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2002 DIGILAW 133 (JK)

Anand Ji Razdan v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Ltd.

2002-05-02

S.K.GUPTA, T.S.DOABIA

body2002
Per Doahia, J; 1. Appellant complainant was successful in convincing the State Commission constituted under the Jammu and Kashmir Consumer Protection Act, 1987, that the loss caused by theft would be covered by a fire policy, which contained a provision to the effect that the risk of riots, strike, terrorist and malicious act is also covered under the said policy. The view expressed by the State Commission was the subject matter of challenge in C1MA No. 31/95. A learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the appeal; the order passed by the State Commission has been set aside. Now a second appeal has been preferred under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 2. The State Commission in its order dated 21st Feb. 95 expressed an opinion that as in the fire policy, there was a mention of the fact that riot, strike and malicious damage would also be covered, therefore, if the loss is caused by any of these factors, then, the Insurance Company is bound to pay compensation . As indicated above, an appeal was preferred. A learned Single Judge of this Court examined the matter. The argument, put across by the Insurance Company was that the loss or damage arising out of burglary, house breaking and theft has been specifically excluded, and therefore, there was no justification to direct the Company to entertain the claim. The learned Single Judge after examining the matter came to the conclusion that this was not a case where any explosion had occurred. The question as to whether the loss had occurred on account of an act of terrorism was gone into. It was observed that in order to bring a claim within the ambit of the policy, two ingredients must be fulfilled. These, according to the learned Single Judge were: i) That the loss or damage should be the direct outcome of act of terrorism: and ii) Such an act of terrorism should be committed by the person or persons acting on behalf of an organisation. 3. It was observed that both things must take place simultaneously. The opinion expressed was that there was nothing on the record to indicate as to whether theft or burglary took place on account of act of terrorism. It was accordingly concluded that the view expressed by the State Commission could not be sustained. 4. 3. It was observed that both things must take place simultaneously. The opinion expressed was that there was nothing on the record to indicate as to whether theft or burglary took place on account of act of terrorism. It was accordingly concluded that the view expressed by the State Commission could not be sustained. 4. So far as the view expressed by the learned Single Judge, is concerned, that to some extent, is supported by what is said by the Supreme Court in the case of Muralidhar Saranji Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 1 (2000) CPJ 3 (SC). Independently of the above, we are of the view that when a fire policy which contains a clause as noticed above is issued, then, in order to claim compensation, it has to be established that there was a malicious act and this resulted in a fire. It is only in these circumstances clause (4) would be attracted. This clause is being reproduced below:- "4. Riot, strike, terrorist and Malicious Damage as per Riot, strike, terrorist Malicious damage clause printed hereon. 5. In case, in a malicious act only theft takes place, then, this would not be covered by a fire policy. For this a separate policy for Theft/burglar) /House breaking has to be obtained. Such is the view expressed by us in CIMA No. 58/96, decided today. What is said in the above case is being quoted below:- i/ That when a Fire policy is issued, it would cover only that risk which ultimately causes loss by fire; ii/ That notwithstanding the fact that loss is caused by a militant related act but the result ends in a theft and not in a fire, the Insurance Company would not be liable." In view of the above, we uphold the view expressed by the learned Single Judge for the reasons given by him and in view of the additional reason given by us in Appeal No. CIMA 58/96. which reasoning is fully applicable to this case also. This appeal is found to be without merit and is dismissed.