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2002 DIGILAW 1290 (PNJ)

Mahender v. State Of Haryana

2002-11-23

R.C.KATHURIA

body2002
Judgment 1. Mahender, petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) read with Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking direction to the respondents to grant parole to the petitioner under S. 3(1)(b) of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on account of marriage of his nephew (sisters son). 2. Mahender, petitioner is undergoing life sentence in pursuance to the judgment dated 18-1-1996 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat and is presently confined in District Jail, Karnal. The marriage of Shish Pal, nephew of the petitioner has been scheduled to be performed with Chetana daughter of Smt. and Shri Jagpal Malik of Ugra Kheri, District Panipat on 24-11-2002. According to the case of the petitioner, the marriage celebrations will start on 23-11-2002 at Village Kurlan, District Karnal and the presence of the petitioner at the occasion of ceremonies and marriage of his nephew is essential. Even Bhat ceremony has to be performed by him as there is no other member of his family who can do so. It is further stated by him that husband of his sister has since expired and for that reason responsibility has fallen on the petitioner look after the family of his sister. On 2-11-2002, the petitioner applied to the Superintendent, District Jail, Karnal for grant of parole for a period of four weeks but respondent No. 3 had refused to sanction or even recommend the case of the petitioner. It is under these circumstances, the present petition has been filed. 3. In pursuance to the notice given to the respondents, written reply has been filed by Mahla Ram, Superintendent, District Jail, Karnal on behalf of the respondents. While opposing the stand of the petitioner it has been stated therein that the petitioner has already availed four weeks parole from 1-3-2002 to 30-3-2002 for house repairs in the current year under S. 3(1)(d) of the Act and for that reason he is not entitled for further parole in the current year under S. 3(1)(b) of the Act. Under clauses (b) and (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, the period for which a prisoner can be released on parole cannot exceed four weeks. Under clauses (b) and (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, the period for which a prisoner can be released on parole cannot exceed four weeks. At the same time, factual position with regard to the marriage of the nephew of the petitioner scheduled as per his claim has not been disputed. 4. I heard counsel for the petitioner and State counsel at length. 5. As the controversy relates to the interpretation of the provisions of S. 3 of the Act, it is prefatory necessary to notice the provisions contained in extenso. The same reads as under :- 3. Temporary release of prisoners on certain grounds :- (1) The State may, in consultation with the District Magistrate or any other officer appointed in this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions and in such manner as may be prescribed, release temporarily a period specified in sub-section (2), any prisoner, if the State Government is satisfied that :- (a) a member of the prisoners family had died or is seriously ill or the prisoner himself is seriously ill; or (b) the marriage of the prisoner himself, his son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, brother, sister, sisters son or daughter is to be celebrated; or (c) the temporary release of the prisoner is necessary for ploughing, sowing or harvesting or carrying on any other agricultural operation on his land or his fathers undivided land actually in possession of the prisoner; or (d) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient cause. (2) The period for which a prisoner may be released shall be determined by the State Government so as not to exceed - (a) where the prisoner is to be released on the grounds specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1), three weeks; (b) where the prisoner is to be released on the grounds specified in clause (b) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), four weeks; and (c) where the prisoner is to be released on the grounds specified in clause (c) of sub-section (1), six weeks : Provided that the temporary release under clause (c) can be availed more than once during the year, which shall not, however, cumulatively exceed six weeks. (3) The period of release under this section shall not count towards the total period of the sentence of a prisoner. (3) The period of release under this section shall not count towards the total period of the sentence of a prisoner. (4) The State Government may, by notification, authorise any officer to exercise its powers under this section in respect of all or any of the ground specified thereunder." 6. Bare reading of the provisions contained in Section 3(1)(b) of the Act would show that the petitioner is entitled to seek parole on the occasion of the marriage of his sisters son but at the same time, while determining the period for which parole is to be granted, the limitation laid down in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act has to be kept in view. It has been specifically provided therein that where prisoner is to be released on the grounds specified in clause (b) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) of S. 3, the prisoner can be released for a period to be determined by the State Government so as not to exceed four weeks. 7. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this entitlement of period of four weeks laid down in these provisions has to be read independently with regard to clause (b) as well as clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act and cannot be read conjointly so as to limit the period of four weeks in relation to these sub-clauses. As already noticed, this stand of the petitioner has been totally opposed on behalf of the respondents in view of the clear maximum period of four weeks provided in relation to clause (b) and clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. 8. Where the question involved is with regard to interpretation of the provisions of the statute, one has to keep in mind the observations made by the Apex Court in Reserve Bank of India V/s. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Limited, AIR 1987 SC 1023, wherein it was observed as under :- Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted." 9. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted." 9. In Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P) Ltd. V/s. The Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P., AIR 1968 SC 102, it was observed by the Apex Court that a statute is an edict of the legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. Salmond in his book Jurisprudence (11th edition, page 152) had observed that the duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the legislature the mens or sententia legis. 10. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is manifest that the Legislature in its wisdom has chosen to categorise and confine the benefit of parole to four weeks where the prisoner is to be released on the grounds specified in clause (b) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. The above stated provisions as such cannot be construed so as to draw a conclusion that maximum period of four weeks parole is to be linked up conjointly in relation to clause (b) as well as clause (d) as sought to be contended by the State counsel. If the intention of the Legislature was to limit the period of four weeks in respect of the grounds specified in clauses (b) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, then it would have used the word and in between clauses (b) and (d) stated in sub-section 2(b) of Section 3 of the Act and not the word or as noticed above. The scheme of the different period for which prisoner is to be released has been provided under clauses (a) to (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, which itself is indicative of the fact that definite demarcation has been made where the parole is to be granted for the purposes specified therein. Ignoring the above limitation would tantamount to ignore the mandate of law. Ignoring the above limitation would tantamount to ignore the mandate of law. Admittedly, in this case, the petitioner had already availed four weeks parole on the ground of house repairs under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. The prayer of the petitioner being covered under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, the benefit of parole under this clause cannot be denied to him merely because he had been granted four weeks parole on the ground of house repairs under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. There is no merit in the stand taken on behalf of the respondents. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, I accept the petition and direct the respondents to release the petitioner on parole for a period of two weeks under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 3 of the Act on his furnishing requisite bond and surety bond to the satisfaction of the competent authority who shall prescribe the terms and conditions on which the parole is to be availed by the petitioner.