JUDGMENT - S.J. VAZIFDAR, J.:---The appeal from order impugns the judgment and order passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Kolhapur dated 2nd May, 2001 dismissing two applications filed by the appellant. The first application sought to restrain the defendants from selling, leasing and creating any third party interest in a plot of land bearing C.T.S. No. 205/1 and 205/2 (hereinafter referred to as the "said plot") at Belgaum which is one of the suit properties. The second application sought an injunction restraining the defendants from demolishing the existing property and developing the said plot. The reliefs claimed in the present interlocutory proceedings are restricted to the said plot. 2. The appellant is the original plaintiff and the respondents are the original defendants in the same order. 3. At the outset it will be convenient to refer to the relationship between the parties. One Shripal was the husband of one Savitribai who expired on 24th April, 1989 and 31st March, 1987 respectively. Defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 and one Nirmalnath are the sons of Shripal and Savitribai. Nirmalnath expired on 31st January, 1986. The plaintiff is the widow of Nirmalnath. Defendant Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are the sons of Nirmalnath and the plaintiff. Defendant No. 3 is the son of defendant No. 2. 4. The appellant's case is that Shripal was the owner of various properties including the said plot which came to him in a partition effected by a consent decree in Civil Suit No. 31 of 1948; that there was no partition by metes and bounds and the properties continued to remain as joint family properties. The appellant, therefore, instituted the present suit for partition and separate possession of her alleged share in the suit properties. The appellant claims a right through her deceased husband, Nirmalnath, who dies on 31st January, 1986. According to the appellant, during the life of Shripal, there was an informal family arrangement (of the members of the family) whereby various members of the family were put in possession of different properties only for convenience and there was no partition by metes and bounds between the members of the family. The appellant therefore submits that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are wrongly claiming an exclusive right in respect of the said plots viz. C.T.S. Nos. 205/1 and 205/2 on the basis of certain deeds and transactions. 5. The appellant therefore submits that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are wrongly claiming an exclusive right in respect of the said plots viz. C.T.S. Nos. 205/1 and 205/2 on the basis of certain deeds and transactions. 5. Before going any further, it is pertinent to note that the appellant herself claims only a 1/12th share in the suit properties. This aspect assumes importance while deciding the present application for injunction in respect of the said plot which is only one of the suit properties. 6. A Memorandum of Partition Deed dated 4th May, 1953 was entered into between the members of the family including the appellant's husband Nirmalnath. The Memorandum records that there were disputes between the members of the family and with a view to avoiding the relations between themselves being further aggravated, it was decided on 29-4-1953 to partition all the assets as stated therein. The Memorandum thus records the partition which was already arrived at on 29th April, 1953. It further records that the same was acted upon between the parties. Paragraph 5 sets out the properties allotted to the share of the appellant's husband, Nirmalnath. Paragraph 2(a) sets out the property allotted to the share of Savitribai and reads as under :- "(a) Entire property bearing C.T.S. No. 205 Karvir along with open space and after her demise, her three sons are entitled to the said property 1/3rd each." The Memorandum is signed by Shripal, Savitribai, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and the appellant's husband, Nirmalnath. The memorandum and the subsequent documents referred to hereinafter are in Marathi. The translations furnished to the Court have not been disputed. 7. On 24th November, 1953 Shripal and defendant No. 1 made an application to mutate their names in respect of the suit properties. The application referred to the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953. Stamp duty and penalty in respect of the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953 was paid on 9th March, 1955. 8. On 2nd February, 1959 Shripal applied to the City Survey Officer for mutating the name of his sons to C.T.S. No. 112 as under Clauses 3, 4 and 5 portions of Plot No. 112 were allotted to their shares. This application also referred to the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953. 8. On 2nd February, 1959 Shripal applied to the City Survey Officer for mutating the name of his sons to C.T.S. No. 112 as under Clauses 3, 4 and 5 portions of Plot No. 112 were allotted to their shares. This application also referred to the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953. On 2nd February, 1959 respondent No. 1 also made a statement before the City Survey Officer in accordance with Shripal's above application for mutating the names of his sons with respect of C.T.S. No. 112. 9. A further agreement dated 8th October, 1959, was executed by the signatories to the memorandum of 4th May, 1953, who included the appellant's husband. This agreement referred to the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953 and recorded the fact that the parties thereto had acted upon and in accordance with the same. The agreement recites that there were some disputes between the members of the family; that the appellant's husband intended to start a new business and therefore, to maintain relations it was felt necessary to effect a partition as per certain discussions in the presence of relatives. Certain adjustments regarding the mode of sharing rent in respect of some properties was set out. Clause (a)(iii) reads as under :- "(iii) In addition to aforesaid two buildings there is another building bearing C.T.S. No. 205. Said building is allotted in favour of Sou. Savitribai Sripal Vankudre with full ownership along with open space therein and she will be fully entitled to dispose off the said building. As the said building is allotted to her, she shall not have any right over other properties of the family." It is pertinent to note that the signatories to the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953 including the appellant's husband were signatories to this agreement as well. 10. On 7th August, 1963 Shripal, Savitribai and respondent No. 2 made an application for mutating the name of only Savitribai to the said plots stating that Savitribai had received the property as full owner under the partition and that she was in actual possession thereof. On 21st August, 1963 Shripal and the appellant's husband made a statement before the City Survey Officer confirming the above application dated 7th August, 1963. On 4th September, 1963, respondent No. 1 made a similar statement before the City Survey Officer and requested that his name be deleted in respect of the said plot. 11. On 21st August, 1963 Shripal and the appellant's husband made a statement before the City Survey Officer confirming the above application dated 7th August, 1963. On 4th September, 1963, respondent No. 1 made a similar statement before the City Survey Officer and requested that his name be deleted in respect of the said plot. 11. Thus the appellant's husband had accepted the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953 as well as the agreement dated 8th October, 1959. He also acted pursuant to and upon the agreement and derived benefit thereunder. 12. On 4th June, 1984, Savitribai executed a registered gift deed in favour of respondent No. 3 i.e. respondent No. 2's son in respect of C.T.S. No. 205/1 and 205/2. Accordingly on 25th July, 1984 the name of respondent No. 3 was mutated in the property card of C.T.S. No. 205/1 and 205/2. 13. On 31st January, 1986 the appellant's husband expired. The appellant's husband never raised any dispute in respect of the gift dated 4th June, 1984 either. 14. The importance of the appellant's husband's above conduct (viz. executing the documents of 4th May, 1953 and 8th October, 1959, acting pursuant thereto and deriving benefits thereunder as well as his statement before the City Survey Officer confirming the application for mutating his mother Savitribai's name to the plots stating that she was the full owner and in possession thereof and not challenging the gift dated 4th June, 1984) is obvious and does not require to be emphasised. 15. The appellant's conduct thereafter is as, if not more, important. On 10th December, 1986 the appellant made an application to the City Survey Officer to mutate the names of the heirs of her deceased husband including herself to C.T.S. Nos. 112 and 46. The importance of this act on the part of the appellant was that C.T.S. Nos. 112 and 46 came to the share of the appellant's deceased husband under the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953. The appellant herself also, therefore, acted upon and took benefit under the memorandum dated 4th May, 1953 and the agreement dated 8th October, 1959. 16. It is also not disputed that after the registered gift deed was executed by Savitribai on 4th June, 1984 in his favour, respondent No. 3 took a series of steps to safeguard and secure his right, title and interest in respect of the said plot. 16. It is also not disputed that after the registered gift deed was executed by Savitribai on 4th June, 1984 in his favour, respondent No. 3 took a series of steps to safeguard and secure his right, title and interest in respect of the said plot. Respondent No. 3 issued notices to tenants, filed suits and obtained decrees against them and prosecuted various litigations in that behalf in the trial Court, the Appellate Court and finally even in the Supreme Court. Respondent No. 3 has also raised various loans for his family against the said plot. 17. For over a decade the appellant did not raise any claim in respect of the said plots. It was only after the efforts of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 started yielding results that the appellant filed the present suit in January, 2000 and moved an application for interim reliefs on 30th June, 2000. 18. In the meantime on 5th March, 2001 respondent No. 3 entered into a registered development agreement for developing the said plot. It appears that the developer has also raised a loan against the said property and has demolished the entire structure thereon. Despite the same, the developer is not made a party to the present proceedings. On this ground alone the appellant's applications for interim reliefs are liable to be rejected. 19. The conduct of the appellant has been less than fair and honest. There is little doubt that she was aware of the memorandum, agreement and gift-deed. In any event, it is established beyond doubt that her deceased husband was not only a party to but had expressly concurred in the same. As stated above, the appellant's deceased husband in fact derived benefit under the memorandum and the agreement. It bears repetition that even the appellant derived benefit under the memorandum and agreement. It is unfortunate that there is a complete volte-face on her part. Moreover having retained the benefits she is now attempting to grab what was by consent of the parties given to the other members of the family including her mother-in-law Savitribai. Equity can be no stretch of imagination be said to be in her favour. The appellant is not entitled to any discretionary reliefs. 20. The trial Court has also rightly held that the balance of convenience is in favour of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Equity can be no stretch of imagination be said to be in her favour. The appellant is not entitled to any discretionary reliefs. 20. The trial Court has also rightly held that the balance of convenience is in favour of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is they who protected and preserved the said plots. It is they who prosecuted the litigations at their expense to safeguard their interest in the property. All this while the appellant said and did nothing. Loans have been taken against the said property and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have altered their position to their detriment. Third party rights have now intervened. Yet the appellant has made no attempt to make them parties to the litigation. In these circumstances, it will be highly unjust and unfair to grant the discretionary reliefs of an injunction in favour of the appellant. Any injunction would cause grave harm and irreparable injury to respondent Nos. 2 and 3. On the other hand, if an injunction is refused, the appellant will suffer no harm or injury. 21. That the balance of convenience lies in favour of the respondent is strengthened by the fact that at the highest, the appellant has only a 1/12th interest in the property of Shripal. If the petitioner succeeds in the suit property, the properties which went to the share of the appellant's deceased husband, would also have to be made available in the partition. As stated above, the appellant's husband and the appellant have enjoyed the benefit of certain properties which fell to the share of the appellant's husband under the memorandum and the agreement. It is not disputed that the same adequately safeguards the alleged 1/12th interest of the appellant in the properties of which she claims a partition. On this ground also, the appellant's application is liable to be rejected. 22. Faced with this situation, Mr. Walawalkar submitted that Savitribai being a female, was not entitled to be granted any share in the property by the memorandum dated 4th May, 1952 and the agreement dated 8th October, 1959. On this ground also, the appellant's application is liable to be rejected. 22. Faced with this situation, Mr. Walawalkar submitted that Savitribai being a female, was not entitled to be granted any share in the property by the memorandum dated 4th May, 1952 and the agreement dated 8th October, 1959. In this regard, he relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Hiraji Tolaji Bagwan v. Shakuntala)1, reported in 1990(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)265, where the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 observed as follows: "A partition of the property can only be among the parties who have a pre-existing right to the property. Under the Hindu law, a female is given a share either in the self-acquired property of the husband or the father, or in the share of the husband nor the father in the coparcenary property after the property is partitioned." 23. The memorandum of 4th May, 1953 gave a life interest in respect of the said plot to Savitribai after which the same was to go to the three sons in equal shares. Thus the memorandum of 4th May, 1953 did not grant the plot to Savitribai absolutely. The judgment of the Supreme Court would therefore be inapplicable to the facts of this case so far as the memorandum of 4th May, 1953 is concerned. Thereafter the three sons i.e. including the appellant's husband were free to deal with the said plot. They did so by the agreement of 8th October, 1959. Mr. Walawalkar was unable to show any impediment in the rights of the three sons to do so. In this view of the matter, it is really unnecessary for me to deal with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Lakshmi Chand Khajuria and others v. Smt. Ishroo Devi)2, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1694 cited by Mr. Kumbhakoni, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 24. Faced with this situation, Mr. Walawalkar submitted that the memorandum of 4th May, 1953 was not a registered document and therefore cannot create any right in favour of the parties thereto. Firstly the memorandum of 4th May, 1953 and the agreement of 8th October, 1959 are in substance family arrangements arrived at with a view to avoiding any escalation in the disputes which already existed between the family members. This is clear from the documents. Firstly the memorandum of 4th May, 1953 and the agreement of 8th October, 1959 are in substance family arrangements arrived at with a view to avoiding any escalation in the disputes which already existed between the family members. This is clear from the documents. Moreover as stated above, the memorandum of 4th May, 1953 merely recorded the prior arrangement of 29th April, 1953 which had even been acted upon. Registration of such a document is not necessary. The Supreme Court in the case of (Kale and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 807 held as under :- "10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions : .................... (4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of section 17(2) (sic) (section 17(1)(b) ?) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registerable :" 25. Further as stated above, the appellant's husband through whom the appellant claims, had acted upon the said documents and had derived benefit thereunder. The appellant herself also affirmed the agreements as stated above and further raised no objection in respect thereof for a number of years. In such circumstances even assuming that the documents were required to be registered, their conduct operated as an estoppel preventing them from resiling from the arrangements. In Kale's case (supra) the Supreme Court held as under- "38. Rebutting the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sharma for the respondents contended that no question of estoppel would arise in the instant case inasmuch as if the document was to be compulsorily registerable there can be no estoppel against the statute...... In Kale's case (supra) the Supreme Court held as under- "38. Rebutting the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sharma for the respondents contended that no question of estoppel would arise in the instant case inasmuch as if the document was to be compulsorily registerable there can be no estoppel against the statute...... Assuming, however, that the said document was compulsorily registerable the courts have generally held that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to it would operate as an estoppel by preventing the parties after having taken advantage under the arrangement to resile from the same or try to revoke it. This principle has been established by several decisions of this Court as also of the Privy Council. In (Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal)4, 45 Indian Application 118 at p. 124 : A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 70 at p. 74, the Privy Council applied the principle of estoppel to the facts of the case and observed as follows: "Kanhai Lal was a party to that compromise. He was one of those whose claims to the family property, or to shares in it, induced Ram Dei, against her daughter, Kirpa, and greatly to her own detriment, to alter her position by agreeing to the compromise, and under that compromise he obtained a substantial benefit, which he has hither to enjoyed. In their Lordships opinion he is bound by it, and cannot now claim as a reversioner." 26. It is well established that the courts generally lean in favour of family arrangements, take a very liberal and broad view of the validity of family arrangements and try to uphold and maintain them rather then strike them down on frivolous grounds. The principle is well settled and it is unnecessary to refer to all the decisions. If any authority is required in this regard, it is sufficient to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kale's case (supra). 27. In the circumstances, the impugned order warrants no interference. The A.O. is dismissed with costs fixed at Rs. 3,000/-. 28. Mr. Kumbhakoni fairly states that no further third party rights shall be created in respect of the said plot for a period of six weeks from today. Parties to act on 'an ordinary copy of this order, duly authenticated by the P.S./Sheristedar of this Court. -----