Judgment G. S. SINGHVI J. 1. This petition is directed against award annexure P-l dated 23/05/1994, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab (for short "the tribunal"), in Reference No.39 of 1992. 2. For the purpose of deciding the issues raised in the petition, it will be useful to notice the relevant facts. 3. In exercise of the power vested in him under bye-law 26, the Registrar, Co-operative societies, Punjab, in consultation with the board of directors of the Punjab State co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation ltd. (for short "the Federation"), framed the punjab State Supply and Marketing co-operative Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1967 (for short "the 1967 Rules"), which were made applicable to the employees working in the services of the Federation and to such employees of the co-operative marketing/processing societies and the District wholesale Supply and Marketing Co-operative societies to be declared suitable as per the screening conducted in pursuance of Rule 2.2 A (a and b) of the 1967 Rules. The posts to which the 1967 Rules were made applicable were specified in annexure 1 appended to the said rules. In the appointment orders of the employees of the Federation, it was clearly mentioned that their service conditions would be governed by the 1967 Rules. On 8/07/1978, the board of directors of the Federation passed resolution and reiterated that the employees belonging to the categories mentioned in annexure I are covered under the common Cadre Rules by virtue of clear-cut provisions of Rules 1.3 and 1.4. As regards the remaining categories, it was resolved that the marketing director should review the position and put up the matter in the meeting. The relevant extract of resolution dated 8/07/1978, is reproduced below: "categories mentioned in annexure I whether in head office or in factories are covered under Common Cadre Rules, 1967, in view of the clear-cut provisions of Rules 1.3 and 1.4 ibid. Board of directors is of the 1 view that in respect of these categories provisions of Common Cadre Rules should be made applicable with effect from 8/07/1978. In respect of remaining categories not covered under annexure I, managing director should review the position and put up before board of directors in next meeting. Board of directors is of the 1 view that in respect of these categories provisions of Common Cadre Rules should be made applicable with effect from 8/07/1978. In respect of remaining categories not covered under annexure I, managing director should review the position and put up before board of directors in next meeting. Application of Common Cadre rules shall not entitle any category of employees technical or non-technical automatically to higher pay scale or common seniority vis-a-vis incumbents of similar posts in the head office or in the field. " ; 4. In 1985, a dispute arose regarding the age of retirement of class IV employees working in Markfed plants/units. This was considered in the meeting of the board of directors of the Federation held on 8/11/1985, and the following resolutions were passed: " (ij On consideration, the board felt that the extension of the facility of Common Cadre rules to some selected categories of plant workers to the exclusion of others would create anomalies between various sections of plant employees whose service conditions are otherwise governed by the model standing orders. Board, therefore, resolved that the decision taken by it in its meeting dated July 8, 1978, be and is hereby rescinded. (ii) Further resolved that the managing director be and is hereby authorised to withdraw any benefit that may have accrued to any categories of employees of the plants consequent upon the above decision of the board dated 8/07/1978, to extend the facility of Common Cadre Rules. (iii) Further resolved that the age of retirement as mutually agreed between the management and class IV employees of markfed plants and units in terms of Rule 39 of the model standing orders be 58 years as here-to-fore. 5. In furtherance of resolution dated 8/11/1985, the managing director of the Federation directed issuance of notice under section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act"), proposing to effect change in the conditions of service of the workers employed in the plants and factories of the Federation. The copies of notices were sent to the manager/general manager, Markfed punjab Fertilizers, Ludhiana, with a direction to them to serve the same upon the employees union. The copies of notices were sent to the manager/general manager, Markfed punjab Fertilizers, Ludhiana, with a direction to them to serve the same upon the employees union. A copy of the notice is said to have been displayed on the main entrance gate of the harvester Combine unit and one copy was endorsed to the Secretary, Punjab Markfed employees Union (Regd.) HC unit and Punjab fertilizers, A-2, Industrial Focal Point, ludhiana. The workmen, who were adversely affected by resolution dated 8/11/1985, raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the State Government to the tribunal. They claimed that their conditions of service had been changed prejudicially affecting them without giving notice under section 9-A of the Act, and, therefore, the resolution passed by the board of directors is liable to be invalidated. They also pleaded that the board of directors of the Federation did not have the jurisdiction to amend/modify the 1967 rules so as to deprive them of the benefits admissible under those Rules. According to the workmen, the Registrar alone was competent to amend or modify the 1967 Rules and in any case, this could not be done by the management of the Federation without prior approval of the registrar. 6. The employer (petitioners herein)contested the claim of the workmen by asserting that change in the conditions of service of the workmen had been effected after giving notice to them through their union. They further averred that the managing director was competent to implement the resolution passed by the board of directors and it was not necessary to obtain approval of the Registrar, co-operative Societies, Punjab. 7. After considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the Tribunal answered the reference in favour of the workmen and declared that the decision of the board of directors was legally unsustainable and that the 1967 Rules, shall continue to govern the workmen. 8. Shri Anil Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the impugned award by arguing that the finding recorded by the tribunal on the issue of service of notice on the workmen is erroneous. 8. Shri Anil Malhotra, learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the impugned award by arguing that the finding recorded by the tribunal on the issue of service of notice on the workmen is erroneous. He submitted that in furtherance of resolution annexure P-3 dated 8/11/1985, notice in the prescribed form had been sent by the managing director to the concerned general manager/manager who, in turn, effected service by displaying the same on the main entrance gate of the unit and also by sending a copy thereof to the Secretary of the employees union. He submitted that service of notice upon the employees union should be treated as sufficient compliance with the requirement of Sec.9-A of the Act. Shri malhotra then argued that the board of directors of the Federation is competent to decide the issue relating to the applicability of the 1967 rules to the particular categories of employees and the Tribunal committed a serious error by granting a declaration that resolution dated 8/11/1985, was invalid. 9. Shri Gurinder Pal Singh, counsel for respondent No.2 supported the impugned award and argued that the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on the issue of service of notice upon the workmen does not call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because it is based on proper appreciation of evidence. He referred to the statement of the managements witness, namely, Shri Madan Lal Chung, senior assistant, Markfed, who had admitted that there was no evidence regarding service of notice under Sec.9-A of the Act upon the workmen and argued that in the face of this candid admission made by their own witness, the petitioners cannot challenge the finding recorded by the Tribunal. Learned counsel also relied on bye-law 26 of the bye-laws of the federation and argued that the board of directors cannot amend or modify the 1967 rules. 10. Before dealing with the arguments of learned counsel, I consider it appropriate to notice the parameters laid down by the Supreme court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High court under Article 226 of the Constitution of 2 india to issue a writ of certiorari. 10. Before dealing with the arguments of learned counsel, I consider it appropriate to notice the parameters laid down by the Supreme court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High court under Article 226 of the Constitution of 2 india to issue a writ of certiorari. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals or where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or the Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, i. e. , it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted by it is opposed to the principles of natural justice. It is equally well settled that the jurisdiction of the High court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and not an appellate one and an order or award passed by the inferior Court or Tribunal cannot be nullified except when it suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The question as to whether an order or award suffers from an error of law cannot be decided by applying a straight-jacket formula but, broadly speaking, an error of law is one which can be discovered on a bare reading of the impugned order or award. An error, the discovery of which is possible only after a detailed scrutiny of the evidence produced by the parties and lengthy arguments at the Bar, cannot be regarded as an error of law which may justify issuance of a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, as a result of appreciation of evidence, cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings, unless it is shown that in recording the said finding, the court or the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence and the same influenced its finding/conclusion. Likewise, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as perverse and can be corrected. However, the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior Court or Tribunal or the quasi- judicial authority cannot be gone into by the High Court while considering the prayer for grant of a writ of certiorari. Likewise, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as perverse and can be corrected. However, the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior Court or Tribunal or the quasi- judicial authority cannot be gone into by the High Court while considering the prayer for grant of a writ of certiorari. Similarly, the mere possibility of forming a different opinion on reappreciation of evidence produced by the parties is not sufficient for issue of a writ of certiorari. 11. In Syed Yakoob V/s. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, their lordships of the Supreme Court considered the scope of writ of certiorari and held as under: " The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. . . The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the points cannot be agitated before a writ court. " 12. In Shaikh Mohammad Umarsaheb V/s. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab, AIR 1970 SC 61 : 1969 (1) SCC 741, their Lordships of the supreme Court, while dealing with the power of the High Court under Article 226 to reappreciate the evidence produced before the trial Judge, held as under (headnote): "where the evidence adduced before the trial judge was not so immaculate that another judge might not have taken a different view, it cannot be said that there was no evidence on which the trial judge could have come to the conclusion he did. When the trial Court accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227. " 13. When the trial Court accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227. " 13. In Jitendra Nath Rathor V/s. Baidyanath ayurved Bhawan Ltd. AIR 1984 SC 976 : 1984 (3) SCC 5 : 1984-II-LLJ-10, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of certiorari jurisdiction of the High court qua the award passed by the Tribunal under the Act and held as under: "the High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinise the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it could in an appropriate case quash the award of the tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions if any. The High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it. " 14. I may now advert to the impugned award, a perusal of which shows that the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal critically evaluated the evidence produced by the parties and observed as under: "in their evidence, the management examined Shri Madan Lal Chug, senior assistant, Markfed, who in his affidavit, stated that Common Cadre Rules have been withdrawn by the board of directors in its meeting held on 23/02/1988, and before withdrawal of the application of common Cadre Rules, notice under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act was given to the workmen. He further stated in his affidavit taken as examination- in-chief that bye-laws of the Markfed vested the powers to the board of directors towards appointment and determination or the service of conditions of its employees. His further examination- in-chief is the repetition of the case of the Federation stating that the board of directors was competent to withdraw the benefits. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the board of directors has passed that Common cadre Rules, 1967, shall apply to the markfed plant workers on 8/07/1978. This concession has been withdrawn by the board on 28/03/1987. No prior approval of the Registrar, Co-operative societies was taken as none was required. He was not sure whether any receipt of the notices was available in the record and he produced none. This concession has been withdrawn by the board on 28/03/1987. No prior approval of the Registrar, Co-operative societies was taken as none was required. He was not sure whether any receipt of the notices was available in the record and he produced none. He has further stated that no service conditions have been laid down for the plant workers by the board of directors. They are governed by the industrial law. " The workers examined Shri Hem Raj, concerned workman as W. W.-1 who stated that he joined the service of the respondent in the year 1973 against the post of storekeeper posting at dhuri in Markfed Fertilizer Plant, Dhuri district sangrur and according to the terms and conditions of his appointment letter, his services were to be governed under the Markfed common Cadre Rules, 1967. He further stated that the board of directors in its meeting dated 7/07/1978, had decided to make applicable to the Common Cadre Rules, 1967, for all categories of service mentioned in annexure I of the Rules, 1967, whether working in the head office or in factories of the respondent and circulated the same, vide their letter dated 3/01/1979, and 20/02/1979. It is further stated by him that the board of directors subsequently decided in its meeting dated 8/11/1985, to rescind its own decision taken in the meeting of 8/07/1978, and through its resolution dated 23/02/1988, decided to withdraw the benefit of applicability of Common Cadre Rules to plant workers with effect from 28/03/1987. It is further stated by him that the respondent before withdrawing the benefit of the applicability of Common cadre Rules did not serve upon the workmen or their union any notice under Sec.9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, intimating them their intention to withdraw the benefit and proposing alternative Service Rules regarding their service conditions nor it was conveyed as to why the benefit is being withdrawn and what are the reasons for the same. It is further stated by him that approval of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies has not been taken. In his cross-examination he stated that before 4/08/1988, for all employees, Common Cadre rules were framed. He denied that any notice was passed on the notice board. I have gone through the evidence and heard the parties. It is further stated by him that approval of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies has not been taken. In his cross-examination he stated that before 4/08/1988, for all employees, Common Cadre rules were framed. He denied that any notice was passed on the notice board. I have gone through the evidence and heard the parties. The case of the workmen is that Common Cadre Rules, 1967, were applicable to them as the board of directors, vide its resolution had decided to apply the same to them and now the board of directors has decided to withdraw the same from back date which they cannot do as no notice has been given to the workmen for changing their service conditions nor any approval of the Registrar, Co- operative Societies had been taken. 15. The learned Presiding Officer then considered the question relating to jurisdiction of the board of directors to withdraw the applicability of the 1967 Rules to the workmen and held as under: "it is not disputed that earlier Common cadre Rules were applicable to all categories of service mentioned in annexure i of Rules, 1967, whether working in the head office or in the factories of the respondent. Later on, the workers of the factory were excluded. The case of the management is that notice under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for changing the service conditions of the workmen was given, but no evidence has been led before me to show whether any notice was served on any worker or the union or it was pasted on the notice board. It is not disputed that no permission of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies was taken. It is also not disputed that the decision was made applicable from the back date. As at one stage, the workers were governed by the Common Cadre Rules and that benefit was withdrawn, notice was to be issued to them or their representative or their point of view was to be considered before decision is taken and the decision taken will be effective from the date of decision if it is to be made applicable from back date, reasons for the same are to be given. Markfed is a co-operative society and registrar, Co-operative Societies is very much in the picture. Markfed is a co-operative society and registrar, Co-operative Societies is very much in the picture. If the service conditions of the employees are to be changed, Markfed being a co-operative society, the Registrar has to be (sic) kept in the picture and it cannot be said his approval earlier or later is not required for changing the service conditions. The board of directors of Markfed has changed the service conditions of the workers without giving any notice or assigning any reason for the same and without any intimation to the Registrar. The representative of the respondent could not point out any evidence to show that any evidence has been led before me as to why the change of service conditions was required or any notice was given to anybody or any information was sent to the Registrar. When the Common Cadre rules were applicable to the workers, the markfed could not withdraw the same without giving them notice or making alternative service rules. No service rules were framed for them. The case of the workman is that their service conditions have been changed by the board of directors without giving any notice to them nor their point of view has been considered nor any reason for the change in their service conditions are mentioned in the resolution. All these objections are valid objections and no body could be put to disadvantage without giving them an opportunity of being heard. The board of directors has violated the basic principles of law and equity. " 16. Shri Anil Malhotra could not point out any patent error in the appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal but insisted that the notice issued to the secretary of the union of the workmen should be treated as sufficient compliance with Sec.9-A of the Act. I am afraid, there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel. Sec.9-A which is couched in mandatory form, lays down that "no employer, who proposes to affect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule, shall affect such change without giving to the workman likely to be affected by such change, a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected. " This necessarily means that individual workman, who is likely to be affected by the proposed change in the conditions of service, must be given notice of the proposed change. The object underlying the requirement of issuing notice to the workman is to enable him to make representation against the proposed change and also take a decision whether or not to continue in the employment of the particular employer. Therefore, sending of notice to the union of the workmen cannot be treated as sufficient compliance with the mandatory requirement of Sec.9-A. As a logical corollary to the aforementioned conclusion. It must be held that implementation or resolution dated 8/11/1985, passed by the board of directors of the Federation was vitiated due to non- compliance with Sec.9-A of the Act and the Tribunal did not commit any illegality in granting a declaration to that effect. 17 In view of the above conclusion, I do not consider it necessary to deal with the question whether resolution dated 8/11/1985, passed by the board of directors of the federation was ultra vires bye-law 26 which, as mentioned above, empowers the Registrar to frame, amend or modify the service rules though, prima facie, I am inclined to agree with learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the said resolution had the effect of amending the rules and the board of directors was not competent to do so. 18. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is dismissed. 19. Before parting with the case, I deem it proper to take notice of the fair and candid statement made by learned counsel for the petitioners that after this Court had declined his clients prayer for interim stay the Federation had issued order dated 22/05/1998, for implementing the impugned award subject to the result of the writ petition. Learned counsel also produced a copy of that order before the court for its perusal.