Judgment :- Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. In this writ petition a prayer has been made for giving a direction to the second respondent to confirm the sale dated 21.2.1994 and issue sale certificate. 3. It is not in dispute that the third respondent herein had borrowed money from the Co-operative Bank Land Development Limited and had defaulted in making the payment. A public auction was held on 21.2.1994 for recovery of overdues in R.R.No. 105/92-93. The petitioner herein has been declared as highest bidder. As per the direction of the second respondent, a sum of Rs.20,000/- was deposited by the petitioner on the very same day vide receipt No. 2226. Subsequently on 19.3.1994, the balance bid amount of Rs.35,000/- was paid vide receipt NO. 3012. Thereafter, legal fees was also paid on 30.11.1994 vide receipt No. 3669 in compliance with the direction dated 10.10.1994. It is stated that the petitioner had filed a petition dated 19.9.1994 to confirm the sale. However, since no action was taken, present writ petition has been filed. 4. The second and third respondents have filed their separate counters. The third respondent has taken a stand that subsequently he had deposited the entire amount and since the loan has already been discharged, there is no question of giving direction for confirmation of the auction. Similar stand is also taken by the second respondent. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the parties have relied upon the provisions contained in Rule 129 of Tamilnadu Co-operative Societies rules,1988. The relevant portions of aforesaid Rule are extracted hereunder:- "Confirmation of sale and issue of sale certificate:- (1) On the expiration of thirty days from the date of sale, if no application to have the sale set aside is made under rule 127 or under sub-rule(1) of rule 128 or if such application has been made and rejected, the said Registrar shall make an order confirming the sale; Provided that if he shall have reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside notwithstanding that no such application has been made or on grounds other than those alleged in any application which has been made and rejected he may after recording his reasons in writing set aside the sale. (2) Whenever the sale of any immovable property is not so confirmed or is set aside the deposit or the purchase money as the case may be shall be returned to the purchaser. ................." 6.Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that since no application had been filed to set aside the sale under Rule 127, eventhough the entire money has been deposited, the second respondent should confirm the sale and issue sale certificate. Learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3 on the other hand have submitted that eventhough no application is filed for setting aside the auction either under Rule 127 or under Rule 128(1), the Registrar has discretion not to confirm the the sale and set aside the sale by invoking the power conferred under Rule 129(1) proviso. He has further submitted that since the debt has already been discharged, the question of confirmation of sale does not arise. 7. The proviso to Rule 129(1) relied upon by the learned counsels appearing for the respondents, makes it clear that the authority has discretion to set aside the sale notwithstanding that no such application has been made or on grounds other than those indicated in any application. 8. Learned counsel for the third respondent has vehemently contended that when discretionary power is there, no writ can be issued to invoke such discretion by citing judgments reported in VEERAPPA -vs- RAMAN AND RAMAN (A.I.R. 1952 SUPREME COURT 192) and MANJULA -vs- D.P.I. (A.I.R. 1952 ORISSA 344). 9. The judgment reported in A.I.R 1952 Supreme Court 192 relates to a case of grant of permit under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The High Court watching the proceedings had given a direction to the authority to issue the permit. In the above cited judgment it was observed that it was clearly in exercise of powers and jurisdiction of the High Court. 10. In another judgment reported in 1952 Orissa 344, it is observed as follows:- "It is, therefore, clear that there is a well-marked distinction between the class of cases in which there is a legal duty imposed to exercise judicial discretion and the class of cases where there is no such duty but where the matter is left quite at the will and pleasure of some person or body. In the latter class of cases, the Court will never interfere at all; in the former class it will. See short on Mandamus, p.282." 11. The observation made by the Supreme Court is not applicable to the case on hand. The observation made by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has not laid down that under no circumstances, a writ of mandamus can be issued where discretionary power is vested in an Authority. In the present case, the proviso itself makes it clear that the concerned Authority can act under the proviso by recording his reasons in writing. In order to satisfy myself, to observe any reasons have been recorded, I called upon the second respondent to produce the entire records. The learned counsel for the second respondent has produced the record and has fairly conceded that no reasons had been recorded in writing as contemplated under the proviso. It appears that merely because the judgment debtor has deposited the money, after auction was held, the Rule itself provides that sale could be set aside by recording reasons. When the reasons not having been recorded, it is obvious that the Registrar has set aside the sale without recording any reasons eventhough the Rule contemplates that reasons recording is necessary. 12. In such view of the matter, the writ petition is allowed. Consequently, connected WMP is closed. The intimation of the Registrar eventhough not specifically challenged cannot be sustained and the same is quashed. The Registrar is directed to consider the matter in the light of the provisions contained under Rule 129 of the Co-operative Societies Rules after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as well as the third respondent. This shall be done as expeditiously as possible and in any event, within the a period of two months from the date of communication of this order.