 and 1993-94 allowing partial exemption in respect of inter-State sales of levy cement on account of increase as against such percentages of the base year 1984-85. The assessing authority also directed refund of the amount of partial exemption. The prayer of interest however not acceded to. The assessing authority did not allow the interest while ordering refund for the years 1989-90, 1990-91, 1992-93 and 1993-94. Against such orders of not allowing interest, appeals are pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Jodhpur. Rectification applications are also pending before the assessing authority claiming interest on the refund of amount for all these years. 11. Theassessing authority for the assessment year 1994-95 allowed partial exemption in terms of notification. The petitioner has not claimed partial exemption in relation to the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97. For the year 1997-98, partial exemption was allowed. 10.12. Thepetitioner in the writ petition alleged that for years 1998-99, assessing authority, namely, Commercial Taxes Officer, Pali, did not allow partial exemption vide his assessment order dated January 15, 2001. It had observed that partial exemption was not admissible. Such order of the assessing authority is against the purport, terms and spirit of the notification dated May 6, 1986. The order is also against the orders of the first appellate authority which are binding on the assessing authority. The appeal against such assessment order for the year 1998-99 is pending before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). 113. It is claimed by the petitioner that the petitioner has been granted partial exemption under notification dated May 6, 1986 during the assessment year 1990-9 1, 199 1-92, 1992-93, 1994-95 and 1997-98 on the basis of the notification referred to hereinabove. The exemption for the year 1995-96 and 1996-97 was rejected and appeals are pending against those orders. 113. It is claimed by the petitioner that the petitioner has been granted partial exemption under notification dated May 6, 1986 during the assessment year 1990-9 1, 199 1-92, 1992-93, 1994-95 and 1997-98 on the basis of the notification referred to hereinabove. The exemption for the year 1995-96 and 1996-97 was rejected and appeals are pending against those orders. The petitioner had not claimed partial exemption in relation to year 1995-96 and 1996-97. 114. Theclaim for the partial exemption for the year 1997-98 and 1998-99 is pending before the Rajasthan Tax Board and Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). It has also been claimed by the petitioner that partial exemption has been allowed in relation to 1989-90, 1990-9 1, 199 1-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 by the first appellate authority. The assessing authority has also granted exemption for the years 1994-95 and 1997-98 on the basis of notification. 115. The petitioner alleges that a survey was conducted by Anti-evasion, Circle I, Jaipur, respondent No. 2 at the business premises of the petitioner on February 16, 2001 and purportedly examined the partial exemption already granted to the petitioner for the year 1997-98. The petitioner’s representative fully apprised the officers conducting the survey of the entire position and complete history and convinced them of the purport of the notification dated May 6, 1986. However, the survey officers were not fully convinced and respondent No. 2 has given reassessment order dated April 19, 2001 to the petitioner, inter alia, stating that partial exemption has been wrongly granted in relation to the assessment year 1997-98. By the said notice, the petitioner has been called upon to show cause as to why the said exemption be not withdrawn and penalty under Section 65 of the RST Act be not imposed. The said notice is under challenge in the present writ petition. 116. The claim of the petitioner is that respondent-department has allowed partial exemption to the petitioner and has held that the benefit of the notification is available to the petitioner. Once denied the benefits permitted to avail, the same cannot be now interpreted differently. The interpretation sought to be given by the respondent No. 2 is patently wrong and also against the accepted position. The reassessment notice is illegal and void. 117. Once denied the benefits permitted to avail, the same cannot be now interpreted differently. The interpretation sought to be given by the respondent No. 2 is patently wrong and also against the accepted position. The reassessment notice is illegal and void. 117. Thepetitioner has claimed that it is well-settled that respondent No. 2 cannot re-invoke jurisdiction under Section 30 of the RST Act on mere change of opinion on same facts. It has been claimed that it cannot be disputed that in the present case, the matter of partial exemption directly received attention of the assessing authority on earlier occasion. The assessing officer cannot be vested with the power to reopen the closed assessment. 118. It has also been claimed that the Anti-evasion Wing had no authority to initiate proceedings. The Anti-evasion Wing under Sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the RST Rules”) is not vested with such jurisdiction. The only contingency where Anti-evasion Wing can issue notice is under notification dated October 23, 1967 where a dealer is found to have evaded or concealed liability of tax. Such notice can be issued for reassessment, penalty and interest which is not the case in case of the petitioner. Therefore, notice is without jurisdiction. No case for concealment of liability of tax has been deducted against the petitioner by the respondent No. 2. 119. The respondent-department was issued notice and they have joined issue with the petitioner. The respondent-department has claimed that the writ petition is filed only against notice and the petitioner will have full opportunity of hearing and the questions raised by the petitioner will be decided in accordance with law. The questions sought to be raised by the petitioner should have been raised before the assessing authority. The assessing authority after affording opportunity of hearing would determine the case and therefore, invoking of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is not called. The respondents have stated that the petitioner has raised the following questions “The respondent No. 2 an officer of the Anti-evasion Wing of the department cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petitioner inasmuch as no case of evasion of tax or concealment of liability to tax has been detected against the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned notice given by respondent No. 2 is on its face illegal and non est. Therefore, the impugned notice given by respondent No. 2 is on its face illegal and non est. The condition precedent for invoking reassessment jurisdiction under Section 30 of the RST Act are completely non-existent. Therefore, the respondent No. 2 has got no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice. At the time of original assessment the benefit of exemption was granted by taking into account the already determined and accepted base year percentages of non-levy cement in terms of the notification dated May 6, 1986. Therefore, there is absolutely no scope for the Respondent No. 2 for taking any different view and change the same now contrary to the said notification. Since levy cement has been taken out of the purview of the said notification in terms of condition No. 4 of the said notification therefore, the same cannot be taken into account either for determining the percentages of the base year or for allowing benefit of the tax payable in respect of inter-State sale in the year for which the benefit is being claimed. (e) There is no sale of levy cement in the year in question in as much as levy cement itself was discontinued in the year 1997-98. Therefore, the question of such exclusion has merely become academic.” 20. The petitioner has according to the respondents not correctly appreciated the fact and law and have reply to the points in the following terms: “(a) That during the survey of the business premises of the petitioner made by the respondent-authority it was detected that during the assessment year 1984-85 the petitioner effected sale of cement as under :--Branch Transfer 2,26,839.800 MT 47.28 per cent, Inter-State sale 1,72,874.400 MT 36.03 per cent and sale within State, 80071.200 MT 16.69 per cent. That during the assessment in question, i.e., 1997-98 the petitioner-unit effected the sale of cement as under Branch transfer 798262.070 MT 61.08 per cent Inter-State sale 222617.600 MT 17.02 per cent Sale within State 286499.770 MT 21.92 per cent Thus, it is manifestly clear that during the assessment year 1997-98 there is no increase in the percentage of quantum of goods sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce out of the total quantum of goods sold within the State and in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and despatched to head office, branch office, depot agent or outside the State for sale outside the State against such percentage of sale during accounting year 1984-85. Therefore, the petitioner-unit was not entitled to avail the benefit of partial exemption in terms of notification dated May 6, 1986. However, with an intention to evade the tax the petitioner-unit while computing percentage of sale during the base year 1984-85 excluded the sale of levy cement which was not permissible in terms of the notification. In this view of the matter, the respondent No. 2 has rightly invoked the jurisdiction for the reassessment of the tax and levy of penalty and interest under sections 30, 65 and 58 of the RST Act, 1994. A perusal of the notification dated April 1, 1997 goes to show that the Assistant Comniissioner/C.T.O., Anti-evasion can exercise the jurisdiction over the dealer against whom the cases of tax evasion or concealment are detected and it includes even the non-payment ot tax at the rate notified. The position has been further clarified by the learned Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Rajasthan, Jaipur, by circular dated May 6, 1998. A correct copy whereof is annexed herewith and marked as annexure Rh. It is abundantly clear that on detection of case against any dealer regarding evasionlconcealment of the tax which includes non-payment of tax at the notified rate, the officers of the anti-evasion wing have jurisdiction to pass assessmentl reassessment order of the dealer for the relevant assessment year. Thus, the notice issued by the respondent No. 2 is absolutely in accordance with law and simply does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. That as detailed Supra the case of the evasionlconcealment of tax on the part of respondent-dealer was detected during the survey conducted by the assessing authority on February 16, 2001. Thus, the notice issued by the respondent No. 2 is absolutely in accordance with law and simply does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. That as detailed Supra the case of the evasionlconcealment of tax on the part of respondent-dealer was detected during the survey conducted by the assessing authority on February 16, 2001. Admittedly while claiming and availing the benefit in terms of the notification dated May 6, 1986 the petitioner excluded sale of levy cement while computing the percentage of sale during the base year 1984-85. As a matter of fact, while computing the percentage of sale within the State, and in the course of inter-State trade and commerce or branch transfer the petitioner was not entitled to exclude the sale of levy cement during the relevant base year if the sale of levy cement as aforesaid during the base year 1984-85 is taken into account then there is no increase in the percentage of quantum of goods sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce out of total quantum of goods sold within the State in the course of inter-State trade or branch transfer during the accounting year in question, i.e., 1997-98 as against such percentage during the accounting year 1984-85. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the impugned notice has been issued only on the basis of change of opinion. At the cost of repetition it is submitted that the notice has been issued on the basis of detection of evasionlconcealment of tax during the survey conducted on February 16, 2001. A fortiori as per the provisions of Section 30 of the RST Act, 1994 if for any reason the levy of tax or any fee or sum payable under the tax escaped wholly or in part or the tax has been wholly or in part unassessed or under-assessed in any way or under any circumstances then the same shall be deemed to be escaped assessment then the assessing authority has jurisdiction to complete such assessment on the basis of the material on record after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary. Therefore, it simply cannot be said that the conditions precedent for invoking the jurisdiction under Section 30 of the RST Act, 1994 are not satisfied. Therefore, it simply cannot be said that the conditions precedent for invoking the jurisdiction under Section 30 of the RST Act, 1994 are not satisfied. It is also absolutely incorrect that the words for any reason used in the said section do not authorise the reopening of the assessment on change of opinion. As a matter of fact, the words “if for any reason” used in section are of wide import and the powers of the assessing authority under the section are not circumscribed by any condition. If on the basis of the material on record the assessing authority prima facie arrives at the conclusion that there has been escapement of assessment or underassessment then he has every jurisdiction to issue the notice for reassessment in conformity with the provisions of Section 30 of the RST Act, 1994. Thus, the impugned notice issued by the respondent-authority is absolutely in accordance with law and cannot be said to be without jurisdiction for any reason whatsoever. That in the matter of assessment of the sales tax under the provisions of the RST Act, 1994 each year’s assessment is complete and the decision arrived at in the previous year by the assessing authority cannot be regarded as binding in the assessment in the subsequent year. Each assessment proceeding being a separate distinct proceeding the determination in the earlier preceding year cannot operate as bar by invoking the principle of res judicata. Moreover, if the assessing authority has committed any error during any particular assessment year then the assessing authority simply cannot be compelled to follow the same and perpetuate illegality. He has every authority to assess/reassess the tax in conformity with the provisions of the RST Act, 1994 independently unaffected by any contrary finding if any recorded by the assessing authority for the previous years. This aspect of the matter stands settled by various decisions of the honourable High Courts and honourable Supreme Court which shall be kept ready for the perusal of the honourable Court. This aspect of the matter stands settled by various decisions of the honourable High Courts and honourable Supreme Court which shall be kept ready for the perusal of the honourable Court. That a bare perusal of the notification dated May 6, 1986 goes to show that the reduction in tax payable has been allowed to a dealer only after and in respect of increase which is effected in percentage of quantum of the goods sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce out of total quantum of goods sold within the State in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and despatched to head office, branch office, depot or agent outside the State for sale outside the State during any accounting year as against such percentage during the accounting year 1984-85. Apparently the words “total quantum of goods sold” used in condition No. 1 of the notification refer to total sales of all the three types of transactions, i.e., sale within the State, inter-State sale during the course of inter-State trade and commerce and branch transfer of the goods manufactured in the State, there is no express or implied exclusion of any sale effected during the period. The words ‘total quantum of goods’ are preceded by the words ‘out of shows that the increase in the inter-State trade or commerce during the relevant assessment year for which the exemption is claimed has to be computed on the basis of the quantum of inter-State sale during the relevant base year 1984-85. Therefore, as per the notification so as to determine the entitlement of any dealer to avail the partial exemption in terms of the notification the following procedure is required to be adopted: 1. In the first instance the percentage of the total sales effected by the dealer during the assessment year 1984-85 admissible shall be allowed to the dealer. However, the increase effected in the percentage as referred above in the course of inter-State trade and commerce shall be limited to the extent of decrease in percentage in respect of despatch of the goods to the head office, branch office, depot or agent outside the State for sale outside the State during the relevant accounting year as against such percentage during the accounting year 1984-85. Thus, while assessing the entitlement of the petitioner for partial exemption in terms of the notification dated May 6, 1986, the sale of the levy cement simply cannot be excluded and it has to be taken into account while determining the percentage of the base year for allowing the benefit of tax payable in respect of inter-State sales in the year for which the benefit is being claimed. (e) It is absolutely misconceived to contend that since no benefit of partial exemption are extended on the levy cement therefore, while determining the percentage of the base year the sale of levy cement cannot be taken into account. It is settled law that the exemption being in the nature of exception has to be construed strictly. While interpreting a notification granting exemption the assessing authority has to construe words strictly and cannot extend any benefit beyond the express language used in the notification. It goes without saying that for availing the benefit of exemption the dealer has to fully and strictly satisfy the condition precedent under the exemption notification. In construction of the exemption notification, there is no scope for the possible intendment, assumption or presumption. Therefore, simply because sale of levy cement has been excluded from availing the benefit of partial exemption in terms of the notification the petitioner cannot claim that while computing the percentage of sales during the base year 1984-85 in terms of condition No. 1 the sale of levy cement has to be excluded. As a matter of fact, while making such claim the petitioner wants to read something in the notification which is not there. Thus, the entire edifice of the writ petition raised by the petitioner is absolutely without foundation and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed for this reason alone.” Thus have prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. 21. The petitioner has submitted reply to the preliminary objections of the respondents and have reiterated their stand taken in the writ petition. 22. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted oral as well as written submissions regarding objections to the notice issued to the petitioner. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the notice has been issued by the respondent No. 2. He is an officer of Anti-evasion Wing of the Commercial Taxation Department. This department has no jurisdiction to issue notice to the petitioner. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the notice has been issued by the respondent No. 2. He is an officer of Anti-evasion Wing of the Commercial Taxation Department. This department has no jurisdiction to issue notice to the petitioner. Any notice can only be issued by the anti-evasion wing when there is evasion or concealment. In absence of these two factors, no notice could be issued. 23. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the existence of mens rea is a must before the anti-evasion wing can invoke jurisdiction. In this case, there was no mens rea involved. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner there does not involve any dispute about rate of tax connected or unconnected with the evasion or concealment. In absence of such evasion, the notice would be patently without jurisdiction. The benefit granted to the petitioner in the shape of partial exemption was after due consideration and due application of mind in terms of notification dated May 8, 1986 (annexure 1). Such benefit was granted to the petitioner consistently. Therefore, also the impugned notice is ex facie and patently without jurisdiction and hence be quashed. 4.24. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision of the Taxation Tribunal wherein it was held that in such cases, the anti-evasion wing has no jurisdiction. A division Bench decision of this Court has upheld the decision of the Tribunal holding that under Article227 of the Constitution of India, any challenge to such decision would not merit any consideration. The High Court had not expressed itself in any way on questions involved. 25. It has further been argued on behalf of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that annexure Rh cannot be of any assistance to the department because this circular speaks about the disputes which relate to the rate of tax and in absence of such a contingency, this circular cannot be enforced. Further the circulars cannot override prejudicial decisions. Thus, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the notice should be struck down on the question of jurisdiction. 26. Further the circulars cannot override prejudicial decisions. Thus, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the notice should be struck down on the question of jurisdiction. 26. Thenext point of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the conditions precedent to invoking reassessment power do not exist as provided under Section 30 of the RST Act, 1994 which corresponds to Section 12 of the RST Act, 1954 and therefore, no notice could be issued to the petitioner. All the three conditions a, b and c according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner are non-existing because according to the learned Counsel, Sub-section (a) of Section 30(1) would not be applicable because that involves the fact of registration which is not germane to the controversy. The case of the petitioner will be then governed by either of Sub-section (b) and (c) of Section 3 0(1). In the present case, no case of escapement of levy of tax is existent. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, there is no case of over-assessment or under-assessment of tax. The entire taxable turnover of inter-State sale has been assessed and taxed in the original assessment. In the notice, there are no allegations that the case is covered by Clause (b) or Clause (c). The department, therefore could not have issued the notice. The assessment order dated July 20, 1999 which decided the assessment for the year 1997-98 was after correct and true disclosure of facts. The assessment was made after due application of mind. The order reveals that the assessing authority determined the levy of tax in respect of the entire inter-State sales. The order does not in any way dispute the position. There is no allegation in the impugned notice that the levy of tax has escaped assessment for any reason wholly or in part or that the tax has been unassessed or under-assessed under any circumstances in the original assessment. 27. In the original assessment, the case of partial exemption under notification dated August 6, 1986 has been accepted by the department. Such assessment was on the basis of excluding levy cement sales base year 1984-85. Now, the department intends to obviate the exemption benefits on the basis of changed opinion. 27. In the original assessment, the case of partial exemption under notification dated August 6, 1986 has been accepted by the department. Such assessment was on the basis of excluding levy cement sales base year 1984-85. Now, the department intends to obviate the exemption benefits on the basis of changed opinion. The terms being that the base year percentages in terms of notification should be inclusive of levy cement, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, such case cannot be said to be covered by any one of the clauses of Sub-section (1) of Section 30. The notice is thus without jurisdiction. 28. The case of the petitioner is that it is only a case of change of opinion that such notice has been issued. Mere change of opinion cannot form the ground for issue of notice. Since the change of opinion cannot be made the basis of any reopening, the respondent No. 2 cannot be permitted to usurp the reassessment jurisdiction under Section 30 of the RST Act. 29. The petitioners have placed reliance on a division Bench decision in the case of “Black Stone Rubber Industries Put. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan” reported in [2001] 124 STC 130 (Raj) ; (2001) 3 RLW 1486 (Raj) and has stressed that this Court has specifically considered the question whether mere change of opinion can be the ground of reopening assessment and has answered that such cannot be the contingency. Learned Counsel has his own impression of the Judgment s relied upon by him in the following terms: “However, wider or narrower view of the expression used in such provisions are taken, in our opinion, there is no warrant for contention that mere change of opinion on the