C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) SINCE common questions of fact and law arise and since petitioner and 1 st respondent in all the cases are the same in these petitions, they are disposed of by a common order. ( 2 ) PETITIONER in all these cases issued 13 cheques, all in favour of the 1st respondent, on various dates, which were dishonoured. After issuing statutory notice to the petitioner, 1st respondent lodged a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable instruments Act (the Act) against the petitioner. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the cases and issued summons to the petitioner. Petitioner filed petitions in each case under Section 204 Cr. PC seeking to discharge him from the cases, inter alia, contending that the complaints filed by the complainant through its Manager, who has not been properly authorized to represent the 1st respondent, which is a proprietory concern, are not maintainable. The learned magistrate dismissed the said petitions. Questioning the said order, petitioner preferred revisions before this Court in crl. R. C. Nos. 1120 of 2001 etc. , which came up for consideration before my learned brother T. CH. Surya Rao, J, who, by his judgment dated 3-1-2002, by dismissing all the revision petitions, confirmed the order of dismissal of the petitions for discharge, holding that a proprietory concern, where a single person carries on business in the name or style other than his own name, can sue or be sued and in the absence of the specific provision in Cr. PC. , the principle laid down in Rule 10 of Order 30 CPC can be invoked. Now the petitioner came up with petitions to quash the complaints on the basis that vilas Mangulkar who signed the complaints is neither the payee nor the holder in due course of dishonoured cheques and so he cannot maintain the complaints, and since he also not a person authorized to sign the complaint on behalf of the complainant concern all the complaints are liable to be quashed. ( 3 ) THE point for consideration is whether there are grounds to quash the complaints. ( 3 ) THE point for consideration is whether there are grounds to quash the complaints. ( 4 ) THE contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the complainant in all the complaints is a proprietory concern and so the complaints should be signed, on behalf of the complainant firm, by the proprietor himself but not anybody else and since the complaints are not signed by the proprietor, but are signed by one Vilas mangulkar claiming to be the Manager of the complainant concern, it is akin to a power of attorney instituting a complaint on behalf of the principal and in view of the division Bench judgment of this Court in s. P. Sampathy v. Manju Gupta, 2002 (1) ald (Crl.) 619 (AP), the complaints are laible to be quashed. In any event since vilas Mangulkar, who signed the complaints, is not the payee or holder in due course of the cheques, the complaints filed with his signature on behalf of the complainant concern are liable to be quashed. The contention of the learned Counsel for 1st respondent is that these petitions are but an abuse of process of Court, because they are filed after the cases are posted for evidence on behalf of the petitioner after he was examined under Section 313 Cr. PC, and also because all the contentions now raised by the petitioner were already answered against him earlier in Criminal RC Nos. 1120 of 2001 and batch in which the petitioner questioned the order of the learned magistrate, dismissed the petitions filed by him under Section 204 Cr. PC. , seeking his discharge from the cases. He relied on mmtc Limited v. M/s. Medchal Chemicals and Pharma Private Limited, 2001 AIR scw 4793, where it is held that complaint lodged by a Manager, who has not been authorized by a company to institute the complaint, is a curable defect, and relying on A. K. Gupta v. Lloyds Steel Industries limited, Hyderabad and another, 2002 (2) ald (Crl.) 366 (A. P.), he contended that the question as to whether the authorization given to the person who signed the complaint is valid or not can be decided only at the time of trial but not at this stage. He also relied on Sova Mukharjee v, Rajiv Mehra, 1998 (2) ALD (Crl.) 171 (Calcutta), Anil G. Shah v. Chittaranjan Company, 1998 (2) ald (Crl.) 71 (Gujarat), Ranjit Ray v. Pukharaj Jain, 1997 (1) Crimes 110 , and m/s. Credential Finance Limited v. State of maharashtra, 1999 Crl. LJ 1032 = 2000 (2) ald (Crl.) 827 (Bom. ). It is not necessary to consider all those decisions for deciding these petitions and so I am not referring to them in detail in this order. ( 5 ) THAT the evidence on behalf of the complainant in all the cases was adduced, and the petitioner was examined under section 313 Cr. PC, and the cases are posted for evidence of the petitioner, when these petitions are filed, is not denied or disputed. The fact that petitioner filed these petitions after the complainant adduced his evidence and when the cases are posted for evidence of the petitioner, by itself entails dismissal of these petitions. Lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioner is apparent from the fact that he did not disclose either in the petitions, or in the Crl. MPs. , filed in these petitions seeking stay of all further proceedings before the trial Court, that the cases are posted for his evidence that he filed these petitions after the complainant adduced his evidence and after he was examined under Section 313 Cr. PC. He also deliberately suppressed the factum of his filing Revisions against the orders of dismissal of the petitions filed by him for discharge and those revisions being dismissed. Certified copies of the proceedings before the learned Magistrate, as recorded on the case dockets by the learned Magistrate, produced by the learned Counsel for 1st respondent, show that he was examined under Section 313 cr. PC. , on 26-6-2002 and the cases were posted to 12-7-2002 for his evidence. On 12-7-2002, as petitioner was absent, his evidence was closed and N. B. W. was issued to him, and the cases were posted to 19-7-2002 and from that date to 2-8-2002 on which date, on petitions filed by the petitioner, he was permitted to adduce evidence on some conditions and the cases were posted to 14-8-2002. The proceedings recorded by the learned magistrate on 14-8-2002 read as follows:"both parties present. The proceedings recorded by the learned magistrate on 14-8-2002 read as follows:"both parties present. The accused has not complied with the conditions and did not take the hand delivery of summons to the proposed witnesses and costs also reported to have not (been) paid. However, as per the Memo filed in this case, time is extended till 23-8-2002 with a direction to pay costs today itself and take hand delivery of the summons of the proposed witnesses today itself and produce witnesses on 23-8-2002 for adducing defence evidence, failing which defence evidence will be treated as nil. Call on 23-8-2002 for compliance of condition. "on 23-8-2002 on petition by the petitioner the cases were adjourned to 13-9-2002 with a direction to produce witnesses, failing which suitable orders would be passed. These petitions are filed between 6-9-2002 and 12-9-2002, which shows that these petitions are designedly filed with a view to some how stall the proceedings before the trial Court on 13-9-2002. ( 6 ) THE ratio in the Division Bench decision of S. P. Sampathy (supra), relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioner, is that a complaint for an offence under Section 138 of the Act can only be filed either by the payee or the holder in due course of the dishonoured cheques, and since power of attorney of the complainant is not and cannot be said to be the payee of the dishonoured cheques, he cannot file the complaint, and when a complaint is filed in the name of the payee, the payee only, but not his power of attorney, has to sign the complaint. In all these cases, admittedly, 1st respondent- complainant is the payee of the dishonoured cheques. Since the 1st respondent is a concern, but not a person, it cannot act by itself and somebody has to act on its behalf. The Manager, but not the proprietor of the 1st respondent, signed the complaints on behalf of the 1st respondent. The complaints in these cases, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to have been filed by a power of attorney of the complainant, who is the payee of the dishonoured cheques. All the complaints are filed by the payee of the cheques only, and they were signed on behalf of the complainant, as the complainant, being concern, by itself cannot sign. All the complaints are filed by the payee of the cheques only, and they were signed on behalf of the complainant, as the complainant, being concern, by itself cannot sign. So the ratio in S. P. Sampathy case (supra) has no application to the facts of this case at all. The question as to whether the Manager who signed the complaints on behalf of the 1st respondent is authorized to sign the complaints or not, can be decided only at the time of disposal of the cases on the basis of evidence adduced but not in these proceedings, as held in A. K. Gupta case (supra ). So complaints cannot be quashed on that ground. ( 7 ) PETITIONER, who unsuccessfully challenged the order of the Magistrate refusing to discharge him from the cases, negativing his contention that the complaints signed by the Manager of the complainant concern cannot be said to have been properly instituted against him, cannot be permitted to raise the very same question in a different garb. Principles of res judicata apply to criminal cases also in the sense that a person who failed to get the relief in one proceeding cannot be permitted to file another petition for the same relief over and again by raising new contentions piecemeal. Petitioner, under the guise of these petitions, obviously is seeking a review of the order passed in Crl. RC Nos. 1120 of 2001 etc. , dated 3-1-2002 referred to above. It is well know that review is not permissible in criminal proceedings. In fact the contentions now raised could as well have been raised before the trial Court at the time of arguments, but obviously with a view to buy time and drag on the proceedings before the trial only, these petitions are filed. For the aforesaid reasons, all the petitions are dismissed. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for 1 st respondent, on the basis that these petitions are filed with a view to harass the 1st respondent, urged that 1st respondent is entitled to costs, I am aware of the fact that in criminal proceedings normally costs are not imposed, because generally the State which is concerned with law and order would be prosecuting the criminal cases. In a proceeding under Section 138 of the Act, the State, i. e. , police, have no role to play. In a proceeding under Section 138 of the Act, the State, i. e. , police, have no role to play. It is a proceeding between two private parties. So, in appropriate cases, if a party by abusing the process of Court tries to put spokes in the progress of the case, such person can be directed to pay costs to the other side by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr. PC. In all these cases since the petitioner deliberately, with a view to stall the proceedings in the trial Court, came up with these petitions and obtained orders of stay from this Court without disclosing his filing Crl. R. C. Nos. 1120 of 2001 etc. , and those revisions being dismissed by a common order dated 3-1-2002, and by misleading the Court by filing a portion of the deposition of PW1 recorded on 5-4-2002 only, in some of the petitions, to create an impression that PW1 was examined only in part by the date of filing of these petitions, though in fact the petitioner was examined under Section 313 cr. PC after the evidence on behalf of 1st respondent-complainant was closed, and also suppressing the fact that on a petition filed by him to reopen the case only he was given an opportunity to adduce evidence on his behalf with some conditions, after his failure to adduce earlier, these petitions deserve to be dismissed with costs. Therefore I dismiss these petitions with costs fixing the advocate s fee at Rs. 500/- (Rupees five hundred only) in each petition.