JUDGMENT V.N. Khare, J.-The dissolved Legislative Assembly of the State of Gujarat was constituted in March 1998 and its five-year term was to expire on 18.3.2003. On 19.7.2002 on the advice of the Chief Minister, the Governor of Gujarat dissolved the Legislative Assembly. The last sitting of the dissolved Legislative Assembly was held on 3rd April 2002. Immediately after dissolution of the Assembly, the Election Commission of India took steps for holding fresh elections for constituting the new Legislative Assembly. However, the Election Commission by its order dated 16th August, 2002 while acknowledging that Article 174(1) is mandatory and applicable to an Assembly which is dissolved and further that the elections for constituting new Legislative Assembly must be held within six months of the last session of the dissolved Assembly, was of the view that it was not in a position to conduct elections before 3rd of October, 2002 which was the last date of expiry of six months from last sitting of the dissolved Legislative Assembly. It is in this context the President of India in exercise of powers conferred upon him by virtue of clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India referred three questions for the opinion of the Supreme Court by his order dated 19th August, 2002 which run as under: "WHEREAS the Legislative Assembly of the State of Gujarat was dissolved on July 19, 2002 before the expiration of its normal duration on March 18, 2003; AND WHEREAS Article 174(1) of the Constitution provides that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the Legislative Assembly in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next Session: AND WHEREAS the Election Commission has also noted that the mandate of Article 174 would require that the Assembly should meet every six months even after the dissolution of the House, and that the Election Commission has all along been consistent that normally a Legislative Assembly should meet at least every six months as contemplated by Article 174, even where it has been dissolved; AND WHEREAS under section 15 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for the purpose of holding general elections on the expiry of the duration of the Legislative Assembly or its dissolution, the Governor shall, by notification, call upon all Assembly Constituencies in the State to elect members on such date or date as may be recommended by the Election Commission of India; AND WHEREAS the last sitting of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Gujarat was held on 3rd April, 2002, and as such the newly constituted Legislative Assembly should sit on or before 3rd October, 2002; AND WHEREAS the Election Commission of India by its order No. 464/GJ-LA/2002 dated August 16, 2002 has not recommended any date for holding general election for constituting a new Legislative Assembly for the State of Gujarat and observed that the Commission will consider framing a suitable schedule for the general election to the State Assembly in November-December 2002. Copy of the said order is annexed hereto; AND WHEREAS owing to the aforesaid decision of the Election Commission of India, a new Legislative Assembly cannot come into existence so as to meet within the stipulated period of six months as provided under Article 174( 1) of the Constitution of India; AND WHEREAS THE Election Commission has held that the non-observance of the provisions of Article 174(1) in the present situation would mean that the Government of the State cannot be carried in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution within the meaning of Article 356(1) of the Constitution and the President would then step in; AND WHEREAS doubts have arisen with regard to the Constitutional validity of the said order of the Election Commission of India as the order of the Election Commission which would result in a non-compliance with the mandatory requirement envisaged under Article 174(1) of the Constitution under which not more than six months shall intervene between two sittings of the State Legislature; AND WHEREAS in view of what has been hereinbefore stated, it appears to me that the questions of law hereinafter set out have arisen which are of a such nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court of India; NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution, I, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, President of India, hereby refer the following questions to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and report thereon, namely:- (i) Is Article 174 subject to the decision of the Election Commission of India under Article 324 as to the schedule of elections of the Assembly? (ii) Can the Election Commission of India frame a schedule for the elections to an Assembly on the premise that any infraction of the mandate of Article 174 would be remedied by a resort to Article 356 by the President? (ii) Can the Election Commission of India frame a schedule for the elections to an Assembly on the premise that any infraction of the mandate of Article 174 would be remedied by a resort to Article 356 by the President? (iii) Is the Election Commission of India under a duty to carry out the mandate of Article 174 of the Constitution, by drawing upon all the requisite resources of the Union and the State to ensure free and fair elections?" Much before the matter was taken up for hearing it was made clear by the Bench hearing the reference that it would neither answer the reference in the context of the election in Gujarat nor look into the questions of facts arising out of the order of the Election Commission and shall confine its opinion only on questions of law referred to it. 2. When this reference was taken up objections were taken by learned counsel appearing for the Election Commission1, several national political parties and counsel for various States that this reference need not be answered and it requires to be returned unanswered, inter alia, on the grounds : (a) that, the reference raises issues already decided or determined by earlier Supreme Court judgments regarding the plenary and all encompassing powers of the Election Commission to deal with all aspects of an election under Articles 324-329; (b) that, if the Supreme Court considers the said question again, it would convert advisory Article 143 jurisdiction into an appellate jurisdiction, which is impermissible; (c) that, if Article 174 were to override Article 324, question No. 3 is unnecessary. Also, if question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, question No. 3 is automatically answered. Also, if question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, question No. 3 is automatically answered. In any event, the last part of question No. 3 raises a question to the effect as to whether the Election Commission is obliged to ensure free and fair elections, the answer to which is axiomatic, obvious and completely unnecessary to be answered in a Presidential Reference; (d) that, since question No. 2 cannot stand in the abstract, it also ought not to be gone into and deserves to be sent back unanswered; (e) that, no undertaking has been furnished by the Union of India that they would be bound by the advice of this Court and, therefore, the reference need not be answered; (f) that, the reference proceeds on the flawed legal premise that Article 174 applies to the holding of periodic elections and mandates the Election Commission to hold elections within the six-month period from the last session of dissolved Legislative Assembly and, therefore, this Court should return the reference unanswered; and (g) that, the reference is a disguised challenge to the order of the Election Commission dated 16th August, 2002 which is inappropriate in a reference under Article 143. 3. In support of the aforesaid propositions learned counsel relied upon the following decisions: (1) In re : Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal - (1993) Suppl. 1 SCC 96; (2) In re : Keshav Singh, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 - (1965) 1 SCR 413 ; (3) In re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978, Spl Ref. No. 1 of 1978 - (1979) 1 SCC 380 ; (4) In re : Appointment of Judges Case, Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 - (1998) 7 SCC 739 ; (5) The Ahmedabad St. Xavier s College Society & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. - (1974) 1 SCC 717 ; (6) In re: Presidential Poll, Special Reference No. 1 of 1974 - (1974) 2 SCC 33 ; (7) In re : The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 - (1959) SCR 995; and (8) Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. - (1994) 6 SCC 360 . 4. In re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra), it was urged that since the Bill introduced in the Legislative Assembly has been referred to under Article 143 and the same having not received legislative sanction the reference need not be answered. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. - (1994) 6 SCC 360 . 4. In re: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra), it was urged that since the Bill introduced in the Legislative Assembly has been referred to under Article 143 and the same having not received legislative sanction the reference need not be answered. Dealing with the said argument this Court held that under Article 143, the Supreme Court is required to advise the President not only as to any question which has arisen but also as to a question which is likely to arise in future. 5. In re: Special Court Bill, 1978 (supra), it was held that it was not necessary that the question on which the opinion of the Supreme Court is sought must have arisen actually. It is competent for the President to make a reference at an anterior stage, namely, at the stage when the President is satisfied that the question is likely to arise - Chandrachud, CJ at pg. 400, para 20 held that: "20. Article 143(1) is couched in broad terms which provide that any question of law or fact may be referred by the President for the consideration of the Supreme Court if it appears to him that such a question has arisen or is likely to arise and if the question is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Court upon it. Though questions of fact have not been referred to this Court in any of the six references made under Article 143(1), that Article empowers the President to make a reference even on questions of fact provided the other conditions of the Article are satisfied. It is not necessary that the question on which the opinion of the Supreme Court is sought must have arisen actually. It is competent to the President to make a reference under Article 143(1) at an anterior stage, namely, at the stage when the President is satisfied that the question is likely to arise. The satisfaction whether the question has arisen or is likely to arise and whether it is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, is a matter essentially for the President to decide. The satisfaction whether the question has arisen or is likely to arise and whether it is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, is a matter essentially for the President to decide. The plain duty and function of the Supreme Court under Article 143(1) of the Constitution is to consider the question on which the President has made the reference and report to the President its opinion, provided of course the question is capable of being pronounced upon and falls within the power of the court to decide. If, by reason of the manner in which the question is framed or for any other appropriate reason the court considers it not proper or possible to answer the question it would be entitled to return the reference by pointing out the impediments in answering it. The right of this Court to decline to answer a reference does not flow merely out of the different phraseology used in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 143, in the sense that clause (1) provides that the Court "may" report to the President its opinion on the question referred to it while clause (2) provides that the Court "shall" report to the President its opinion on the question. Even in matters arising under clause (2), though that question does not arise in this reference, the Court may be justified in returning the reference unanswered if it finds for a valid reason that the question is incapable of being answered. With these preliminary observations we will consider the contentions set forth above." 6. In re. Keshav Singh, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, (supra) 413, Gajendragadkar, CJ speaking for the Court stated that the words of Article 143(1) are wide enough to empower the President to forward to this Court for its advisory opinion any question of law or fact which has arisen or is likely to arise, provided it appears to the President that such a question is of such a nature or of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Court upon it. 7. In re: Allocation of Lands and Buildings, 1943 FCR 20, Gwyer CJ stated "we felt some doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by giving of an opinion under Section 213 of the Government of India Act. 7. In re: Allocation of Lands and Buildings, 1943 FCR 20, Gwyer CJ stated "we felt some doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by giving of an opinion under Section 213 of the Government of India Act. The terms of that section do not impose an obligation on the Court, though we should always be unwilling to decline to accept a reference except for good reason; and two difficulties presented themselves. First, it seemed that questions of title might sooner or later be involved, if the Government whose contentions found favour with the Court desired to dispose of some of the lands in question to private individuals and plainly no advisory opinion would furnish a good root of title such as might spring from a declaration of this Court in proceedings taken under Section 204(1) of the Act by one government against the other". 8. In re: Levy of Estate Duty, 1944 FCR 317, it was held that Section 213 of the Government of India Act empowers the Governor General to make a reference when questions of law are "likely to arise". 9. From the aforesaid decisions it is clear that this Court is well within its jurisdiction to answer/advise the President in a reference made under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India if the questions referred are likely to arise in future or such questions are of public importance or there is no decision of this Court which has already decided the question referred. 10. In the present case what we find is that one of the questions is as to whether Article 174 (1) prescribes any period of limitation for holding fresh election for constituting Legislative Assembly in the event of premature dissolution of earlier Legislative Assembly. The recitals contained in the Presidential reference manifestly demonstrate that the reference arises out of the order of the Election Commission dated 16th August, 2002. In the said order the Election Commission has admitted that under Article 174(1} six months should not intervene between one Assembly and the other even though there is dissolution of the Assembly. The reference proceeds upon the premise that as per order of the Election Commission, a new Legislative Assembly cannot come into existence within the stipulated period of six months as provided under Art. 174(1) of the Constitution on the assessment of conditions prevailing in the State. The reference proceeds upon the premise that as per order of the Election Commission, a new Legislative Assembly cannot come into existence within the stipulated period of six months as provided under Art. 174(1) of the Constitution on the assessment of conditions prevailing in the State. Further, a doubt has arisen with regard to the application of Article 356 in the order of the Election Commission. In view of the decision in Re: Presidential Poll, 1974 (2) SCC p.33 holding that in the domain of advisory jurisdiction under Article 143(1) this Court cannot go into the disputed question of facts, we have already declined to go into the facts arising out of the order of the Election Commission. But the legal premise on which order was passed raises questions of public importance and these questions are likely to arise in future. The questions whether Article 174(1) is mandatory and would apply to a dissolved Assembly, that, whether in extraordinary circumstances Article 174(1) must yield to Art.324, and, that, the non-observance of Article 174 would mean that the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and in that event Art. 356 would step in, are not only likely to arise in future but are of public importance. It is not disputed that there is no decision of this Court directly on the questions referred and further, a doubt has arisen in the mind of the President of India as regards the interpretation of Art. 174(1) of the Constitution. Under such circumstances, it is imperative that this reference must be answered. We, therefore, overrule the objections raised and proceed to answer the Reference. Question No. 1 Is Article 174 subject to decision of the Election Commission of India under Article 324 as to the schedule of election of the Assembly? 11. Under such circumstances, it is imperative that this reference must be answered. We, therefore, overrule the objections raised and proceed to answer the Reference. Question No. 1 Is Article 174 subject to decision of the Election Commission of India under Article 324 as to the schedule of election of the Assembly? 11. In an effort that aforesaid question be answered in the negative it was, inter alia, urged on behalf of the Union of India2; one of the national political parties3 and one of the States4: (a) that, the provision in Article 174(1) of the Constitution that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the date appointed for its first meeting of the next session is mandatory in nature and it applies when the Governor either prorogues either of the Houses or dissolves the Legislative Assembly; (b) that Article 174(2) empowers the Governor to prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Assembly and Article 174(1) does not make any exception in respect of the interregnum irrespective of whether the Governor has prorogued the House or dissolved the Legislative Assembly under Article 174(2); (c) that, on the correct interpretation of Art. 174, the mandate of Article 174(1) is applicable to the dissolved Assembly also. Such an interpretation would be in the defence of a democracy and, therefore, as and when an Assembly is prematurely dissolved, the Election Commission has to fix its calendar for holding fresh election within the time mandated under Article 174(1); (d) that, alternatively, it was argued that in a situation where mandate under Article 174(1) cannot be complied with, it does not mean that the mandate is directory in nature; and (e) that, the holding of election immediately after dissolution of the Assembly is also necessary in view of the sanction which is required to be taken with regard to Money Bills by the Legislative Assembly. 12. The contentions advanced on behalf of the other national political parties (5)(10)(14), political parties. (18) as well as other States (6)(7)(8)(9)(11)(12)(13)(15)(16)(17) is that Article 174(1) is neither applicable to the dissolved Assembly nor does it provide any period of limitation of six months for holding fresh election in the event of a premature dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. 12. The contentions advanced on behalf of the other national political parties (5)(10)(14), political parties. (18) as well as other States (6)(7)(8)(9)(11)(12)(13)(15)(16)(17) is that Article 174(1) is neither applicable to the dissolved Assembly nor does it provide any period of limitation of six months for holding fresh election in the event of a premature dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. According to learned counsel appearing for these parties, there is no provision either in the Constitution or in the Representation of the People Act which provides an outer limit for holding election for constituting the new Legislative Assembly or the new House of the People, as the case may be, in the event of their premature dissolution. 13. On the argument of learned counsel for the parties, the first question that arises for consideration is whether Article 174(1) is applicable to a dissolved Assembly? 14. A plain reading of Article 174 shows that it stipulates that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. It does not provide for any period of limitation for holding fresh election in the event a Legislative Assembly is prematurely dissolved. It is true that after commencement of the Constitution, the practice has been that whenever either Parliament or Legislative Assembly were prematurely dissolved, the election for constituting fresh Assembly or Parliament, as the case may be, were held within six months from the date of the last sitting of the dissolved Parliament or Assembly. It appears that the Election Commission s interpretation of Article 174 that fresh elections for constituting Assembly are required to be held within six months from the date of the last sitting of the last session was very much influenced by the prevailing practice followed by the Election Commission since enforcement of the Constitution. At no point of time any doubt had arisen as to whether the interval of six months between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next session of the Assembly under Article 174(1) provides a period of limitation for holding fresh election to constitute new Assembly by the Election Commission in the event of a premature dissolution of Assembly. Since the question has arisen in this Reference and also in view of the fact that Article 174 on its plain reading does not show that it provides a period of limitation for holding fresh election after the premature dissolution of the Assembly, it is necessary to interpret the said provision by applying accepted rules of interpretations. 15. One of the known methods to discern the intention behind enacting a provision of the Constitution and also to interpret the same is to look into the Histortical Legislative Development, Constituent Assembly Debates or any judgment preceding the enactment of the Constitutional provision. 16. In His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru etc. vs. State of Kerala & Anr. etc. (1973) 4 SCC 225 , it was held that Constituent Assembly debates although not conclusive, yet show the intention of the framers of the Constitution in enacting provisions of the Constitution and the Constituent Assembly Debates can throw light in ascertaining the intention behind such provisions. 17. In R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay - (1984) 2 SCR 495 , it was held that reports of the Commission which preceded the enactment of a legislation, reports of Joint Parliament Commission, report of a Commission set up for collecting information leading to the enactment are permissible external aid to construction of the provisions of the Constitution. If the basic purpose underlying construction of legislation is to ascertain the real intention of the Parliament, why should the aids which Parliament availed of such as report of a Special Commission preceding the enactment, existing state of Law, the environment necessitating enactment of legislation, and the object sought to be achieved, be denied to the Court whose function is primarily to give effect to the real intention of the Parliament in enacting the legislation. Such denial would deprive the Court of a substantial and illuminating aid to construction of the provisions of the Constitution. The modern approach has to a considerable extent eroded the exclusionary rule in England. 18. Since it is permissible to look into the pre-existing law, Historical Legislative Developments, and Constituent Assembly Debates, we will look into them for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. Historical Legislative Developments Government of India Act, 1915 & Government of India Act, 1919 19. Part VI of Government of India Act 1915 dealt with the Indian Legislatures containing provisions dealing with Indian and governor's provinces legislatures. Historical Legislative Developments Government of India Act, 1915 & Government of India Act, 1919 19. Part VI of Government of India Act 1915 dealt with the Indian Legislatures containing provisions dealing with Indian and governor's provinces legislatures. Section 63D dealt with Indian Legislature while Section 72B dealt with the legislature of Governor's provinces. Sections 63D(1) and Sec. 72B(1) run as under: "Sec 63D(1) : Every Council of State shall continue for five years and every Legislative Assembly for three years from its first meeting: Provided that: (a) either Chamber of the Legislature may be sooner dissolved by the Governor general; and (b) any such period may be extended by the governor General, if in special circumstances he so think fit; and (c) after the dissolution of either Chamber the Governor General shall appoint a date not more than six months or, with the sanction of the Secretary of the State, not more than six months from the date of dissolution for the next session of that Chamber." Sec 72B(1) : Every Governor's legislative council shall continue for three years from its first meeting : Provided that: (a) the Council may be sooner dissolved by the Governor; and (b) the said period may be extended by the Governor for a period not exceeding one year, by notification in the official gazette of the province, if in special circumstances (to be specified in the notification) he so think fit; and (c) after the dissolution of the council the Governor shall appoint a date not more than six months or, with the sanction of the Secretary of the State, not more than nine months from the date of dissolution for the next session of the council. 20. After repeal of Government of India Act 1915, Government of India Act, 1919 came into force. Section 8 of the Government of India Act 1919 provided for sittings of Legislative Council in provinces. 20. After repeal of Government of India Act 1915, Government of India Act, 1919 came into force. Section 8 of the Government of India Act 1919 provided for sittings of Legislative Council in provinces. Section 8 read as follows : "Sec 8(1) : Every Governor's legislative council shall continue for three years from its first meeting : Provided that: (a) the Council may be sooner dissolved by the Governor; and (b) the said period may be extended by the Governor for a period not exceeding one year, by notification in the official gazette of the province, if in special circumstances (to be specified in the notification) he so think fit; and (c) after the dissolution of the council the Governor shall appoint a date not more than six months or, with the sanction of the Secretary of the State, not more than nine months from the date of dissolution for the next session of the council." 21. Similarly, Section 21 provided for the sittings of the Indian legislature. Section 21 runs as under: "Sec 21(1) : Every Council of State shall continue for five years and every Legislative Assembly for three years from its first meeting : Provided that: (a) either Chamber of the Legislature may be sooner dissolved by the Governor General; and (b) any such period may be extended by the Governor General, if in special circumstances he so think fit; and (c) after the dissolution of either Chamber the Governor General shall appoint a date not more than six months or, with the sanction of the Secretary of the State, not more than nine months from the date of dissolution for the next session of that Chamber. 22. A combined reading of Sections 63D(1) & 72B(1) of Government of India Act 1915 and Sections 8(1) and 21(1) of Government of India Act 1919 shows that the Governor General could also either dissolve the Council of State or the Legislative Assembly sooner than its stipulated period or extend the period of their functioning. Further, it was mandated that after the dissolution of either Chamber, the Governor General shall appoint a date not more than six months or with the sanction of the Secretary of the State, not more than nine months from the date of dissolution, for the next session of that Chamber. Further, it was mandated that after the dissolution of either Chamber, the Governor General shall appoint a date not more than six months or with the sanction of the Secretary of the State, not more than nine months from the date of dissolution, for the next session of that Chamber. Similarly, the Governor of the province could also either dissolve the Legislative Council sooner than its stipulated period or extend the period of its functioning. Further, the Governor was duty bound after the dissolution of the legislative council to appoint a date not more than six months, or with the sanction of the Secretary of the State, not more than nine months from the date of dissolution for the next session of legislative council. 23. It is noteworthy that these powers of the Governor General and the Governor of the province were similar to the powers exercised by the British monarch historically under British conventions. The mandate to the Governor General and the Governor to fix the date for the next session of the new chamber or the legislative council respectively was based on the British conventions whereunder the monarch fixes a date for next session of the House of Commons after its dissolution. Further the power of Governor General to extend the period of Legislative Council or to prematurely dissolve it was also based on British conventions. Government of India Act 1935 23A. The Government of India Act, 1919 was repealed by the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 19(1) provided for the sittings of the Federal Legislature. Section 19(1) runs as under: Sec 19(1) : The Chambers of the Federal Legislature shall be summoned to meet once at least in every year, and twelve months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session." 24. Similarly, Section 62(1) of the Act provided for sittings of Provincial Legislature. Section 62(1) runs thus: ''62(1): The Chamber or Chambers of each Provincial Legislature shall be summoned to meet once at least in every year, and twelve months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session.'' 25. Section 62(1) runs thus: ''62(1): The Chamber or Chambers of each Provincial Legislature shall be summoned to meet once at least in every year, and twelve months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session.'' 25. We find that under the Government of India Act, 1935, there was a complete departure from the provisions contained in the Government of India Act, 1915 and Government of India Act, 1919 as regards the powers and responsibilities of the Governor General and the Governors of the Provinces to extend the period of the chambers or fix a date for the next session of the new chamber. By the aforesaid provisions, not only were the powers to extend the life of the chambers of the Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures done away with, but the British Convention to fix a date for the next session of the new chamber was also given up. These were the departures from the previous Acts. It may also be noted that under the Government of India Act, 1935, statutory provisions were made in respect of the conduct of elections. Under Schedule V Para 20 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor General was empowered to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Vth and VIth Schedule. Para 20 as a whole related to matters concerning elections, and Clause (iii) particularly pertained to conduct of elections. Similarly, Schedule VI of the Government of India Act, 1935 contained provisions with respect to electoral rolls and franchise. Such provisions are not found in either the Government of India Act, 1915 or the Government of India Act, 1919. Thus, we see that statutory provisions have come in for the first time and conduct of elections has been entrusted in the hands of the executive. Since the power to fix the calendar for holding elections was given in the hand of executive, therefore, the provisions for fixing a date of next session of new legislature in The Government of India Act of 1915 and 1919 was given up in the 1935 Act. This shows that elections in India were no longer based on the British conventions. 26. Under the Constitution of India, 1950, even these provisions have been departed from. This shows that elections in India were no longer based on the British conventions. 26. Under the Constitution of India, 1950, even these provisions have been departed from. While under the Government of India Act, 1935, the conduct of elections was vested in an executive authority, under the Constitution of India, a Constitutional authority was created under Art. 324 for the superintendence, direction and conduct of elections. This body, called the Election Commission, is totally independent and impartial, and is free from any interference of the executive. This is a very noticeable difference between the Constitution of India and the Government of India Act, 1935 in respect of matters concerning elections for constituting the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly. It may be noted that Arts. 85(1) and 174(1) which were physically borrowed from Govt. of India Act, 1935 were only for the purposes of providing the frequencies of sessions of existing Houses of Parliament and State Legislature, and they do not relate to dissolved Houses. Constituent Assembly Debates with regard to Articles 85 & 174 of the Constitution 27. Draft Articles 69 and 153 correspond to Article 85 and Article 174 of the Constitution respectively. Article 69 dealt with the Parliament and Article 153 dealt with State Legislative Assembly. When the aforesaid two draft Articles were placed before the Constituent Assembly for discussion, there was not much debate on Draft Article 153. But there was a lot of discussion when Draft Article 69 was placed before the Constituent Assembly. Draft Articles 69 and 153 run as under: "69(1) : The Houses of Parliament, shall be summoned to meet twice atleast in every year, and six months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Article, the President may from time to time- (a) summon the Houses or either House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit; (b) prorogue the Houses; (c) dissolve the House of the People. 153(1): The House or Houses of the Legislature of the State shall be summoned to meet twice at least in every year, and six months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. 153(1): The House or Houses of the Legislature of the State shall be summoned to meet twice at least in every year, and six months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Article, the Governor may from time to time- (a) summon the Houses or either House to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit; (b) prorogue the House or Houses; (c) dissolve the Legislative Assembly. (3) The functions of the Governor under sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (2) of this Article shall be exercised by him in his discretion". 28. On 18.5.1949, when Draft Article 69 came up for discussion, there was a proposal to change the intervening period between the two sessions of the Houses of Parliament from six months to three months so as to ensure that the Parliament has more lime to look into the problems faced by the people of the country. Prof. K.T. Shah - one of the members of the Constituent Assembly, while moving an amendment to the Draft Article 69, as it then stood, said that the Draft Article was based on other considerations prevailing during the British times, when the legislative work was not much and the House used to be summoned only for obtaining financial sanction. Shri H.V. Kamath while intervening in the debate emphasized on the need to have frequent sessions of the Houses of Parliament. He suggested that the Houses should meet at least thrice in each year. He pointed out that in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, the Legislatures sat for eight to nine months in a year as a result of which they were able to effectively discharged their parliamentary duties and responsibilities. He also emphasized that the period of business of transactions provided in the Federal or State Legislatures under the Government of India Act, 1935 were very short as there was not much business to be transacted then by those Legislatures. He also reiterated that the Houses of Parliament should sit more frequently so that the interests of the country are thoroughly debated upon and business is not rushed through. He also reiterated that the Houses of Parliament should sit more frequently so that the interests of the country are thoroughly debated upon and business is not rushed through. Prof K.T. Shah was very much concerned about the regular sitting of the Parliament and, therefore he moved an amendment 1478 which read as follows : "at the end of Art 69(2) (c), the following proviso is to be added: Provided that if any time the President does not summon as provided for in this Constitution for more than three months the House of the People or either House of Parliament at any time after the dissolution of the House of the People, or during the currency of the lifetime of the House of the People for a period of more than 90 days, the Speaker of the House of the People or the Chairman of the Council of States may summon each his respective House which shall then be deemed to have been validly summoned and entitled to deal with any business placed or coming before it". 28A. Further, Prof K.T. Shah also moved amendment No. 1483, which provided for insertion of Cl. (3) after Art. 69(2), and a proviso thereto, which is very relevant. Clause (3) runs as under: "(3): If any time the President is unable or unwilling to summon Parliament for more than three months after the prorogation or dissolution of the House of the People and there is in the opinion of the Prime Minister a National Emergency he shall request the Speaker and the Chairman of the Council of States to summon both Houses of Parliament, and place before it such business as may be necessary to cope with the National Emergency. Any business done in either House of Parliament thus called together shall be deemed to have been validly transacted, and shall be valid and binding as any Act, Resolution or Order of Parliament passed in the normal course: Provided further that if at any time the President is unable or unwilling to summon Parliament for a period of more than three months or 90 days after prorogation or dissolution of the House of the People, and the Prime Minister is also unable or unwilling to make the request aforesaid, the Chairman of either Houses of Parliament thus called together shall be deemed to be validly convened and entitled to deal with any business places before it". 29. Shri B.R. Ambedkar, while replying to the aforesaid proposed amendment, highlighted that after the Constitution comes into force, no executive could afford to show a callous attitude towards the legislature, which was not the situation before as the legislature was summoned only to pass revenue demands. Since there was no possibility of the executive showing a callous attitude towards the legislature, this would take care of the fear voiced by some members that no efforts to go beyond the minimum mandatory sittings of the Houses of Parliament would be made. He further dwelled on the fact that the clause provided for minimum mandatory sittings in a year so that if the need arose, the Parliament could sit more often and if more frequent sessions were made mandatory, the sessions could be so frequent and lengthy that members would grow tired. 30. From the aforesaid debates, it is very much manifest that Articles 85 and Article 174 were enacted on the pattern of Sections 19(1) and 62(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 respectively which dealt with the frequency of sessions of the existing Legislative Assembly and were not intended to provide any period of limitation for holding elections for constituting new House of the People or Legislative Assembly in the event of their premature dissolution. Further, the suggestions to reduce the intervening period between the two sessions to three months from six months so that Parliament could sit for longer duration to transact the business shows that it was intended for existing Houses of Parliament and not dissolved ones, as a dissolved House cannot sit and transact legislative business at all. 31. Further, the suggestions to reduce the intervening period between the two sessions to three months from six months so that Parliament could sit for longer duration to transact the business shows that it was intended for existing Houses of Parliament and not dissolved ones, as a dissolved House cannot sit and transact legislative business at all. 31. It is interesting to note that during the debate Prof K.T. Shah suggested amendment Nos. 1478 and 1483, quoted above, which specifically contemplated the possibility of a dissolved House of the People and convening of the Council of States in an emergency session by the President or the Speaker if the circumstances so necessitated. Even these amendments were not accepted. This shows that Draft Article 69 was visualized in the context of a scenario applicable only to a living and functional House and that the stipulation of six months intervening period between the two sessions is inapplicable to a dissolved House. 32. Moreover, it may be noticed that if the suggestion put forth during the course of the debate that the Houses of Parliament should sit for eight to nine months in a year was accepted, it would not have given sufficient time for holding fresh elections in the event of premature dissolution of either Parliament or Legislative Assembly and it would also have led to a breach of Constitutional provisions. This also shows that what is contained in Article 174(1) is meant only for an existing and functional House. In a further scenario, if the suggestion during the debate for reducing the intervening period from six months to three months were accepted, it would mean that after premature dissolution of the Houses of People or the Legislative Assembly, fresh elections have to be held so that House of People or Legislative Assembly could hold their first sitting within three months from the date of last sitting of the dissolved Parliament or Legislative Assembly, as the case may be. This would also have not allowed sufficient time for holding election for constituting either House of People or a Legislative Assembly. This shows that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the provisions contained in Article 174 were meant for a living and existing Legislative Assembly and not to a dissolved Legislative Assembly. Debates during the Constitution First Amendment Bill regarding amendment of Article 85 and Article 174 33. This shows that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the provisions contained in Article 174 were meant for a living and existing Legislative Assembly and not to a dissolved Legislative Assembly. Debates during the Constitution First Amendment Bill regarding amendment of Article 85 and Article 174 33. The original Articles 85 and 174 as they stood prior to first Constitution Amendment and after the Amendment read as follows : Article Original Articles in the Constitution As amended by Constitution (Amendment) Act 1951 Article 85 Sessions of Parliament, Prorogation & Dissolution. (1) the Houses of Parliament shall be summoned to meet twice at least in every year, and six months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. (2) Subject to the provisions ofcl (1); the President may from time to time- (a) Summon the Houses or either House to meet at such time & Place as he thinks fit; (b) Prorogue the Houses;(c) Dissolve the House of the People. (1) The President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session.(2) The President may from time to-(a) Prorogue the Houses of either House(b) Dissolve the House of the People Article 174 Sessions of the State Legislature Prorogation & Dissolution (1) The House or Houses of the State shall be summoned to meet twice at least in every year, and six months shall not intervene between their last sitting in one Session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session.(2) Subject to the provisions of c1. (1), the Governor may from to time to time-(a) summon the House or either House to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit; (b) prorogue the House or Houses (1) the Governor shall from time to summon the House or each House to the Legislature of the State to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not inter-vene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session.(2) the Governor may from time to time-(a) prorogue the House or either House;(b) dissolve Legislative Assembly 34. The aforesaid original Articles show that what was mandated was that the Houses of Parliament and State Legislature were required to meet at least twice in a year and six months shall not intervene between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. This resulted in absurdity. If it was found that the session then had been going on continuously for 12 months, technically it could have been contended that the Parliament had not met twice in that year at all as there must be prorogation in order that there may be new session and, therefore, the original Article 174(1) resulted in contradictions. In order to remove the said absurdity, the First Amendment Bill for amendment of Articles 85 and 174 was moved. While introducing the First Amendment Bill, Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru stated thus: ".... one of the Articles mentions that the House shall meet at least twice every year and the President shall address it. Now a possible interpretation of that is that this House has not met at all this year. It is an extraordinary position considering that this time this House has laboured more than probably at any time in the previous history of this or the preceding Parliament in this country. We have been practically sitting with an interval round about Xmas since November and we are likely to carry on and yet it may be held by some acute interpreters that we have not met at all this year strictly in terms of the Constitution because we started meeting November and we have not met again - it has not been prorogued - the President has not addressed the Parliament this year. Put in the extreme way, suppose this House met for the full year without break except short breaks, it - worked for 12 months, then it may be said under the strict letter of the law that it has not met all this year. Of course that Article was meant not to come in the way of our work but to come in the way of our leisure. It was indeed meant and it must meet at least twice a year and there should not be more than six months interval between the meetings. It did not want any government of the day to simply sit tight without the House meeting.". (emphasis mine) While intervening in the debate, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar stated thus: " ....due to the word summon, the result is that although Parliament may sit for the whose year adjoining from time to time, it is still capable of being said that Parliament has been summoned only once and not twice. There must be prorogation in order that there may be a new session. It is felt that this difficulty should be removed and consequently the first part of it has been deleted. The provision that whenever there is a prorogation of Parliament, the new session shall be called within six months is retained." (emphasis mine) 35. Even other members of the Parliament, who participated in the debate with regard to the proposed amendment of Article 85 and Article 174 were concerned only with the current session and working of the existing House of the People. The proceedings of the debate further show that the entire debate revolved around prorogation and summoning. There was no discussion as regards dissolution or Constitution of the House at all and the amendment was sought to remove the absurdity which has crept into the original Articles 85 and 174. For these reasons we are of the view that Art. 174(1) is inapplicable to a dissolved Assembly. Textually 36. The question at hand may be examined from another angle. As noticed earlier, the language employed in Article 85 and Article 174 is plain and simple and it does not contemplate an interval of six months between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session of the new Assembly after premature dissolution of Assembly. Yet we will examine Article 174 textually also. 37. Yet we will examine Article 174 textually also. 37. Article 174 shows that the expression 'date appointed for its first sitting in the next session' in Article 174 (1) cannot possibly refer to either an event after the dissolution of the House or an event of a new Legislative Assembly meeting for the first time after getting freshly elected. When there is a session of the new Legislative Assembly after elections, the new Assembly will sit in its "first session" and not in the "next session". The expression 'after each general election' has been employed in other parts of the Constitution and one such provision is Article 176. The absence of such phraseology 'after each general election' in Article 174 is a clear indication that the said Article does not apply to a dissolved Assembly or to a freshly elected Assembly. Further, Article 174(1) uses expressions i.e. 'its last sitting in one session', 'first sitting in the next session'. None of these expressions suggest that the sitting and the session would include an altogether different Assembly i.e. a previous Assembly which has been dissolved and its successor Assembly that has come into being after elections. Again, Article 174 also employs the word 'summon' and not 'constitute'. Article 174 empowers the Governor to summon an Assembly which can only be an existing Assembly. The Constitution of an Assembly can only be under Sec. 73 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the requirement of Art. 188 of the Constitution suggests that the Assembly comes into existence even before its first sitting commences. 38. Again, Article 174 contemplates a session, i.e. sitting of an existing Assembly not a new Assembly after dissolution and this can be appreciated from the expression 'its last sitting in one session and its first sitting in the next session'. Further, the marginal note 'sessions' occurring in Articles 85 and 174 is an unambiguous term and refers to an existing Assembly which a Governor can summon. When the term 'session or sessions' is used, it is employed in the context of a particular Assembly or a particular House of the People and not the legislative body whose life is terminated after dissolution. Dissolution ends the life of legislature and brings an end to all business. When the term 'session or sessions' is used, it is employed in the context of a particular Assembly or a particular House of the People and not the legislative body whose life is terminated after dissolution. Dissolution ends the life of legislature and brings an end to all business. The entire chain of sittings and sessions gets broken and there is no next session or the first sitting of the next session after the House itself has ceased to exist. Dissolution of Legislative Assembly ends the representative capacity of legislators and terminates the responsibility of the Cabinet to the members of the Lok Sabha or the Legislative Assembly, as the case may be. 39. The act of summoning, sitting, adjourning, proroguing or dissolving of the Legislature is necessarily referable to an Assembly in praesenti i.e. an existing, functional legislature and has nothing to do with the Legislative Assembly which is not in existence. It is well understood that a dissolved House is incapable of being summoned or prorogued and in this view of the matter also Article 174(1) has no application to a dissolved Legislative Assembly, as nothing survives after dissolution. Conceptually 40. Yet, Art. 174 may be examined conceptually. Conceptually, Article 174 deals with a live legislature. The purpose and object of the said provision is to ensure that an existing legislature meets at least every six months, as it is only an existing legislature that can be prorogued or dissolved. Thus Article 174 which is a complete code in itself deals only with a live legislature. 41. Article 174(1) shows that it does not provide that its stipulation is applicable to a dissolved legislature as well. Further, Article 174 does not specify that interregnum of six months period stipulated between the two sessions would also apply to a new legislature vis-a-vis an outgoing legislature. If such be the case; then there was no need to insert the proviso to Article 172(1) and insertion of the said proviso is rendered meaningless and superfluous. 42. Further, if Article 174 is held to be applicable to a dissolved House as well, it would mean that Article 174(2) is controlled by Article 174(1) inasmuch as the power has to be exercised under Article 174(2) in conformity with Article 174(1). 42. Further, if Article 174 is held to be applicable to a dissolved House as well, it would mean that Article 174(2) is controlled by Article 174(1) inasmuch as the power has to be exercised under Article 174(2) in conformity with Article 174(1). Moreover, if the House is dissolved in 5th month of the last session, the election will have to be held within one month so as to comply with the requirement of Article 174(1) which would not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution. 43. Yet, there is another aspect which shows that Article 174(1) is inapplicable to a dissolved Legislative Assembly. It cannot be disputed that each Legislative Assembly after Constitution is unique and distinct from the previous one and no part of the dissolved House is carried forward to a new Legislative Assembly. Therefore, Article 174(1) does not link the last session of the dissolved House with the newly formed one. The distinction between frequency of sessions and periodicity of the elections 44. A perusal of Articles 172 and 174 would show that there is a distinction between the frequency of meetings of an existing Assembly and periodicity of elections in respect of a dissolved Assembly which are governed by the aforesaid provisions. 45. As far as frequency of meetings of Assembly I