GHULAM MOHAMMED, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed seeking writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the order dated 13-12-1990 made in proceedings No. BZO: PER: 4820:90 issued by the respondents-Bank as confirmed in order dated 30-11-1993, and to quash the same as illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service by giving all the monetary and attendant service benefits including the seniority. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as an apprentice in respondent-Dena Bank, a nationalized bank and after his appointment he was posted at hyderabad, at Bank Street branch. In the year 1978, the petitioner was promoted as an officer in the cadre of Junior Manager grade-I. By virtue of the said promotion, the petitioner was posted to work at Bank s branch Office at M. G. Road, Secunderabad. In the year 1981, he was further promoted as an additional Accountant and on such promotion he was posted with the bank s branch office at Koti, Hyderabad. The petitioner continued to work in the said post till he was once again promoted in the year 1982 as an Accountant. On promotion as an accountant, he was posted at the Bank s branch at Sanathnagar, Hyderabad. In the year 1987, he received further promotion as branch Manager and was posted as Branch manager to Dharmaram Branch, nizamabad District. ( 3 ) THE petitioner states that he was promoted as Manager in MM-II Cadre and was posted to Belgaum branch. He was relieved from the Dharmaram branch, nizamabad District on 27-10-1988 and reported to duty at Belgaum branch of the respondent-Bank. Upon being appointed and posted as Manager in MM-II Cadre in belgaum branch, he was forced to apply for medical leave since he was not keeping good health. The petitioner states that subsequently he received a communication from the respondents stating that he should submit himself before the panel of doctors appointed by the bank. Thereafter, the bank has changed its intention and gave a go-by to the said communication and called upon him to appear before the Medical Board appointed by the Director of Medical services. The petitioner states that subsequently he received a communication from the respondents stating that he should submit himself before the panel of doctors appointed by the bank. Thereafter, the bank has changed its intention and gave a go-by to the said communication and called upon him to appear before the Medical Board appointed by the Director of Medical services. In obedience to the said directions of the bank, the petitioner appeared before the Medical Board, on two occasions the medical Board refused to check him as the respondent-Bank did not remit the entire amount to the Medical Board, since the medical Board would not check a person unless the whole amount is remitted and therefore he cannot be blamed for the same. Despite the specific directions that the dharmaram Branch, Nizamabad District had to deposit the amount to the Medical board, Branch failed to do so. ( 4 ) THE petitioner in the month of July, 1989 had to undergo a major abdominal surgery and due to the said surgery he was advised to take rest for two months. While being on bed rest, the respondents issued a charge-sheet to him vide Ref. No. BZO/ per/dis/3840/89 dated 28-8-1989. ( 5 ) IT is stated that the Enquiry Officer completed his enquiry without wailing for written statement of the delinquent, and submitted the report to the management. The petitioner therefore, approached this court by filing a writ petition and this court directed the Enquiry Officer to cancel the earlier report by accepting the written statement and to give a fresh report. ( 6 ) THEREAFTER, the Enquiry Officer after the said direction of this court, has submitted his report to the management. The respondents acting upon the report of the Enquiry Officer have passed the order of removal dated 13-12-1990. On receipt of the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 25-1-1991 to the appellate authority and the appellate authority has rejected the appeal by its order dated 18-8-1992. It is stated that the removal order of the petitioner itself is bad inasmuch as the enquiry was proceeded in respect of a charge which was not included in the charge-sheet and on this ground alone, the removal order is contrary to law. It is stated that the removal order of the petitioner itself is bad inasmuch as the enquiry was proceeded in respect of a charge which was not included in the charge-sheet and on this ground alone, the removal order is contrary to law. The appellate authority too, it is averred in the writ affidavit, mechanically confirmed the order of the removal though it knew fully well that the charge introduced in the enquiry was not a charge forming part of the charge-sheet. ( 7 ) THEREAFTER, the petitioner made a review petition to the 1st respondent-Chairman, Dena Bank who alsb rejected the review petition by his order dated 30-11-1993. The contention of the petitioner is that in the enquiry the respondents have stated that he has procured alternative employment and no opportunity was given to rebut the same. ( 8 ) THE respondents filed a counter affidavit, inter alia, stating that the respondent issued the transfer Memo no. BRO: PER: 1216: 87 dated 2-4-1987 posting the petitioner to Dharmaram branch. The petitioner, however, went on leave from 9-4-1987 ostensibly to avoid service of the above said transfer memorandum. The transfer memorandum was thereafter sent to the petitioner s residential address by the registered post with acknowledgment due which was returned unaccepted and undelivered. It is stated that the petitioner has however been pressurising the management to retain him only at Hyderabad center avoiding to take delivery of the transfer memorandum issued to him by not reporting to duty where he has been working. ( 9 ) IT is further stated that the petitioner did not report at Dharmaram Branch till 2nd august, 1987 and reported on 3rd August,1987 only at Dharmaram Branch but proceeded on leave from the very next day i. e. , 4th August, 1987 by seeking extension of leave on the pretext of illness. In the month of September, 1987 the petitioner had submitted certain medical bills. Since the management of the respondent was dissatisfied with the documents produced by the petitioner, the petitioner was directed to appear before the Medical Board for medical examination and the petitioner has avoided the same. When the petitioner was confronted that he was falsely reporting sick as an excuse for reporting the duties, the petitioner has changed his plan and requested for posting him at Hyderabad city branch. When the petitioner was confronted that he was falsely reporting sick as an excuse for reporting the duties, the petitioner has changed his plan and requested for posting him at Hyderabad city branch. In the meantime the petitioner attended the written test and personal interview on separate occasions at Bangalore in connection with promotion from Officer in JMG Scale-I to Officers in MMG Scale-II. It was thus established that sickness was not the real cause for the petitioner to remain absent for a long time. ( 10 ) IT is further stated that the petitioner was elevated to MMG Scale-II and posted as branch Manager, Belgaum on 31-10-1988 and repeated the same modus operandi by proceeding on leave unauthorizedly from the very next day without even obtaining prior permission to leave the Headquarters from the competent authority viz. , the regional Manager, though he availed the postponement for joining the duty but never reported for duty again, nor had he given any valid reason for remaining absent unauthorizedly for months together. ( 11 ) IT is further stated that the petitioner had joined M/s. A1-Ammen Islamic financial Investment Corporation (India) ltd. , as Branch Manager of their office at hyderabad without taking bank s prior permission which is gross violation of regulation 6 (1) of the Dena Bank Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. It is also stated that the respondents-Bank provided the documents pertaining to the petitioner s employment during the enquiry, but unfortunately the petitioner has not made any comments anywhere in the writ petition filed by him, thereby concealing the fact that he procured alternative employment. ( 12 ) MR. M. Panduranga Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was sanctioned leave upto october, 1988 and no posting was given thereafter. He further submitted that the petitioner attended before the Medical board, but it could not examine the petitioner as the respondents did not pay the required charges to the Medical Board by way of bank challans and cash deposits, and under those circumstances, the respondents cannot cover up their mistake by stating that the petitioner failed to appear before the medical Board. ( 13 ) IT is mainly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that securing of alternative employment was not the subject matter of the charge, and therefore impugned order of removal is liable to be quashed on that ground itself. ( 13 ) IT is mainly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that securing of alternative employment was not the subject matter of the charge, and therefore impugned order of removal is liable to be quashed on that ground itself. Learned counsel further argued that the Enquiry officer has not followed the procedure and the enquiry itself is violative of principles of natural justice. In support of his contentions the learned counsel has drawn my attention to the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Central Bank of India v. P. C. Jain kuldep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and others. ( 14 ) THE relevant portion of the judgment in P. C. Jain s case reads as thus:"8. However, we find that, on the other ingredients of the first charge, the tribunal was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Enqiury Officer were perverse. The Tribunal gave the reason that these findings were based on hearsay evidence. This view taken by the tribunal appears to be fully justified. The first and the third elements of the charge relating to payment of the sum of Rs. 30,400 to the respondent by nand Kishore and of the respondent leaving for Muzaffarnagar in the company of some persons in order to retire the bills drawn by M/s. Gupta iron Industries, were sought to be proved before the Enquiry Officer by the evidence of the Internal Auditor, n. N. Vazifdar, but the latter could not give any direct evidence, as he was not present at the time when money was paid to the respondent or when the respondent left for Muzaffarnagar. He purported to prove these elements of the change by deposing that a statement was made to him by Nand kishore to the effect that Nand Kishore had paid Rs. 30,400 to the respondent and that, thereafter, the respondent left for Muzaffarnagar in the company of two persons. The Enquiry Officer accepted this evidence of Vazifdar, but ignored the fact that Vazifdar s evidence was not direct evidence in respect of the elements of the charge sought to be proved, and that Vazifdar was only trying to prove a previous statement of Nand Kishore which, as rightly held by the Tribunal, would amount to hearsay evidence. The Enquiry Officer accepted this evidence of Vazifdar, but ignored the fact that Vazifdar s evidence was not direct evidence in respect of the elements of the charge sought to be proved, and that Vazifdar was only trying to prove a previous statement of Nand Kishore which, as rightly held by the Tribunal, would amount to hearsay evidence. Nand kishore himself was also examined as a witness, but, in his evidence, which was admissible as substantive evidence, he made no statement that this sum of Rs. 30,400 was paid by him to the respondent or that the respondent left for Muzaffarnagar in the company of some persons to retire the bills drawn by M/s. Gupta Iron industries. In fact, Nand Kishore even went further and denied that he had made any statement to Vazifdar as stated by Vazifdar. The Enquiry Officer was, of course, entitled to from his own opinion and to believe Vazifdar in preference to Nand Kishore; but on this basis, the only finding that the domestic tribunal could record was that Nand Kishore s statement given before him was incorrect and that nand Kishore had made statements to vazifdar as deposed by Vazifdar. Those statements made by Nand kishore to Vazifdar could not, however, become substantive evidence to prove the correctness of these elements forming part of the charge. It is in this connection that importance attaches to the views expressed by this court in the cases cited above where it was pointed out that a finding of a domestic tribunal may be perverse if it is not supported by any legal evidence. It is true that, in numerous cases, it has been held that domestic tribunals, like an Enquiry Officer, are not bound by the technical rules about evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act; but it has nowhere been laid down that even substantive rules, which would form part of principles of natural justice, also can be ignored by the domestic tribunals. The principle that a fact sought to be proved must be supported by statements made in the presence of the person against whom the enquiry is held and that statements made behind the back of the person charged are not to be treated as substantive evidence, is one of the basic principles which cannot be ignored on the mere ground that domestic tribunals are not bound by the technical rules of procedure contained in the Evidence act. In fact, learned counsel for the appellant-Bank was unable to point out any case at all where it may have been held by this court or by any other Court that a domestic tribunal will be justified in recording its findings on the basis of hearsay evidence without having any direct or circumstantial evidence in support of those findings:9. In the case of Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Their workmen, 1964-3 SCR 506 at pp. 512-13= ( AIR 1964 SC 719 at p. 722) this aspect was noted by this Court as follows:"normally, evidence on which the charges are sought to be proved must be led at such an enquiry in the presence of the workman himself. It is true that in the case of departmental esquiries held against public servants, this Court has observed in the State of mysore v. Sivabasappa, 1963-2 SCR 943 = (AIR 1968 SC 375) at if the deposition of a witness has been recorded by the enquiry Officer in the absence of the public servant and a copy thereof is given to him, and an opportunity is given to him to cross-examine the witness after he affirms in a general way the truth of his statement already recorded, that would conform to the requirements of natural justice; but as has been emphasised by this Court in m/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar, 1964-2 SCR 809 = ( AIR 1964 SC 708 ), these observations must be applied with caution to esquiries held by domestic Tribunals against the industrial employees. In such esquiries, it is desirable that all witnesses on whose testimony the management relies in support of its charge against the workman should be examined in his presence. Recording evidence in the presence of the workman concerned serves a very important purpose. In such esquiries, it is desirable that all witnesses on whose testimony the management relies in support of its charge against the workman should be examined in his presence. Recording evidence in the presence of the workman concerned serves a very important purpose. The witness knows that he is giving evidence against a particular individual who is present before him, and therefore, he is cautious in making his statement. Besides, when evidence is recorded in the presence of the accused person, there is no room for persuading the witness to make convenient statements, and it is always easier for an accused person to cross-examine the witness if his evidence is recorded in his presence. Therefore, we would discourage the idea of recording statements of witnesses ex parte and then producing the witnesses before the employee concerned for cross-examination after serving him with such previously recorded statements, even though the witnesses concerned make a general statement on the latter occasion that their statements already recorded correctly represent what they stated. " ( 15 ) IN Kuldep Singh (supra), the Apex court held that reliance on a document which was not mentioned in the charge- sheet, could not be relied on or even referred to by the disciplinary authority, more so when the document (a voucher in that case) mentioned the date of payment in question different from that mentioned in the charge. ( 16 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgments of the Supreme court reported in Union of India v. Mohd ramzan Khan, Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, S. C. Girotra v. United commercial Bank and others Ministry of finance v. S. B. Ramesh Hardwari Lal v. State of u. P. and others. ( 17 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Subramanya reddy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-Bank submitted that the disciplinary authority followed the procedure in accordance with the Bank regulations, and the disciplinary authority considering the gravity of charges has passed the order of removal, which was confirmed in appeal and also in revision, and the same does not warrant any interference by this court. He further contended that the petitioner was given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and mere one violation is not sufficient to quash the whole disciplinary proceedings, and that he must establish and prove that prejudice is caused. He further contended that the petitioner was given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and mere one violation is not sufficient to quash the whole disciplinary proceedings, and that he must establish and prove that prejudice is caused. He further contended that the findings of the Enquiry Officer with regard to unauthorized absence are established and the disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the Enquiry officer and imposed the punishment of order of removal, and thereafter on appeal it was confirmed by the appellate authority. Thereafter, on revision the same was also confirmed by the revisionary authority and the same cannot be found fault with. Learned senior counsel further argued that after April, 1988 no leave was sanctioned and despite sending the reminders the petitioner did not attend the job and he remained absent. He has drawn my attention to regulations of the Dena Bank officer Employees (Discipline and Appeals) regulations, 1976, with regard to powers of appellate authority and reviewing authority, with regard to the charge of unauthorized absence together with the material with regard to nature of securing alternative employment and contended that the order of the disciplinary authority merges with the orders of the appellate authority and thereafter with the reviewing authority. Learned senior counsel has drawn my attention to the Regulation No. 6 (1) of the dena Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) regulations, 1976, (for short "the Rules"), which reads as follows:"no officer employee shall, except with the previous sanction of the bank, engage directly or indirectly in any trade or business or undertake any other employment: provided that an officer employee may, without such sanction, undertake honorary work of a social or charitable nature or occasional work of a literary, artistic, scientific, professional, cultural, educational, religious or social character, subject to the conduct that this official duties do not thereby suffer, but he shall not undertake, or shall discontinue such work if so directed by the Competent Authority. " ( 18 ) LEARNED Senior Counsel alternatively contended that even assuming that no charge was made in the enquiry to the effect that the petitioner has secured alternative employment, the petitioner was found guilty for the charges i. e. (i) willful disobedience of lawful and reasonable orders of his superiors, (ii) unauthorized absence and (iii) conduct unbecoming of a bank Officer, and as the punishment was imposed basing on the charges that were proved, the punishment cannot be termed as excessive or arbitrary warranting interference of this Court. ( 19 ) IN support of his contentions the learned senior counsel has drawn my attention to the judgments of the Supreme court reported in State of U. P. v. Harendra arora, Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor ali Khan, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Graver and State Bank of patiala v. S. K. Sharma. ( 20 ) THE issues that fall for consideration are (i) whether the punishment imposed by the authorities warrants any interference considering the gravity of charges that were proved and (ii) when the procurement of alternative employment was not at all a charge against the petitioner, the enquiry is vitiated on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, and therefore order of removal so made against the petitioner is justified or not warranting interference of this court in the given factual situations? ( 21 ) ADMITTEDLY, procuring of alternative employment was not the subject matter of the charge. Whether the petitioner would be entitled for the relief on that count itself in the present facts and circumstances of the case is to be seen? In this context it is apt to refer to charge sheet dated 28-8-1989. The charge-sheet dated 28-8-1989 reads as follows:" (1) That while you were working as an Accountant at our Sanathnagar branch during April, 1989, you were relieved from the aforesaid branch on 28-7-1987 to enable you to report to our dharmaram Branch where you were transferred as a Branch Manger vide transfer order No. BRO/rrc/1216/87 dated 2-4-1987. You, however, reported at Dharmaram Branch on 3-8-1989 and proceeded on leave immediately thereafter, i. e. , with effect from 4-8-1987. You have, however, since then been requesting for extension of leave on medical grounds. (2) That you have submitted a medical certificate dated 24-9-1987 requesting for leave for two months from 11-7-1987. You, however, reported at Dharmaram Branch on 3-8-1989 and proceeded on leave immediately thereafter, i. e. , with effect from 4-8-1987. You have, however, since then been requesting for extension of leave on medical grounds. (2) That you have submitted a medical certificate dated 24-9-1987 requesting for leave for two months from 11-7-1987. However, you were seen to be moving about in good health/normal condition even though you reported sick. You have attended the promotion test from J. M. G. Scale I to mmg Scale II, held at Bangalaore in december, 1987 and thereafter attended the interview held at bangalore in May, 1988 for the said promotion. (3) That you were promoted from j. M. G. Scale I to M. M. G. Scale II, in the month of May, 1988 and on promotion you were posted as Branch Manager of belgaum Branch vide order No. BZO/per/3545/88, dated 14-10-1988 which was sent to your residential address. You have reported at Belgaum branch on 31-10-1988 and on the very next day you have proceeded on leave on the pretext of availing joining time. However, you have remained absent unauthorisedly. (4) That when you were confronted with the fact that you were falsely reporting sick as an excuse for not resuming to duties, you have changed your stand and made a representation for posting at any one of the hyderabad city branches. Even after informing that your request is not acceded to as the transfer is effect at the exigencies of administration, consequent upon promotion to Scale II, you failed to resume duties without giving any valid reasons. (5) That you were instructed by the regional Manager, Bangalore to get yourself medically examined before the Medical Board. However, you failed to appear before the Medical board. The Regional Manager, bangalore vide his letter No. BRO/rrc/per/232/11989, dated 7-11-1989 and the undersigned vide letter no. BZO/per/411/89, dt. 21-1-1989 had instructed you to report for duty with immediate effect. However, you failed to report for duty. (6) That you are aware that you have no leave to your credit, you still continue to remain absent unauthorisedly from your duties at belgaum and avoided resuming duties in that Branch without giving any valid reasons. (7) Your above act/s if proved shall constitute following act/s of misconduct viz. However, you failed to report for duty. (6) That you are aware that you have no leave to your credit, you still continue to remain absent unauthorisedly from your duties at belgaum and avoided resuming duties in that Branch without giving any valid reasons. (7) Your above act/s if proved shall constitute following act/s of misconduct viz. , (i) willful disobedience of lawful and reasonable orders of your superiors and/or (ii) unauthorized absence and/or (iii) conduct unbecoming of a bank officer. ". . . . . ( 22 ) THE Enquiry Officer afforded reasonable opportunity to the delinquent (petitioner) and he considered the material on record. There was no specific charge with regard to the petitioner securing alternative employment. With regard to first charge the enquiry Officer held that the petitioner was transferred to Dharmaram branch vide orders dated 2-4-1987. He was relieved on 28-7-1987. He reported at Dharmaram branch on 3-8-1987 and proceeded on long leave immediately till 26-10-1988. With regard to the second charge, the Enqiury officer considering the material on record observed as follows:"he had admitted in ME. 32 that he never stated that he was bedridden or unable to move about. Further, he had attended the promotion test from JMG scale I to MMG Scale II held at bangalore in December, 1987 and thereafter attended the interview held at Bangalore in May 1988 for the said promotion. It is clear that the CSO was health enough to attend the office without availing sick leave for such a long period. Hence, he is found guilty of unauthorized absence. " ( 23 ) WITH regard to third charge, the enquiry Officer held that the petitioner had reported at Belgaum branch on 31-10-1988 and on the very next day he had proceeded on leave under the pretext of availing joining time and he left the headquarters without the permission of the authorities. With regard to the fourth charge, the enquiry Officer held even after informing that his request for posting him in hyderabad city branches is not accepted to, the petitioner failed to resume duties without giving any valid reasons. With regard to the fifth charge, it was observed considering Exs. ME-22 and ME-23, that clear cut instructions were given to the petitioner to resume duties but the same were not complied with and no satisfactory reasons were furnished for non-compliance. With regard to the fifth charge, it was observed considering Exs. ME-22 and ME-23, that clear cut instructions were given to the petitioner to resume duties but the same were not complied with and no satisfactory reasons were furnished for non-compliance. The Enquiry Officer with regard to 6th charge observed as follows:"on 26-4-1988, the Regional Manager, (ME. 15) informed the CSO that in view of his long absence from June 1987 on medical grounds and in view of his leave sanctioned only upto 8th April,1988 as per the medical certificate produced by him and in the absence of any letter from him about his resuming duties/extension of leave on medical grounds, the Regional Manager advised him to report for duty immediately, but he persisted in his unauthorized absence from duties. " ( 24 ) ON the basis of the evidence on record, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the following charges are proved. (I) Wilful disobedience of lawful and reasonable orders of his superiors and, (ii) Unauthorized absence, (iii) Conduct unbecoming of a Bank officer. " ( 25 ) THUS observing, the Enquiry Officer, however, proceeded to consider the aspect of petitioner securing alternative employment in AIFIC (India) Limited. As can be seen from the records produced before the court, it was only during the course of enquiry it came on record that the petitioner joined in M/s. A1-Ameen Islamic financial Investment Corporation (India) limited as Branch Manager on a pay of rs. 5,203/ -. The petitioner was confronted with the question of securing alternative employment, the delinquent has not denied that he was otherwise employed. In that context, it was observed by the Enquiry officer that petitioner securing alternative employment is relevant to the charges that were proved, who also requested the authorities that he be posted in Hyderabad city only. ( 26 ) THE disciplinary authority considering the enquiry report, by its order dated 13-12-1990 held that the petitioner is guilty of three charges (i) wilful disobedience of lawful and reasonable orders of his superiors, (ii) unauthorized absence and (iii) conduct unbecoming of a bank officer. The authority, however, further observed that in the course of enquiry it has come on record that the petitioner has joined aifci (India) Ltd. , as Branch Manger at hyderabad without taking bank s prior permission and the same is in violation of dena Bank Regulations. The authority, however, further observed that in the course of enquiry it has come on record that the petitioner has joined aifci (India) Ltd. , as Branch Manger at hyderabad without taking bank s prior permission and the same is in violation of dena Bank Regulations. The authority considering the findings of the Enquiry officer and also the finding of petitioner securing alternative employment, imposed the penalty of removal from service. ( 27 ) FROM an analysis of the evidence available on record, with regard to the aspect of petitioner securing alternative employment, I am of the view that the material was gathered during the course of enquiry so as to bring within the ambit of charges of unauthorized absence, and unbecoming of a Government (sic. Bank) officer in securing alternative employment, that is precisely Charge No. 3. Obviously, the charges referred above were proved, based on which the order of punishment was imposed and on those charges also the order of punishment imposed does not warrant any interference by this Court. The Supreme court in Mansor AH Khan s case (supra) has held that where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not necessary. ( 28 ) IN S. K. Sharma s case (supra) it was observed as follows:"an order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. . . . . A substantive provision has normally to be complied with and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. xxx xxx in case of a procedural provision which is not a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former than it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found. that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the constitution Bench in B. Karunakar (supra ). The ultimate test is always the same, viz. , test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing as it may be called. " ( 29 ) IN Prabhu Dayal Graver s case (supra) it was held as follows:"under Regulation 68 (3), only in those cases where the disciplinary authority considers it necessary to direct fresh or further enquiry or disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, it has to record the reasons for its such directions, but there is no such obligation if it agrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It can therefore, be legitimately inferred that when express provisions have been made in the regulations for recording reasons in only the first two of the three fact situation - and not the other - there is no implied obligation also to record the reasons in case of concurrence with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. "the Supreme Court further at para 10 of its judgment observed thus:". . . . . . . . FROM the above resume it is evident that in setting aside the order of removal this court was influenced primarily by the facts that the charges were totally vague and indefinite and that in spite of repeated requests made the disciplinary authority did not furnish the delinquent the detailed particulars thereby depriving him of his legitimate right to defend himself. FROM the above resume it is evident that in setting aside the order of removal this court was influenced primarily by the facts that the charges were totally vague and indefinite and that in spite of repeated requests made the disciplinary authority did not furnish the delinquent the detailed particulars thereby depriving him of his legitimate right to defend himself. It is in that context that the Court laid emphasis upon the requirement of furnishing the statement of allegations in Fundamental Rule 55; but it cannot be said that this Court laid down, as an abstract proposition of law in Surath Chandra case (supra) that wherever there is a breach of any statutory rule in conducting a departmental enquiry it will render the entire proceeding bad, irrespective of the nature of the breach, as contended by Mr. Dutta. " ( 30 ) THE disciplinary authority while accepting the findings reached by the enquiry Officer, passed the order of removal and the same was confirmed by the appellate authority and also by the revisionary authority. The order passed by the disciplinary authority does not suffer from any jurisdictional error nor any procedural irregularities, legal or otherwise. The appellate authority s order merges with the reviewing authority, which gave cogent and convincing findings. ( 31 ) IN view of the specific findings of the enqiury Officer referred above and considering the fact that several reminders were issued to the petitioner to join the duty; and that the petitioner secured alternative employment and was working in some other organization, in these circumstances, the contentions of the petitioner merit no consideration. The Court cannot go into the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of which such findings are recorded. The court will interfere only in a case where it finds that the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority are based on no evidence. That is not the situation obtaining in the instant case. Further, this Court has the power to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed on a delinquent if the penalty imposed shocks the conscience of the court, in other words where such penalty being totally disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct committed by the delinquent. ( 32 ) THE facts and circumstances discussed above do not persuade me to interfere with the order of punishment passed by the authorities. ( 32 ) THE facts and circumstances discussed above do not persuade me to interfere with the order of punishment passed by the authorities. This court while exercising the certiorari jurisdiction is only confined with regard to the limited scope and ambit i. e. , with regard to the irregularities or error apparent on the face of record. Accepting the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel, I am of the view that the punishment imposed is not excessive nor disproportionate to the gravity of the charges so proved, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in this writ petition. The writ petition being meritless it is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.